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ABSTRACT
 Ancient philosophers employed the topos of ideal kingship as a way to think about monarchy 
and the superior person who could ascend to this office. Following those modern scholars who have 
used topoi from Hellenistic and Graeco-Roman moral philosophy to study the apostle Paul’s writings 
as part of the intellectual milieu of the first century, I compare the Hellenistic topos of ideal kingship
with Pauline Christology. This comparison is achieved by examining the origins of the ideal kingship 
topos in fourth-century texts by Isocrates (To Nicocles) and Xenophon (Cyropaedia). These two 
classical writers emphasize the superiority of the king and the virtues that establish this superiority. The 
king’s care for his subjects forms the core of this construction of ideal kingship. With the exception of 
three Neopythagorean tracts entitled On Kingship, no kingship treatises produced by the Hellenistic 
philosophical schools have survived. Nevertheless, by studying how Cynic, Stoic, and Epicurean 
thinkers deal with kingship in other contexts, I am able to postulate the silhouette of the ideal king as 
he might have been conceived of in each of these schools. The portrait that emerges from the 
Neopythagorean writings contributes further to the Hellenistic topos of ideal kingship. Selected texts 
from the Greek translation of the Hebrew Bible are also studied in order to determine what Paul might 
have learned about ideal kingship from them. Next, three Hellenistic Jewish texts (the Letter of 
Aristeas, Philo’s Life of Moses, and Wisdom of Solomon) are discussed in order to demonstrate the 
fusion between Jewish and Greek constructions of ideal kingship. Finally, the undisputed Pauline 
letters are examined alongside the various configurations of ideal kingship found in the preceding 
chapters. I conclude that Paul has drawn on both Hellenistic and Jewish traditions in order to write 
about Jesus the Messiah to nascent groups of Graeco-Roman believers.  
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OPSOMMING
 Antieke filosowe het die topos van ideale koningskap gebruik as ’n manier om oor monargie 
en die mees ideale persoon wat hierdie amp kon beklee, na te dink. Na aanleiding van die werk van
onlangse geleerdes wat topoi van die Hellenistiese en Grieks-Romeinse morele filosofie gebruik om die 
apostel Paulus se briewe as deel van die intellektuele milieu van die eerste eeu te bestudeer, vergelyk
ek die Hellenistiese topos van ideale koningskap met die Pauliniese Christologie. Hierdie vergelyking 
word gemaak deur die oorsprong van die ideale koning topos in vierde-eeuse tekste deur Isokrates (Aan 
Nikokles) en Xenophon (Cyropaedia) te ondersoek. Hierdie twee klassieke skrywers beklemtoon die 
meerderwaardigheid van die koning en die deugde wat sy meerderwaardigheid bevestig. Die koning se 
sorg vir sy onderdane vorm die kern van hierdie konstruksie van ideale koningskap. Met die 
uitsondering van drie Neopythagerese geskrifte met die titel Oor koningskap, is daar geen oorblywende 
koningskap verhandelinge van die Hellenistiese filosofiese skole nie. Nietemin, deur na te gaan hoe 
Siniese, Stoïsynse en Epikurese denkers in ander kontekste met die idee van koningskap omgegaan het,
kan ek postuleer hoe die silhoeët van die ideale koning, volgens die opvatting daaroor in elkeen van
hierdie skole, daar uitgesien het. Die beeld wat uit die Neopythagorese geskrifte na vore kom, dra 
verder by tot die Hellenistiese topos van ideale koningskap. Geselekteerde tekste uit die Griekse
vertaling van die Hebreeuse Bybel word ook bestudeer om vas te stel wat Paulus moontlik by hulle oor 
die ideale koningskap geleer het. Vervolgens bespreek ek drie Hellenisties-Joodse tekste (die
Aristeasbrief, Philo se Lewe van Moses en die Wysheid van Salomo) om die samesmelting tussen 
Joodse en Griekse konstruksies van ideale koningskap aan te toon. Ten slotte word die onbestrede 
briewe van Paulus naas die onderskeie konfigurasies van ideale koningskap wat in die voorafgaande 
hoofstukke aan die orde gekom het, ondersoek. Ek kom tot die slotsom dat Paulus beide uit 
Hellenistiese en Joodse tradisies put om oor Jesus die Messias aan die ontluikende groepe van Grieks-
Romeinse gelowiges te skryf .
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CHAPTER 1. PAUL’S ΧΡΙΣΤΟΣ AND THE IDEAL ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ
The kingship of Jesus Christ is a common theme in Christian thought. In the twentieth-century, for 
example, two quite different churchmen proposed the recovery of the figure of Christ the King as a 
response to the tragedies of the First and Second World Wars, respectively.1 Behind these ideas stand 
Christological discussions configured around the munus triplex: Christ’s office as prophet, priest, and 
king.2 These discussions did not originate in the modern period. Sixteen centuries earlier, Christ’s 
kingship provided fourth-century Christians with intellectual tools to think about the relationship 
between religious and political power.3 However, the origin of the monarchical aspect of Christ’s 
person and work can be traced back even earlier.
The canonical Gospels identify Jesus as βασιλευ' ς, both through their use of the word in a descrip-
tive and titular sense4 and, perhaps more significantly, in their narrative construction of his person.5 
The centrality of the kingdom of God in Jesus’ preaching6 and his identification in the Gospels as 
Israel’s χριστο' ς7 contribute further to highlighting the significance of this royal theme in early 
Christian8 literature, while at the same time linking Jesus’ royalty to the narratives defining Israel’s 
Messiah in the literature of Second Temple Judaism.
  
  
————————————
1. Pope Pius XI established the Feast of Christ the King in a 1925 encyclical. “When once men recognize, both in 
private and in public life, that Christ is King, society will at last receive the great blessings of real liberty, well-ordered 
discipline, peace and harmony” (Quas primas, §19). Similarly, in the wake of the Second World War, the first General 
Secretary of the World Council of Churches, W. A. Visser ’t Hoof, drew attention to the implications of the rule of Christ in 
the church and the world in the 1947 Stone Lectures (The Kingship of Christ: An Interpretation of Recent European 
Theology [London: SCM, 1948]).
2. For an historical survey of the doctrine, see Gerald W. McCulloh, Christ’s Person and Life-Work in the Theology of 
Albrecht Ritschl: With Special Attention to Munus Triplex (Lanham: University Press of America, 1990), 86–144.
3. For the implications of Jesus’ kingship in the early church and beyond, especially in relation to political realities, see 
Per Beskow, Rex Gloriae: The Kingship of Christ in the Early Church (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksells, 1962); Jaroslav 
Pelikan, Jesus Through the Centuries: His Place in the History of Culture (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 46–56.
4. Matt 2.2; 25.34; 27.11, 29, 37, 42; Mark 15.2, 9, 12, 18, 26, 32; Luke 19.38; 23.3, 37, 38; John 1.49; 12.13, 15; 
18.37, 39; 19.3, 14, 15, 19, 21.
5. See, e.g., Matthew: Sungho Choi, The Messianic Kingship of Jesus: A Study of Christology and Redemptive History 
in Matthew’s Gospel with Special Reference to the “Royal Enthronement” Psalms, WTMS (Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 2011); 
Mark: Robert D. Rowe, God’s Kingdom and God’s Son: The Background in Mark’s Christology from Concepts of Kingship 
in the Psalms, AGJU 50 (Leiden: Brill, 2002); Luke: Sarah Harris, The Davidic Shepherd King in the Lukan Narrative, 
LNTS 558 (London: Bloomsbury, 2016); John: Beth M. Stovell, Mapping Metaphorical Discourse in the Fourth Gospel: 
John’s Eternal King, Linguistic Biblical Studies 5 (Leiden: Brill, 2012). For the argument that the identification of Jesus as 
Messiah goes back not to the earliest believers or the evangelist, but to Jesus himself, see N. T. Wright, Jesus and the Victory 
of God, vol. 2 of Christian Origins and the Question of God (London: SPCK, 1996).
6. See, e.g., Wright, Jesus and the Victory of God, 198–474.
7. Matt 1.1, 16; 16.16, 20; Mark 1.1; 8.29; 14.61–62; Luke 2.11, 26; 23.2–3, 35, 39; John 1.41; 4.25–26; 20.30–31. 
8. While cognizant of the problems with using the term “Christian” and “Christianity” when describing this movement 
in the first century (see Anders Runesson, “The Question of Terminology: The Architecture of Contemporary Discussions on 
Paul,” in Paul Within Judaism: Restoring the First-Century Context to the Apostle, ed. Mark D. Nanos and Magnus 
Zetterholm [Minneapolis: Fortress, 2015], 53–77), not the least of which is its relative scarcity in the earliest sources 
(Χριστιανο' ς occurs only at Acts 11.26; 26.28; 1 Pet 4.16), nevertheless, in this dissertation I follow those like E. P. Sanders 
(Paul: The Apostle’s Life, Letters, and Thought (London: SCM, 2015), 9–10) in using the term as a commonly accepted 
description of the communities to which these texts were addressed.
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According to the author of Acts, Paul appealed to the narratives of the Jewish Scriptures9 when he 
announced Jesus as Messiah. The sermon in Acts 13.16–41, for example, surveys the history narrated 
in these Scriptures up to the person of King David before announcing that Jesus is the promised 
saviour in the line of David (v. 22–23). That this could be understood as a reference to Jesus’ kingship 
is made clear in the accusation brought against those in Thessalonica who had responded to Paul’s 
preaching about Jesus’ messiahship (Acts 17.3): “They are all acting contrary to the decrees of the 
emperor, saying that there is another king (βασιλε'α ε«τερον ) named Jesus” (Acts 17.6–7).10 Further-
more, the content of Paul’s preaching is often summarized in terms of the “kingdom of God” (Acts 
19.8; 20.25; 28.23, 31).11 Thus Jesus’ royal office in the preaching of Paul in Acts follows a similar 
pattern to that found in the Gospels.
When we turn to Paul’s language about Jesus as found in his letters,12 the christological melody 
seems to have modulated into a slightly less royal key. It is true that there are elements in Paul’s Christ-
ology indicative of Jesus’ kingly reign. This reign is explicitly mentioned in 1 Corinthians 15.20–28, 
while in Romans 14.9 it is said that Jesus’ death and resurrection occurred so that he might be lord of 
the living and the dead (νεκρωñ ν και` ζω' ντων κυριευ' ση, ). This latter passage might simply speak of 
authority, but it contributes to the cumulative evidence of Jesus’ royal rule in Paul’s letters, to which 
might be added his Davidic heritage (Rom 1.3; 15.12), his role in judgment (Rom 2.16; 2 Cor 5.10), 
and the exalted position granted him by God (Phil 2.9–11). Nevertheless, Paul’s use of royal language 
seems muted. 
Paul never explicitly identifies Jesus as βασιλευ' ς. The lexeme βασιλευ' ς does not occur in the un-
disputed Pauline texts, except in 2 Corinthians 11.32, where it refers to King Aretas. The phrase 
“kingdom of God,” furthermore, occurs far less frequently in Paul’s writings than it does in the 
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9. The nomenclature describing this body of work is a potential minefield. “Old Testament” leaves one open to 
accusations of Christian chauvinism.  “Hebrew Scriptures” or “Hebrew Bible” are potentially misleading terms because the 
texts read by Paul were written in Greek. Furthermore, the use of “Scriptures” or “Bible” assumes a certain canonical rigidity 
which might not have pertained in Paul’s time. Nonetheless, reflecting Paul’s usage, I have chosen to use “Scriptures” as a 
reasonable translation of γραφη' /γραφαι' (e.g., Rom 1.2; 15.4; 1 Cor 15.3–4; Gal 3.8, 22) without assuming any particular 
canonical form. And although most of these writings are now also part of the Christian Scriptures, I will identify them as the 
“Jewish Scriptures” in reference to their origins. 
10. C. Kavin Rowe argues that in this passage Jesus is not in competition with Caesar, but that the kingdom of God is 
nonetheless shown to be disruptive in so far as it disturbs the socio-political order (World Upside Down: Reading Acts in the 
Graeco-Roman Age [Oxford: Oxford University press, 2009], 92–102, esp. 101–2). Bruce Winter argues that Paul and Silas 
were seen as revolutionaries who were rejecting Claudius’ decrees (Divine Honours for the Caesars: The First Christians’ 
Responses [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2015], 251–59).
11. Both Jesus (Acts 1.3) and Philip (8.12) are reported as preaching about the kingdom of God. Despite other 
similarities between Peter’s sermons and others in the book, Acts does not record him preaching explicitly about the 
kingdom. This does not mean that Jesus’ rule is not emphasized in Peter’s sermons; see, e.g., 2.31–36.
12. I will limit my study to the seven undisputed Pauline epistles, namely, Romans, 1 and 2 Corinthians, Galatians, 
Philippians, 1 Thessalonians, and Philemon; see, e.g., Werner Georg Kümmel, Introduction to the New Testament, trans. A. 
J. Mattill Jr. (London: SCM, 1966), 177–79; Mark Harding, “Disputed and Undisputed Letters of Paul,” in The Pauline 
Canon, ed. Stanley E. Porter, PAST 1 (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 129–68. Douglas Campbell has recently produced a book-length 
argument for the inclusion of Colossians, Ephesians, and 2 Thessalonians among the genuine Pauline epistles (Framing 
Paul: An Epistolary Biography [Grand Rapids; Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2014]). Arguments for Pauline authorship of all 
thirteen Pauline texts can be found in D. A. Carson and Douglas J. Moo, An Introduction to the New Testament (Grand 
Rapids: Zondervan, 2005).
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Gospels.13 It will become clear in Chapter 6 that despite Paul’s infrequent use of this phrase, God is 
still spoken of in ways that evoke divine monarchy.14 However, with the exception of 1 Corinthians 
6.9–11 and 15.24, Jesus’ relationship to and role within God’s kingdom is not made explicit in those 
passages that deal with the kingdom. With the Gospel writers, Paul identifies Jesus as χριστο' ς, but 
many consider this word to have lost its original force as “Messiah,” arguing that in Paul’s letters it 
now serves simply as a second name.15 At first sight, then, it would seem that Jesus’ royalty has been 
considerably diminished in Paul’s writings.16 Before concluding that this is indeed the case, the 
possibility must be considered that it is not Paul’s presentation of Jesus’ kingship that is muted but the 
reader’s perception of that kingship.
In this study, I ask whether Jesus’ royalty has truly been diminished by Paul or whether there are 
royal elements which, despite the absence of explicit kingship titulature, Paul has included through the 
use of kingship language. In particular, this project is pursued through a comparative study of Paul’s 
Christological language and the Hellenistic kingship ideal expressed in the piερι` βασιλει'ας topos. I 
conclude that focusing on the kingship topos allows the kingship of Jesus to emerge more clearly in 
certain Pauline texts.  
The “Philosophical” Paul in His Hellenistic Jewish Context
The way in which an object of study is framed plays a determinative role in the results of the 
study. Pauline scholars have spent the past two-hundred years debating the nature of the milieu within 
which Paul and his thinking was formed. According to the evidence of the New Testament documents, 
Paul identifies himself as an exemplary Jew who writes in Greek and shows evidence of having bene-
fitted from a Greek education, although the content and level of that education is debated.17 
Furthermore, a non-Pauline text, Acts, makes Roman citizenship a significant part of Paul’s 
biography.18 These three aspects of Paul’s person—Jewish, Hellenistic, Roman—are frequently taken 
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13. Rom 14.17; 1 Cor 4.20; 6.9, 10; 15.24, 50; Gal 5.21; 1 Thess 2.12.
14. But see 1 Tim 1.17 where God is ο   βασιλευ`ς τωñ ν αιω' νων and 1 Tim 6.15 where God is ο   βασιλευ`ς τωñ ν 
βασιλευο' ντων και` κυ' ριος τωñν κυριευο' ντων. In Rev 17.14 and 19.16 this language is used of Christ.
15. Scholarship on this topic is summarized in Matthew V. Novenson, Christ Among the Messiahs: Christ Language in 
Paul and Messiah Language in Ancient Judaism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 12–33.
16. This assumes that the Gospels, despite being produced later than Paul’s letters, nevertheless reflect an earlier 
tradition of which Paul was aware. For Paul’s knowledge of Jesus, see, e.g., Edward Adams, “Paul, Jesus, and Christ,” in The 
Blackwell Companion to Jesus, ed. Delbert Royce Burkett (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 94–98; Armand Puig i 
Tàrrech, “The Use of the Story and the Words of Jesus in the Letters of Paul,” in Paul, John, and Apocalyptic Eschatology: 
Studies in Honour of Martinus C. de Boer, ed. Jan Krans, et al., NovTSup 149 (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 1–14.
17. Phil 3.5; cf. Rom 9.3–4; Acts 22.3). For Pauline biography, see Martin Hengel, The Pre-Christian Paul, in 
collaboration with Roland Deines, trans. John Bowden (London: SCM, 1991); Martin Hengel and Anna Maria Schwemer, 
Paul Between Damascus and Antioch: The Unknown Years (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1997); J. Albert Harrill, 
Paul the Apostle: His Life and Legacy in Their Roman Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 23–94; 
Sanders, Paul. The debate around Paul’s education is surveyed by Ryan S. Schellenberg, Rethinking Paul’s Rhetorical 
Education: Comparative Rhetoric and 2 Corinthians 10–13, ECL 10 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2013), 17–55; 
see also Christopher Forbes, “Paul Among the Greeks,” in All Things to All Cultures: Paul Among Jews, Greeks, and 
Romans, ed. Mark Harding and Alanna Nobbs (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2013), 129–35.
18. See Acts 16.37–38; 22.25–29. Sean A. Adams, “Paul the Roman Citizen: Roman Citizenship in the Ancient World 
and Its Importance for Understanding Acts 22.22–29,” in Paul: Jew, Greek, and Roman, ed. Stanley E. Porter, PAST 5 
(Leiden: Brill, 2008), 309–26, provides an outline of the nature of Roman citizenship and argues that Acts’ claims regarding 
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into account in recent Pauline scholarship, as can be observed in N. T. Wright’s approach to Paul’s 
thought in his magnum opus, Paul and the Faithfulness of God (2013).19 In Part I, Wright takes over 
two-hundred pages to describe not only the Jewish context (pp. 75–196), but also Hellenistic 
philosophy (pp. 197–245), Graeco-Roman religion (pp. 246–278), and Roman politics (pp. 279–347). 
Wright describes Paul and his world in the following terms:
A complex person in a complex time. Paul stands where three great roads converge; and he has 
made of them another, travelled less, and making all the difference. ... Paul lived and worked, 
in fact, in at least three worlds at once ... The three worlds overlapped and interlocked in all 
sorts of ways, and that is part of the point, part of what makes the world confusing and Paul 
such a complex character.20
If it is now common coin among New Testament scholars that Paul typifies a synthesis of Jewish, 
Hellenistic, and Graeco-Roman cultures, ideas, and practices, the question remains as to the specific 
influences and elements that might be identified in Paul’s writings and the way in which these might be 
used to illuminate Paul’s letters:21 What might be said about Paul’s education? Is there evidence that he 
used Graeco-Roman literary forms or devices? What was his attitude towards rhetoric? What was his 
approach to the politics of his day? Does Paul show familiarity with the philosophical traditions of the 
first century?22 It is this last question, in particular, that has provided the impetus for the present study.   
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Paul’s citizenship have a high degree of historical veracity; see also David L. Eastman, “Roman History and Paul’s Roman 
Citizenship: A Creative Solution to the Historical Problem,” in Paul’s Graeco-Roman Context, ed. Cilliers Breytenbach, 
BETL 277 (Leuven: Peeters, 2015), 645–55. For broader arguments regarding the reliability of Acts’ portrayal of Paul, see 
Colin J. Hemer, The Book of Acts in the Setting of Hellenistic History, ed. Conrad H. Gempf (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 
1990), esp. 244–307; Stanley E. Porter, Paul in Acts, Library of Pauline Studies (Peabody: Hendrikson, 2008), 350.
19. Paul and the Faithfulness of God, vol. 4 of Christian Origins and the Question of God (Minneapolis: Fortress, 
2013). This synthesis is also illustrated in the titles of other recent volumes on Paul: Stanley E. Porter, ed., Paul: Jew, Greek, 
and Roman, PAST 5 (Leiden: Brill, 2008); Mark Harding and Alanna Nobbs, eds., All Things to All Cultures: Paul Among 
Jews, Greeks, and Romans (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2013).
20. Wright, Faithfulness of God, 75–76.
21. A number of these aspects of Graeco-Roman culture and society as they pertain to Paul are surveyed in Cilliers 
Breytenbach, “Die Briefe des Paulus: Kreuzpunkt griechisch-römischer Traditionen,” in Paul’s Graeco-Roman Context, ed. 
Cilliers Breytenbach, BETL 277 (Leuven: Peeters, 2015), 47–74; see also the essays in the following collections: Troels 
Engberg-Pedersen, ed., Paul in His Hellenistic Context (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995); Troels Engberg-Pedersen, ed., Paul 
Beyond the Judaism/Hellenism Divide (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2001); Porter, Jew, Greek, and Roman; Stanley 
E. Porter, ed., Paul’s World, PAST 4 (Leiden: Brill, 2008); Stanley E. Porter and Andrew W. Pitts, eds., Christian Origins 
and Hellenistic Judaism: Social and Literary Contexts for the New Testament, TENTS 10 (Leiden: Brill, 2012); Stanley E. 
Porter and Andrew W. Pitts, eds., Christian Origins and Greco-Roman Culture: Social and Literary Contexts for the New 
Testament, TENTS 9 (Leiden: Brill, 2013); Harding and Nobbs, All Things to All Cultures; J. Paul Sampley, ed., Paul in the 
Greco-Roman World: A Handbook, 2nd ed.2 vols. (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2016), 198–227.
22. Modern political philosophers have shown a growing interest in Paul as interlocutor; see Alain Badiou, Saint Paul: 
The Foundation of Unversalism, trans. Ray Brassier, CMP (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003); Jacob Taubes, The 
Political Theology of Paul, trans. Dana Hollander; ed. Aleida Assman and Jan Assman, CMP (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2004); Giorgio Agamben, The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans, trans. Patricia Dailey, 
Meridian: Crossing Aesthetics (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005). This scholarly movement is described in Bradley 
J. Bitner, Paul’s Political Strategy in 1 Corinthians 1–4: Constitution and Covenant, SNTSMS 163 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015), 20–22; N. T. Wright, Paul and His Recent Interpreters: Some Contemporary Debates (London: 
SPCK, 2015), 305–46. For engagement, critique, and extension of this approach, see Ward Blanton, “Disturbing Politics: 
Neo-Paulinism and the Scrambling of Religious and Secular Identities,” Di 46.1 (2007): 3–13; John D. Caputo and Linda 
Martín Alcoff, eds., St. Paul Among the Philosophers, Indiana Series in the Philosophy of Religion (Bloomington: Indiana, 
2009); Douglas Karel Harink, ed., Paul, Philosophy and the Theopolitical Vision: Critical Engagement with Agamben, 
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The “Philosophical Paul”
As a starting point in the discussion of Paul’s relationship to Graeco-Roman philosophy it should 
be observed that the New Testament writers were aware their message competed with those of various 
philosophical groups. The warning against “philosophy and empty deceit” in Colossians 2.8 pits that 
which is “according to Christ” against that which is “according to human tradition [and] according to 
the elemental spirits of the universe.” Acts 17.16–34 portrays Paul in debate with “some Epicurean and 
Stoic philosophers” in the agora and the Areopagus. 
From the second century onwards, competition between Christianity and philosophy had given 
way to co-operation and co-option in some Christian groups.23 It is this impulse that contributed to the 
writing of the apocryphal collection of letters between Seneca and Paul which, while not philosoph-
ically profound, indicate a desire in the early church to associate Paul with the Stoic philosopher.24 The 
question remains, however, whether the strand of Christianity which viewed Graeco-Roman philosophy 
positively can be traced back to Paul’s own use of philosophical traditions. Put differently, are there 
ideas in Paul’s writings which are best understood in comparison with the broader Graeco-Roman 
philosophical tradition? A number of scholars have answered this question positively.
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Badiou, Zizek and Others, Theopolitical Visions 7 (Eugene: Cascade, 2010); Peter Frick, ed., Paul in the Grip of the 
Philosophers: The Apostle and Contemporary Continental Philosophy, Paul in Critical Contexts (Minneapolis: Fortress, 
2013). But these studies tend to illuminate modern concerns more than they do those of Paul and his first readers. As Bitner 
correctly observes: “In their pursuit of the political Paul, these philosophers often sidestep questions of historical setting in 
the interests of appropriating the apostle as a theoretical resource” (Paul’s Political Strategy, 22).  For a collection of essays 
that attempts to reflect Paul’s interaction and debt to ancient philosophy as well as modern appropriations of Pauline thought, 
see Ward Blanton and Hent de Vries, eds., Paul and the Philosophers (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013). Biblical 
scholars and theologians have also entered this discussion; see Theodore W. Jennings Jr., Reading Derrida / Thinking Paul: 
On Justice, CMP (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006); L. L. Welborn, Paul’s Summons to Messianic Life: Political 
Theology and the Coming Awakening, Insurrections: Critical Studies in Religion, Politics, and Culture (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2015). And while these approaches will, no doubt, yield further fruitful readings of Paul, in the study that 
follows, my focus will be on investigating Paul in the philosophical context of the first century.  
23. It is possible to identify in Christian writings from the second century onwards both positive and negative positions 
with regard to Graeco-Roman philosophy; in addition to Hubertus R. Drobner, “Christian Philosophy,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of Early Christian Studies, ed. Susan Ashbrook Harvey and David G. Hunter, Oxford Handbooks in Religion and 
Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 672–90, see, e.g., the essays in Margaret M Mitchell and Frances M. 
Young, eds., Origins to Constantine, vol. 1 of The Cambridge History of Christianity (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006) and Frances M. Young, Lewis Ayres, and Andrew Louth, eds., The Cambridge History of Early Christian 
Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), as well as the older studies of Werner Jaeger, Early Christianity 
and Greek Paideia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961) and Henry Chadwick, Early Christian Thought and the Classical 
Tradition: Studies in Justin, Clement, and Origen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966).
24. Abraham J. Malherbe, “‘Seneca’ on Paul as Letter Writer,” in Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and 
Early Christianity: Collected Essays, 1959–2012, ed. Carl R. Holladay, et al., NovTSup 150 (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 903–11 
argues that the collection provides an apology for Paul’s letter-writing skills. For a recent discussion of the linguistic nature 
of the collection and its allusions to the New Testament, see Ilaria L. E Ramelli, “The Pseudepigraphical Correspondence 
Between Seneca and Paul: A Reassessment,” in Paul and Pseudepigraphy, ed. Stanley E. Porter and Gregory P. Fewster, 
PAST 8 (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 319–36 and Ilaria L. E. Ramelli, “A Pseudepigraphon Inside a Pseudepigraphon? The Seneca–
Paul Correspondence and the Letters Added Afterwards,” JSP 23.4 (2014): 259–89. The similarities and differences between 
the two ancient writers have not been lost on modern scholars. Comparisons between Paul and Seneca continue to provide 
insight into both figures and the intellectual traditions they represent; see, most recently, the essays in Joseph R. Dodson and 
David E. Briones, eds., Paul and Seneca in Dialogue, APhR 2 (Leiden: Brill, 2017).  
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 The explanatory power of Hellenstic and Graeco-Roman texts encouraged Johann Jacob 
Wettstein, an eighteenth-century scholar, to produce an extensive collection of parallel material within 
his edition of the Greek New Testament.25  His labours have continued to inspire the search for and 
publication of parallels between Graeco-Roman texts and the New Testament.26 This recognition of 
parallel linguistic elements leads to further questions about the nature of the observed parallels. Are 
these parallels indicative of direct influence in one direction or another? What are the similarities and 
differences between the way in which the New Testament and other texts have used common 
terminology and/or concepts? 
In contrast to the collection of parallels, studies that answer the sort of question posed in the 
previous paragraph necessarily work at a higher level of abstraction, requiring careful analysis and 
comparison of the relevant materials.27  The richest source of comparative material has proven to be the 
ethical writings of the Hellenistic and Graeco-Roman periods. In his survey of “primitive Christianity,” 
Rudolf Bultmann notes,
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25. Johann Jacob Wettstein, Η ΚΑΙΝΗ ∆ΙΑΘΗΚΗ: Graecum editionis receptae cum lectionibus, 2 volumes 
(Amsterdam: Ex officina Dommeriana, 1751–52); see Werner Georg Kümmel, The New Testament: The History of the 
Investigation of Its Problems, trans. Howard C. Kee, NTL (London: SCM, 1973), 49–50; L. Michael White and John T. 
Fitzgerald, “Quod Est Comparandum: The Problem of Parallels,” in Early Christianity and Classical Culture: Comparative 
Studies in Honor of Abraham J. Malherbe, ed. John T. Fitzgerald, Thomas Olbricht H., and L. Michael White (Leiden: Brill, 
2003), 15–16. Wettstein’s contribution was not unique in its time (see Abraham J. Malherbe, “Hellenistic Moralists and the 
New Testament,” in Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays, 1959–2012, 
ed. Carl R. Holladay, et al., NovTSup 150 [Leiden: Brill, 2014], 683–84 n. 42).
26. This project is exemplified by the various contributions to the Corpus Hellenisticum Novi Testamenti (see W. C. 
Van Unnik, “Corpus Hellenisticum Novi Testamenti,” JBL 83.1 [1964]: 17–33; W. C. Van Unnik, “Words Come to Life: 
The Work for the ‘Corpus Hellenisticum Novi Testamenti’,” NovT 13.3 [1971]: 199–216; Pieter W. Van Der Horst, “Corpus 
Hellenisticum Novi Testamenti,” ABD 1: 1157–61) and the multi-volume Neuer Wettstein: Texte zum Neuen Testament aus 
Griechentum und Hellenismus being published by De Gruyter (see Georg Strecker, “Das Göttinger Projekt ‘Neuer 
Wettstein’,” ZNW 83.3–4 [1992]: 245–52). M. Eugene Boring, Klaus Berger, and Carsten Colpe, eds., Hellenistic 
Commentary to the New Testament (Nashville: Abingdon, 1995) represents a shorter English similar in nature. For a survey 
of this scholarship in the twentieth century, see White and Fitzgerald, “Quod Est Comparandum,” 19–27.   
27. David Runia suggests a typology of four ways in which ancient philosophical material might assist those 
interpreting the New Testament (“Ancient Philosophy and the New Testament: ‘Exemplar’ as Example,” in Method and 
Meaning: Essays on New Testament Interpretation in Honor of Harold W. Attridge, ed. Andrew B. McGowan and Kent 
Harold Richards, RBS 67 [Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2011], 350–54). First, philosophical texts and the New 
Testament writings show evidence of shared sociological structures as well as similar literary methods and conventions. For a 
survey of socio-historical and sociological approaches to Paul, see Wright, Recent Interpreters, 221–304. The importance of 
considering philosophical aspects of the Graeco-Roman world when doing social history is demonstrated most clearly in 
Abraham Malherbe’s work; see, e.g.,  Social Aspects of Early Christianity, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983). Second, 
terminology and concepts found in the New Testament resonate with those found in Greek philosophy. The third approach 
contextualizes a  broader common theme (for example, cosmology, anthropology) in order to compare the two bodies of 
writing. The fourth approach recognizes ancient philosophy as essential for understanding the New Testament texts since it is 
assumed that the New Testament author is explicitly interacting with ancient philosophy. The search for parallels probably 
forms part of the second group, while the third and fourth group of studies are the focus of the following paragraphs.  
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Quite early on the Christian churches adopted a system of morality, with its pattern of 
catechetical instruction derived in equal proportions from the Old Testament Jewish tradition 
and from the ethics of popular philosophical pedagogic.28
Behind this assertion lies the comparative and synthetic work exemplified in Bultmann’s earlier 
studies.29 The relationship between “the ethics of popular philosophical pedagogic” and early Christian 
writings has been central to the research interests of Abraham Malherbe, whose essay on “Hellenistic 
moralists and the New Testament” both summed up previous labours in the field and set the agenda for 
the following generation.30 Given the nature and concerns of the New Testament documents in 
general—and the Pauline letters in particular—it is not surprising that ethical matters are central. Other 
topics like theology and cosmogony make an appearance, but Paul’s primary reason for producing his 
letters is to shape the way of life of the Christian communities to which he writes.31 Primarily because 
of the dominant influence of the Socratic traditions, ethics plays a central role in the Hellenistic and 
Graeco-Roman philosophical writings that have come down to us.32 
Comparative studies of Graeco-Roman and Christian ethics are legion, as are their approaches to 
the task. Some studies work with large groups of texts and ideas in order to draw broad conclusions. 
Runar Thorsteinsson focuses on Roman Stoicism (Seneca, Musonius Rufus, Epictetus) and Roman 
Christianity (Romans, 1 Peter, 1 Clement) to conclude that the two ethical systems are quite similar in 
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28. Rudolf Bultmann, Primitive Christianity in Its Contemporary Setting, trans. Reginald Horace Fuller (New York:
Meridian Books, 1956), 177.
29. Der Stil der paulinischen Predigt und die kynisch-stoische Diatribe, FRLANT 13 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck &
Ruprecht, 1910); “Das religiöse Moment in der ethischen Unterweisung des Epiktet und das Neue Testament,” ZNW 13 
(1912): 97–110, 177–91. Marcia Colish describes how controversy and conflict around the questions of influence gradually 
gave way to a more moderate and nuanced debate in the second half of the twentieth century (“Stoicism in the New 
Testament: An Essay in Historiography,” ANRW 26.1: 367–79).
30. Originally written in 1972, the essay was published 20 years later in Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt
(ANRW 26.1: 267–333) and was republished in the 2014 collection of his work (Malherbe, “Hellenistic Moralists”). The 
Hellenistic Moral Philosophy and Early Christianity Group in the Society for Biblical Literature continues this research 
programme (see, e.g., John T. Fitzgerald, ed., Friendship, Flattery, and Frankness of Speech: Studies on Friendship in the 
New Testament World, NovTSup 82 [Leiden: Brill, 1996]; John T. Fitzgerald, ed., Greco-Roman Perspectives on 
Friendship, RBS 34 [Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1997]; John T. Fitzgerald, Dirk Obbink, and Glenn S. Holland, eds., 
Philodemus and the New Testament World, NovTSup 111 [Leiden: Brill, 2004]). For a thumbnail sketch of this group’s 
origin and work, see White and Fitzgerald, “Quod Est Comparandum,” 26 n. 58.
31. This is not to deny that Paul’s theology determines the shape of the ethical life to which he expects believers to
conform. While this may be spoken of in terms of “indicative and imperative” (see James D. G. Dunn, The Theology of Paul 
the Apostle [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998], 626–31), other configurations are possible. Udo Schnelle offers “participation 
and transformation” as a more dynamic paradigm within which to consider Paul’s exhortations (Apostle Paul: His Life and 
Theology, trans. M. Eugene Boring [Grand Rapids: Baker, 2005], 546–58). See, further, the survey in Nijay K. Gupta, “The 
Theo-Logic of Paul’s Ethics in Recent Research: Crosscurrents and Future Directions in Scholarship in the Last Forty 
Years,” CurBR 7.3 (2009): 336–61.
32. So, for example, Runar M. Thorsteinsson, Roman Christianity and Roman Stoicism: A Comparative Study of
Ancient Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 15–16 whose observation about Roman Stoicism can be extended 
to non-Stoic writers like Plutarch and Dio Chrysostom. The dominant position of ethics in these surviving texts can be traced 
back to the ethical emphasis within the Socratic school. For the influence of Socrates on Hellenistic ethics, see A. A. Long, 
“Hellenistic Ethics and Philosophical Power,” in From Epicurus to Epictetus: Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), 3–22 and for Socrates’ enduring influence, see A. A. Long, Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic 
Guide to Life (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002); “Socrates in Later Greek Philosophy,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Socrates; Donald R. Robinson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 355–79.
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many ways,33 while Kavin Rowe’s comparison of Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius with Paul, 
Luke, and Justin Martyr lead him to the opposite conclusion.34 Working at a similarly high level of 
abstraction, Troels Engberg-Pedersen has produced two large works in which he argues for the 
dependency of Paul on Stoic ethics and Stoic cosmology, respectively.35
Some scholars have narrowed their focus in order to compare a specific Graceo-Roman author or 
text to early Christian writings,36 or to study a specific concept or theme across a number of texts. 
Important New Testament themes have occupied the attention of scholars engaged in this comparative 
exercise. To cite but a few examples: grace/gift has been studied in Paul and Seneca,37 Pauline 
anthropology has been considered against the broad background of ancient philosophy, as well as in the 
context of Stoic and Platonic thought,38 and the education of women in terms of virtue and conduct in 
the Pastoral Epistles has been compared with the moral formation of women in Pythagorean letters.39 
While moral philosophy has provided much comparative material, the study of Hellenistic and Graeco-
Roman political thought has also illuminated certain New Testament texts.40
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33. Thorsteinsson, Roman Christianity and Roman Stoicism.
34. C. Kavin Rowe, One True Life: The Stoics and Early Christians as Rival Traditions (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2016).
35. Troels Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and the Stoics (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2000) and Troels Engberg-
Pedersen, Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul: The Material Spirit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); see also 
Troels Engberg-Pedersen, “The Material Spirit: Cosmology and Ethics in Paul,” NTS 55 (2009): 179–97. These works have 
not been without their critics. For critique of Paul and the Stoics, see J. Louis Martyn, “De-Apocalypticizing Paul: An Essay 
Focused on Paul and the Stoics by Troels Engberg-Pedersen,” JSNT 86 (2002): 61–102; Seon Yong Kim, “Paul and the 
Stoic Theory of οικει'ωσις: A Response to Troels Engberg-Pedersen,” NovT 58 (2016): 71–91. For Cosmology and Self, see 
the two review articles in the Journal for the Study of the New Testament 33 (2011) by John Barclay (pp. 406–414) and John 
Levinson (pp. 415–432).
36. See, e.g., the collection of studies in Hans Dieter Betz, ed., Plutarch’s Theological Writings and Early Christian 
Literature, SCHNT 3 (Leiden: Brill, 1975); Hans Dieter Betz, ed., Plutarch’s Ethical Writings and Early Christian 
Literature, SCHNT 4 (Leiden: Brill, 1978).
37. Troels Engberg-Pedersen, “Gift-Giving and Friendship: Seneca and Paul in Romans 1–8 on the Logic of God’s 
χα' ρις and Its Human Response,” HTR 101.1 (2008): 15–44; Thomas R. Blanton IV, “The Benefactor’s Account-Book: The 
Rhetoric of Gift Reciprocation According to Seneca and Paul,” NTS 59 (2013): 396–414. The volume edited by Dodson and 
Briones (Paul and Seneca) includes essays on this theme by John M.G. Barclay, David E. Briones, and David A. deSilva.
38. See, respectively, George H. Van Kooten, Paul’s Anthropology in Context: The Image of God, Assimilation to 
God, and Tripartite Man in Ancient Judaism, Ancient Philosophy and Early Christianity, WUNT 232 (Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 2008), Michelle V. Lee, Paul, the Stoics and the Body of Christ, SNTSMS 137 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006) and Emma Wasserman, “Paul Among the Philosophers: The Case of Sin in Romans 6–8,” JSNT 30.4 
(2008): 387–415; Emma Wasserman, “Paul Beyond the Judaism/Hellenism Divide? The Case of Pauline Anthropology in 
Romans 7 and 2 Corinthians 4–5,” in Christian Origins and Hellenistic Judaism: Social and Literary Contexts for the New 
Testament, ed. Stanley E. Porter and Andrew W. Pitts, TENTS 10 (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 259–79.
39. Annette Bourland Huizenga, Moral Education for Women in the Pastoral and Pythagorean Letters: Philosophers 
of the Household, NovTSup 147 (Leiden: Brill, 2013).
40. It should be remembered that in some philosophical taxonomies, politics forms part of ethics. Diogenes Laertius, 
for example, discusses Stoic political thought within the section on ethics (D. L. 7.84–131; cf. 7.39). Brad Inwood notes the 
difficulty in describing Seneca’s De beneficiis as either a socio-political or ethical treatise: “the political and ethical traditions 
were never neatly separated in the ancient world” (“Politics and Paradox in Seneca’s De Beneficiis,” in Justice and 
Generosity: Studies in Hellenistic Social and Political Philosophy. Proceedings of the Sixth Symposium Hellenisticum, ed. 
André Laks and Malcolm Schofield [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995], 246). Cleanthes, on the other hand, did 
make the distinction (D. L. 7.41).
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The “Political Paul”
The presence of terminological parallels in the New Testament and in papyrological and 
epigraphic texts led Adolf Deissmann describe 
a polemical parallelism between the cult of the emperor and the cult of Christ, which makes 
itself felt where ancient words derived by Christianity from the treasury of the Septuagint and 
the Gospels happen to coincide with the solemn concepts of the Imperial cult which sounded 
the same or similar.41
These and similar observations by others would eventually lead to a reassessment by Pauline scholars 
of the apostle’s relationship to the Roman empire. The rubric “Paul and politics” is often applied to 
projects undertaken as part of this reassessment, with the “politics” in question usually referring to an 
anti-imperial stance on the part of the apostle.42 It is probably safe to say that the view that Paul writes 
in opposition to the Roman Empire—in either a subversive or explicitly antagonistic way—is currently 
the communis opinio among New Testament scholars.
While this approach to reading Paul has yielded new insights and provided necessary correctives 
to wholly apolitical readings of Paul and the New Testament, it is not without its weaknesses. There is 
a small but growing group of scholars who are critical of key aspects of the “Paul and politics” 
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41. Light from the Ancient East: The New Testament Illustrated by Recently Discovered Texts of the Graeco-Roman 
World, 2nd ed., trans. Lionel R. M. Strachan (1910; repr., London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1927), 342. The parallels are 
discussed on pp. 338–378. For more recent studies of Paul in the context of the imperial cult, see Justin K. Hardin, Galatians 
and the Imperial Cult: A Critical Analysis of the First-Century Social Context of Paul’s Letter, WUNT 2/237 (Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 2008); Winter, Divine Honours. William Horbury (Jewish Messianism and the Cult of Christ [London: SCM, 
1998]) argues that Jewish messianism mediated the language and attitudes of the Graeco-Roman ruler cult to early Christian 
communities.
42. Richard Horsley and the “Paul and Politics Group” of the Society of Biblical Literature are foundational in this 
project; see the essays in Richard A. Horsley, ed., Paul and Empire: Religion and Power in Roman Imperial Society 
(Harrisburg: Trinity, 1997); Paul and Politics: Ekklesia, Israel, Imperium, Interpretation. Essays in Honor of Krister 
Stendahl (Harrisburg: Trinity, 2000); Paul and the Roman Imperial Order (Harrisburg: Trinity, 2004). Horsley identifies the 
“aims and agenda” of the group as follows: “to problematize, interrogate, and re-vision Pauline texts and interpretations, to 
identify oppressive formulations as well as potentially liberative visions and values in order to recover their unfulfilled 
historical possibilities” (“Krister Stendahl’s Challenge to Pauline Studies,” in Paul and Politics: Ekklesia, Israel, Imperium, 
Interpretation, ed. Richard A. Horsley [Harrisburg: Trinity, 2000], 15).
Surveys of this approach are provided by Wiard Popkes, “Zum Thema ‘Anti-imperiale Deutung neutestamentlicher 
Schriften’,” TLZ 127 (2002): 850–62; David J. Lull, “Paul and Empire,” RelSRev 36.4 (2010): 251–62; Ed Mackenzie, “The 
Quest for the Political Paul: Assessing the Apostle’s Approach to Empire,” EuroJTh 20.1 (2011): 40–50; Judy Diehl, “Anti-
Imperial Rhetoric in the New Testament,” CurBR 10.1 (2011): 9–52; Judy Diehl, “Empire and Epistles: Anti-Roman 
Rhetoric in the New Testament Epistles,” CurBR 10.2 (2011): 217–63.
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project.43 Despite the prima facie similarities between Deissmann’s observation of “polemical 
parallelism” in New Testament language and the attempts in my dissertation to study Paul’s royal 
language, I do not aim to contribute directly to the “Paul and politics” discussion.44
A number of scholars have used ancient political discourse to illuminate Paul’s letters without 
necessarily reaching a conclusion about Paul’s attitude to the empire.45 Because of the wealth of 
archaeological, epigraphical, and legal data relating to the city, Paul’s letters to the believers in Corinth 
have been the subject of a number of such studies.46 But the other epistles are not neglected. To 
identify but a few examples: Brigitte Kahl uses visual culture, more specifically, the Great Altar of 
Pergamum (now in Berlin), to construct an imperial ideology against which she reads Galatians;47 Peter 
Oakes combines the socio-political history of Philippi with the city’s realia as they relate to the empire 
in order to sharpen the context within which Philippians is understood.48 These studies share a concern 
to situate Paul’s letters within the context of ancient political discourses, but they tend to build their 
arguments from non-literary material. When they do draw on literary data, they often stop at identifying 
verbal or conceptual parallels. I will argue below for the need to study philosophical ideas in their 
broader textual context. 
There are some studies which aim to situate Paul in the context of ancient political discourses by 
focusing on Hellenistic and Graeco-Roman philosophical texts and traditions in order to compare them 
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43. See, e.g., John M. G. Barclay, “Why the Roman Empire Was Insignificant to Paul,” in Pauline Churches and 
Diaspora Jews, WUNT 275 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2016), 363–87; J. Albert Harrill, “Paul and Empire: Studying Roman 
Identity After the Cultural Turn,” EC 2 (2011): 281–311; Christoph Heilig, “Methodological Considerations for the Search 
of Counter-Imperial ‘Echoes’ in Pauline Literature,” in Reactions to Empire, ed. John Anthony Dunne and Dan Batovici, 
WUNT 2/372 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014), 73–92; Anders Klostergaard Petersen, “Imperial Politics in Paul: Scholarly 
Phantom or Actual Textual Phenomenon?” in People Under Power: Early Jewish and Christian Responses to the Roman 
Empire, ed. Michael Labahn and Outi Lehtipuu, Early Christianity in the Roman World 1 (Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
University Press, 2015), 101–28 and the essays in Scot McKnight and Joseph B. Modica, eds., Jesus is Lord, Caesar is not: 
Evaluating Empire in New Testament Studies (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2013). Heilig’s methodological cautions have 
been expanded in Hidden Criticism? The Methodology and Plausibility of the Search for a Counter-Imperial Subtext in 
Paul, WUNT 2/392 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2015).
44. As indicated in my concluding chapter, this is not to say that my comparison of Paul’s Christological language with 
philosophical constructions of kingship might not yield certain results which have a bearing on “Paul and politics.”
45. At the end of his response to the essays in Richard Horsley’s Paul and the Roman Imperial Order, Simon Price 
rightly observes, with regard to Paul, that “his critiques were not narrowly political, but encompassed broader aspects of local 
social and religious values” (“Response,” in Paul and the Roman Imperial Order, ed. Richard A. Horsley [Harrisburg: 
Trinity, 2004], 183). By “narrowly political” I take it that Price is referring to questions of ruling and being ruled, ideal 
constitutions, and the management of the various institutions of the polis or state. If, however, we accept that in the ancient 
world the “political” included ethics (Price’s “local social and religious values”), legitimate ways of life, household 
management, and other subjects that can be considered under the rubric of “economics” (see, e.g., Te-Li Lau, The Politics of 
Peace: Ephesians, Dio Chrysostom, and the Confucian Four Books, NovTSup 133 [Leiden: Brill, 2010], 76–81 and the 
literature cited there), then Paul’s letters do address the political far more frequently than might otherwise be acknowledged.
46. See, e.g., L. L. Welborn, Politics and Rhetoric in the Corinthian Epistles (Macon: Mercer University Press, 1997); 
John M. G. Barclay, “Matching Theory and Practice: Josephus’ Constitutional Ideal and Paul’s Strategy in Corinth,” in Paul 
Beyond the Judaism/Hellenism Divide, ed. Troels Engberg-Pedersen (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2001), 139–63 
and Bradley Bitner’s recent study (Paul’s Political Strategy) which interprets the opening chapters of 1 Corinthians as a form 
of ancient political discourse which engages with ideas of politeia in order to create an alternate civic ideology, but he draws 
on epigraphic and legal material, rather than philosophical texts.
47. Brigitte Kahl, Galatians Re-Imagined: Reading with the Eyes of the Vanquished, Paul in Critical Contexts 
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 2010); see also Hardin, Galatians and the Imperial Cult. 
48. Peter Oakes, Philippians: From People to Letter, SNTSMS 110 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
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to the Pauline literature. Bruno Blumenfeld surveys classical Greek political philosophy and provides a 
close reading of certain Neopythagorean political texts as a foundation for his reading of Philippians 
and Romans.49 He concludes that many of Paul’s terms such as δικαιοσυ' νη, νο' µος, ε κκλησι'α, 
ευ αγγε' λιον are drawn from Greek political discourse. More recently, Anna Miller explores Paul’s 
writing to the Corinthian assembly by comparing it with what Plutarch and Dio Chrysostom say about 
the democratic ε κκλησι'α.50 In his study of peace in Ephesians, Te-Li Lau also employs Dio, but 
includes the Confucian Four Books as a third-leg in the comparative process.51 These studies all 
demonstrate the value of a careful, in-depth discussion of ancient texts as part of the process of 
situating the Pauline material in its first-century milieu.  
Numerous studies have demonstrated the value of reading Paul through the lens of Hellenistic 
moral philosophy for situating his writings more accurately in their socio-historical context. Although 
politics is regarded as a sub-set of ethics in Hellenistic and Graeco-Roman thought, political thought is 
under-represented in comparative studies which give due attention to both the philosophical and the 
Pauline material. It is this comparative approach that I hope to employ in order to study the presence of 
the ideal kingship topos in Paul’s writing.  
Kingship in Pauline Texts and Graeco-Roman Philosophy
Until relatively recently, the possibility that Paul uses ideal kingship language as part of his 
Christology has not seized the attention of many scholars. There are a number of reasons why this 
might have been the case: the absence of the title “king” with reference to Jesus in Paul’s writings; the 
emphasis on Paul’s Jewish context within which the category of “messiah” is seen as sufficiently 
explanatory of Paul’s language;52 the emphasis on ethics and, to a lesser degree, religion amongst those 
studying Paul and Graeco-Roman philosophy. Nevertheless, in recent years, a number of studies have 
appeared in which the category of “ideal kingship” or “kingship discourse” is used to examine Paul’s 
writings.
The significance of Graeco-Roman kingship ideals for the study of Paul’s writings has not been 
ignored.53 In Paul’s Offer of Leniency, Donald Dale Walker argues that the piραο' της and εpiιει'κεια of 
Christ in 2 Corinthians 10.1 was drawn from a “matrix of ideas”  (p. 4) that defined the Greco-Roman 
ideal of the good king.54 Walker’s survey of “the good king” topos (pp. 91–145) is followed by an 
argument for the presence of these ideas in Paul’s epistles (pp. 145–183). Douglas A. Campbell’s 
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49. Bruno Blumenfeld, The Political Paul: Justice, Democracy and Kingship in a Hellenistic Framework, JSNTSup 
210 (London: T &T Clark, 2001); see below for further discussion of Blumenfeld’s study.
50. Anna C. Miller, Corinthian Democracy: Democratic Discourse in 1 Corinthians, PrTMS 20 (Eugene: Pickwick, 
2015).
51. Lau, The Politics of Peace: Ephesians, Dio Chrysostom, and the Confucian Four Books.
52. As will be discussed in Chapter 6, Paul’s use of χριστο' ς is not without its problems.
53. Ancient constructions of ideal kingship have also played important roles in the study of the historical figure of 
Herod the Great (Adam Kolman Marshak, The Many Faces of Herod the Great [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2015], 25–42) and 
in the study of other texts like the Wisdom of Solomon (Matthew Edwards, Pneuma and Realized Eschatology in the Book of 
Wisdom, FRLANT 242 [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2012], 201–23).
54. Donald Dale Walker, Paul’s Offer of Leniency (2 Cor 10:1): Populist Ideology and Rhetoric in a Pauline Letter 
Fragment, WUNT 2/152 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002).
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explanation of δικαιοσυ' νη θεουñ55 as it pertains to the opening chapters of Romans employs “a robust 
narrative Christology developed in terms of ancient kingship” (p. 698) to argue that Christ is portrayed 
in Romans 1 as God’s messianic agent who is raised from the dead and appointed as lord of the cosmos 
by God, the divine king.56 James Harrison surveys Greek and Roman writings on the ideal ruler (pp. 
279–299) in order to contrast these portrayals with Paul’s depiction of the governing authorities in 
Romans 13.57 Harrison concludes that Romans 13 must be understood as a type of “hidden transcript”58 
in which Paul’s exhortation to the Roman Christians demotes the ruler from the exalted status ascribed 
to the ideal ruler in Greek and Roman thought while also warning them about the dangers posed by the 
authorities. These studies highlight the potential explanatory power that Graeco-Roman constructions 
of ideal kingship provide when studying Paul’s writings. Three  studies explore in more detail the New 
Testament’s use of the conceptual category of ideal kingship.
Bruno Blumenfeld study of Paul’s political thought59 proceeds by comparing Paul’s thought with 
Hellenistic Pythagorean political writings.60 These texts are divided into two groups: “the polis group,” 
concerned with matters like law, constitutions, and ways of life,  and “the basileia group” which 
concentrates on kingship.61 In the first half of the book, Blumenfeld discusses these texts and observes 
certain parallels between them and elements of Paul’s thought, on the basis of which he proposes that 
this two-tiered system informs Paul’s thought about human institutions and divine rule, respectively. 
Ideal kingship thought as developed in these Pythagorean writings is used primarily to analyse God’s 
divine kingship rather than Christology. Blumenfeld’s analysis of the Pythagorean texts is thorough and 
illuminating. In the second half of his study, Blumenfeld engages in a “political reading” of Romans in 
order to demonstrate the utility and validity of his earlier comparative analysis. Both parts of the study 
are coherent and reinforce the claims made in the study. Taken on its own terms, this study provides a 
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55. Douglas A. Campbell, The Deliverance of God: An Apocalyptic Rereading of Justification in Paul (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2009), 677–704.
56. For a response to a later essay in which Campbell restates his case, see Scott J. Hafemann, “Reading Paul’s 
DIKAIO-Language: A Response to Douglas Campbell’s ‘Rereading Paul’s DIKAIO-Language’,” in Beyond Old and New 
Perspectives on Paul: Reflections on the Work of Douglas Campbell, ed. Chris Tilling (Eugene: Cascade, 2014), 214–29.
57. James R. Harrison, Paul and the Imperial Authorities at Thessalonica and Rome: A Study in the Conflict of 
Ideology, WUNT 273 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), 271–323.
58. James C. Scott’s construal of resistance in these terms (see Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden 
Transcripts [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990]) has become a favorite among some New Testament scholars; see, 
e.g., the essays in Richard A. Horsley, ed., Hidden Transcripts and the Arts of Resistance: Applying the Work of James C. 
Scott to Jesus and Paul, SemeiaSt 48 (Atlanta: SBL Press, 2004). 
59. Blumenfeld, Political Paul. This is the published version of a 1997 doctoral dissertation completed at Columbia 
University.
60. My use of “Pythagorean” to refer to these texts is defended in Chapter 3.
61. The polis group (pp. 120–188) includes texts by Archytas, Hippodamos, Callicratidas, Ocellus, Damippos, 
Zaleucus, and Charondas. The piερι` βασιλει'ας texts by Diotogenes, Ecphantus, and Sthenidas make up the basileia group (pp. 
189–274). A number of themes, notably kingship and law, are found in both groups and these two categories, while 
heuristically useful, do not arise from the texts themselves.
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strong argument for Blumenfeld’s thesis: that “Paul relied on the political tradition of the Classical and 
Hellenistic world.”62
But there is a methodological problem that undermines Blumenfeld’s thesis. In his conclusion, 
Blumenfeld observes that for his thesis to stand he has had to show that “there is nothing else in the 
Pauline background that can explain the similarities [between Paul’s thought and Hellenistic political 
theories].”63 In his introduction, however, Blumenfeld notes that he chooses to disregard Jewish and 
Hellenistic Jewish influences on Paul.64 By ignoring this significant element of Paul’s cultural milieu 
and cultural repertoire (for which, see below), Blumenfeld weakens his argument considerably. There 
are only so many sources from which Paul might have drawn intellectually, and since the Jewish 
sources are removed for methodological reasons, it is not surprising that Paul’s thought is then seen to 
cohere with what is left. Blumenfeld has successfully demonstrated certain similarities between Paul’s 
thought and Hellenistic political thought. He has not demonstrated the latter is the source of the former. 
Blumenfeld’s study pursued the presence of Graeco-Roman antecedents in Paul’s political thought 
conceptualized quite broadly in terms of the nature of God’s reign, law, righteousness, human sin, and 
the nature of early communities of believers. Two studies published after Blumenfeld’s have focused 
on ideal kingship concepts and language in relation to Pauline Christology.
Julien Smith argues that Ephesians portrays Christ as a type of ideal king.65 Unlike Blumenfeld, 
Smith’s main concern is not with the origins or sources of the author’s ideas, but with describing the 
potential cultural repertoire shared by the letter’s writer and its audience.66 Smith describes the ideal 
king in both Graeco-Roman and Jewish thought (chaps. 2 and 3, respectively) before showing how 
these concepts of ideal kingship might inform a reading of Ephesians. 
The section on Graeco-Roman literature provides a discussion of kingship thought in the classical, 
Hellenistic, and Roman periods. In the first and last of these, Smith discusses individual writers, while 
the Hellenistic period surveys certain topoi (e.g., “the divinity of the ideal king,” “the ideal king as 
benefactor”). Two shortcomings are present in this section. First, while the breadth of material sur-
veyed is impressive, it is inevitably (and necessarily) somewhat superficial. The entire classical period 
is discussed in fourteen pages, for example.67 Second, the selection of certain elements from the Helle-
nistic period also opens Smith up to the accusation of choosing only those themes in the Hellenistic 
corpus that are found in the text being studied. 
Smith’s survey of Jewish material (Chapter 3) discusses the Psalms of Solomon and the Qumran 
literature as examples of Palestinian Jewish literature before looking at the Sibylline Oracles, the Letter 
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62. Political Paul, 302, see also 288, 447–50. Blumenfeld argues that classical political thought is mediated to Paul 
through the Pythagorean writings. Blumenfeld even goes so far as to suggest that these writings “may be sources for Paul” (p. 
123), however, the burden of proof for this thesis is far weightier than Blumenfeld’s study can bear. 
63. Political Paul, 448.
64. Political Paul, 25–26, see 447–48.
65. Julien Smith, Christ the Ideal King: Cultural Context, Rhetorical Strategy, and the Power of Divine Monarchy in 
Ephesians, WUNT 2/313 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011).
66. For “cultural repertoire,” see below.
67. For a more detailed discussion, see Carol Atack, “Debating Kingship: Models of Monarchy in Fifth- and Fourth-
Century BCE Greek Political Thought” (Ph.D. diss., Cambridge University, 2014).
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of Aristeas, Philo, Josephus, and the Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs. The survey has the same 
strengths and weaknesses as those of the classical and Roman periods in Chapter 2. More problematic, 
however, is the relatively curt treatment given to texts from the Hebrew Bible. In fewer than eight 
pages, Smith deals with “Kingship in Ancient Israel.” His treatment of these texts is primarily 
concerned with the debate around the origins of Israelite monarchy rather than the textual construction 
of kingship in these foundational Jewish texts. The presence of quotations and allusions from this 
corpus in Ephesians68 suggest they deserve closer attention than Smith has given them.
Finally, Smith’s penultimate chapter compares Ephesians’ portrayal of Christ with the kingship 
discourse in the preceding texts under the following rubrics derived from the letter: Christ reconciles 
the cosmos to God, he is benefactor, he enables moral transformation, household harmony, and victory 
over oppressive powers. Smith concludes that Ephesians portrays Christ as God’s vice-regent and ideal 
king.  
Smith’s study is impressive in the breadth of the primary material surveyed; the comparison with 
Ephesians allows him to make his case on the basis of the cumulative weight of these many smaller 
pieces of evidence. Nevertheless, there are three ways in which my study aims to extend Smith’s 
results. First, while fewer texts will be examined, those examined will be treated in greater detail in 
order to establish the way in which the various elements in the constructions of ideal kingship interact 
with one another. The methodological rationale for this decision is discussed below. Next, I will pay 
greater attention than Smith has to the corpus upon which early Christian writers, including Paul, drew 
most explicitly: the Greek translation of the Hebrew Bible. Finally, I will take up Smith’s suggestion 
(p. 247) to explore the portrayal of Christ as a royal figure elsewhere in the New Testament.
This final suggestion was taken up by Joshua Jipp in Christ is King.69 Following a sketch of 
“ancient kingship discourse” in Chapter 1, Jipp examines in four subsequent chapters the relationship 
between Christ and the law, the New Testament hymns to Christ, Paul’s participatory soteriology,70 and 
the themes of justice and righteousness in Romans. He demonstrates how reading certain Pauline texts 
through the lens of ancient discourses on ideal kingship enables fresh insights to emerge. Jipp’s careful 
reading of Pauline texts will be engaged more fully—both in agreement and, at points, in 
disagreement—in Chapter 6 where my debt to his study will become obvious. This current study 
extends that of Jipp’s in an important way. 
Like Julien Smith’s study, Jipp’s work engages with a broad cross-section of the primary sources, 
rather than a more concentrated examination of particular instances of kingship discourse. Each chapter 
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68. E.g., Eph 4.8, 25, 26; 5.31; 6.2–3; see also Thorsten Moritz, “The Psalms in Ephesians and Colossians,” in The 
Psalms in the New Testament, ed. Steve Moyise and Maarten J. J. Menken, NTSI (London: T&T Clark, 2004), 181–95; 
Sylvia C. Keesmaat, “In the Face of the Empire: Paul’s Use of Scripture in the Shorter Epistles,” in Hearing the Old 
Testament in the New Testament, ed. Stanley E. Porter, McMaster New Testament Studies (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
2006), 182–212.
69. Joshua W. Jipp, Christ is King: Paul’s Royal Ideology (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2015).
70. See also Joshua W. Jipp, “Sharing the Heavenly Rule of Christ the King: Paul’s Royal Participatory Language in 
Ephesians,” in “In Christ” in Paul: Explorations in Paul’s Theology of Union and Participation, ed. Michael J. Thate, 
Kevin J. Vanhoozer, and Constantine R. Campbell, WUNT 2/384 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014), 251–79.
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begins with a description of a theme in the Hellenistic/Graeco-Roman literature and the Jewish 
literature—law, praise, shared rule, justice/righteousness—and then proceeds to discuss the Pauline 
material in the light of those themes. Jipp’s discussion gives more attention to Jewish biblical texts than 
Smith’s. However, Jipp’s analysis of the Pauline material does not always distinguish between the 
ideas found in the various groups of texts; he is content simply to identify Paul’s language as derivative 
of “ancient kingship discourses.”71 In this study I examine the kingship topos as it occurs in a select 
group of sources in order to establish both similarities and differences between the various groups of 
texts. I thus rend asunder what Jipp has joined together in order to distinguish more carefully between 
the possible traditions which might be present in the Pauline material.
There is growing interest in the possibility that Graeco-Roman philosophical constructions of ideal 
kingship played a role in Paul’s thought and language about Jesus. In order to fill some of the gaps in 
earlier studies and strengthen some of their weaknesses, I propose to study these philosophical 
constructions of ideal kingship from both Graeco-Roman and Jewish authors. In the following section I 
address some terminological issues and questions of methodology by which this present study attempts 
to extend the studies discussed above. 
Comparing Paul with the piερι` βασιλει'ας Topos
A study of all the possible sources of kingship ideology from the cultural milieu within which Paul 
lived is impossible. Oswyn Murray rightly observes that 
a properly embedded account of kingship ideas would be a lifetime’s work. It would have to 
embrace king worship, the style of kingship, the Alexander motif, royal regalia and ceremonial, 
coronation rituals, New Year festivals, and so on. It would have to consider the reflection in 
the official chancellery style of the ideology of kingship ... It would require detailed studies of 
the ideology of particular courts, in relation to what later became known as their ethnicity.72
As important as these above-mentioned elements are,73 I will limit myself to a literary study of kingship 
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71. See, e.g., Jipp, Christ is King, 41–42, 273–81. Campbell feels comfortable treating Jewish and non-Jewish material 
in the same way because of the shared metaphor of God as king (Deliverance of God, 691, 1116 n. 37). But it is precisely the 
different ways in which these texts deal with the same fundamental idea or metaphor that is of interest to me. 
72. “Philosophy and Monarchy in the Hellenistic World,” in Jewish Perspectives on Hellenistic Rulers, ed. Tessa 
Rajak, et al., HCS 50 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 15–16. A number of these approaches are on view in 
Per Bilde, et al., Aspects of Hellenistic Kingship, SHC 7 (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1996). Hellenistic kingship is 
surveyed in Frank W. Walbank, “Monarchies and Monarchic Ideas,” in The Hellenistic World, 2nd ed., ed. Frank W. 
Walbank, et al., CAH 7.1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 62–100; Biagio Virgilio, Lancia, diadema e 
porpora: il re e la regalità ellenistica: seconda edizione rinnovata e ampliata con una appendice documentaria, Studi 
ellenistici 14 (Pisa: Giardini, 2003); John Ma, “Kings,” in A Companion to the Hellenistic World, ed. Andrew Erskine, 
BCAW (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 177–95; Arthur M. Eckstein, “Hellenistic Monarchy in Theory and Practice,” in A 
Companion to Greek and Roman Political Thought, ed. Ryan K. Balot, BCAW (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 247–65.
73. For studies that emphasize the visual culture within which the New Testament should be understood, see, e.g., 
Kahl, Galatians Re-Imagined; Harry O. Maier, Picturing Paul in Empire: Imperial Image, Text and Persuasion in 
Colossians, Ephesians and the Pastoral Epistles (London: Bloomsbury, 2013) and the collection of essays in Annette 
Weissenrieder, Friederike Wendt, and Petra von Gemünden, eds., Picturing the New Testament: Studies in Ancient Visual 
Images, WUNT 2/193 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005). Rita Amedick, “‘Iesus nazarenus rex iudaiorum’: Hellenistische 
Königsikonographie und das Neue Testament,” in Picturing the New Testament: Studies in Ancient Visual Images, ed. 
Annette Weissenrieder, Friederike Wendt, and Petra von Gemünden, WUNT 2/193 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 53–66 
illustrates the contribution that this approach can make to the study of the New Testament’s use of kingship themes.
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ideology. Even this, however, presents one with an impossibly wide pool of data from which to draw. 
The ubiquity of kingship in the Hellenistic world and beyond ensured that kingship is a common topic 
mentioned throughout the surviving literature. In order to limit the study even further, I will focus on 
determining and describing the piερι` βασιλει'ας topos as it was used to construct ideal kingship. In what 
follows, I establish the concept of topos as it will be used in this study and then ask where the piερι` 
βασιλει'ας topos might be found.    
On Topoi
In ancient rhetorical education, a topos was most likely the place in a handbook where a student 
might find an idea or argument to be emulated.74 This usage suggests how the term eventually came to 
describe a commonplace idea.75 The term has often been used by New Testament scholars interested in 
the way in which Graeco-Roman philosophical ideas might present themselves in the New Testament, 
but their studies have failed to yield a consensus regarding the way in which topos should be used in 
this field of scholarship.76
Within the context of Hellenistic moral philosophy, Abraham Malherbe viewed the topos as “the 
stock treatment of subjects of interest to the moralist” and “a fairly systematic treatment of a topic of 
moral instruction.”77  In a Festschrift for Malherbe, Johan Thom extends and refines the discussion of 
topoi by first distinguishing between three different ancient usages of the term topos:78 the logical or 
rhetorical topos that provides lines of argument;79 the literary topos containing literary themes and 
motifs; and the moral or philosophical topos. Thom argues that “the notion of an ordered cognitive 
space underlies all these uses”  of topos in various ancient contexts.80 In the case of the philosophical 
topoi, this space is frequently ordered by a semantic network of questions and answers.81 Although it is 
possible to invoke a particular topos by alluding to elements of this network,82 it is the combination of 
elements and their relationship to one another that defines the topos and enables its presence to be 
detected. Thus, what Carol Newsom argues with regard to genre can be extended to topoi: 
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74. George A. Kennedy, A New History of Classical Rhetoric (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 28, 60–
61.
75. Walker, Paul’s Offer of Leniency, 91 n. 1.
76. See the survey in Johan C. Thom, “‘The Mind in Its Own Place’: Defining the Topos,” in Early Christianity and 
Classical Culture: Comparative Studies in Honor of Abraham J. Malherbe, ed. John T. Fitzgerald, Thomas Olbricht H., and 
L. Michael White, NovTSup 110 (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 557–60; cf. David G. Bradley, “The Topos as a Form in the Pauline 
Paraenesis,” JBL 72.4 (1953): 238–46; Terence Y. Mullins, “Topos as a New Testament Form,” JBL 99.4 (1980): 541–47; 
John C. Brunt, “More on the Topos as a New Testament Form,” JBL 104.3 (1985): 495–500.
77. Malherbe, “Hellenistic Moralists,” 735–40, here, 735 n. 277; see also Abraham J. Malherbe, “The Christianization 
of a Topos (Luke 12:13–34),” in Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays, 
1959–2012, ed. Carl R. Holladay, et al., NovTSup 150 (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 340.
78. “Defining the Topos,” 566–67.
79. Brunt wants to limit the use of topos to this phenomenon (“Topos,” 496–98). 
80. “Defining the Topos,” 566.
81. “Defining the Topos,” 568–69.
82. Thom, “Defining the Topos,” 569–70; see also Walker, Paul’s Offer of Leniency, 93: “good king topoi are so well-
known and widespread that they can be invoked with the briefest allusion or used as the foundation for further 
argumentation.”
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“elements” alone are not what trigger recognition of a genre but rather the way in which they 
are related to one another in a Gestalt structure that serves as an idealized cognitive model. 
Thus the elements only make sense in relation to a whole. Since the Gestalt structure contains 
default and optional components, as well as necessary ones, individual exemplars can depart 
from the prototypical exemplars with respect to default and optional elements and still be 
recognizable.83
It is this flexibility which makes the topos such an attractive method of dealing with philosophical 
matters. Furthermore, the significance of an individual author’s use of the topos lies not exclusively in 
its presence, but also in the manner in which components of the topos are added, ignored, or changed. 
With regard to the study of topoi in relation to the New Testament, Abraham Malherbe notes that “a 
more detailed study of the topoi might very well cast new light on [New Testament] passages which 
have traditionally been seen primarily from a theological perspective.”84 It is this task which is 
undertaken in this study with regard to the kingship topos. Before this task is attempted, it is important 
to establish whether we can speak confidently of an ancient piερι` βασιλει'ας topos.  
Hellenistic Kingship Writings
If, as has been suggested,85 the presence of a topos is often signalled using piερι', then the kingship 
topos is frequently attested in the Hellenistic period. Diogenes Laertius’ On the Lives of Eminent 
Philosophers lists volumes entitled piερι` βασιλει'ας by Euphantus (2.110), Aristotle (5.22), 
Theophrastus (5.42, 49), Strato (5.59), Persaeus (7.36), Cleanthes (7.175), Sphaerus (7.178) and 
Epicurus (10.28). According to Clement of Alexandria, Anaxarchus produced a work entitled Περι` 
βασιλεια' ς (Strom. 1.6). According to Diogenes Laertius, other works with similar titles were written by 
Xenocrates (Στοιχειñα piρο`ς Α λε'ξανδρον piερι` βασιλει'ας; 4.14), Theophrastus (Περι` piαιδει'ας βασιλε'ως; 
5.42; Προ`ς Κα' σανδρον piερι` βασιλει'ας; 5.47), Antisthenes (Κυñρος η  piερι` βασιλει'ας; 6.16; Α ρχε'λαος η  
piερι` βασιλει'ας; 6.18). Plato’s Statesman is given the secondary title of piερι` βασιλει'ας by Thrasylus 
(3.58). Unfortunately, except for Plato’s work and a handful of fragments, none of these texts have 
survived.86 Further attestation that this was recognized as a topos by at least some ancient authors is 
found in Stobaeus’ Florilegium which contains a group of excerpts entitled Υ  piοθη' και Περι` Βασιλει'ας 
(Stob. 4.7.1–76 = WH 4, 249–295).87 The excerpts collected in this section range chronologically from 
Hesiod and Homer through to Musonius and Plutarch, and include three passages excerpted from texts 
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83. “Spying Out the Land: A Report from Genology,” in Bakhtin and Genre Theory in Biblical Studies, ed. Roland 
Boer (Atlanta: Society of biblical literature, 2007), 25.
84. “Hellenistic Moralists,” 740.
85. Bradley, “Topos,” 242; Thom, “Defining the Topos,” 564.
86. For Theophrastus’ treatise on kingship, see Athenaeus, Deipn. 144e; Plutarch, Themistocles 25; Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 5.73 (= frags. 125–127 in C. Friedrich H. Wimmer, Fragmenta, vol. 3 of Theophrasti Eresii Opera 
quae supersunt omnia [Leipzig: Teubner, 1862], 200) and P.Oxy. 1611.38–97. On the basis of these fragments, Oswyn 
Murray (“Philosophy and Monarchy,” 18) suggests Theophrastus’ “studies were antiquarian and historical in nature, rather 
than philosophically interesting or politically useful.” Plutarch mentions Epicurus’ On Kingship (Suav. viv. 13 [1095c–d]; cf. 
Adv. Col. 31 [1125c]).
87. In his discussion of topoi, Malherbe (“Hellenistic Moralists,” 735–36) notes how “the titles of Seneca’s essays, 
Plutarch’s Moralia, the diatribes of Musonius, Epictetus and Dio Chrysostom, and the subject headings under which 
Stobaeus collects his material, make it sufficiently clear what subjects were discussed with some regularity.”
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entitled Περι` Βασιλει'ας attributed to Diotogenes (§§61–62), Sthenidas (§63), and Ecphantus (§§64–
66).
The existence of a Hellenistic topos receives further support from the way in which texts in the 
imperial period employ similar sets of ideas to speak about kingship. The writings of Seneca (De 
clementia), Plutarch (Ad principem ineruditum), Musonius Rufus (Discourses 8 = That Kings Should 
Also Study Philosophy), and Dio Chrysostom (Orations 1–4) all demonstrate continuity with 
Hellenistic kingship ideals,88 suggesting interaction with the same kingship topos. The topos can be 
traced through to the fourth century CE.89 
The presence of this topos is indicative of the importance of kingship as a political phenomenon in 
the Hellenistic period and subsequent theorizing about the phenomenon in ancient political thought.90 
As Matthias Haake observes, the emergence of these treatises
reflects the main and most obvious feature of the political history of that [Hellenistic] period: 
for treatises On Kingship to emerge, a necessary condition was not only the actual existence of 
monarchs, but also their direct influence on and partial control of the world of the poleis to an 
unprecedented extent.91
Given the centrality and influence of the institution, it us understandable why kingship has attracted the 
attention of scholars studying this period. Biographies,92 specialized studies of various aspects of 
kingship,93 and collections of wide-ranging essays94 have all contributed to our knowledge of the 
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88. Seneca: Traute Adam, Clementia Principis: Der Einfluß hellenistischer Fürstenspiegel auf den Versuch einer 
rechtlichen Fundierung des Principats durch Seneca, Kieler Historische Studien 11 (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett, 1970); Susanna 
Braund, ed., Seneca, De Clementia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Plutarch: William D. Desmond, Philosopher-
Kings of Antiquity (London: Continuum, 2011), 61–86; Dio: Harry Sidebottom, “Studies in Dio Chrysostom On Kingship,” 
D.Phil. (Oxford University, 1991); Harry Sidebottom, “Dio Chrysostom and the Development of On Kingship Literature,” in 
Advice and Its Rhetoric in Greece and Rome, ed. Diana Spencer and Elena Theodorakopoulos (Bari: Levante Editori, 
2006), 117–57.
89. So, e.g., Lester K. Born, “The Perfect Prince According to the Latin Panegyrists,” AJP 55.1 (1934): 20–35; Glenn 
F. Chesnut, The First Christian Histories: Eusebius, Socrates, Sozomen, Theodoret, and Evagrius, 2nd ed. (Macon: Mercer 
University Press, 1986), 141–74; Lukas de Blois, “Traditional Virtues and New Spiritual Qualities in Third Century Views 
of Empire, Emperorship and Practical Politics,” Mnemosyne 47.2 (1994): 166–76. 
90. Surveys of kingship in articles or chapters provide a useful overview of the subject: Leon Mooren, “The Nature of 
the Hellenistic Monarchy,” in Egypt and the Hellenistic World. Proceedings of the International Colloquium Leuven — 24–
26 May 1982, ed. E. Van ‘t Dack, P. Van Dessel, and W. Van Gucht, Studia Hellenistica 27 (Leuven: N.P., 1983), 205–40; 
Walbank, “Monarchies”; Francis Cairns, Virgil’s Augustan Epic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 1–28; 
David E. Hahm, “Kings and Constitutions: Hellenistic Theories,” in The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political 
Thought, ed. Christopher Rowe and Malcolm Schofield (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 457–76; Ma, 
“Kings”; Eckstein, “Hellenistic Monarchy”; Nino Luraghi, “Ruling Alone: Monarchy in Greek Politics and Thought,” in The 
Splendors and Miseries of Ruling Alone: Encounters with Monarchy from Archaic Greece to the Hellenistic Mediterranean, 
ed. Nino Luraghi, StAM 1 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2013), 11–24.
91. Matthias Haake, “Writing Down the King: The Communicative Function of Treatises On Kingship in the 
Hellenistic Period,” in The Splendors and Miseries of Ruling Alone: Encounters with Monarchy from Archaic Greece to the 
Hellenistic Mediterranean, ed. Nino Luraghi, StAM 1 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2013), 168.
92. See, e.g., W. W. Tarn, Antigonos Gonatas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913); H. S. Lund, Lysimachus: A Study of 
Hellenistic Kingship (London: Routledge, 1992); Janice J. Gabbert, Antigonus II Gonatas: A Political Biography (London: 
Routledge, 1997); Eve MacDonald, Hannibal: A Hellenistic Life (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015); Ian 
Worthington, Ptolemy I: King and Pharaoh of Egypt (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016). Although not biographies 
in the strict sense, see also Paul R. McKechnie and Philippe Guillaume, eds., Ptolemy II Philadelphus and His World, MNS 
300 (Leiden: Brill, 2008); O’Sullivan Lara, The Regime of Demetrius of Phalerum in Athens, 317–307 BCE: A Philosopher 
in Politics, MNS 318 (Leiden: Brill, 2009); Branko F. van Oppen de Ruiter, Berenice II Euergetis: Essays in Early 
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phenomenon. The philosophical topos of kingship as it might have been expressed in the piερι` 
βασιλει'ας treatises has received less concentrated attention.
E. R. Goodenough’s much-cited article on Hellenistic kingship95 studied the Pythagorean texts, 
together with another by Archytas, in order to determine the “official political philosophy of the 
Hellenistic age.”96 At the centre of this philosophy was the idea of the king as “embodied law” or 
νο' µος ε»µψυχος. Because he imitates God and God’s rule of the cosmos, the king is more than human, 
although less than divine. The king’s virtues are important and by imitating the king’s virtues and his 
person, his people are saved. Although some of his conclusions have been questioned, Goodenough’s 
essay served to introduce the Pythagorean texts into the discussion of philosophical constructions of 
kingship and forms the starting point for a number of more recent discussions of the topic. 
Oswyn Murray’s Oxford dissertation investigates the Hellenistic philosophical treatises entitled 
piερι` βασιλει'ας in order to understand the attitude of educated people towards monarchy.97 In the 
opening chapters he examines classical and Hellenistic texts. The second half of the dissertation shows 
how these Greek ideas interacted with and were transformed by indigenous traditions.98 Murray’s 
discussion is situated historically and relates the philosophical discussion to the political practices of 
the day. While there is mention of the elements that contribute to the philosophical construction of 
kingship, the focus is on the way in which these texts sought to legitimate and justify kingship in the 
Hellenistic period.
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Hellinistic Queenship, Queenship and Power (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). I ignore here the numerous 
biographies and biographical studies of Alexander.
93. See, e.g., on the Hellenistic court: Rolf Strootman, “The Hellenistic Royal Court: Court Culture, Ceremonial and 
Ideology in Greece, Egypt and the Near East, 336–30 BCE” (Ph.D. diss., Utrecht University, 2007); on the relationship 
between βασιλευ' ς and piο' λις: John Ma, Antiochos III and the Cities of Western Asia Minor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999); on the visual expression of Hellenistic kingship, R. R. R. Smith, Hellenistic Royal Portraits, Oxford Monographs on 
Classical Archaeology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988); Paul Edmund Stanwick, Portraits of the Ptolemies: Greek Kings as 
Egyptian Pharaohs (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2002); on the construction of royal ideology, Sabine Müller, Das 
hellenistische Königspaar in der medialen Repräsentation: Ptolemaios II. und Arsinoe II., BzA 263 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 
2009).
94. To identify only a few collections: Kay Ehling and Gregor Weber, eds., Hellenistische Königreiche (Darmstadt: 
Philipp von Zabern, 2014); Christian Habicht, The Hellenistic Monarchies: Selected Papers (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 2006); Bilde, et al., Hellenistic Kingship; Tessa Rajak, et al., Jewish Perspectives on Hellenistic Rulers, 
HCS 50 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007); Nino Luraghi, ed., The Splendors and Miseries of Ruling Alone: 
Encounters with Monarchy from Archaic Greece to the Hellenistic Mediterranean, StAM 1 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2013). 
Although its scope is broader than Hellenistic kingship, the number of essays dealing with kingship in Peter Green, ed., 
Hellenistic History and Culture, HCS 9 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, California; London: University of California Press, 
1993) illustrates the point about the significance of kingship and its treatment in the scholarly literature.
95. Erwin R. Goodenough, “The Political Philosophy of Hellenistic Kingship,” YCS 1 (1928): 53–102.
96. “Hellenistic Kingship,” 102.
97. Oswyn Murray, “Peri Basileias: Studies in the Justification of Monarchic Power in the Hellenistic Period” (Ph.D. 
diss., Oxford University, 1971). For a summary of Murray’s dissertation and the development of his thinking since then, see 
Murray, “Philosophy and Monarchy”.
98. The three chapters in Part II on Hecataeus, Aristeas, and Philodemus are published as “Hecataeus of Abdera and 
Pharaonic Kingship,” JEA 56 (August 1970): 141–71; “Aristeas and Ptolemaic Kingship,” JTS 18 (1967): 337–71; 
“Philodemus on the Good King According to Homer,” JRS 55.1–2 (1965): 161–82, respectively.
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Matthias Haake, too, is concerned primarily with the purpose and function of the Hellenistic piερι` 
βασιλει'ας treatises.99 Haake argues that the piερι` βασιλει'ας treatises should not merely be considered as 
types of the Fürstenspiegel since this approach is too generalizing and too broad.100 Haake treats these 
texts as a specific Hellenistic genre which he investigates through analyzing the author, addressee, 
form, content, and implied audience of the piερι` βασιλει'ας treatises. The known texts are all written by 
philosophers and addressed to kings. The fragmentary nature of the evidence makes it difficult to say 
much about form, but the content of these texts is quite consistent: they focus on “the ideal figure of the 
good king as a factual reality.” The implied audience was “the Panhellenic public of the poleis.”101 
On the basis of this analysis, Haake argues that the primary role of the piερι` βασιλει'ας treatises was 
to function as a form of political communication between the philosopher and king in front of the 
Greek polis.102 This discourse played a number of positive roles for all three parties. It served to 
legitimate the monarch by portraying him in terms of kingship rather than tyranny, and in doing so, 
encouraged the polis to accept the king as a new form of benevolent power which, up to this point, had 
been foreign. Furthermore, it communicated to both king and polis a framework of benefaction within 
which he could act in order to ensure that his subjects would respond positively. The discourse also 
provided the philosopher with a chance to exercise piαρρησι'α , thus demonstrating that he was a true 
philosopher, while affording the king an opportunity to tolerate this speech, thus demonstrating that he 
was not a tyrant.103 The piερι` βασιλει'ας genre was thus a discourse between philosopher and king 
performed before the Greek polis for the benefit of all three parties.104
In contrast to both Murray and Haake, I am less concerned with the pragmatics of these texts in 
their historical contexts and more interested with understanding the conceptual matrices, that is, topoi, 
created by these texts. My work’s centre of gravity lies closer to the literary and tradition-historical 
rather than the historical end of the spectrum of approaches. While Haake provides a convincing 
argument for the purpose and function of the piερι` βασιλει'ας treatises, he does not describe the content 
that defined this discourse. Murray also does not describe the combination of elements which defined 
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99. Haake, “Writing Down the King”. This is a revised version of Matthias Haake, “Warum und zu welchem Ende 
schriebt man peri basileias? Überlegungen zum historischen Kontext einer literarischen Gattung im Hellenismus,” in 
Philosophie und Lebenswelt in der Antike, ed. Karen Piepenbrink (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 
2003), 83–138.
100. Haake, “Writing Down the King,” 166–67. For a thorough discussion of the Fürstenspiegel, see Pierre Hadot, 
“Fürstenspiegel,” RAC 8: 555–632. Walker (Paul’s Offer of Leniency, 103 n. 48) suggests that the good king ideal might 
function as a mirror for the sake of flattery, a map for guidance, or it might be a map masquerading as a mirror (so Seneca 
Clem. 1.1) A kingship treatise might represent a real attempt at political thought or it may simply be a rhetorical exercise. 
Walker’s focus seems to be closer to mine: it is the topos rather than the specific text that is in view. The assumption, 
however, is that the topos and the piερι` βασιλει'ας treatise coincide for the most part.
101. Haake, “Writing Down the King,” 174–78, quotations from 177 and 178, respectively.
102. Haake, “Writing Down the King,” 178–84.
103. Haake argues that the good king ideal was drawn as a mirror image of the tyrant (Haake, “Writing Down the 
King,” 176; see also Nino Luraghi, “One-Man Government: The Greeks and Monarchy,” in A Companion to Ancient Greek 
Government, ed. Hans Beck, BCAW [Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013], 143–44).
104. See also Eckstein, “Hellenistic Monarchy” who notes not only that Greek intellectuals “sought to tame royal 
power through an image of the ideal king” (p. 253), but also that “there developed a rhetoric of highly polite communication” 
between king and subject. The philosophical kingship treatises formed part of this communication.
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the texts he studies. In a later essay, however, he provides a sketch of a typical kingship treatise.105 This 
treatise might have consisted of an argument for monarchy on the basis of the virtue of the king. These 
virtues would have been laid out in terms of the ideals of the philosophical tradition producing the 
treatise and might also have included a list of the king’s duties. Given its philosophical source, such a 
treatise would, no doubt, have described the relationship between philosophy and kingship. The treatise 
might also have described the nature and dangers of tyranny. Finally, the necessity of philosophical 
piαρρησι'α would have been emphasized. In this description Murray by and large blends what individual 
authors wrote or might have written about kingship. As useful as this composite summary is, the 
potential differences between various treatises representing different schools of thought are also of 
interest.
In the first chapter of his book on the Aeneid, Francis Cairns provides a similar synthetic survey of 
the nature of kingship reflected in Hellenistic literature.106 He concludes with a list of twelve elements 
that delimit the stereotype of the good king:107 K1: pre-eminence in virtue; K2: a model for imitation in 
virtue; K3: the imitator of god to reach virtue; K4: possessor of the cardinal virtues (justice, self-
control, wisdom, courage); K5: possessor of other virtues (piety, mercy, kindness, hard work, 
generosity, foresight, law-observance, care for his people); K6: because of his care for his people, he is 
recognized as father, shepherd, leader, saviour; K7: lover of peace and harmony; K8: of good 
appearance; K9: endowed with good advisers and ministers; K10: seeing and hearing everything, often 
through his agents; K11: ensuring that citizens go about their tasks; K12: deriving kingship from Zeus-
Jupiter.108
Cairns points out that his concept of the good king is derived from secondary literature on 
Hellenistic kingship and that the elements must be analyzed in the primary sources in order that they be 
established on firmer footing.109 It is this sort of analysis that I undertake in my study. Unlike Cairns, 
but following Murray, I limit myself to studying, as far as possible, Greek philosophical constructions 
of ideal kingship. This allows me to give the chosen texts sufficient attention while restricting the study 
to a reasonable length. Where possible, I analyze writings or portions of writings that focus on positive 
monarchical rule, instead of collecting and synthesizing various statements about  kingship. When it 
comes to the Cynics and Stoics, no suitable text has survived and I am forced to cast my net more 
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105. “Philosophy and Monarchy,” 21–27. Philip J. Smith (“Greek Images of Monarchy and Their Influence on Rome 
from Alexander to Augustus” [Ph.D. diss., 2 volumesUniversity of Newcastle upon Tyne, 1999], 75–98) provides a similar 
composite description of aspects of Hellenistic kingship ideals drawn from a variety of sources  in order to study the impact 
of Greek images of monarchy on Rome,
106. Augustan Epic, 1–21.
107. Augustan Epic, 19–21.
108. Thom (“Defining the Topos,” 568–69) notes that in some cases the topos is defined by a set of questions. With the 
exception of the dialectical section of the Letter of Aristeas, I have not found a treatise shaped around questions of this sort. 
However, it is easy to see how these elements might have formed around such questions: What is a good king? The most 
virtuous person. What are his virtues? Justice, piety, etc. How does the good king act towards his subjects? What is the 
relationship between the good king and the law? How will the good king act in battle/against his enemies?
109. Augustan Epic, 19.
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widely in order to suggest a reconstruction of kingship thought in these schools with which I may 
compare Paul’s writing about Jesus.     
On Comparisons
Jonathan Z. Smith identifies the process of comparison as “a fundamental characteristic of human 
intelligence,”110 and recent developments in cognitive science seem to bear this out.111 But Smith has 
also problematized the comparative process, especially in the way it is often undertaken by those 
studying the New Testament and Christian origins.112 The comparative approach used in this 
dissertation, therefore, needs briefly to be described and justified.
David Litwa’s study of the understanding and depiction of Jesus’ divinity takes Smith’s warnings 
seriously in order to define a careful comparative method.113 The method does not assume that 
similarities arise from direct borrowing nor that they come from a universal human experience.114 
Rather, the similarities arise from a shared culture. In the same vein, Abraham Malherbe rightly 
observes that “Paul and the philosophers inhabited the same space to such a degree that one can 
conceive of a relationship between them.”115 The space Malherbe has in mind is not only physical 
space, but also cultural and intellectual space. Using organic language, Malherbe speaks of the 
“ecology” of the “environment” which early Christians shared with others in the Graeo-Roman 
world.116 This cultural and intellectual space which Paul is assumed to have shared is described by 
Johan Thom in terms of a “cultural repertoire:”
[The] contexts the author could have expected his ideal audience to know and to have in 
common with himself ... formed a cultural repertoire of linguistic, historical, social, or religious 
  
 22 
————————————
110. “Adde Parvum Parvo Magnus Acervus Erit,” HR 11.1 (1971): 67.
111. See Robert E. Haskell, “The Access Paradox in Analogical Reasoning and Transfer: Whither Invariance?” 
JMB 30.1–2 (2009): 33–65, cited by James Constantine Hanges, “‘Severing the Joints and the Marrow’: The Double-Edged 
Sword of Comparison,” R&T 20.3–4 (2013): 331–44.
112. In Drudgery Divine: On the Comparison of Early Christianities and the Religions of Late Antiquity (1990; repr., 
Jordan Lectures in Comparative Religion 1988Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); see also Hanges, “Sword of 
Comparison”. The history of the use of parallels in the study of the New Testament is summarized in White and Fitzgerald, 
“Quod Est Comparandum”; Malherbe, “Hellenistic Moralists,” 679–87.
113. M. David Litwa, Iesus Deus: The Early Christian Depiction of Jesus as a Mediterranean God (Minneapolis: 
Fortress, 2014), esp. 28–35, 215–24. Litwa uses Smith’s “historical approach” to comparison which Smith places within the 
“morphological mode.”  In “Adde Parvum Parvo Magnus Acervus Erit”, Smith defines four modes of comparison: the 
ethnographic, the encyclopaedic, the morphological, and the evolutionary. Smith’s discussion of the historical as a 
refinement of the morphological is found in “In Comparison a Magic Dwells,” in A Magic Still Dwells: Comparative 
Religion in the Postmodern Age, ed. Kimberley Patton C. and Benjamin C. Ray (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2000), 31–34.
114. For Deissmann, similarities or parallels can be resolved into one of two alternatives: analogy or genealogy (Light 
from the Ancient East, 265–66). In the case of the former, the universal human condition explains similarities; the latter 
describes more direct dependence and borrowing. The apologist recognizes only analogy, while the amateur sees genealogy 
in every similarity (p. 266). Deissmann does not offer a third option, but “pledge[s] to no inexorable ‘method,’ but test[s] 
each case as it arises” (p. 267). For a critique of the ongoing assumption of genealogy or analogy in many comparative 
enterprises, see Bert Cozijnsen, “A Critical Contribution to the Corpus Hellenisticum Novi Testamenti: Jude and Hesiod,” in 
The Use of Sacred Books in the Ancient World, ed. Leonard Victor Rutgers, et al., CBET 22 (Leuven: Peeters, 1998), 81–95.
115. Abraham J. Malherbe, “Introduction,” in Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: 
Collected Essays, 1959–2012, ed. Carl R. Holladay, et al., NovTSup 150 (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 4.
116. Malherbe observes that he has never defined or described an explicit methodology but has worked intuitively. The 
introduction to the collection of his essays serves as a brief statement of this method (“Introduction”). 
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knowledge which author and audience shared and which had to be applied in reading and 
understanding a text.”117
As it pertains to the relationship between specific texts and ideas—in this case, texts and ideas about 
kingship—Julien Smith explains:
It is not assumed that the audience would have known all, or even many, of the works 
discussed ... Rather, the assumption is that the works under investigation either reflected or 
informed a general cultural expectation regarding the reign of the ideal king.118
So, too, in this study, I will assume that Paul would have been able to draw from his shared cultural 
repertoire various elements that contributed to the topos of ideal kingship.119
 But this shared culture does not imply identity or uniformity. In the case of the various sub-
groups of the first-century Mediterranean world, Litwa argues that this shared culture is defined by “a 
vigorous process of reciprocal exchange on all levels—social, material, intellectual” which can be 
usefully analyzed using the concept of “cultural hybridity.”120 It is this “reciprocal exchange” that 
produces the trichotomous Paul who is simultaneously Jew, Greek, and Roman.   
For my comparative approach, the recognition of hybridity within a shared cultural space means 
that attention must be given to both similarities and differences.121 In terms of the investigation of a 
particular topos, the way in which an author has adapted or changed elements of the topos in order to 
offer a different answer to an age-old question is as important as the elements the author has 
conserved.122 Using the phrasing of John Fitzgerald, this careful attention to similarity and difference 
will also allow us to detect a “paradigm shift” in Paul “in which the elements of the old paradigm 
remain, but they appear in a revolutionary new configuration.”123
  
 23 
————————————
117. Johan C. Thom, “Paul and Popular Philosophy,” in Paul’s Graeco-Roman Context, ed. Cilliers Breytenbach, 
BETL 277 (Leuven: Peeters, 2015), 47; see, e.g., White and Fitzgerald, “Quod Est Comparandum,” 39, who speak of “a 
common set of worldview assumptions—a symbolic universe or template of reality” shared by the early Christians with 
others in their environment.  
118. Christ the Ideal King, 21; Smith’s methodology is worked out on pp. 8–13; see also Blumenfeld, Political 
Paul, 25–27.
119. The approach sketched here is similar in shape to that described by Cozijnsen in terms of “cultural codes and [the] 
horizon of expectations” (“Critical Contribution,” 89–95).  
120. Litwa, Iesus Deus, 32.
121. Litwa, Iesus Deus, 33–34. This emphasis on difference as well as similarity is one of the hallmarks and strengths 
of Malherbe’s studies; see, e.g., Martyn, “De-Apocalypticizing Paul,” 62–65 and Malherbe’s own observations that in his 
studies, “equal attention is given to the ways in which Paul differs from his contemporaries” (“Introduction,” in Paul and the 
Popular Philosophers [Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989], 7). 
122. Thom, “Defining the Topos,” 569, 573. This two-step process in which sufficient attention is paid to both 
similarities and differences is one of the defining traits and important strengths of Abraham Malherbe’s various studies; see 
Martyn, “De-Apocalypticizing Paul,” 62–65. For the importance of emphasizing difference in comparative studies in general, 
see Jonathan Z. Smith, “In Comparison,” 40, who comments: “comparison is, at base, never identity. Comparison requires 
the postulation of differences as the grounds of its being interesting.”
123. John T. Fitzgerald, “Paul and Paradigm Shifts: Reconciliation and Its Linkage Group,” in Paul Beyond the 
Judaism/Hellenism Divide, ed. Troels Engberg-Pedersen (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2001), 245; see also N. T. 
Wright’s warning about using parallels: he argues that we must allow Paul his own “radical innovation from within a 
tradition” and his “radical head-on confrontation with other traditions” (“Paul’s Gospel and Caesar’s Empire [2000],” in 
Pauline Perspectives: Essays on Paul 1978–2013 [Minneapolis: Fortress, 2013], 171).
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In a further methodological step taken in order to move beyond the search for facile verbal 
parallels,124 I attend to the conceptual matrix of ideas that go into constructing the topos of ideal 
kingship. This matrix is made up of a number of distinct elements or sub-topoi that combine to form 
the larger topos.125 In the ideal-king topos, these sub-topoi include the king’s relationship to law, the 
king’s virtues, questions around the nature of justice, and so forth. It is not only the presence of a 
specific sub-topos that is important, but also the way in which that element relates to the other elements 
in order to construct the piερι` βασιλει'ας topos. If the conceptual elements are likened to building 
elements, a Corinthian volute or flying buttress by itself says something about a building’s architecture, 
and the presence of one or another might be indicative of a certain building tradition, but the way in 
which an individual builder uses these elements to construct a particular structure is even more 
significant.126 
In order to develop the conceptual matrix of ideas or the network of sub-topoi that make up the 
piερι` βασιλει'ας topos, it will be necessary to study these ideas in the broad context of the texts within 
which they occur.127  Such an approach allows for a more careful examination of the interaction 
between the various sub-topoi and their function, both individually and as part of the larger topos. This 
means that the conceptual matrices will be established on the basis of a detailed study of a handful of 
primary texts, rather than a more superficial survey of a larger corpus.  
In Chapters 2–5, I attempt to give the classical, Hellenistic, and Jewish texts the detailed treatment 
described above. The final chapter which investigates the Pauline literature does so thematically and 
without any claim to comprehensiveness with regard to traditional Pauline themes. Having identified 
several different configurations of the piερι` βασιλει'ας topos, the aim in the final chapter is to see 
whether there are traces of this topos in the Pauline corpus. This approach is somewhat different from 
those approaches usually taken by New Testament scholars in which the focus is on the New 
Testament, with other texts being referenced and compared as “parallels.” The disadvantage of my 
approach is that the treatment Paul receives is considerably more brief than might be hoped. To address 
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124. Any comparative study of biblical material must note Samuel Sandmel’s caution against “parallelomania”: “...that 
extravagance among scholars which first overdoes the supposed similarity in passages and then proceeds to describe source 
and derivation as if implying literary connection flowing in an inevitable or predetermined direction” (“Parallelomania,” 
JBL 81 [1962]: 1); see, also, Smith, Drudgery Divine, 33, 76–78. 
125. Thom speaks of an “intricate network of relationships” between topoi that contribute to defining a larger topos 
(“Defining the Topos,” 569). Malherbe, using slightly different language, identifies the importance of studying “complexes of 
ideas” (“Hellenistic Moralists,” 740). There are some similarities between this approach and Luc van der Stockt’s method of 
employing “clusters of parallels” to study Plutarch’s use of his sources via his υ  piο' µνηµα (“‘With Followeth Justice Always’ 
[Plato, Laws 716A]: Plutarch on the ‘Divinity’ of Rulers and Laws,” in Plutarch’s Statesman and His Aftermath: Political, 
Philosophical, and Literary Aspects ed. Lukas de Blois, et al., vol. 1 of The Statesman in Plutarch’s Works: Proceedings of 
the Sixth International Conference of the International Plutarch Society, Nijmegen / Castle Herne, May 1–5, 2002, 
Mnemosyne, Bibliotheca Classica Batava. Supplementum 250 [Leiden: Brill, 2004], 137–49; “A Plutarchan Hypomnema on 
Self-Love,” American Journal of Philology 120.4 [1999]: 575–99).  
126. This building analogy comes from James A. Waddell, The Messiah: A Comparative Study in the Enochic Son of 
Man and the Pauline Kyrios, Jewish and Christian Texts in Contexts and Related Studies 10 (London: T&T Clark, 
2011), 16–19. E. P. Sanders uses a similar analogy of bricks and buildings to talk about comparing two religions in toto 
(Paul and Palestinian Judaism: A Comparison of Patterns of Religion (London: SCM, 1977), 16–17). 
127. Sandmel calls for a detailed contextual study of the “specific” and not the abstract “juxtaposing [of] mere 
excerpts” (“Parallelomania,” 2).
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the Pauline texts at the same level as the other material would have added substantially to an already 
prolix dissertation. However, I trust Paul’s letters will be dealt with to the extent necessary to establish 
my thesis.
Following the discussion of topoi in his programmatic essay on the New Testament and 
Hellenistic moral philosophers, Abraham Malherbe concludes with the following paragraph: 
These comments are intended to be suggestive only, and to argue that a more detailed study of 
the topoi might very well cast new light on passages which have traditionally been seen 
primarily from a theological perspective. In order to attain greater certainty, more attention 
would have to be given to the constituent parts of the topoi in both groups of literature in order 
to determine whether the same complexes of ideas occur in each. The elimination or 
modification by the NT writers of standard parts of a topos would be especially significant. 
Equally important is the need to determine the function to which the topos is put by a writer.128  
A number of my key methodological considerations are adumbrated in this short paragraph: I will use a 
Hellenistic topos (in this case, the piερι` βασιλει'ας topos) to illuminate the New Testament from a non-
theological perspective by focusing on the various elements of the topos and the way in which they 
relate to one another in their own contexts before comparing them while paying due attention to both 
similarities and differences.
A further assumption in this study is that popular philosophy would have seeded the cultural and 
intellectual milieu or ecology in which Paul lived with Hellenistic and Graeco-Roman constructions of 
ideal kingship.  
Popular Philosophy
I have already touched on the question of Paul’s education,129 but note here that if Paul had an 
advanced Graeco-Roman education,130 then it is possible that he would have been exposed to political 
thought or, at least, political topoi, as part of his literary and rhetorical education.131 If, however, Paul’s 
education was fairly rudimentary,132 then an alternative must be sought to account for his possible 
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128. Malherbe, “Hellenistic Moralists,” 740.
129. For a recent discussion of the status quaestionis, see Schellenberg, Rethinking Paul’s Education, 17–56.
130. So Tor Vegge, Paulus und das antike Schulwesen: Schule und Bildung des Paulus, BZNW 134 (Berlin: De 
Gruyter, 2006) who argues that, “Paulus’ Texte zeigen eindeutig, daß er literarisch ausgebildet war” (p. 423) and that, “Der 
Paulus, der uns in seinen Texten entgegentritt, war ein hellenistisch gebildeter Mann jüdischer Herkunft und Prägung” (p. 
487). 
131. I am not arguing that advanced education necessarily included a study of philosophy, but that philosophical 
elements, especially topoi, would have found their way into literary and rhetorical education. The final stages of education as 
evidenced by the Egyptian papyri are described by Rafaella Cribiore, Gymnastics of the Mind: Greek Education in 
Hellenistic and Roman Egypt (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 220–44. Although political thought is not 
mentioned explicitly, the student could be exposed to these ideas through, for example, the chreia or other exercises; see, 
e.g., Ronald F. Hock and Edward N. O’Neil, eds., Classroom Exercises, vol. 2 of The Chreia and Ancient Rhetoric, WGRW 
2 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2002), s.v. βασιλει'α, βασιλευ' ς, βασιλευ' ω.
132. E. A. Judge argues, “for Paul the art [of rhetoric] was acquired by hard experience rather than by training” (“The 
Early Christians as a Scholastic Community,” in The First Christians in the Roman World: Augustan and New Testament 
Essays, ed. James R. Harrison, WUNT 229 [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008], 541).  Similarly, Ryan Schellenberg concludes, 
in contrast to Vegge (see above, n. 130), that “the alleged correspondence between Paul and the theorists and practitioners of 
formal Greco-Roman rhetoric [turns] out to be unsubstantiated and illusory” (Rethinking Paul’s Education, 309, see pp. 81–
181). He argues, instead, that rhetorical elements identified in the Pauline letters are the result not of “formal education” but 
of “informal social practice” (pp. 309–10). There are some similarities between this argument and the one made in the 
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knowledge of philosophical ideas. Popular philosophy has been suggested as the most likely source for 
Paul’s familiarity with these “philosophical concepts, terminology, and forms of communication.”133
Writing at the start of the twentieth century, Bevan views “Hellenistic popular philosophy” as the 
common ethical teaching found amongst most of the Hellenistic schools that resulted from the 
moribund state of the Hellenistic world.134 In this uncertain context, shelter from the vicissitudes of 
Τυ' χη was sought through the cultivation of self-sufficiency and self-control as a buffer against the 
external world. This inward and ethical turn in philosophy addressed the psychological needs of the 
average Hellenistic person in a period of cultural and political uncertainty in terms that were “popular,” 
both in the sense of “wide-spread, common” and in the sense of “simple, straightforward.” Bevan’s 
argument with respect to the cause of Hellenistic popular philosophy, as well as his general 
characterisation of Hellenistic philosophy as unsophisticated, might be questioned,135 but he correctly 
identifies the phenomenon of a straight-forward, common form of moral philosophy found throughout 
the various Hellenistic philosophical schools as “popular philosophy.” A century after Bevan, Teresa 
Morgan identifies the same phenomenon in the Graeco-Roman world in terms of “ethical ideas which 
were in wide circulation around the Empire and widely shared up and down the social spectrum.”136 
Although much popular philosophy in the Hellenistic and Graeco-Roman period is focused on 
questions of morality, other fields like cosmology, theology, and politics also form part of this 
phenomenon.137 
While the term “popular philosophy” is difficult to define precisely,138 the Graeco-Roman world 
Paul inhabited was filled with opportunities facilitating the circulation of these ideas.139 In addition to 
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following paragraph about popular philosophy. Phenomena known to us primarily through literary sources would have 
circulated beyond the world of the literary élite and been accessible to the masses through non-literary means.  
133. Thom, “Paul and Popular Philosophy,” 48; see also Blumenfeld, Political Paul, 17–24; Edwin A. Judge, “St Paul 
and Classical Society,” in Social Distinctives of the Christians in the First Century: Pivotal Essays by E. A. Judge, ed. David 
M. Scholer (Peabody: Hendrikson, 2008), 92–93.
134. See, e.g., Edwyn Bevan, “Hellenistic Popular Philosophy,” in The Hellenistic Age; J. B. Bury, et al. (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1923), 79–107. Some question whether social and political crises of the Hellenistic period were 
as determinative for the shape of Hellenistic philosophy as Bevan indicates; see, e.g., Long, “Hellenistic Ethics and 
Philosophical Power,” 4.  
135. Robert Sharples, for example, has argued that the inward, ethical turn is not necessarily indicative of a shallow 
philosophical position (“Philosophy for Life,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Hellenistic World, ed. Glenn R. Bugh 
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006], 224). As is the case with Hellenistic philosophy in general, the source of 
popular Hellenistic moral philosophy should be sought in the classical period, for which, see K. J. Dover, Greek Popular 
Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974).
136. Teresa Morgan, Popular Morality in the Early Roman Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), 1–2. Morgan studies popular morality by tracing proverbs, fables, gnomai, exempla, and more general patterns 
through the surviving literature in order to produce a “map” of the “ethical landscape” thus inscribed (p. 13).  
137. See the examples cited in Johan C. Thom, “Popular Philosophy in the Hellenistic-Roman World,” EC 3.3 
(2012): 279–95. So, too, Stanley Stowers: “Placing Paul in the first century intellectual context means that we need to 
expand the idea of popular philosophy to include widespread ideas about the physical makeup of the cosmos. The focus only 
on ethics and practical philosophy is too narrow” (“Paul and the Terrain of Philosophy,” EC 6 (2015): 156).
138. According to Blumenfeld, ”The term ‘popular philosophy’ covers a Hellenistic phenomenon that is ambiguous as 
it is widespread” (Political Paul, 18).
139. On the public nature of Hellenistic cultural and intellectual life, see Helmut Koester, History, Culture, and 
Religion of the Hellenistic Age, vol. 1 of Introduction to the New Testament, 2nd ed. (New York: De Gruyter, 1995), 97–100.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
the well-described itinerant philosophers,140 one might also be exposed to philosophical ideas in a 
city’s public library,141 theatre, or through discussion and debate in the stoa where various oral 
manifestations of popular moral philosophy would have circulated through proverbs, fables, and 
gnomai.142 Statues, inscriptions, coins, and sarcophagi provided further avenues through which ideas 
might be spread visually.143 Even if technical philosophical and other literary texts would have 
stretched the intellectual ability of the average person, the ideas contained therein might have circulated 
in less technical texts144 or been mediated through interaction with the educated élite.145
While Paul’s direct knowledge of philosophical texts and ideas cannot be denied out of hand, such 
knowledge it is not a necessary postulate for the thesis being argued. The philosophical knowledge on 
display in Paul’s letters is understood as an instance of Graeco-Roman popular philosophy as it would 
have been found in the intellectual ecology of his day. A comparison of Paul’s thought about ideal 
kingship as it appears in his letters with the ideal kingship topos found in other Greek texts is thus 
viable without the assumption of Paul’s dependence on or direct knowledge of philosophical texts.  
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140. Blumenfeld views Paul’s knowledge of philosophical ideas as coming “mostly from general school instruction and 
by listening to the orators who traveled around lecturing” (Political Paul, 18). Blumenfeld’s broad use of “orator” in this 
quotation is preferable to the hard distinction he makes between “popular philosopher” and “sophist” (p. 20). The case of Dio 
Chrysostom shows that these two categories could overlap and that the distinction was frequently used as part of the process 
of identity formation. As Tim Whitmarsh observes with regard to Dio, “‘Philosopher’ is not an absolute but a differential 
category” (Greek Literature and the Roman Empire: The Politics of Imitation [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001], 159); 
see also Glen Warren Bowersock, Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), 11–14; Judge, 
“Scholastic Community,” 540. For the argument that Paul exploits the ancient distinction made between rhetoric and 
philosophy, see Edgar Krentz, “Logos or Sophia: The Pauline Use of the Ancient Dispute Between Rhetoric and 
Philosophy,” in Early Christianity and Classical Culture: Comparative Studies in Honor of Abraham J. Malherbe, ed. John 
T. Fitzgerald, Thomas Olbricht H., and L. Michael White (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 277–90.
141. Matthew Nicholls (“Roman Libraries as Public Buildings in the Cities of the Empire,” in Ancient Libraries, ed. 
Jason König, Katerina Oikonomopoulou, and Greg Woolf [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013], 261–76) argues 
that public libraries in the Roman Empire were not meant for a small number of élite readers, but that they were intended for 
a broad audience.
142. See Morgan, Popular Morality in the Early Roman Empire, 23–121.
143. Paul Zanker, for example, notes how imperial imagery was used “to convey a range of civic virtues and values” 
(The Power of Images in the Age of Augustus, trans. Alan Shapiro, Jerome Lectures 16 [Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1988], 336). This was one way in which ideas “trickled down” to the masses to become part of everyday discourse. 
The presence of popular morality in inscriptions and papyri remains is discussed by Morgan (Popular Morality in the Early 
Roman Empire, 300–321). 
144. Thom suggests three examples of texts which contain this sort of popular philosophy: the Pythagorean Golden 
Verses, Cleanthes’ Hymn to Zeus, and Pseudo-Aristotle’s On the Cosmos  (“Popular Philosophy”). 
145. As Gerald Downing puts it: “Stories, ideas, attitudes moved down” (“A Bas les Aristos: The Relevance of Higher 
Literature for the Understanding of the Earliest Christian Writings,” NovT 30.3 [1988]: 216). Morgan argues that it is quite 
likely that popular morality bubbles up: “High philosophy begins, at least, by depending on popular ideas, and when ideas 
appear in popular ethical texts which could come from either tradition, it is rarely safe to assume that they originated in high 
philosophy” (Popular Morality in the Early Roman Empire, 274–99, here 299). She also points out that a similar element (an 
anecdote or proverb, for example) does not necessarily mean the same for the common person as it does for the educated 
élite.
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Outline of the Study
Whether or not Paul drew upon the Hellenistic kingship topos and, if he did, to what extent and in 
what way, will occupy the penultimate chapter of this study. In order to make the comparisons that will 
answer those questions, it is important to describe ideal kingship as it is found in a number of different 
texts in order to circumscribe this topos within the cultural repertoire of a first-century Mediterranean 
thinker. It is this project which will be undertaken in Chapters 2–5.
It is true, as Haake observes, that no piερι` βασιλει'ας treatise before Aristotle’s is known to us.146 
Nevertheless, my concern is not primarily with the genre or the title but with the topos reflected in the 
genre.147 In Chapter 2, I thus examine two important classical antecedents for the Hellenistic 
monarchical writings: Isocrates’ To Nicocles and Xenophon’s Cyropaedia. The former  is studied 
because it stands at the head of the Fürstenspiegel tradition.148 Writing about Isocrates’ speeches, Nino 
Luraghi, for example, observes that “their outline of kingly virtues was to be enormously influential in 
Greek political culture and beyond.”149 The Cyropaedia enjoys prominence not only in Xenophon’s 
oeuvre150 and in the fourth-century, but also in the history of western political thought.151 More often 
than not, Xenophon’s picture of Cyrus the Great is also cast as a precursor to the Fürstenspiegel genre. 
James Tatum identifies it as “the most influential of all mirrors for princes.”152 The examination of 
these two texts prepares the ground for our study of Hellenistic models of ideal kingship.  
In Chapter 3, I attempt to reconstruct the outlines of the piερι` βασιλει'ας treatises as they might 
have been produced by Hellenistic philosophical schools. While the Pythagorean texts mentioned 
above, namely, the piερι` βασιλει'ας treatises attributed to Diotogenes, Ecphantus, and Sthenidas, provide 
a well-defined object of study, the dearth of Hellenistic literature will force us to follow a slightly 
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146. Haake, “Writing Down the King,” 168 n. 15.
147. Of course, Haake recognizes that the piερι` βασιλει'ας topos did not develop ex nihilo; see “Writing Down the 
King,” 168–73.
148. Hadot, “Fürstenspiegel”; cf. Takis Poulakos and David Depew, “Introduction,” in Isocrates and Civic Education, 
ed. Takis Poulakos and David Depew (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004), 11. Lukas de Blois, looking back from the 
vantage point of third-century texts concerning the Roman emperor, identifies Isocrates as “the fountainhead of [the 
kingship] traditions” seen in Cassius Dio, Herodian, Philostratus, and Pseudo-Aelius Aristides (“Traditional Virtues and New 
Qualities,” 166, 167). For the influence of Isocrates’ writings on Renaissance thinking, see Tarik Wareh, The Theory and 
Practice of Life: Isocrates and the Philosophers, HellSt 54 (Washington: Center for Hellenic Studies, 2012), 198–208. 
149. “One-Man Government,” 141; see also de Blois, “Traditional Virtues and New Qualities”; Sidebottom, “Dio 
Chrysostom”.
150. Luraghi calls the Cyropaedia “the most striking, and most substantial, among Xenophon’s explorations of 
monarchy” (“One-Man Government,” 140). 
151. For the work’s influence in the Hellenistic period, see J. Joel Farber, “The Cyropaedia and Hellenistic Kingship,” 
AJP 100.4 (1979): 497–514. A full discussion of the text’s reception can be found in James Tatum, Xenophon’s Imperial 
Fiction: On The Education of Cyrus (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 3–35. For the reception of the 
Cyropaedia as a Fürstenspiegel in the English Renaissance, see Jane Grogan, “‘Many Cyruses’: Xenophon’s Cyropaedia and 
English Renaissance Humanism,” Hermathena 183 (2007): 63–74.
152. Tatum, Xenophon’s Imperial Fiction, xiii; cf. Heleen Sancisi-Weerdenburg, “The Death of Cyrus: Xenophon’s 
Cyropaedia as a Source for Iranian History,” in Xenophon, ed. Vivienne J. Gray, ORCS (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010), 452. Vivienne Gray, while admitting a rather broad definition of the genre, reads a number of Xenophon’s works as 
offering “mirrors of princes” meant to reflect positive images of leaders for the education of his readers  (Xenophon’s Mirror 
of Princes: Reading the Reflections [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011], 5).
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different methodological path with regard to the Cynic, Stoic, and Epicurean material available to us. 
Without access to texts which have monarchical rule as their centre of gravity or focus, we shall be 
obliged to examine the general philosophical traditions for their discourse on ideal kingship.153    
Since the corpus of literature from which Paul quotes most extensively is the Jewish Scriptures in  
Greek translation, it is important to examine the ideal king in this literature to establish the nature of 
Jewish kingship language that would have been available to Paul. Chapter 4 thus examines kingship 
texts found in the Septuagintal books quoted or alluded to most often by Paul: Deuteronomy, the 
Psalms, and Isaiah. Since Paul recognizes Jesus as standing in the Davidic royal line, key passages in 
Samuel–Kings are also examined for their contribution to Jewish kingship ideology.  
Chapter 5 examines the Wisdom of Solomon, Philo of Alexandria’s Life of Moses, and the Letter 
of Aristeas, three Hellenistic Jewish texts frequently identified as having used Hellenistic kingship 
ideals. These provide three examples of the synthesis of Jewish scriptural and Hellenistic thought on 
kingship, thus providing a further point of comparison for the following chapter in which I examine 
Paul, another Hellenistic Jewish writer, for evidence of the Hellenistic piερι` βασιλει'ας topos.
The penultimate chapter discusses Paul’s writings with an eye on the kingship topos developed in 
the four chapters which precede it. This discussion would ideally situate the elements of the topos 
within the respective letters in which they occur while discussing their function within those texts. This 
procedure would add substantially to the length of this dissertation and so I am forced to examine the 
various elements synthetically.
A brief concluding summary of the dissertation is provided in Chapter 7. 
By the end of this dissertation I hope to have demonstrated the utility of employing a Graeco-
Roman topos in the study of Paul. Chapters 2 and 3 establish the shape this topos takes and also 
demonstrate the necessity of working with comparative material in its own context before turning to the 
New Testament. Chapters 4 summarizes foundational Jewish ideas, thus providing a third point of 
comparison.154 Chapter 5 provides three examples of what a Hellenistic-Jewish synthesis of kingship 
ideals might look like. These examples prepare us for the writings of another Hellenistic Jew, Saul of 
Tarsus, and his use of this material to write to groups of believers about the Jewish Messiah.    
Johann Jacob Wettstein writes the following about the interpretation of the New Testament:
If you wish to get a thorough and complete understanding of the books of the New Testament, 
put yourself in the place of those to whom they were first delivered by the apostles as a legacy. 
Transfer yourself in thought to that time and that area where they were first read. Endeavor, so 
far as possible, to acquaint yourself with the customs, practices, habits, opinions, accepted 
ways of thought, proverbs, symbolic language, and everyday expressions of these men, and 
with the ways and means by which they attempted to persuade others or to furnish a foundation 
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153. In examining ideas of kingship in these schools, I include four out of the six groups Malherbe considers important 
to study in relation to the New Testament (“Introduction,” 5). Peripatetic and Platonic constructions are set aside because 
they have been extensively studied (see, e.g., Atack, “Debating Kingship”; Blumenfeld, Political Paul, 36–94).
154. On this, see Smith, Drudgery Divine, 33, 99, although Smith’s examples are of a “generic” third point with which 
two specific cases can be compared. In my case, it is necessary to have the Jewish scriptural material in view lest ideas 
common to the LXX and Hellenistic/Graeco-Roman material be ascribed solely to Paul’s use of the Hellenistic kingship 
topos. In one sense, the common elements in these two bodies of texts approximate Smith’s “generic” third point of 
comparison.  
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for faith. Above all, keep in mind, when you turn to a passage, that you can make no progress 
by means of any modern system, whether of theology or logic, or by means of opinions current 
today.155
This dissertation hopes to demonstrate the utility of reading Paul’s Christology alongside the “opinions, 
accepted ways of though, proverbs, symbolic language, and everyday expressions” as they pertain to 
ideal kingship.    
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155. Wettstein, Η ΚΑΙΝΗ ∆ΙΑΘΗΚΗ, 2.878; translated and quoted by White and Fitzgerald, “Quod Est 
Comparandum,” 16. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 2. IDEAL KINGSHIP IN FOURTH-CENTURY ATHENS
 Hellenistic political philosophy is rooted in the turbulence of fourth-century Athens.1 The 
democratic polis furnished both its supporters and its critics with the milieu as well as the material for 
developing and articulating a philosophical discourse that would be taken up by those who inhabited 
the world created by Alexander’s military successes and his successors. As will become evident in 
Chapter 3, Hellenistic constructions of ideal kingship drew heavily on their classical antecedents. In 
fact, when one examines this topos carefully, it becomes clear that the continuities between these two 
periods are far more significant than the discontinuities. Two Greek thinkers who produced significant 
texts on ideal rulers are examined in this chapter: Isocrates and Xenophon. 
Isocrates
Although his contribution to the intellectual pursuits of fourth-century Greece are frequently 
overshadowed by those of his contemporaries, Isocrates’ writings were admired, studied, and emulated 
by thinkers in the classical, Hellenistic, and Graeco-Roman periods. In his survey of oratory, Cicero 
pauses to exclaim:
Then behold! there arose Isocrates, the Master of all rhetoricians, from whose school, as from 
the Horse of Troy, none but leaders (principes) emerged, but some of them sought glory in 
ceremonial, others in action. (De oratore 2.22.94)
It is a text addressed to one of these principes that we will examine in this section in order to 
understand something about Isocrates’ conception of monarchy.2
Towards the middle of his life, Isocrates composed a series of texts that have become known as 
the “Cyprian orations”— Evagoras, To Nicocles, and Nicocles or the Cyprians—because of their link 
to Evagoras (c. 435–374/3), king of Salamis, and his son and successor, Nicocles.3 All three texts 
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1. An Atheno-centric approach is inevitable for two related reasons. First, the majority of sources that have been 
preserved come from Athens. Second, most of the thinkers examined in this chapter and the next were based in Athens or 
linked very closely to Athens, even though they came from throughout the Mediterranean world.   
2. I am assuming that Isocrates can be credited with some level of political thought, even if this is not a carefully 
articulated political philosophy. Isocrates’ reputation as a teacher of rhetoric (as displayed in the preceding quotation from 
Cicero) and the influence his opponents have had on the western philosophical tradition have meant that the philosophical 
side of Isocrates’ thought has been neglected. For recent works in which this neglect is corrected, see, e.g. Tarik Wareh, The 
Theory and Practice of Life: Isocrates and the Philosophers, HellSt 54 (Washington: Center for Hellenic Studies, 2012); 
James Henderson Collins II, Exhortations to Philosophy: The Protreptics of Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015).
3. For the connection between these three texts see, e.g., Edward S. Forster, Isocrates: Cyprian Orations: Evagoras, 
Ad Nicoclem, Nicocles Aut Cyprii (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1912), 16–21. A fourth text, To Demonicus, is possibly related 
to this group, if it is true that Hipponicus, Demonicus’ father and a friend of Isocrates’, was a Cyprian (Geogre Norlin, 
Isocrates: Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library 209 [Cambridge; London: Harvard University Press, 1928], 2; Richard C. Jebb, 
The Attic Orators: From Antiphon to Isaeus, 2 ed. 2 vols. [1876; repr., London; New York: Macmillan, 1893], 2.80 ). Jebb 
writes that Demonicus’ father must have been well known (Demon. 11) but that this was not a royal family (Demon. 36).
Evagoras died in 374/3 BCE and it is likely that To Nicocles was written soon after. Assuming that the other works 
were produced at more or less the same time, the “Cyprian orations” should be placed in a period from the late 370s to the 
mid-360s (Norlin, Isocrates 1, 2–3, 38–39, 74–75; Jebb, Attic Orators, 2.80–89; Christoph Eucken, Isokrates: Seine 
Positionen in der Auseinandersetzung mit den zeitgenössischen Philosophen, Untersuchungen zur antiken Literatur und 
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present monarchy in a positive light and would therefore appear to be at odds with the democratic 
sentiments of Athens. These texts, together with his letters to Macedonians Philip II and the young 
Alexander III, have led some to view Isocrates as “the specious adulator of personal rulers.”4 In a 
slightly kinder tone, David Konstan speaks of “Isocrates’ ambidextrous relationship with both 
democracies and monarchies.”5 But Isocrates’ ambivalent response to Athenian democracy is not 
unique and neither is his “ambidextrous relationship” to monarchy.6 Isocrates is one of the educated 
elite of classical Athens who register their dissent to the politics of the day through oratory and written 
texts.7 Isocrates’ kingship writings exhibit the tensions that arise from expressing pro-monarchical 
ideas within a democratic milieu. When seen within the context of his larger body of work, however, 
these kingship texts seem less eccentric.8
Harvey Yunis identifies Isocrates’ writings as part of the phenomenon of emerging “literary 
rhetoric.”9 Written texts (as opposed to speeches delivered in front of an assembly) allowed the writer 
to address political topics to audiences beyond those found in traditional Athenian political and judicial 
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Geschichte 19 [Berlin: De Gruyter, 1983], 213–15). Evagoras might come from a later date since Isocrates identifies himself 
as “past his prime” (Evag. 73), so LaRue van Hook, Isocrates: Volume 3, LCL 373 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1945), 2–3; see also Jebb, Attic Orators, 2.103–4. 
4. George Law Cawkwell, “Isocrates,” OCD: 769. This is not Cawkwell’s own characterisation of Isocrates but his 
description of how some view Isocrates; he notes that others treat Isocrates as “the prophet of the Hellenistic world” (769).  
5. “Isocrates’ ‘Republic’,” in Isocrates and Civic Education, ed. Takis Poulakos and David Depew (Austin: University 
of Texas Press, 2004), 111.
6. On tension between monarchy and democracy in fifth-century Athens, see David Braund, “Friends and Foes: 
Monarchs and Monarchy in Fifth-Century Athenian Democracy,” in Alternatives to Athens: Varieties of Political 
Organization and Community in Ancient Greece, ed. Roger Brock and Stephen Hodkinson (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), 103–18.
7. Josiah Ober (Political Dissent in Democratic Athens: Intellectual Critics of Popular Rule, Martin Classical Lectures 
[Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998]) discusses a number of elite, intellectual voices critical of Athenian democracy; 
see especially pp. 248–89 for his treatment of Isocrates.  For responses to monarchy, see Braund, “Friends and Foes”.
Isocrates’ texts were written over a period of almost seven decades (see David Mirhady and Yun Lee Too, trans., 
Isocrates I, The Oratory of Classical Greece 4 [Austin: University of Texas Press, 2000], 10). The details of Isocrates’ 
political point of view were influenced by the changes in the complex political situation in fourth-century Athens and in its 
relationship with greater Hellas and Macedonia (Niall Livingstone, “The Voice of Isocrates and the Dissemination of 
Cultural Power,” in Pedagogy and Power: Rhetorics of Classical Learning, ed. Yun Lee Too and Niall Livingstone, Ideas in 
Context 50 [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998], 273–74). Norman Baynes (“Isocrates,” in Byzantine Studies 
and Other Essays [Westport: Greenwood, 1955], 144–67) sees only contradiction and incoherence in the larger patterns of 
Isocrates’ political writings.
8. With regard to “kingship texts,” Isocrates produced both (1) letters addressed to monarchs on the question of sole 
rule and (2) philosophical texts about monarchy; for this taxonomy in Hellenistic texts, see Matthias Haake, “Writing Down 
the King: The Communicative Function of Treatises On Kingship in the Hellenistic Period,” in The Splendors and Miseries 
of Ruling Alone: Encounters with Monarchy from Archaic Greece to the Hellenistic Mediterranean, ed. Nino Luraghi, StAM 
1 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2013), 169–70. According to Haake, the texts in (2) can be further subdivided into (A) those texts that 
discuss kingship in the context of constitutional debates and (B) those that present the concept of the good ruler directly 
(“Writing Down the King,” 173). The writings we are concerned with fall largely into the latter group, although Nicocles 
does contain an argument for monarchy that would not be out of place (even if not very convincing) within a larger 
discussion of the best polity.
9. “Political Uses of Rhetoric in Democratic Athens,” in The Greek Polis and the Invention of Democracy: A Politico-
Cultural Transformation and Its Interpretations, ed. Johann P. Arnason, Kurt A. Raaflaub, and Peter Wagner, The Ancient 
World: Comparative Histories (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 144–62; for “literary rhetoric,” see pp. 155–58. 
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institutions. Despite his avoidance of active political life,10 Isocrates’ texts constitute a form of political 
discourse that he means to be of use within Greek society.11 In one of his later orations, Isocrates claims  
that he dedicated himself “to giving advice on the true interests of Athens and of the rest of the 
Hellenes” (Panath. 2). In doing so, he states that he deliberately chose to avoid writing about myths, 
“marvels and fictions,” and Greek history.12 He reminds his readers of the focus of his efforts:
I took refuge in study and work and writing down my thoughts, choosing as my field, not petty 
matters nor private contracts, nor the things about which the other orators prate, but the affairs 
of Hellas and of kings and of states (piερι` τωñν Ε  λληνικωñν και` βασιλικωñν και` piολιτικωñν 
piραγµα' των). (Panath. 11; cf. Antid. 79–80)
The logos politikos in which Isocrates engaged was thus closely related to the welfare of Athens and 
the Greeks as a whole. In addition to matters pertaining to Athens, Isocrates’ Panhellenism was 
necessarily concerned with those of Greek elites from other cities and the affairs of Macedonian and 
Cyprian kings.13 Once this “cosmopolitan aristocratic/panhellenic”14 point of view is recognized, 
Isocrates’ thinking and writing about kingship can be seen to fall comfortably within the larger scheme 
and purpose of his body of work.
In keeping with this study’s methodology of examining texts that focus their attention on 
theorizing about kingship, especially those that take the form of advice given to kings, I will 
concentrate on Isocrates’ To Nicocles in the remainder of this section. Although the Evagoras also 
speaks of a king,15 it takes the form of a funeral encomium and represents a somewhat different genre 
to the one on which I am focusing.16 Nicocles is a speech written by Isocrates addressed to the king’s 
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10. Isocrates identifies his “small voice” as the reason for this (Phil. 81; Panath. 9–10; Ep. 8.7), so Josiah Ober, Mass 
and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric, Ideology, and the Power of the People (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1989), 113–14. Yun Lee Too (The Rhetoric of Identity in Isocrates: Text, Power, Pedagogy, CCS [Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995], 74–112) shows that this was part of Isocrates’ self-presentation through which he resisted oratory as 
a basis of political authority. Through adopting this persona he both aligned himself with traditional models of political 
moderation and presented his pedagogy as political service.
11. Too argues that, with the exception of his six judicial orations, Isocrates considered his writings as logoi politikoi 
(Rhetoric of Identity, 19–35). Despite the range of topics addressed, Livingstone notes how, in addition to a very consistent 
style, “the speeches also have a distinctive, and consistent, moral and intellectual tone, and a distinctive sense of purpose, 
which create a strong impression of unity” (“Voice of Isocrates,” 271). This sense of unity justifies the approach in which 
Isocrates’ works are considered as a whole. 
12. At Antid. 45–46 Isocrates lists some of the numerous types of prose discourse—genealogies, studies of the poets, 
histories of wars, dialogues (piερι` τα`ς ε ρωτη' σεις και` τα`ς α  piοκρι'σεις)—before stating the focus of his work: matters relating to 
Hellas, the city/state, and civic assemblies (piερι` ... Ε λληνικου`ς και` piολιτικου`ς και` piανηγυρικου' ς). For the argument that this 
final element in the list is indeed the most significant, see Too, Rhetoric of Identity, 23–24.
13. Ober, Political Dissent, 254–55.
14. Ober, Political Dissent, 255.
15. Hilmar Kehl (“Die Monarchie im politischen Denken des Isokrates” [Ph.D. diss., University of Bonn, 1962], 111–
17) reconstructs Isocrates’ Herrscherideal on the basis of Evagoras and To Nicocles since, “in diesen Reden [sind] alle die 
Vorstellungen zusammengefaβt, die Isokrates über die gute Monarchie bzw. den guten Monarchen in seinem Gesamtwerk 
zum Ausdruck gebracht hat” (p. 111). 
16. Isocrates suggests that this is the first prose encomium (Evag. 8–11), written in order that Nicocles might emulate 
his father (73–77). As James Collins puts it, the Evagoras illustrates how “protreptic lives” can be transformed into 
“protreptic texts” (Exhortations to Philosophy, 178); see also Charles W. Hedrick Jr., “Imitating Virtue and Avoiding Vice: 
Ethical Functions of Biography, History, and Philosophy,” in A Companion to Greek and Roman Political Thought, ed. 
Ryan K. Balot, BCAW (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 421–39. 
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subjects in the king’s voice. In this text we see Isocrates adopt the literary persona of the king to speak 
about kingship. It would also have been possible to include To Demonicus in this section, but there is 
no clear evidence that Demonicus enjoyed monarchical rule of any sort.17 Nevertheless, given the 
similarity in thought (and form, in the case of Demonicus18) between these three texts and To Nicocles, 
I shall refer to them throughout this section in order to illustrate or clarify elements in the treatise 
addressed to the young king.19
Much of the advice contained in To Nicocles is commonplace. Similar ideas are found throughout 
Isocrates’ own writings and, indeed, in other texts from that period.20 In this discussion I am not 
attempting to be exhaustive in my description of Isocrates’ advice to the young king. Neither am I 
attempting to describe every aspect of Isocrates’ kingship ideology. Instead, my focus is on the way in 
which kingship elements within this specific text combine to form a matrix of concepts. It is this 
matrix, consisting both of the concepts and their relationship to one another, which can then be 
compared to similar matrices identified in other texts. 
In the introduction (1–8) and conclusion (40–54), Isocrates offers Nicocles a gift of advice. The 
advice in the body of the text (9–39) comes in the form of short precepts that seem to lack any logical 
connection. In Antidosis 68, Isocrates admits that in To Nicocles he had collected separate bits of 
advice under various rubrics (κεφα' λαια) instead of writing in a more coherent form as he usually 
does.21 Nevertheless, this way of writing, in which one collects the γνωñµαι of poets like Hesiod, 
Theognis, and Phocylides, can be profitable for the reader (Ad Nic. 43–44). In excusing the lack of 
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17. Demonicus’ father, Hipponicus, lived a distinguished life (Demon. 11), but there is no indication that he was a 
king. When the subject of governing does come up, Isocrates can speak to Demonicus only of servants and not of subjects 
(21). Furthermore, Demonicus is encouraged to obey the laws set down by the king and to imitate the king’s life (36). I can 
find no justification for Collins’ identification of Demonicus as a “young tyrant” (Exhortations to Philosophy, 196–228).
18. As convincingly demonstrated by Collins (Exhortations to Philosophy, 196–228). The authenticity of To 
Demonicus has been questioned (see Too, Rhetoric of Identity, 58 n. 53) but, with Wareh, I consider it “Isocratean enough” 
(Isocrates and the Philosophers, 42 n. 79) for the purposes of my argument. For an extended defence of the work’s 
authenticity, see John Edwin Sandys, ed., Isocrates: Ad Demonicum et Panegyricus (1868; repr., London: Longmans, Green, 
and Co., 1899), xxxi-xl. For a discussion of the identity of Isocrates’ opponents in Demon. 3–5 and how this might affect 
one’s view of the text’s authenticity, see Diana Marie Swancutt, “Paraenesis in Light of Protrepsis: Troubling the Typical 
Dichotomy,” in Early Christian Paraenesis in Context, ed. James Starr and Troels Engberg-Pedersen (Berlin: De Gruyter, 
2005), 141–42 n. 60.
19. Carol Atack rightly identifies the Cyprian discourses as “central to the understanding of Isocrates’ political thought, 
and to his stress on the moral and practical qualities of the leading individual” (“Debating Kingship: Models of Monarchy in 
Fifth- and Fourth-Century BCE Greek Political Thought” [Ph.D. diss., Cambridge University, 2014], 158). It is precisely 
these qualities that I am arguing form Isocrates’ concept of the ideal king.
20. In his study of the Antidosis and Areopagiticus, Ober shows that Isocrates’ writing  consists of much that is 
conventional and is thus broadly representative of the intellectual climate of fourth-century Athenian elites (Political 
Dissent, 248–49, 286).
21. Baynes (“Isocrates,” 148–49) is quite dismissive of To Nicocles, identifying it as “a collection of gnomic remarks 
and maxims, many of surprising banality ... presumably primarily intended to illustrate the verbal dexterity of Isocrates” (p. 
149). In what follows I hope to show that in Isocrates’ hands the commonplace is not necessarily banal. A more positive view 
of To Nicocles can be found in Eucken (Isokrates, 216–48) who considers this text to be a response to Plato’s Republic. 
Eucken’s assessment indicates the philosophical nature of Isocrates’ work. The evidence that connects To Nicocles to the 
Republic is tenuous and Eucken’s thesis has not won widespread support, but this is not to deny the reciprocal influence that 
existed between Isocrates and Plato (Wareh, Isocrates and the Philosophers, 55–75). For Isocrates’ influence on Aristotle, 
see David Depew, “The Inscription of Isocrates Into Aristotle’s Practical Philosophy,” in Isocrates and Civic Education, ed. 
Takis Poulakos and David Depew (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004), 157–85.
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originality in his address to Nicocles, Isocrates states that novelty is not something to be desired. On the 
contrary, 
we should regard that man as the most accomplished in this field who can collect the greatest 
number of ideas scattered among the thoughts of all the rest and present them in the best form. 
(41)
In the treatise addressed to Nicocles, Isocrates has chosen to present the young king with a collection of 
maxims, most of them containing commonplace ideas, in order to advise him on how to live and rule 
well.22 A number of scholars have thus classified To Nicocles broadly as hortatory literature.23
Although the most reliable manuscript tradition, represented by G (= Urbinas 111), identifies the 
text with the superscript ΠΡΟΣ ΝΙΚΟΚΛΕΑ, the remaining manuscripts read piρο`ς Νικοκλε'α piερι` τουñ 
βασιλευ' ειν η  piερι` βασιλει'ας.24 The descriptive subtitle is not likely to be original, yet it shows that at 
some stage in its transmission, the text was identified as a piερι` βασιλει'ας treatise. Modern scholarship 
agrees. In so far as the text takes on the form of sage advice offered to a ruler, Isocrates’ address to 
Nicocles is considered by Pierre Hadot to be the first Fürstenspiegel.25
While Isocrates did not choose to entitle any of his works piερι` βασιλει'ας, what we are looking for 
is a sustained discussion of ideal kingship which will enable us to create the matrix of concepts that 
constituted the portrait of the ideal king.26 Isocrates’ work To Nicocles proves to be exactly that sort of 
text.27 As Nino Luraghi observes, “Isokrates’ speeches come closer than any other extant work of 
fourth-century literature to the medieval genre of the mirror of princes, and their outline of kingly 
virtues was to be enormously influential in Greek political culture and beyond.”28
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22. In his description of Pseudo-Phocylides’ Sentences, Walter T. Wilson observes, “Like any gnomic document, our 
poem configures itself in relation to a broad fund of traditions expressing the cumulative wisdom of ancient people about the 
moral life” (The Sentences of Pseudo-Phocylides, CEJL [Berlin: De Gruyter, 2005], 14). There are clear parallels between 
Wilson’s description of gnomic poetry and Isocrates’ own description of his efforts (Ad Nic. 43–44; see above). The 
similarity in form between the Cyprian orations and the poets led G. A. Kennedy to describe the former as “a kind of gnomic 
oratory, reminiscent of the elegiac poets” (The Art of Persuasion in Greece [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1963], 190).
23. Jebb identifies To Nicocles, Nicocles, and To Demonicus as Isocrates’ “hortatory letters or essays,” part of his 
“scholastic works” which are differentiated from his political writings, on the one hand, and forensic speeches, on the other 
(Attic Orators, 2.78–80). Similarly, Swancutt identifies Isocrates’ writings to Nicocles as “hortatory letters composed of 
paraenetic advice in good government” (“Paraenesis,” 136).  Too provides a summary of the history of attempts to place 
Isocrates’ work within a specific genre (Rhetoric of Identity, 13–19).
24. Emmanuel Bekker, Oratores Attici, vol. 2, Isocrates (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1823), 15  
25. Pierre Hadot, “Fürstenspiegel,” RAC 8: 555–632.
26. Haake (“Writing Down the King,” 166–67) avoids reading the Hellenistic piερι` βασιλει'ας treatises in terms of the 
medieval speculum principis genre or Fürstenspiegel so as to avoid blurring the differences between these texts. In this study 
I am not so much concerned with the piερι` βασιλει'ας genre as with the topoi that contribute to that genre. 
27. Haake (“Writing Down the King,” 168) credits Aristotle with originating the genre of On Kingship. The narrow 
focus of this excellent study allows for careful examination of the genre, but will exclude by definition texts which have the 
same form and content but lack this title. 
28. Nino Luraghi, “One-Man Government: The Greeks and Monarchy,” in A Companion to Ancient Greek 
Government, ed. Hans Beck, BCAW (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 141; see also Lukas de Blois, “Traditional Virtues 
and New Spiritual Qualities in Third Century Views of Empire, Emperorship and Practical Politics,” Mnemosyne 47.2 
(1994): 166–76; Harry Sidebottom, “Dio Chrysostom and the Development of On Kingship Literature,” in Advice and Its 
Rhetoric in Greece and Rome, ed. Diana Spencer and Elena Theodorakopoulos (Bari: Levante Editori, 2006), 117–57.
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In Isocrates’ own words, he is attempting “to seek a field that has been neglected by others and lay 
down principles for [monarchies] (νοµοθετειñν ταιñς µοναρχι'αις)” (Ad Nic. 8). The neglect in this field is 
perhaps not as total as Isocrates would have his reader believe. Hesiod’s Works and Days and 
Theogony provide a model of the ideal ruler in the person of Zeus and also contain passages which 
might be construed as instruction to rulers.29 And Pindar’s epinicians to Hieron (Olympian 1, Pythian 
1–3) serve to construct “a model of virtuous kingship” for the Sicilian ruler.30 Nonetheless, Isocrates’ 
innovation was to address his text directly to the ruler in question, an approach made slightly easier, no 
doubt, by the fact that the ruler had once been a pupil of his.31 In a later reflection on this work he 
claims he was “advising (συµβουλευ' ων) [the king] how to rule his subjects” (Antid. 67, my trans-
lation). Taking Isocrates’ own description of his work seriously, we can safely follow Hadot in placing 
To Nicocles at the start of the long line of mirror-for-princes treatises.
As mentioned above, the body of the treatise consists primarily of short, pithy sayings, not 
dissimilar to various types of gnomic literature.32 Walter Wilson has shown that gnomic texts of this 
sort were often structured around the cardinal virtues. Plato’s enumeration of the four virtues in Book 4 
of his Republic—σοφι'α, δικαιοσυ' νη, σωφροσυ' νη, α  νδρει'α—is probably the best-known example, 
although numerous other examples exist.33 It would seem that Isocrates does not work with a consistent 
set of four cardinal virtues. A number of passages contain various three-virtue combinations: at 
Nicocles 44, for example, he mentions δικαιοσυ' νη, σωφροσυ' νη, ε γκρα' τεια and at Panathenaicus 197, 
καρτερι'α, σωφροσυ' νη and α  νδρει'α are listed.34 And there are one or two points at which four virtues 
are mentioned, but these differ from the Platonic cardinal virtues.35 We are somewhat closer to the 
Platonic list at Evagoras 22–23 where the king is said to have added courage, wisdom, and justice to 
the beauty, strength, and moderation he exhibited as a boy.36 These passages indicate that Isocrates 
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29. Kurt A. Raaflaub, “Poets, Lawgivers, and the Beginnings of Political Reflection in Archaic Greece,” in The 
Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought, ed. Christopher Rowe and Malcolm Schofield (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 34–37.
30. Kathryn A. Morgan, Pindar and the Construction of Syracusan Monarchy in the Fifth Century B.C., Greeks 
Overseas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 2; see also Simon Hornblower, “Pindar and Kingship Theory,” in Ancient 
Tyranny, ed. Sian Lewis (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 151–63. For Isocrates’ debt to Pindar, see William 
H. Race, “Pindaric Encomium and Isokrates’ Evagoras,” TAPA 117 (1987): 131–55; Werner Jaeger, The Conflict of Cultural 
Ideals in the Age of Plato, vol. 3 of Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, trans. Gilbert Highet (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1986), 85–86. 
31. Evag. 78; Antid. 30; cf. 40, 93–94; see Norlin, Isocrates 1, 39; Jebb, Attic Orators, 2.83.
32. For a survey of chreiae, gnomic poetry, gnomologia, and wisdom instruction, see Walter T. Wilson, The Mysteries 
of Righteousness: The Literary Composition and Genre of the Sentences of Pseudo-Phocylides, TSAJ 40 (Tübingen: Mohr, 
1994), 14–41.
33. Wilson, Mysteries of Righteousness, 42–59.
34. See also Evag. 23 (α  νδρι'α, σοφι'α, δικαιοσυ' νη), Demon. 15 (αι σχυ' νη, δικαιοσυ' νη, σωφροσυ' νη), De pace 63  
(ευ  σε'βεια, σωφροσυ' νη, δικαιοσυ' νη ), Antid. 111 (σοφι'α, δικαιοσυ' νη, σωφροσυ' νη) speaking of Pericles,  Ep. 9.4 (α  νδρι'α, 
σωφροσυ' νη, φρο' νησις).
35. Four virtues are mentioned at Nic. 43 (δικαιοσυ' νη, σωφροσυ' νη, α  νδρει'α, δεινο' της), but this is in order to 
emphasise the significance of the first two which are the sole property of the good and noble, while the second two are shared 
with the base. Nonetheless, if δεινο' της is understood as “cleverness” (so Norlin [LCL] and Too [in Mirhady and Too, 
Isocrates I, 178]) and thus related to σοφι'α, we are left with a series of four virtues similar to those of Plato.
36. Helen F. North (Sophrosyne: Self-Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek Literature, Cornell Studies in Classical 
Philology 35 [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966], 147) observes that this is one of the few examples of the rhetorical use 
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often spoke of virtues in groups of three, sometimes four, especially when describing an ideal character 
such as Evagoras or Theseus. Furthermore, there is evidence that Isocrates adopts a hierarchy of 
virtues.37 He can speak, for example, of piety, moderation, justice,38 and the rest of virtue (Peace 63), 
or of courage, wisdom, piety, moderation, and the rest of virtue (Helen 31). Even though these sets of 
three or four virtues show some variability, some virtues are more significant than others in Isocrates’ 
thought. It is not improbable, then, that he would use these primary virtues as a method of structuring 
his system of thought.39 Indeed, Helen North states that “this very device of converting the canon of 
cardinal virtues into a framework to support the biographical approach to history” was one of the 
enduring legacies of the rhetorical schools.40 The thesis that just such a framework of virtues serves to 
structure the treatise To Nicocles will now be presented.
In a discussion of gnomic literature, Walter Wilson argues that the canon of four cardinal virtues 
acts as an organizational device in To Nicocles.41 It is important to remember, however, that this is not 
a treatise concerning these four virtues. The virtues are not always named and neither are they 
expounded systematically. Rather, they form a framework for Isocrates’ maxims—they are perhaps the 
unnamed  κεφα' λαια of which he speaks in  Antidosis 68—and he used this framework, presumably, 
because he expected his reader to be familiar with the cardinal virtues.42 In the analysis that follows, I 
adopt the macro-structure of Wilson’s outline of To Nicocles that looks as follows:
1–8 Introduction43
9–39 Maxims relating to kingship
 9–14  Wisdom
 15–29a  Justice
 29b–35a Moderation
 35b–39  Courage
40–54 Conclusion
It is axiomatic for Isocrates that monarchical rule belongs to one who is superior (Antid. 71–72). This 
idea will prove to be foundational for Hellenistic thinking about kingship. At this point, if we allow it 
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of the four-fold canon of cardinal virtues. The absence of piety is striking, although it occurs elsewhere; see esp. Helen 31 
where Theseus is described as acting with courage, wisdom, piety, and moderation. For piety and justice as the primary 
virtues to be exercised in relationship towards the gods and humanity, see, e.g., Peace 33; Nic. 2.
37. For the hierarchy of Isocratean virtues, see North, Sophrosyne, 144.
38. Most MSS include και` τη`ν δικαιοσυ' νην at this point, which Γ and Ε omit. In light of Isocrates’ discussion in Peace 
31–35, it seems prudent to follow the majority at this point, even though Γ is generally considered to contain the most 
reliable textual tradition (see George Nolin, “General Introduction,” in Isocrates: Volume I; trans. George Nolin, LCL 209 
[Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1928], xlvi–xlviii). 
39. See also Kenneth R. Chase, “Constructing Ethics Through Rhetoric: Isocrates and Piety,” Quarterly Journal of 
Speech 95.3 (2009): 243. For the argument that the Platonic canon of four virtues goes back to Pindar and perhaps even 
earlier, see Helen F. North, “Pindar, Isthmian, 8, 24–28,” AJP 69.3 (1948): 304–8.
40. North, Sophrosyne, 148.
41. Wilson, Mysteries of Righteousness, 49–51. Wilson extends the introduction to include §9, but it seems that §9 
starts the body of the text with a summary statement of its purpose: to “consider what is the function of kings” (τι' τωñν 
βασιλευο' ντων ε»ργον ε στι'ν); so Eucken, Isokrates, 225. 
42. Wilson, Mysteries of Righteousness, 50.
43. I have modified Wilson’s structure slightly at this point. He has the “Introduction” extending from §§1–9 whereas I 
consider §9 to be part of the body of the text (see below).
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as a thesis, it becomes clear why Isocrates might find it appropriate to structure his treatise on the good 
king around this set of cardinal virtues which serve to define the nature of the superior person.
Allowing for some of the modifications mentioned above, Werner Jaeger’s mid-twentieth-century 
assessment of the treatise still rings true: Isocrates provides the reader with an “educational treatise for 
princes” which, although unsystematic at first glance, is not “only a list of practical tricks” but “a 
portrait of the ideal ruler—a portrait whose unity lies in its ethical consistency, and thereby is 
completely typical of the spirit of the new era.”44 It is to this portrait that we now turn. 
Introduction (1–8) and Conclusion (40–54) 
The opening line of the treatise45 identifies its recipient as Nicocles, one of those who lead 
kingdoms (Ad Nic. 1). The text is silent about any other historical matters pertaining to Nicocles and 
his rule; it could quite easily have been addressed to any number of monarchs.46 Furthermore, 
recognizing Nicocles as the primary recipient of this text does not mean we need to deny the possibility 
that Isocrates had other audiences in view.47 We may note, for example, that at Nicocles 11, Isocrates, 
adopting the literary persona of the king, assumes that the Cyprians have “heard” him speak on how a 
ruler should act. It is presumably the treatise addressed to Nicocles that is in view at this point. 
Isocrates’ Antidosis provides an even clearer example of the fact that Isocrates expected his text to have 
multiple readers.48 Before quoting from To Nicocles, Isocrates explains:
But my reason for writing upon this subject was that I thought my advice would be the best 
means of aiding his [sc. the king’s] understanding and at the same time the readiest means of 
publishing my own principles (το`ν τρο' piον το`ν ε µαυτουñ). (Antid. 69)
Isocrates hopes that the principles he had made clear to those who read the earlier treatise would also 
serve him in his present defence. He mentions his honesty and frank speech, his support of the king’s 
subjects, and his advice to the king regarding his wisdom and understanding (Antid. 70–71). For our 
purposes we can ignore the audiences of the Antidosis49 and concentrate on those for whom Isocrates 
produced To Nicocles. Anyone reading the text would be in the same position as the young king to 
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44. Jaeger, Paideia III, 98.
45. The influence that Isocrates has had on the Western tradition is clearly demonstrated by the way in which 
Machiavelli’s dedication in The Prince echoes Isocrates’ opening paragraphs (Wareh, Isocrates and the Philosophers, 199–
200).
46. This is true for the Cyprian Orations in general (Eucken, Isokrates, 213). Isocrates claims, however, that Nicocles is 
the first monarch to pursue a proper philosophical education (Evag. 78).
47. James Collins shows how Isocrates’ texts “employ advanced literary strategies to speak simultaneously to multiple 
audiences” (Exhortations to Philosophy, 196).
48. If further examples are sought, we might note that at Phil. 12 Isocrates indicates that his discourse is aimed at the 
king as well as Isocrates’ pupils. The conclusion (Phil. 155) also addresses an audience in the plural (υ µωñν τωñν α  κουο' ντων).
49. On the double audience—mass and elite—of the Antidosis, see Ober, Political Dissent, 257–60. Kathryn A. 
Morgan (“The Tyranny of the Audience in Plato and Isocrates,” in Popular Tyranny: Sovereignty and Its Discontents in 
Ancient Greece, ed. Kathryn A. Morgan [Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003], 184–86) observes that in the Antidosis the 
Athenian demos is also an audience for To Nicocles. She argues that Isocrates uses his past writings to cast those in the 
audience who disagree with him in the role of tyrants. The Panathenaicus also contains a reinterpretation of Isocrates’ 
speech by his Spartan pupil (235–263) highlighting the way in which its ambiguity allows different audiences to interpret it 
differently (Livingstone, “Voice of Isocrates,” 276).
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benefit from the education provided by Isocrates. Anything imparted to the king would be imparted to 
them. As argued above, To Nicocles should be understood not only as a contribution to the piερι` 
βασιλει'ας genre, but also, more broadly, as a fourth-century philosophical protrepsis in which Isocrates 
puts forward his educational programme.50
The elements of protreptic are found largely (but not exclusively) in the text’s “frame”—its 
introduction and conclusion.51 We will examine these sections before proceeding to the body of the 
treatise.
In the introduction and conclusion, Isocrates couches his advice in the language of gift-giving. 
Others give clothing or bronze or gold in the expectation that they will receive something of equal or 
greater value in return, thus turning the encounter into commerce (ε µpiορι'α; 1). Isocrates, in contrast, 
engages in real giving by offering what is the finest and most useful and fitting gift, that he might give 
and the king might receive advice about how the king might govern for the sake of his polis and 
kingdom (1–2; cf. 54). On the basis of his reconstruction of Isocrates’ relationship with the general 
Timotheus (Antid. 101–139), Niall Livingstone argues that this passages is indicative of the reciprocal 
relationship that existed between Isocrates and Nicocles, a mutually beneficial relationship marked by 
exchange.52 But if Nicocles is given this gift of advice (education), what can Isocrates expect in return? 
Perhaps the reputation of teaching princes and kings,53 and the glory of involvement with the political 
process, albeit in an indirect manner.     
The value of Isocrates’ gift is further increased by the fact that it is rare. While private individuals 
have many opportunities to be educated in the way they should live, kings, generally speaking, do not 
enjoy the same advice from those around them (2–4).54 The result is that, despite honours and wealth 
and power, kings end up in unenviable positions, having to make impossible decisions and living in 
fear and danger (4–6). Isocrates implies that these difficulties arise because kingship has been 
approached without the recognition that “it is the most important of human functions and demands the 
greatest wisdom (piλει'στης piρονοι'ας)” (6). To this end, Isocrates advises the king on “the objects at 
which he should aim and the pursuits to which he should devote himself” (6). This advice does not 
usurp the practical, day-to-day advice that a king should receive from those around him, but rather 
provides the king with a broader framework within which he should consider his conduct. Isocrates’ 
advice is that which will persuade him to live virtuously (ε pi α  ρετη`ν piροτρε'ψειεν; 8).
In the conclusion of this treatise, Isocrates returns to discuss the way in which he has sought to 
persuade his reader. He does not peddle novelties, but presents the king with conventional advice: 
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50. Ad Nicocles and Demonicus were part of Isocrates’ attempt, within the marketplace of philosophical ideas, to 
“circumscribe the competition” and present his own educational/philosophical agenda (Collins, Exhortations to 
Philosophy, 206–19).
51. Collins, Exhortations to Philosophy, 197–206.
52. Livingstone, “Voice of Isocrates,” 277–80.
53. The “accusation” at Antid. 30—that Isocrates educated generals, kings, and tyrants—enhances his pre-eminence as 
a teacher; cf. Antid. 93–95.
54. The teacher and advisor, necessarily the person with the best understanding of what they’re passing on (Panath. 
235), is in a similar position to the king (cf. Evag. 44) (Livingstone, “Voice of Isocrates,” 266–68).
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We should regard that man as the most accomplished in this field who can collect the greatest 
number of ideas scattered among the thoughts of all the rest and present them in the best form. 
(41)
The commonplace nature of Isocrates’ advice leads David Konstan to note wryly, “None of this is so 
profound as to make one wish passionately that one had been a classmate of Nicocles while he was 
attending Isocrates’ school in Athens, in the way one would give a fortune to have sat in on Plato’s 
lectures in the Academy.”55 Isocrates is aware of the shortcomings of this mode of exhortation, but he 
argues that most people have tended to concern themselves with what brings pleasure rather than with 
what is useful (42–49). But the king is not like other people and, unlike the masses, it is this criterion of 
utility that he should employ when seeking advice (50).56
Isocrates’ conclusion contributes to his attempt to persuade the king to adopt the advice in this 
treatise. He suggests two main groups that claim to discipline the soul through teaching philosophy: the 
one through eristic and the other through political discourse (οι µε`ν δια` τωñν ε ριστικωñν λο' γων οι δε` δια` 
τωñν piολιτικωñν; 51). Although Isocrates identifies himself with the latter,57 a teacher’s worth, he claims, 
will be seen in whether the student is able to deliberate successfully on matters, in other words, whether 
the teaching is useful in real-life activities. Isocrates has confidence in the ability of his own 
educational programme to produce such a student and these closing paragraphs mean to exhort the 
reader to follow this programme. Having offered the king counsel on that of which he is knowledgeable 
(54), Isocrates fits his own description of “the good counsellor [who] is the most useful and the most 
princely of all possessions” (53). 
In the frame of the treatise we see Isocrates encouraging the reader to adopt the advice given in the 
body of the text. The advisor he describes matches the description of Isocrates himself, and the benefits 
available to the one adopting this advice correspond to those derived by Isocrates’ pupils. The treatise 
To Nicocles thus serves as both an exhortation to, and an instance of, Isocrates’ educational 
programme.58 
Wisdom (9–14)
The opening passage, §9, sets out to define Isocrates’ main topic: the proper function of a king (τι' 
τωñν βασιλευο' ντων ε»ργον ε στι'ν). A careful definition will allow him to correctly handle the parts that 
make up his discourse. The king’s duties are defined as follows: to relieve the state when it is in 
distress, to maintain it in prosperity, and to make it great when it is small. All royals activities, then, 
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55. Konstan, “Isocrates’ ‘Republic’,” 118.
56. See, e.g., Panath. 1–2 for the same contrast between pleasure and utility. In making this distinction, Isocrates does 
not deny that a text can be useful in addition to bringing pleasure. He notes that those who would reach the masses will 
necessarily need to employ this combination of pleasure and utility, as Homer did (Ad Nic. 48–49). See Too, Rhetoric of 
Identity, 30–33, for further discussion of the pleasure/utility distinction.   
57. Isocrates seems somewhat positive without being effusive in his praise towards eristic teaching when it is part of a 
larger programme of education (e.g. Panath. 26 and Antid. 261), but see Helen 1 for the observation that these sorts of 
disputations are not only useless but can even be harmful. For the argument that Isocrates meant for all of his writings to fall 
within the genre of logos politikos, see Too, Rhetoric of Identity, 19–35. 
58. For further description of this programme, see Livingstone, “Voice of Isocrates”; Niall Livingstone, “Writing 
Politics: Isocrates’ Rhetoric of Philosophy,” Rhetorica: A Journal of the History of Rhetoric 25.1 (2007): 15–34.
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would have the good of the state as their goal. Isocrates’ monarchy is no different from other 
constitutions in this regard.59
In the first major section of the treatise, the focus is on the king’s intellect and on the virtues 
related to the mind. If kings are to act for the good of their state, then it is necessary that they must be 
superior in intelligence (φρονιµω' τερον) and must prepare their minds (τα`ς ε αυτωñ ν γνω' µας 
piαρασκευα' σωσιν) for the task (10). As much as it is true that the king surpasses others in virtue (11),60 
Isocrates makes the noetic superiority of the king explicit at §14, thus indicating its significance within 
his understanding of kingship.
In Isocrates’ writings, to be “high-souled” (µεγαλο'ψυχος) is to think the thoughts of an immortal 
(Demon. 32; cf. Evag. 3, 27). The development of the king’s soul is an important topic. In §11 
Isocrates encourages the king to train his soul (ψυχη' ) even more than an athlete would his body.61 The 
maxims contained in the treatise are given to this end since, as he states elsewhere, “[just] as it is the 
nature of the body to be developed by appropriate exercises, [so] it is the nature of the soul to be 
developed by moral precepts (τοιñς σpiουδαι'οις λο' γοις)” (Demon. 12; cf. Paneg. 1–2). Nicocles is urged 
to listen to poets and learn from sages as he prepares himself to rule;62 these intellectual pursuits are, 
again, referred to in athletic terms as γυ' µνασις “training” (13). The strongest challenge to self-
improvement will necessarily come from the king himself as he trains his understanding (τη`ν αυ τουñ 
δια' νοιαν α  σκη' σεις; 14), yet another phrase that draws on the semantic field of athletic endeavour.
Isocrates’ use of athletic/agonistic imagery not only emphasizes the necessity to develop the 
intellect, but it also suggest a clear distinction between body and soul.63 According to Antidosis 180, 
human nature consists of body and soul, and of these, the soul is superior since it deliberates on matters 
while the body serves the soul in carrying out its decisions. In another well known Isocratean analogy, 
the constitution is identified as the ψυχη'  of the city, since it has as much power over the city as 
thought/wisdom (φρο' νησις) has over the body.64 Two points should be noted: first, Isocrates does not 
make a precise distinction between ψυχη'  and φρο' νησις, and seems to identify soul with mind. Second, 
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59. Eucken, Isokrates, 225; Jaeger, Paideia III, 93.
60. Cf. Nic. 15: “Monarchies ... make the highest award to the best man (τωñ,  βελτι'στω, ).” 
61. For discussion of the soul in Homer, Aristotle, Herodotus, Euripides, and Plato (including caveats about translating 
the term as “soul”) see Michael Davis, The Soul of the Greeks: An Inquiry (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011). See 
also  Jan N. Bremmer, The Early Greek Concept of the Soul (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983) for an analysis of 
the concept in Archaic Greece. André Laks, “Soul, Sensation, and Thought,” in The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek 
Philosophy, ed. A. A. Long (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 250–70 presents a useful introductory essay 
that focuses largely on the pre-Socratics.
62. At §53 Isocrates tells the prince, “those [persons] contribute most to the greatness of your reign who can contribute 
most to your understanding (δια' νοια).” Demonicus is urged to heed  Isocrates’ exhortations and to add to them what is best 
in the poets and what is useful from other sages (Demon. 51).
63. Another analogy compares the benefit of philosophical training on the soul with that of medicine upon the body 
(Bus. 22). See also Demonicus 40: “Strive with your body to be a lover of toil, and with your soul to be a lover of wisdom.” 
The soul/body opposition can be traced back to Homer but its meaning changes together with the meaning of the individual 
term. Beliefs about transmigration greatly influenced these changes in the sixth and fifth centuries (Laks, “Soul,” 251–52).
64. This passage occurs in two late works—Panath. 138 and Areop. 14—possibly in response to Plato’s Republic (so 
G. R. F. Ferrari, City and Soul in Plato’s Republic, Lecturae Platonis [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005], 103–4).
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
the function of this aspect of a human being is to control the body.65 This second point makes it crucial 
that this aspect of the king’s person be trained in the virtues.
Can Virtue Be Taught?. The question must then be asked whether Isocrates thinks that virtue can be 
taught.66  In the Antidosis 209–214, Isocrates expresses dismay and astonishment that there are some 
who think that education and philosophy are not able to improve an individual. These people observe 
that animals can become more gentle or intelligent through training, yet they deny that human nature, 
which is far superior, can be improved in this way. Isocrates tells Nicocles that diligence (ε piιµε'λεια) is 
able to make one better and wiser, and drawing again on the analogy of training wild animals, Isocrates 
argues against those who say that human beings are not able to pursue virtue (Ad Nic.12). Taken at face 
value, these passages suggest that Isocrates follows the Sophists’ position at this point: that virtue can 
indeed be taught.67 However, he seeks to qualify this basic sophistic tenet.68
While allowing that virtue can be taught, Isocrates argues that the student also needs natural 
ability and practical experience (Soph. 10, 14–15).69 Just as an athletic coach is limited by the athlete’s 
physical ability, so the teacher of philosophy is limited by the student’s nature (Antid. 181–185). 
Someone with great natural ability can succeed even if he or she only receives a mediocre education 
(Antid. 189–190). It is not possible to implant the virtues into those with depraved natures, but an 
education in Isocratean political discourse (piολιτικοι' λο' γοι) can serve to stimulate the student’s 
development (Soph. 21; Antid. 274–277). At first glance it might seem that Isocrates is only speaking 
about oratory and not necessarily virtue. But the description of the piεpiαιδευµε'νοι at Panathenaicus 30–
32 makes it clear that virtue is one of the goals of Isocrates’ educational programme. In order for the 
student to advance in this programme and to achieve virtue, all three elements—natural ability, 
practical experience, and education—must be present.70 Evagoras is held up as an example of one who, 
though “gifted by nature with the highest intelligence,” still spent time in inquiry, deliberation, and 
counsel in order to prepare his mind for rule (Evag. 41).
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65. Intoxication can impair the intellect (δια' νοια) and cause the soul to stumble, as demonstrated by its inability to 
control the body (Demon. 32). 
66. Paul Shorey (“Φυ' σις, Μελε'τη, Ε  piιστη' µη,” TAPA 40 [1909]: 187) observes that the question of whether virtue can 
be taught forms part of the bigger question about the relationship between φυ' σις and νο' µος. W. K. C. Guthrie, The Sophists 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971) provides a good summary of the origins of these questions: for the 
φυ' σις/νο' µος, see pp. 55–134; for virtue, see pp. 250–260.
67. See, e.g., George Briscoe Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 131–
38. Guthrie notes that since this claim was tied up with the Sophists’ livelihood, “the suggestion that no teacher could 
communicate it [virtue] was in Socrates’s day an attack on a large vested interest” (Sophists, 257).
68. It is not necessary to suppose that Isocrates has given any careful thought to this question. He draws on 
commonplace ideas that are found throughout the literature that precedes him. “Isocrates’ admirable summing up of the 
whole question offered nothing new to any well-informed fourth-century reader” (Shorey, “Φυ' σις,” 193).  
69. Cf. Plato, Phaedr. 269d. For a discussion of the similarities between Isocrates and Plato on these matters, see 
Wareh, Isocrates and the Philosophers, 58–69, and Shorey, “Φυ' σις.”
70. Jaeger perceives a shift in emphasis from Isocrates’ position in Against the Sophists—dubious about the possibility 
of teaching virtue—to the exhortation in To Nicocles in which Isocrates seems far more positive about training in virtue. 
Jaeger attributes this shift, not to a fundamental change in Isocrates’ philosophical position, but rather to the change in 
purpose of the respective texts. He summarizes Isocrates’ position as follows: “Theoretically, he is a pessimist with regard to 
the philosophical paradox that virtue can be taught. But practically, his will to teach remains unbroken” (Paideia III, 95). 
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  Similarly, Evagoras’ son, Nicocles, must surround himself with sages and pay careful attention to 
the teaching of the poets in order that he might improve himself through the education he receives from 
them (Ad Nic. 12–13). The king should be inspired to pursue the intellectual virtues by remembering 
that it is “monstrous” for the foolish to rule over those of greater wisdom.71
The “hinge” verse at 15a concludes by stressing the significance of wisdom “for those who set out 
to do their duty.” But if wisdom is foundational, the length of the following section suggests the 
centrality of justice in Isocrates’ advice to the young king.
Justice (15–29a)
The lexeme δικαιοσυ' νη does not appear explicitly in 15–29a, and δι'καιος only occurs four times 
(17, 18, 20, 24). We might ask, therefore, whether “justice” is an adequate or accurate rubric under 
which to consider this section.72 The content of this section deals largely with the way in which the 
king treats and relates to his subjects. That this is indeed central to Isocrates’ notion of justice can be 
seen from Nicocles 29–47, where Isocrates produces an extended discussion of “the two chief virtues,” 
σωφροσυ' νη and δικαιοσυ' νη.73 In the discussion of the latter (Nic. 31–35) the king mentions, among 
other things, his devotion to advancing the well-being of the state and its citizens (32), the fact that he 
has never wronged another person (35), and his service to his own citizens and “the Hellenes at large” 
(35). Justice here is primarily relational and, with regard to the king, consists of dealing fairly with his 
subjects for the sake of their welfare. The similarities between this conceptualization of justice and the 
ideas in To Nicocles 15–29a as analyzed in what follows confirm that “justice” is indeed an accurate 
description of the subject matter of this part of the treatise addressed to the Cyprian monarch.74
The good king must be φιλα' νθρωpiος and φιλο' piολις (Ad Nic. 15b).75 These virtues are perhaps not 
as altruistic as they might seem at first glance: “all governments ... have the longest life when they best 
serve the masses” (15–16). Well-disposed friends and the good will (ευ»νοια) of his subjects will ensure 
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71. This statement is made as an example of the more general principle that the better should rule over the worse (14). 
We will examine this doctrine in the context of justice in the following section.
72. Isocrates’ apparent disinterest in theorizing about justice is illustrated by the fact that his name does not appear in 
the index of Hugh Lloyd-Jones, The Justice of Zeus, Sather Classical Lectures 41 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1971) or Eric A. Havelock, The Greek Concept of Justice: From Its Shadow in Homer to Its Substance in Plato (Cambridge; 
London: Harvard University Press, 1978). 
73. There are other examples where δικαιοσυ' νη and σωφροσυ' νη occur together in such a way as to indicate that they 
are indeed the chief virtues or summarize the other virtues; see, e.g., Antid. 84, 274; Panath. 72, 138. Wilson (Mysteries of 
Righteousness, 44) notes that Isocrates follows popular opinion here in making justice and moderation the most beneficial 
virtues, in contrast to Plato for whom wisdom was the most important virtue (see Laws 631c). However, Isocrates’ statement 
in Nicocles does not negate the significance he assigns to wisdom in his advice to kings.
74. When Isocrates seeks to convince his audience that all his writings are intent upon exhorting his readers to virtue 
and justice (Antid. 67), he quotes To Nicocles 14–39 (cf. Antid. 73), which includes this section on justice. It is clear that 
δικαιοσυ' νη was established as a key virtue at an early stage in Greek writing; see E. F. Beall, “Hesiod’s Treatise on Justice: 
Works and Days 109–380,” CJ 101.2 (2005–6): 161–82.
75. Evagoras was beloved and admired for governing reverently and humanely (θεοφιλωñς και` φιλανθρω' piως; Evag. 43).
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the king’s safety more than any bodyguard (21).76 The monarch will best establish his authority by 
convincing his subjects that his concern for their safety (σωτηρι'α) exceeds their own (24). Isocrates’ 
discussion of justice shows an interesting combination of Realpolitik and real concern for the king’s 
subjects. On the one hand, there is the recognition that even in a monarchy, the citizens must be kept 
happy, since a dissatisfied population will inevitably lead to a change of government. On the other 
hand, the essence of good government is that it must honour those who deserve it and protect all from 
injustice (16). It is this line of thinking that Isocrates highlights at Antidosis 70, where he claims that in 
the treatise addressed to Nicocles, he is “pleading the cause of [the king’s] subjects, and striving with 
all my powers to secure for them the mildest (piραοτα' την) government possible.” For Isocrates there is 
nothing intrinsically unjust about monarchy, as long as φιλανθρωpiι'α characterises the ruler’s dealings 
with his subjects. The king’s performance of his judicial role provides the clearest example of the 
combination of δικαιοσυ' νη and φιλανθρωpiι'α.
It is not surprising to find the king’s judicial role discussed in a section related to justice. This, 
after all, is an essential element of the king’s duty within a monarchical government. In order to be 
δεινο' ς (stern) the good king should not overlook any misdeed (23),77 yet his authority is not to be 
established by being harsh or excessive in the punishment he deals out (24). Rather, he should show 
that he is piραñος (gentle, kind) by tempering any punishment he might be called upon to deliver (23). 
Justice consists not only of punishing those who have transgressed in some or other way, but 
fundamental to Isocrates’ sense of justice is the necessity of leniency. Strict δικαιοσυ' νη is thus 
moderated by φιλανθρωpiι'α. This emphasis should probably be attributed to Isocrates’ teaching about 
the importance of good will between the king and his subjects.
In Isocrates’ monarchy, the king’s judgment has replaced law. When judging between two parties, 
impartiality is the most important principle to which the king must adhere (18). The king’s impartiality 
at this point is compared to “wisely ordained laws” which are described in §17 as being just, beneficial, 
and consistent, allowing for the speedy resolution of disputes. These laws should, furthermore, 
encourage industry and discourage frivolous lawsuits (18).78 The king should adapt and change poor 
“public ordinances and institutions” according to what he considers best for his subjects, if necessary, 
imitating what is good in the laws of other countries (17). Whatever their source, with regard to the 
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76. While Jaqueline de Romilly (“Eunoia in Isocrates or the Political Importance of Creating Good Will,” JHS 78 
[1958]: 92–101) is correct that Isocrates usually employs the concept of ευ»νοια in the context of foreign affairs, i.e., the 
relationship between states, it is also an important aspect of the relationship between ruler and ruled. In addition to the 
passage under discussion; see also Demon. 36; Nic. 58, 61.
77. Cf. Evag. 43 where Evagoras is praised for ruling with strictness (σφο' δρα µε`ν α piα' ντων α»ρχων), and punishing 
wrongdoers according to the law.
78. Is sycophancy in view here? For Isocrates’ characterization of sycophants, see, e.g., Euth. 5; Antid. 164, 288; 
Callim. 51–52, 64. For an attempt to provide the sycophant with a somewhat more positive image within the democratic 
structures of Athens, see Robin Osborne, “Vexatious Litigation in Classical Athens: Sykophancy and the Sykophant,” in 
Nomos: Essays in Athenian Law, Politics, and Society, ed. Paul Cartledge, Paul Millett, and Stephen Todd (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 83–102; for a response to Osborne and a defence of the traditional view, see David 
Harvey, “The Sykophant and Sykophancy: Vexatious Redefinition?” in Nomos: Essays in Athenian Law, Politics, and 
Society, ed. Paul Cartledge, Paul Millett, and Stephen Todd (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 103–21.
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laws, the king’s authority is absolute: “Regard my words as your law” (Nic. 62).79 Isocrates offers no 
further exposition in To Nicocles of his understanding of law and its relationship to monarchy.
In the discourse addressed to Philip II Isocrates indicates that the king is completely free from the 
dictates of constitution or laws. Whereas other eminent leaders are necessarily bound by these 
institutions and unable to act beyond what they prescribe, the king, unhindered by laws or assemblies, 
is able to act with freedom (Phil. 12–15; cf. 127). For this very reason, there is more value in 
addressing the monarch directly80—the very thing Isocrates does in this discourse and in his advice to 
Nicocles—leaving the ruler to work out the details of the law code suitable to his own state. So 
absolute is the king’s authority that Isocrates seems to leave little, if any, space for even divine 
oversight.
The King and the Gods. The gods occupy a small role in Isocrates’ writings.81 There is no indication 
that he considers the law divine in any sense or that he considers kingship to be an imitation of the 
divine. The only mention of the gods in To Nicocles comes in §20 where the king is urged to adhere to 
his ancestral practices while at the same time realising that the best sacrifice and greatest worship 
consists in his being the best and most just man.82 Similarly, Demonicus is urged to show his piety 
through both sacrifice but also keeping his vows (Demon. 13).83 Religion is ethical as well as cultic, 
and so reverence towards the gods and justice towards humanity are the summary characteristics of the 
good man (Panath. 124, 204; Nic. 2).84 In the advice he gives to young rulers, Isocrates does not stray 
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79. Similarly, Demonicus is told to obey the laws laid down by kings, but to consider the kings’ way of life (τρο' piος) as 
the greatest law (Demon. 36). See below, pp. 51–55, for a discussion of the king as a model.
80. Cf. Ep. 1.5 (addressed to Dionysius): “those who wish to bring some serious thing to pass should address the man 
who is likely most promptly to accomplish in deed that which the word has proposed.”
81. This does not necessarily mean that religion was unimportant in Isocrates’ thought. It could simply indicate that he 
did not consider religion and the divine significant as part of his educational programme, even if these elements were 
important in daily life. For a discussion of the centrality of religion and its cult in the polis, see Christiane Sourvinou-
Inwood, “What is Polis Religion?” in The Greek City: From Homer to Alexander, ed. Oswyn Murray and Simon R. F. Price 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 295–322; Mogens Herman Hansen, Polis: An Introduction to the Ancient Greek City-State 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 118–21; cf. Julia Kindt, Rethinking Greek Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012) for an attempt to move beyond traditional models of polis religion.
82. At a number of places Isocrates associates piety (ο σιο' της) with justice (δικαιοσυ' νη); see Antid. 76, 284; Plat. 2. 
The close link in fourth-century philosophy between justice and piety is discussed at length in Jon D. Mikalson, Greek 
Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 187–207.
83. On keeping oaths, see Mikalson, Greek Popular Religion, 155–57.On the commonplace nature of the injunction to 
honour the gods and one’s parents (Demon. 13–14), see Leslie Kurke, “Pindar’s Sixth Pythian and the Tradition of Advice 
Poetry,” TAPA 120 (1990): 89 n. 20.
84. In the same way, in the Areopagiticus, Isocrates argues that a well-ordered community is marked out by proper 
conduct towards the gods (29–30) and towards one another (31–35), expressed in the same categories of justice observed in 
To Nicocles.
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far from traditional platitudes: “Fear the gods, honor your parents, respect your friends, obey the laws” 
(Demon. 16).85
 As one moves from considering the king as religious actor to considering the king’s divine nature 
(or lack thereof), it becomes clear that Isocrates’ conception of kingship lacks the religious and 
mystical elements that occur in other writers, especially those in the Hellenistic period.86 Isocrates is 
agnostic as to whether or not human monarchy reflects the divine order, but even if it doesn’t, he 
claims that the fact that most people assume that Zeus is a king proves the superiority of this form of 
government (Nic. 26). As will be shown in the following chapter, this parallel between the human and 
divine king is exploited in a number of piερι` βασιλει'ας treatises, and frequently around questions of the 
origin and nature of law. Isocrates, however, shows no such inclination.
One statement, in particular, is frequently cited as evidence for Isocrates’ contribution to the 
development of the Hellenistic ruler cult.87  In a letter to Philip II, Isocrates states that, should Philip 
defeat the Persian king, there will be nothing left for him to do except become a god (Ep. 3.5). That 
Isocrates is indeed attributing divinity to the Macedonian seems unlikely in the light of evidence found 
elsewhere in his writings. Without wanting to diminish any of Evagoras’ deeds, Isocrates classifies as 
extravagant and hyperbolic those who speak of rulers as gods among men or mortal divinities (Evag. 
72), an attitude he considers characteristic of Persian inferiority (Paneg. 151).88 Isocrates also plays 
down the significance of “portents, oracles, the visions appearing in dreams” which some claim were 
associated with Evagoras’ birth (Evag. 21). He gives as his reason for neglecting these accounts the 
fact that they are known only to a few and that he prefers to speak of those facts that are publicly 
known.89 In light of §72, however, this statement provides further evidence for Isocrates’ desire to 
avoid portraying Evagoras’ kingship in divine terms. With Jon Mikalson, then, it is probably best to 
consider Isocrates’ statement to Philip metaphorically.90
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85. Dieter Zeller points out the similarities in form and content between this passage and the opening of Sosiades’ 
collection of sayings from the Seven Sages (Stob. 3.1.137 = WH 3, 125–128 ): Ε« piου θεωñ, . Νο' µω,  piει'θου. Θεου`ς σε'βου. 
Γονειñς αι δουñ (“Pauline Paraenesis in Romans 12 and Greek Gnomic Widsom,” in Greco-Roman Culture and the New 
Testament, ed. David Edward Aune and Frederick E. Brenk, NovTSup 143 [Leiden: Brill, 2012], 76–79). For a summary list 
of the sort of general statements about religion made by orators and philosophers in this period, see Jon D. Mikalson, 
Religion in Hellenistic Athens, HCS 29 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 32 n. 49.
86. James R. Harrison, Paul and the Imperial Authorities at Thessalonica and Rome: A Study in the Conflict of 
Ideology, WUNT 273 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), 280; Louis Delatte, Les Traités de la Royauté d’Ecphante, 
Diotogène et Sthénidas, Bibliothèque de la Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres de l’Université de Liége 97 (Paris: Droz, 
1942), 130–31.
87. For a summary discussion of the classical beginnings of the Hellenistic ruler cult, see Hans-Josef Klauck, The 
Religious Context of Early Christianity: A Guide to Graeco-Roman Religions, trans. Brian McNeil (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
2000), 253–66.
88. The Persian anti-type is also in view at Phil. 124, where the Persians are characterized as effeminate barbarians, 
unskilled in war and degenerate because of their addiction to luxury.
89. Isocrates traces Evagoras’ lineage back to Zeus via Aeacus (Evag. 12–21; cf. Nic. 42). Rather than demonstrate 
divinity, this is “to provide his hero with an ethical potential inherited from mythical ancestors” (Tomas Hägg, The Art of 
Biography in Antiquity [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012], 35). The genealogical argument may also serve as 
an argument for the king’s authority (Atack, “Debating Kingship,” 151–52).
90. “Isocrates is, perhaps, not to be taken literally here but as pushing to an extreme a metaphor known since Homer 
(e.g., Il. 24.258–59)” (Mikalson, Hellenistic Athens, 47 n. 2).
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In summary, the king is responsible for establishing laws according to which he then exercises 
judgment, meting out punishment that is, when appropriate, marked by leniency. There is no sense of 
an external guide or measure according to which these laws should be established. The most important 
characteristic of these laws, however, is that they exist for and seek to further the good of the king’s 
subjects. The king’s authority, including that of establishing laws, is based solely on his person.
Government by the Best. The king’s authority in the realm of law, and indeed, everything else, is based 
on his superiority. William Desmond points out that this definition of the king as “the best,” together 
with the question it naturally raises—“How is the best defined?”—pervade Homer’s poems.91 In 
addressing the concerns of Otanes and Megabyzus about monarchical abuses, Herodotus’ Darius 
responds: “One could describe nothing better than the rule of the one best man ( α  νδρο`ς ... ενο`ς τουñ 
α  ρι'στου); using the best judgment, he will govern the multitude with perfect wisdom” (Hist. 3.82).92 
The same emphasis on the superiority and excellence of the king can be found in Isocrates’ kingship 
writings.
Isocrates encourages Nicocles to remember that it is a terrible thing for the worse to rule the better 
(του`ς χει'ρους τωñν βελτιο' νων α»ρχειν; Ad Nic. 14). It is of the essence of justice to distinguish between 
the good and the bad and to treat them differently (Nic. 14). This distinction forms one of the 
arguments presented in support of monarchy (Nic. 14–15), since it is only in a monarchy that the best 
person is rewarded with the highest position. This corresponds to the idea of a geometric or 
proportional distribution of honour and responsibility.93 
Absolute monarchy of this sort is open to abuse, however. Without the sanction of any 
constitution or laws, and in the absence of any divine direction, what is to prevent a king from preying 
on his subjects?94 Isocrates’ answer is that the character of the superior person will inhibit this sort of 
behaviour. His nature and personality, rather than institutions and customs, will produce a certain type 
of ruler and rule. To these intrinsic qualities will be added Isocrates’ paideia which will further enable 
the monarch to apply the virtues correctly. With regard to justice, for example, love for his subjects and 
his kingdom (Ad Nic. 15) are crucial since they will circumscribe the best man’s actions towards his 
subjects.95
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91. William D. Desmond, Philosopher-Kings of Antiquity (London: Continuum, 2011), 5–6.
92. So, e.g., Aristotle, Pol. 1284b25–34, where someone who excels in virtue (τις γε'νηται διαφε'ρων κατ’ α  ρετη' ν) must 
necessarily rule over all others.
93. Cf. Aristotle, Eth. nic. 5.1131a25–30 for his statement of geometric or proportional equality in relation to 
distributive justice. This is worked out in relation to the distribution of political offices in Book 3 of Aristotle’s Politics. For 
a survey of justice in Aristotle, see Charles M. Young, “Aristotle’s Justice,” in The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics, ed. Richard Kraut (Malden: Blackwell, 2006), 179–97. Plato, too, is critical of the “indiscriminate 
equality” that is the hallmark of democracy (Resp. 8.558c). For Isocrates’ comparison of democracy, oligarchy, and 
monarchy in Nicocles, see Kehl, “Monarchie,” 46–51. Kehl argues that Isocrates’ arguments for monarchy are not derived 
from Herodotus, but should rather be traced back to the Sophists’ discussion of the best constitution (pp. 50–51).
94. This is the concern of both Otanes and Megabyzus with regard to monarchy in Herodotus’ discussion of the best 
regime (Hist. 3.80–81).
95. Jaeger, Paideia III, 96–97.
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But monarchy is not the only polity that allows the good to exercise leadership; Isocrates 
recognizes the possibility of other good forms of government. When addressing Athenians, he allows 
that any of the three regimes—democracy, oligarchy, monarchy—might attain excellence as long as the 
excellent are allowed to lead (Panath. 131–132).96 The democracy of Solon and Cleisthenes, for 
example, recognized this truth and filled the city’s offices, not through the drawing of lots, but by 
appointing the best and most suited to each position (Areop. 20–22). A democracy in which the most 
capable exercise authority over the state and in which the people have authority over those rulers will 
be marked by stability and justice (Areop. 27). The reader is again confronted with a discrepancy in 
Isocrates’ political thought. In Nicocles he argues not only that monarchy is superior because it awards 
the superior person with the top position in the states’s hierarchy, but also that monarchy is best able to 
assess the worth of each citizen and reward him or her accordingly.97 While some will continue to see 
Isocrates as hopelessly confused or duplicitous,98 Isocrates’ understanding of the rule of the superior 
person seems to provide another example of his ability to produce a discourse that is best suited to a 
particular audience at a particular time. 
Nonetheless, the rule of the best remains a hallmark of Isocrates’ portrait of the ideal king. This 
idea is central in Hellenistic constructions of kingship and we will return to it at the end of this chapter. 
War. The question of justice in relation to other states is raised in a brief discussion of war (Ad Nic. 
24–26). Elsewhere Isocrates holds up the success of sole leadership in war as another proof of the 
superiority of monarchy (Nic. 22–25).99 In To Nicocles, the king is advised to be prepared for war, but 
to have peace as his goal. Isocrates is neither a pacifist nor a warmonger, and his advice comes from 
one who knows both the cost and the necessity of war. As a general rule, he asserts, the king should 
deal with weaker states as he would like stronger states to deal with him. Foreign citizens should feel 
safe within his city and the king to be moderate and sensible in matters pertaining to outsiders (22).
Friends. The king’s friends occupy the opposite end of this spectrum. The relational elements within 
Isocrates’ concept of δικαιοσυ' νη provide the reason for the inclusion of friendship in this part of the 
treatise. Isocrates is not alone in bringing questions of friendship into the discussion of justice,100 but 
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96. Later in this discourse, Isocrates introduces a pro-Spartan interlocutor who suggests the possibility that the wisest 
might at times fail to discern the correct course of action at a particular point and one who is inferior might chance upon the 
right decision (Panath. 248). This role-reversal is also highlighted by the fact that in this exchange the teacher, Isocrates, has 
become a pupil (see Livingstone, “Voice of Isocrates,” 266–68). Isocrates seems to use the ambiguity introduced by this 
interlocutor as part of his critique of Athens (Ober, Political Dissent, 364–65)
97. Atack, “Debating Kingship,” 148–49.
98. So Baynes, “Isocrates”.
99. So Homer, in a well known clause supporting sole rule: “In no wise shall we Achaeans all be kings here. No good 
thing is a multitude of lords; let there be one lord, one king, to whom the son of crooked-counselling Cronos hath vouchsafed 
the sceptre and judgments, that he may take counsel for his people” (Il. 203–206). The context of this statement suggests that 
it points to the desirability of sole leadership in war and not to monarchy in general (Luraghi, “One-Man Government,” 135).
100. Plato has Simonides summarise Polemarchus’ definition of justice as “To do good to friends and evil to enemies” 
(Resp. 1.332d). This “traditional” position is subsequently deconstructed and debunked by Plato’s Socrates. Isocrates would 
seem to agree with Polemarchus’ view (Demon. 26) and Aristotle’s observation about justice, that “the whole of justice in 
general is in relation to a friend” (Eth. eud. 10.1242a20) would seem to lead in the same direction.
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the combination of these two topics sounds odd to modern ears since the first seems to deal with the 
private sphere and the latter with the public sphere. In classical antiquity, however, friendship was 
understood within broad social structures that crossed the private/public divide.101 Nowhere was this 
more evident than in the case of the king’s friends.
The strategic political positions that the king’s friends occupy in Isocrates’ treatise suggests that 
he is using φι'λοι as a technical term for the king’s close advisors.102 These are companions bound to 
the king through friendship who also serve various official functions within the king’s court and 
beyond.103     
The king’s friends are crucial for his safety and should be rewarded for their loyalty in order that 
their good will towards the king is maintained (20–21).104 The king should befriend only those worthy 
of his friendship. In a surprising piece of advice that combines the teaching on friends with that of 
benefiting subjects, worthy friends are defined as those who are able to help the king best govern the 
state, rather than those of whom the king is fond (27).105 And those who would best help him govern 
are those who are truthful and who speak openly to him (20, 28). They should be confident that they 
enjoy a certain freedom of speech (piαρρησι'α) in the presence of the king. This is the friendly frankness 
which private individuals enjoy and kings often lack (3–4), the very thing that Isocrates provides in this 
treatise.106
The free speech recommended by Isocrates combines social and aristocratic aspects with political 
and democratic aspects of free speech as described by Kurt Raaflaub.107 Because of the elevated level 
of their social class, the king’s friends should be able to address him without fear of intimidation or 
retribution for speaking their minds. Also in view, however, is the freedom of speech that is necessary 
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101. Malcolm Schofield, “Political Friendship and the Ideology of Reciprocity,” in Kosmos: Essays in Order, Conflict 
and Community in Classical Athens, ed. Paul Cartledge, Paul Millett, and Sitta von Reden (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 37–51.
102. LSJ s.v. φι'λος, I.1.d.
103. The Hellenistic φι'λος develops from the Macedonian εταιñρος (Rolf Strootman, “Dynastic Courts of the Hellenistic 
Empires,” in A Companion to Ancient Greek Government, ed. Hans Beck, BCAW [Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013], 43. 
For εταιñροι in Homer, see Pierre Carlier, La Rouyauté en Grèce avant Alexandre, Études et travaux publiés par l’Université 
de Sciences Humaines de Strasbourg 6 [Strasbourg: AECR, 1984], 181–82; for the Homeric council, see pp. 185–187. 
Carlier argues in a later essay (“Homeric and Macedonian Kingship,” in Alternatives to Athens: Varieties of Political 
Organization and Community in Ancient Greece, ed. Roger Brock and Stephen Hodkinson [Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000], 259–68) that the Homeric patterns can be used to investigate Macedonian kingship and he concludes that the 
εταιñροι were those who were closely linked to the king through friendship and loyalty (pp. 261–262). For further discussion 
of the Hellenistic king’s φι'λοι, see Christian Habicht, “The Ruling Class in the Hellenistic Monarchies,” in The Hellenistic 
Monarchies: Selected Papers (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006), 26–40; Rolf Strootman, “The Hellenistic 
Royal Court: Court Culture, Ceremonial and Ideology in Greece, Egypt and the Near East, 336–30 BCE” (Ph.D. diss., Utrecht 
University, 2007), 119–39.
104. Aristotle also recognises the friendship between a superior and an inferior (Eth. eud. 7.1238b18–39), albeit of a 
different type when compared to egalitarian friendship.
105. For the role of reciprocity in hierarchical friendships of this type, see Schofield, “Political Friendship,” 43–47.
106. Although the word is not used again, it is clear in the conclusion that this is what Isocrates is offering (50–54). He 
certainly claims to engage in this sort of frank speech elsewhere (Evag. 39; Antid. 179).
107. Kurt A. Raaflaub, “Aristocracy and Freedom of Speech in the Greco-Roman World,” in Free Speech in Classical 
Antiquity, ed. Ineke Sluiter and Ralph M. Rosen, MnSup 254 (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 43.
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in, but also characteristic of, democratic polities.108 Once again we see Isocrates proposing an ideal 
kingship which is gentler than that usually associated with autocratic rule since it is tempered with what 
are usually considered “democratic virtues,” in this case, the free speech considered so vital in 
democratic Athens. 
Justice in Relationship. The focus of Isocrates’ advice on justice is primarily relational.109 The king is 
to act justly towards his subjects (as benefactor and as judge), towards other states, and towards his 
friends. Isocrates does not go to great lengths defining justice; he relies on the understanding of the 
nature of this virtue that he assumes his reader will share. As Johan Thom observes with regard to 
classical thought, “Justice as a relational concept indicating the appropriate relationship or 
proportionality between two entities was therefore considered the norm for all behaviour and for all 
relationships.”110 Using rather broad strokes Isocrates paints a picture of what justice would look like in 
the dealings of the ideal king with others.
Moderation (29b–35a)111
We have already seen (p. 43) that Isocrates assigns considerable significance to σωφροσυ' νη, 
judging it to be the “chief virtue” alongside δικαιοσυ' νη (Nic. 29; cf. Antid. 84, 274).112 Moderation 
(σωφροσυ' νη) is ascribed to Theseus at Helenae encomium 31 as that which enables him to govern the 
city well.113 The idealized past provides a political form of σωφροσυ' νη that serves to critique Athenian 
democracy while at the same time forming an important element of Isocrates’ programme of 
international relations.114 It is not unexpected, therefore, that Isocrates should include it as one of the 
head virtues in his treatise for the young king.
The king must not be enslaved by pleasure (η δονη' ) but should rather rule over his desire 
(ε  piιθυµι'α) (29). This self-control is described in terms of self-rule, a common motif in the 
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108. D. M. Carter (“Citizen Attribute, Negative Right: A Conceptual Difference Between Ancient and Modern Ideas of 
Freedom of Speech,” in Free Speech in Classical Antiquity, ed. Ineke Sluiter and Ralph M. Rosen, MnSup 254 [Leiden: 
Brill, 2004], 197–220) argues for a difference between ancient and modern manifestations of free speech. In particular, the 
Athenians conceptualized free speech not as a negative right (the modern understanding: freedom of speech as freedom from 
censorship), but as “a characteristic of citizens, an attribute, which was a sort of side effect of their political enfranchisement” 
(p. 198).
109. Cf. Aristotle: “The same reason, namely that it involves relationship with someone else, accounts for the view that 
Justice alone of the virtues is ‘the good of others,’ because it does what is for the advantage of another, either a ruler or an 
associate” (Eth. nic. 1130a2–3).
110. “Justice in the Sermon on the Mount: An Aristotelian Reading,” NovT 51 (2009): 320.
111. For treatments of the Greek virtue, see North, Sophrosyne; Adriaan Rademaker, Sophrosyne and the Rhetoric of 
Self-Restraint: Polysemy and Persuasive Use of an Ancient Greek Value Term, MnSup 259 (Leiden: Brill, 2005).
112. Elsewhere Isocrates speaks as if it is the single chief virtue: virtue and σωφροσυ' νη sum up the character of those 
who are noble and good (Areop. 37; cf. Soph. 6, 20). Atack (“Debating Kingship,” 80) suggests this collection of the virtues 
under σωφροσυ' νη  is a response to the Socratic teaching about the unity of the virtues. 
113. In this passage  Isocrates also ascribes to Theseus α  νδρι'α, ε piιστη' µη (of war), and ευ  σε'βεια. On the figure of 
Theseus in Isocrates, see Atack, “Debating Kingship,” 75–86 and Carol Atack, “The Discourse of Kingship in Classical 
Athenian Thought,” Histos 8 (2014): 343–54.
114. Panath. 151, 197; Areop. 13; see  Too, Rhetoric of Identity, 99–102. North (Sophrosyne, 142–45) observes that 
σωφροσυ' νη is used to different ends as the historical situation being addressed in the discourses changes in the first half of 
the fourth century. 
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philosophical literature of the time, especially as it pertained to ideal rulers.115 In contrast to its political 
use in treatises concerned with Athens and/or the city’s foreign policy, σωφροσυ' νη as it is applied to 
kings is a moral virtue that emphasizes self-control in the face of the temptations offered by the power 
and privilege that accompany absolute rule.116 
Self-control is displayed in various ways: by pursuing only those relationships and activities which 
are profitable (29), by seeking out only those things that add to one’s virtue (30), by being serious 
about significant things, rather than busying oneself with trivialities (30).117 In each of these cases the 
king is to pursue that which will make him a better person and thus most suited for rule. Since the king 
is, theoretically, the most virtuous person and occupies his position of authority on that basis, it follows 
that others might look to him as a model of how they might live. 
The King as Model. The king must serve as an model (piαρα' δειγµα) of self-control for his subjects 
since the character of the state is derived from those who rule over it (το` τηñς piο' λεως ο«λης ηòθος 
ο µοιουñται τοιñς α»ρχουσιν; Ad Nic.31).118 In To Nicocles it is only the king’s σωφροσυ' νη that is 
mentioned for imitation, but Isocrates states that Evagoras had turned the region surrounding his realm 
to mildness (piραο' της) and moderation (µετριο' της) (Evag. 49). Noting that both of these are typically 
related to σωφροσυ' νη, Helen North concludes that ruler and subject are, nonetheless, expected to 
exhibit different aspects of the virtue: “As the sophrosyne of the ruler in Isocratean eulogy tends to be 
confined to self-restraint, the sophrosyne of his subjects is usually obedience or quiet behavior, rather 
than more positive civic virtue.”119 In addition to the king’s virtues, his general pattern of living is 
meant to be exemplary: “Obey the laws which have been laid down by kings, but consider their manner 
of life (η γουñ το`ν ε κει'νων τρο' piον) your highest law” (Demon. 36). It is the example set by the king, 
rather than the laws or constitution,  that serves the subject as the clearest guide for living well.120  The 
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115. Plato’s Socrates says that a ruler should be able to rule himself. Such a person would be moderate and self-
controlled, able to rule over pleasure and desire (σω' φρονα ο»ντα και` ε γκρατηñ  αυ  το`ν εαυτουñ, τωñν η δονωñν και` ε piιθυµιωñν) 
(Plato, Gorg. 491d–e; cf. Resp. 4.430d–431b; Xenophon, Mem. 2.1.1–7, 4.5.1–12; Ages. 10.2: “Agesilaus prided himself less 
on reigning over others than on ruling himself” ). See also Demon. 21; Nic. 29.
116. North, Sophrosyne, 145. With regard to the longevity of this sense of the virtue, North observes that “the civic 
virtue of sophrosyne did not survive the Athenian democracy which gave it birth, but the sophrosyne of the ruler was one of 
the most persistent and influential aspects developed in the entire history of the concept, and was especially fruitful in history 
and oratory” (145 n. 67).
117. To be more precise, Isocrates urges the king to conceal his love for trivialities while making public his 
earnestness. Isocrates’ pragmatism seems to be on view here. If the king must engage in unseemly behaviour, then it is best to 
keep this secret.
118. As Jaeger observes, “[Isocrates] makes the ideal monarch the representative of his people's culture, the visible 
embodiment of the character of his state” (Paideia III, 100). The same idea is expressed with regard to the democratic state; 
see, e.g., Panath. 197; Areop. 22, 28. Ryan K. Balot (Courage in the Democratic Polis: Ideology and Critique in Classical 
Athens [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014], 11–13) notes how certain constitutions were thought to promote certain 
virtues or vices. Democracy engenders courage while tyranny foments cowardice. Balot cites as examples Herodotus 5.78, 91 
(democracy); Xenophon, Hiero 5 (tyranny).
119. North, Sophrosyne, 147.
120. On the basis of Ad Nic. 9, presumably, Jaeger (Paideia III, 93) states that Isocrates is concerned only with the 
state’s “material greatness and prosperity” and not, like Plato, with the education of its citizens. This passage indicates that 
the king should be concerned with his subjects’ ethical development, so Kehl (“Monarchie,” 113–14).
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same concept is placed in the mouth of the king, who offers himself as a paradigm through which his 
subjects might reform their lives. He describes his goal in writing to them as follows:
to set up my conduct as a pattern to my people (piαρα' δειγµα καταστηñσαι το`ν τρο' piον το`ν 
ε µαυτουñ τοιñς α»λλοις piολι'ταις), knowing that the multitude are likely to spend their lives in 
practices in which they see their rulers occupied. (Nic. 37)121
 That the king will serve as a model is thus an important element of monarchy in Isocratean political 
thought. The source of this way of thinking, however, must be sought in Isocrates’ pedagogy.122 
As we have seen above, Isocrates’ text is addressed to multiple audiences. Not only the king, but 
also his subjects, and perhaps even some in Athens, were expected to read and benefit from the letter 
To Nicocles.123 As such, Isocrates’ writings provide an insight into his educational programme, within 
which imitation plays a significant role. The source of imitation is found not only in the teacher, but 
also in the text and in the paradigmatic examples presented in the text.124 
As part of his educational programme, Isocrates urges Demonicus to seek out the example of the 
noble (α  ντιpiοιουµε'νους τωñν σpiουδαι'ων) and not to imitate the base (µη` τωñν φαυ' λων ειòναι µιµητα' ς) 
(Demon. 2). Heracles, Theseus, but especially Demonicus’ own father, Hipponicus, all stand as 
examples that might be emulated (8–9).
I have produced a sample125 of the nature of Hipponicus, after whom you should pattern your 
life as after an example (piαρα' δειγµα), regarding his conduct as your law, and striving to 
imitate and emulate your father's virtue; for it were a shame, when painters represent the 
beautiful among animals, for children not to imitate (µιµειñσθαι) the noble among their 
ancestors. (Demon. 11)
Isocrates concludes this section by exhorting Demonicus to rival his father in his way of life (Demon. 
12). This language of competition and rivalry occurs in other treatises where imitation is in view.126 
The student is encouraged to surpass the example set before him or her.
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121. At this point, of course, the king’s pattern of life is seen most clearly in the text he is placing before his subjects 
(Too, Rhetoric of Identity, 190). That this is an important goal of this particular text is highlighted at §29 and §47.
122. For a more general discussion of the significance of narrative and examples as part of an ethical education, see 
Hedrick, “Imitating Virtue”. Robert Hariman (“Civic Education, Classical Imitation, and Democratic Polity,” in Isocrates 
and Civic Education, ed. Takis Poulakos and David Depew [Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004], 217–34) discusses 
Isocrates’ use of imitation. See also Ad Nic. 35. 
123. See, e.g., Nic. 11. In some ways, the audience of Isocrates’ orations (Nicocles, the king’s Cyprian subjects, the 
Athenian assembly) are simply part of the mise en scène of Isocrates’ work, “an enabling fiction” for his written text 
(Kathryn A. Morgan, “The Education of Athens: Politics and Rhetoric in Isocrates and Plato,” in Isocrates and Civic 
Education, ed. Takis Poulakos and David Depew [Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004], 148).  
124. At Soph. 17 the teacher must present himself as a model of oratory; for discussion, see Too, Rhetoric of 
Identity, 184–94. For Evagoras as a biographical model, see Hägg, Art of Biography, 30–45; Collins, Exhortations to 
Philosophy, 178–79.
125. This is only a “sample” or perhaps a “sketch” (δειñγµα); presumably Demonicus is meant to complete the portrait 
(Collins, Exhortations to Philosophy, 222, n. 48; cf. Too, Rhetoric of Identity, 194–99).
126. See, e.g., Nic. 59–60; Ad Nic. 12–13.
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When the student is a monarch and the example is the teacher, it is difficult for the teacher to be 
offered as an object of imitation.127 One should emulate those who are superior to oneself and the king 
is meant to be superior to all. Niall Livingstone frames the same problem in more general terms: “to 
‘become’ an Isocrates is not a relevant goal for a pupil bent on a political career.”128 Given that 
Isocrates’ pupils are largely engaged in the political life and will take on roles that he chooses to 
avoid,129 what exactly are they to imitate? What elements of Isocrates’ model are they to observe and 
emulate? The answer is found in Isocrates’ logoi. Although there is a consistent Isocratean identity 
throughout his speeches, the voices and political perspectives presented therein tend to change. 
Through following his example, they will be able to assess situations that arise, make correct 
judgments, and choose the correct course of action (Panath. 30). The other aspect of education, the 
refining of virtue (Panath. 31–32), is something that Isocrates’ pupils might do through more direct 
imitation of their teacher, although this is nowhere stated explicitly. Again, it would seem that we are 
dealing with the problem of those who are greater in virtue (rulers) imitating the lesser (the teacher). 
Isocrates’ solution to this problem is twofold.
First, Isocrates avoids this problem by not using the language of imitation in this context in the 
treatise To Nicocles. Instead, he offers counsel that would benefit the king (2, 7, 53–54). The language 
of imitation is largely replaced by exhortation. And by offering the king this advice, Isocrates positions 
himself as one of those sages whom the king should send for and keep near if he is to succeed in his 
office (13).
Second, even if Isocrates cannot serve as a model for the king, another king might.130 Isocrates 
thus holds up Nicocles’ father as one who might be imitated (Evag. 73–77). In his treatise concerning 
the deceased king, Isocrates provides Nicocles with a memorial of Evagoras’ deeds and character 
(73).131 A memorial text of this nature has numerous advantages over a traditional statue.132 Its 
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127. In the realm of rhetoric, however, Isocrates offers the teacher as a suitable, even necessary, model (Soph. 17–18). 
Too argues on the basis of Against the Sophists that this does not imply that the pupil is a precise replica of the teacher. A 
good teacher leaves room for a student to create his or her own identity (Rhetoric of Identity, 194–99).
128. Livingstone, “Voice of Isocrates,” 270.
129. Isocrates claims that he is “not robust and vigorous enough for public affairs,” and that he lacks “the two things 
which have the greatest power in Athens—a strong voice and ready assurance (φωνηñς ικανηñς και` το' λµης)” (Panath. 9–10).
130. For Isocrates’ use of historical examples, see Jaeger, Paideia III, 100–103. The significance of the past in 
Isocrates is also discussed in Collins, Exhortations to Philosophy, 219–23. See also Phil. 109–115 where Isocrates 
encourages Philip II to imitate the model of Heracles. Kehl (“Monarchie,” 78) claims that Isocrates provides us with the first 
extant Greek texts to use Heracles as an example of ideal kingship. He denies any direct relationship between Isocrates and 
Antisthenes at this point (pp. 81–82). The source of the comparison with Heracles might be the Macedonian claim to descent 
from Zeus via Heracles and the Temenid–Argive line (Theopompus frag. 393; see Robin J. Lane Fox, “Philip of Macedon: 
Accession, Ambitions, and Self-Presentation,” in Brill’s Companion to Ancient Macedon: Studies in the Archaeology and 
History of Macedon, 650 BC–300 AD, ed. Robin J. Lane Fox [Leiden: Brill, 2011], 351).  
131. Hägg suggests that the Evagoras’ lack of psychological (and other) detail, even by ancient standards, is the result 
of the text’s panegyric and protreptic elements—“There is no balance created, or intended, between the personal and the 
ideal; the ideal is never allowed to take on flesh and blood” (Art of Biography, 40).
132. This is not to deny the worth of physical representations of this type. Mention of the king's physical beauty at 
Evagoras 23 suggests that physiognomy played a role in Isocrates’ thought, albeit a relatively minor one. 
Xenophon’s Agesilaus desired to leave behind memorials of his ψυχη'  rather than his σωñµα since the latter was the 
work of a sculptor for the rich, while the former would exist on the basis of his own efforts and represents the work of the 
good (Ages. 11.7).  
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mobility, for example, means that it can be read and appreciated throughout Greece, instead of being 
confined to one place (74). More importantly, though, those who wish to imitate the person being 
memorialized can imitate that person’s character and thought as portrayed in such a discourse with far 
greater ease than they might imitate that person’s physical features portrayed in a statue (75). Isocrates 
hopes that the descendants of Nicocles and Evagoras will do exactly this. He concludes:
For we exhort young men to the study of philosophy (piροτρε'piοµεν ε piι` τη`ν φιλοσοφι'αν) by 
praising others in order that they, emulating those who are eulogized (ζηλουñντες του`ς 
ευ  λογουµε'νους), may desire to adopt the same pursuits, but I appeal to you and yours, using as 
examples (piαραδει'γµασι) not aliens, but members of your own family, and I counsel you to 
devote your attention to this, that you may not be surpassed in either word or deed by any of 
the Hellenes. (Evag. 77) 
Is it possible to determine how this process of imitation might have worked in Isocrates’ thinking? 
James Collins discerns at To Nicocles 37–38 a pattern in which discourse on noble deeds leads to 
habituated thought and from there to corresponding action, all of which is based upon imitating the 
deeds of those whose reputations are envied. These deeds are found in the discourses which Isocrates 
has prepared for his students.133 George Kennedy describes Isocrates as practising “a kind of 
behavioral conditioning.”134 “In short, studied speech conditions thought which, when exercised, 
corresponds to measured actions which, in turn, refer the reader again to the measured logos.”135 
Isocratean discourse is found at the beginning and the end of this process, and it is that which turns this 
process into a cycle.
So, Nicocles is to look to figures in the past as sources for his own actions (which flow from 
discourse and careful thought), but he, in turn, is to stand as an example for his subjects (Ad Nic. 31). 
“While drawing on and imitating one collection of wisdom, a person can create another collection for 
others to imitate.”136 Isocrates provides a collection of wisdom for Nicocles who, in turn, is to be a 
model of wisdom for his subjects. Isocrates concludes his treatise to Nicocles by observing that, with 
regard to the gifts of wisdom contained in the treatise,  “even though you make hard use of them every 
day without fail, you will never wear them out, but will, on the contrary, enlarge them and increase 
their worth” (Ad Nic.54). As the king heeds the words of the teacher, he becomes like the teacher and 
so Isocrates’ educational programme will continue to increase, even in his absence.137
Isocrates’ ideal king is to provide his subjects with a model upon which they might base their 
lives. As they attempt to imitate him, they will become more like him, growing in the virtues that define 
him as their superior. But to whom might the king look for an exemplar? The king’s father is held up in 
the Evagoras as a suitable model for imitation—would that the new king surpass this (no doubt, 
idealized) portrait painted by Isocrates. In addition, Isocrates offers Nicocles a gift of a discourse on 
how a king should act in order to govern well (Ad Nic. 2). Although this text does not contain any 
  
 54 
———————————
133. Cf. Antid. 274–278.
134. George A. Kennedy, A New History of Classical Rhetoric (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 47–48.
135. Collins, Exhortations to Philosophy, 224–25. A similar pattern can be discerned at Antid. 275–277.
136. Collins, Exhortations to Philosophy, 227.
137. Collins, Exhortations to Philosophy, 227–28.
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explicit exemplars, the sages and poets provide the king with maxims from which he should learn (Ad 
Nic. 12–13; 40–49). Isocrates’ counsel, drawing together the wisdom of those who have come before 
him (41), will prove to be a most valuable gift (50–54).138 
Wealth, Appearance. The realm of wealth and possessions requires the exercise of moderation, and 
nowhere is this more true than in the lives of those whose power affords them the opportunity for 
unbridled acquisitiveness.139 If, as Ryan Balot argues, greed is “one of the most powerful evaluative 
tools in the arsenal of Athenian rhetoric,”140 then it is essential for a good ruler to avoid behaving in 
such a way as to attract negative evaluation from his peers and subjects. To this end, Isocrates urges the 
king to pursue a good reputation (δο' ξαν καλη' ν) instead of wealth (32).141 The former is desirable 
because it is imperishable, it is independent of wealth since it is something that cannot be bought, and 
finally, and perhaps most importantly, only superior people (οι διενεγκο' ντες)142 are able to acquire a 
good reputation (32; cf. Demon. 21, 38; Nic. 50). The royal reputation is important because the 
multitude are ignorant of the truth and make their judgment upon reputation (Demon. 17). The king’s 
reputation is thus of prime importance if he is to enjoy the good will of his subjects.
One way in which the king is able to manage his reputation is through appearance. The caution 
against wealth is not extended to the king’s dress; on the contrary, in this regard he should be 
extravagant (τρυφα'ω), since this will indicate to those who gaze upon the king that he is worthy of his 
office.143 In other matters, however, he should exercise restraint (32). Similarly, at §19, in the section 
on justice, the king is told that the city, like his estate, should be magnificent and royal—for the same 
reason: his reputation—yet he should manage his finances with care. Seen together, §§19 and 32 
illustrate the close connection between δικαιοσυ' νη and σωφροσυ' νη in Isocrates’ thought. The royal 
office necessitates a certain level of extravagance; it is important for royalty to appear royal. But justice 
and moderation serve to direct and temper this necessary extravagance so that the excesses often 
associated with sole rule are avoided. Appearance before the king’s subjects is in view at §34 where the 
king is urged to be both courteous and dignified (α  στειñος ... και` σεµνο' ς). The latter is most suited to 
kingship but the former is necessary for social intercourse. While “familiarity breeds contempt,” the 
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138. The non-royal readers of Isocrates’ texts will find in this gift, and in Isocrates’ other writings, exemplars that they 
might imitate. This is made explicit in the Nicocles 37 and implied by the fact that the readership of these texts extends 
beyond those to whom they are addressed.
139. For Isocrates, greed is an important concept not only at the personal level, but also in his political analysis; see De 
Pace 5–7; Panath. 54–55. For a stimulating study of greed from a social-historical and philosophical perspective, see Ryan 
K. Balot, Greed and Injustice in Classical Athens (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
140. Greed and Injustice, 7. Isocrates used this criticism against his opponents, calling the Sophists “professors of 
meddlesomeness and greed” (piλεονεξι'ας υ piε'στησαν ειòναι διδα' σκαλοι; Soph. 20).
141. For an examination of Isocrates’ conception of δο' ξα as “reputation” and its significance within his educational 
programme, see Takis Poulakos, “Isocrates’ Civic Education and the Question of Doxa,” in Isocrates and Civic Education, 
ed. Takis Poulakos and David Depew (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004), 44–65.
142. A favourite term of Isocrates’ for describing the sort of person in view at this point; cf. Demon. 48; Antid. 308; 
Panath. 120.
143. Demonicus, on the other hand, is urged “to be a man of taste, not a fop” (φιλο' καλος, α  λλα` µη` καλλωpiιστη' ς; 
Demon. 27). The former is magnificent (µεγαλοpiρεpiη' ς), while the latter is excessive (piερι'εργος). The next part of §27 places 
this exhortation in the context of moderation with regard to possessions.
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king should also attempt to be “a man of the people.” At this point σωφροσυ' νη consists in successfully 
maintaining the tension between these two poles.144 
The closing paragraph (33–35a) in the section on moderation begins with an exhortation given in 
terms of the goal of Isocratean education: correctly assessing a situation in order to seize the moment 
and to speak and act in the right way.145 Isocrates recognizes that it is often difficult to determine the 
correct path in all situations,146 in which case to fall short (ε  λλει'piειν) is more desirable than to 
overreach (piλεονα' ζειν); moderation, here µετριο' της, is described as lack (ε»νδεια) rather than excess 
(υ piερβολη' ). Perfect moderation would mean hitting the target, making exactly the right decision at the 
right time, but where this is not possible, moderation will be seen in a cautious, conservative 
approach.147 The route to achieving this ability lies in following Isocrates’ philosophical programme. In 
addressing whether the king should seek knowledge in experience (ε µpiειρι'α) or study (φιλοσοφι'α),148 
moderation is established when both are pursued (35). It is this combination of theory and practice (in 
addition to natural ability) that lies at the heart of an Isocratean education.149 It is natural that this 
combination forms a key part of Isocrates’ formation of the king’s person.
If justice is primarily relational in this treatise, then moderation is that virtue which is concerned 
primarily with the self. It is about ruling oneself, leading a disciplined life, and avoiding excesses and 
extremes. It is linked to Isocrates’ philosophical programme which has as its outcome the ability to 
respond correctly at the appropriate time. But the king’s concern for his excellence of his own person 
has a greater goal in mind. Moderation is an especially important virtue for the king to display since he 
stands as an example which his subjects will imitate. In this way the virtues of the royal person will be 
transferred to his subjects and thus the character of the state will be like that of its ruler (31; cf. Nic. 
37). The king will know that he has set the right example if his subjects become more prosperous and 
moderate (ευ  piορωτε'ρους και` σωφρονεστε'ρους) as a result of his care (31). In other words, the success 
of his example will be seen when his subjects and his state mirror his virtues.
Courage (35b–39)
The relatively short length of this section on courage (α  νδρει'α/α  νδρι'α)150 might arise from the fact 
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144. Isocrates see the ideal monarch in terms of “a harmonious balance between the two forces, in uniting which he 
considers the hardest part of his prince's education to lie—amiability of character and serious virtue. Either of these qualities 
is by itself insufficient for a king. Virtue is regal, but chilling. Charm and refinement make it easy to associate with others, 
but draw one down to their level” (Jaeger, Paideia III, 100).
145. For a summary of Isocrates’ educational ideas, see Terry L. Papillon, “Isocrates,” in A Companion to Greek 
Rhetoric, ed. Ian Worthington, BCAW (Malden: Blackwell, 2007), 60–62.
146. At Soph. 2 this difficulty is attributed to humanity’s lack of perfect prescience.
147. Edward S. Forster’s paraphrase, “that right action consists in an avoidance of the two extremes of excess and 
defect, and is the ‘golden mean’ between them” (Cyprian Orations, 123), seems to assume the ideal situation rather than the 
difficult one Isocrates has in view in which the correct course of action is not obvious.
148. For a discussion of the various ways in which Isocrates uses φιλοσοφι'α, see Livingstone, “Isocrates’ Rhetoric of 
Philosophy,” 19–27. At Ad Nic. 35 the word is being used in a narrow sense to refer to the process of intellectual growth. 
149. See p. 42; see also Antid. 183–192, esp. 187; Soph. 17. Papillon speaks of the “triad of  ability, teaching, and 
practice” which is unified, but not necessarily equally balanced (“Isocrates,” 61). Of the three elements in the triad, the first is 
most important (Antid. 189). 
150. For the construction of this virtue in classical Athens, see Balot, Courage; Joseph Roisman, The Rhetoric of 
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that it is not considered a “primary virtue” (like justice and moderation) since it is not the unique 
possession of the superior person, but is instead a virtue in which the base might share (Nic. 43).151 
That courage stands at the bottom of Isocrates’ list of virtues is evident at Panathenaicus 197 where the 
Athenians ancestors are admired for their self-control (καρτερι'α) and moderation (σωφροσυ' νη) rather 
than their courage.152 Nonetheless, courage is an important martial virtue which is central—along with 
wisdom and justice—to Isocrates’ portrayal of, for example, Theseus (Helen 21, 31; cf. 1, 51). 
Evagoras, too, is remembered for his courage, wisdom, and justice—virtues added, as he matured, to 
the beauty, strength, and moderation he acquired in his childhood (Evag. 22–23; cf. 65). As these 
examples suggest, war is the traditional theatre within which courage or “manly virtue” is displayed.153 
The Spartans are thus famous models of courage (Panath. 217, 258), though Isocrates is careful also to 
attribute this virtue to his Athenian audience (Areop. 74). But fourth-century discussions of courage 
were not limited to war, important as that historical reality was in Athens.154
Isocrates’ discussion of courage in To Nicocles is concerned primarily with reputation.155 The 
king’s reputation had been on view earlier in the treatise (32), but in this section it is the king’s 
posthumous reputation that is of concern. A memorial image (ει κω' ν) of the king’s virtue is preferable 
to one of his body (36); the king’s body is mortal, so he should attempt to leave behind an immortal 
remembrance of his soul (37).156 Courage is needed if the king is to choose to die well rather than to 
live in shame (36; cf. Demon. 43).157 
Isocrates’ letter to Philip II (Ep. 2) shows how this exhortation needs to be tempered by mode-
ration. The first half of the letter, §§1–11, consists of a mild rebuke for Philip’s recklessness in battle. 
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Manhood: Masculinity in the Attic Orators (Berkeley; Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005) and the collection 
of essays in Ralph M. Rosen and Ineke Sluiter, eds., Andreia: Studies in Manliness and Courage in Classical Antiquity, 
MnSup 238 (Leiden: Brill, 2003).
151. While terms for “courage” do not appear in this section, as the following paragraphs demonstrate, an Isocratean 
construal of the virtue is nonetheless present.
152. North, Sophrosyne, 144, 146.
153. So K. J. Dover, who summarizes the two most significant aspects of manly virtue as “valour on the battlefield” 
and “wisdom in discussion [of military matters]” (Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle [Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1974], 161). Death, pain and grief must all be met with courage (pp. 161–170). For the link between 
courage/death in war and reputation/fame/glory (κλε'ος) in Homer, see Michael Clarke, “Manhood and Heroism,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Homer, ed. Robert Fowler, Cambridge Companions to Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 74–90.
154. The locus classicus for courage is Pericles’ funeral oration in Thucydides (2.35–46). For a detailed study of the 
virtue, see Balot, Courage; Isocrates’ particular formulation with regard to Athens is examined in Chapter 7 (pp. 149–176). 
See also Roisman, Rhetoric of Manhood, 188–92. 
155. Reputation is closely linked to honour and shame (Roisman, Rhetoric of Manhood, 64–83; David Konstan, 
“Shame in Ancient Greece,” SocRes 70.4 [2003]: 1040–47. Incidents or actions that harm (or have the potential to harm) 
one’s reputation (δο' ξα) and bring about disgrace (α  δοξι'α) give rise to shame (αι σχυ' νη); see, e.g., Demosthenes, Fals. leg. 41, 
83, 146, cited by Konstan, “Shame,” 1040, n. 32. For Isocrates’ use of δο' ξα , see Takis Poulakos, “Isocrates’ Use of Doxa,” 
Philosophy & Rhetoric 34.1 (2001): 61–78; Poulakos, “Isocrates’ Civic Education”.
156. Isocrates’ prose encomium of Evagoras provides Nicocles with precisely such a memorial (Evag. 73–77; cf. 3); 
see also Phil. 134.
157.  “The idea that honorable death in battle was preferable to ignoble cowardice was a cornerstone of the Athenian 
ideology of masculine honor, a commonplace that speakers could take for granted and use to their own ends” (Roisman, 
Rhetoric of Manhood, 67).
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The king is encouraged to weigh the needs of his people for leadership against his desire for honour in 
battle. Isocrates concludes (Ep. 2.9–10): 
you should not honor that courage which accompanies heedless folly and unseasonable 
ambition ... nor should you desire such glory (δο' ξα) as many, both Greeks and barbarians, 
obtain, but rather that exalted renown which you alone of living men could win.
Philip is to pursue the reputation that attaches to those who live well, rather than the glory of those who 
die recklessly. The king’s responsibility to his state, both in the letter to Philip and in the exhortation to 
Nicocles (Ad Nic. 36), serves to moderate the competitiveness that often characterizes α  νδρει'α and its 
related virtues in Greek society.     
It is not easy to place most of the content of the last three sections (§§37–39) under the rubric of 
courage. There is general advice about acting in a way worthy of the office of kingship (37), living 
according to the advice one would give to one’s children (38), recognising wisdom in those who speak 
of important matters and not those who quarrel over trivialities (39). These sayings can be seen to relate 
to reputation in one way or another. Others are more explicit: advice to imitate those whose reputation 
he admires (38), and to admire those who are able to navigate well the good and the bad that fate places 
before them (39).
The reputation Isocrates has in mind extends beyond the martial reputation that usually defined 
Athenian courage. The fact that the Spartans were courageous is not enough to commend them as 
examples to be followed. The courage they displayed, tainted as it was by piλεονεξι'α (Panath. 45–46), 
focused on military virtues.158 As part of his historical analysis, Isocrates argues that the Spartan’s 
exclusive focus on military matters to the exclusion of other concerns “were  both  the  expression and 
the cause of a narrow, and thus ill-informed, vision of what andreia is really for.”159 
Courage is a necessary but not sufficient virtue for political leadership. In the Panathenaicus, 
Agamemnon and Sparta serve as positive and negative examples of this thesis, respectively. The 
“manly” virtues are only worthwhile if they are exercised within the framework provided by the other 
virtues, especially those of wisdom, justice, and moderation. “Isocrates both appreciates the importance 
of the military virtues and worries seriously about the dangerous proclivities of militaristic culture.”160 
The warning given in the Panathenaicus to the Athenian assembly in this regard is presumably the 
same one Isocrates would have given to Nicocles had he expanded his teaching on the topic of courage. 
The good king must display courage in every area of life, not only in his dealings with military 
enemies. He will do so through maintaining a concern for his reputation. Rather than follow the easiest 
path or the one free from danger, he must choose to act according to the mores of those around him, 
that they might think and speak well of him. He will do this by following the example of those who 
have shown themselves able to bear well both the misfortune and the success of life. A central part of 
the king’s duties have to do with being exactly this sort of model for others.
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158. Balot, Courage, 165–66. But Isocrates’ use of the Spartans was not exclusively negative; see Ober, Political 
Dissent, 280–81.
159. Balot, Courage, 166.
160. Balot, Courage, 163–67.
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Walter Wilson’s observation that in To Nicocles the four virtues of wisdom, justice, moderation, 
and courage provide Isocrates with a structure for his advice to the young Cyprian prince has proved a 
useful heuristic tool as we have examined Isocrates’ portrait of the ideal king. We have seen that 
Isocrates does not follow the four categories strictly, but they do provide a framework around which he 
has constructed his Fürstenspiegel.
Xenophon
There are no other classical texts that approach the Hellenistic piερι` βασιλει'ας genre as closely as 
Isocrates’ To Nicocles. In this part of the chapter I turn to another fourth-century writer who, although 
he has not supplied us with a kingship treatise, nevertheless produced biographical works that focused 
on kings. Xenophon’s Cyropaedia and Agesilaus take as their respective subjects the eponymous 
Persian and Spartan kings. Agesilaus is an encomiastic biography of the recently deceased Spartan 
leader with whom Xenophon was familiar.161 The Cyropaedia is a much longer text that provides the 
reader with “a portrait of virtue monarchy.”162
In addition to the prominence it enjoys in Xenophon’s oeuvre and in the fourth-century, the 
Cyropaedia plays a significant role in the history of western political thought.163 More often than not, 
this role is that of a Fürstenspiegel. Heleen Sancisi-Weerdenburg notes that the Cyropaedia is often 
considered the first Fürstenspiegel in the European tradition, while James Tatum identifies it as “the 
most influential of all mirrors for princes.”164 Xenophon’s portrait of the Persian king Cyrus II, the 
founder of the Achaemenid Empire, is thus worth investigating as part of the study of fourth-century 
conceptions of kingship. My working hypothesis, which the following discussion attempts to confirm, 
is that Cyrus conforms to Xenophon’s concept of an ideal king.
While it might be sufficient to classify the Cyropaedia as Xenophon’s biography of Cyrus— 
bearing in mind the nature of fourth-century biography165—the purpose of the biography is contested. 
Nino Luraghi summarizes some of the recent attempts to explain the pragmatics of the text: “a covert 
indictment of monarchy ... an educational handbook for upper-class Greeks ... a Machiavellian 
exploration in the manipulative use of power ... a utopian reflection on the best form of leadership.”166 
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161. Isocrates’ Evagoras most likely provided the model for Xenophon’s Agesilaus; so Arnaldo Momigliano, The 
Development of Greek Biography, expanded ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 49–50.
162. Atack, “Debating Kingship,” 156.
163. See n. 152 in Chapter 1.
164. Heleen Sancisi-Weerdenburg, “The Death of Cyrus: Xenophon’s Cyropaedia as a Source for Iranian History,” in 
Xenophon, ed. Vivienne J. Gray, ORCS (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 452; James Tatum, Xenophon’s Imperial 
Fiction: On The Education of Cyrus (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), xiii. See also Vivienne J. Gray, 
Xenophon’s Mirror of Princes: Reading the Reflections (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 5 who, while admitting a 
rather broad definition of the genre, reads a number of Xenophon’s works as offering “mirrors of princes” meant to reflect 
positive images of leaders for the education of his readers.
165. Momigliano identifies the work as “the most accomplished biography we have in classical Greek literature” 
(Greek Biography, 55), but also reminds the reader that it is important not to lose sight of fourth-century biography’s 
“ambiguous position between fact and imagination” and that fact that we are presented with the “potentialities” rather than 
the “realities” of its subjects (p. 46).
166. Luraghi, “One-Man Government,” 140–41.
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And it would be possible to expand this list, should one so desire. I will abstain from drawing any 
conclusions in this regard at this point and will address the matter in the conclusion to this section. The 
diversity highlighted in the list is partially a result of different approaches taken when reading the 
Cyropaedia. Before turning to the text I will clarify some of the assumptions undergirding this present 
reading of Xenophon.
How Should One Read Xenophon?
Since the middle of the twentieth century, the work of the political philosopher Leo Strauss has 
been influential in Xenophon studies.167 Strauss argued that political philosophers of the past needed to 
mask the true teachings and intentions of their writings. They did this by writing ironically—producing 
texts that worked at two levels: the esoteric and the exoteric. The surface meaning of the text comprises 
the latter, while the former is only accessible to those who are able to “read between the lines.”168
With regard to the Cyropaedia, then, we should not take at face value the claim that the work 
holds up Cyrus as the supreme example of the fact “that to rule men might be a task neither impossible 
nor even difficult, if one should only go about it in an intelligent manner” (1.1.3). Rather, the final 
chapter of Cyropaedia in which the decay of Persia after Cyrus’ death is described (8.8) shows those 
with ears to hear and with eyes to read between the lines that Cyrus and the regime he founded was not 
perfect since it did not produce the stability and continuity that the best regime should produce.169
Ancient readers approached the text differently. Plato’s critique of Cyrus’ failure to educate his 
sons properly (Leg. 3.694a–696b) certainly seeks to tarnish the reputation of the Persian, but given the 
rivalry between the two (Athenaeus, Deipn. 11.112; 504f–505a), this negative version must stand in 
opposition to Xenophon’s more positive version of the king. Cicero’s testimony is more explicit. For 
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167. A glance at the table of contents of two recent collections of essays (Christopher Tuplin and Vincent Azoulay, 
eds., Xenophon and His World: Papers from a Conference Held in Liverpool in July 1999, Historia–Einzelschriften 172 
[Stuttgart: Steiner, 2004] and Fiona Hobden and Christopher Tuplin, eds., Xenophon: Ethical Principles and Historical 
Enquiry, MnSup 348 [Leiden: Brill, 2012]) is sufficient to show the continuing influence of Leo Strauss on Xenophon 
studies. Both collections were produced following conferences devoted to Xenophon in 1999 and 2009, respectively. For 
Strauss, see Thomas L. Pangle, Leo Strauss: An Introduction to His Thought and Intellectual Legacy, The Johns Hopkins 
Series in Constitutional Thought (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006) and the essays in Steven B. Smith, 
ed., The Cambridge Companion to Leo Strauss, Cambridge Companions to Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009).
168. Strauss’ seminal works in this regard are “The Spirit of Sparta or the Taste of Xenophon,” SocRes 6.4 
(1939): 502–36; “Persecution and the Art of Writing,” SocRes 8.4 (1941): 488–504; On Tyranny, revised and expanded ed., 
ed. Victor Gourevitch and Michael S. Roth (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000). For Strauss’ “esotericism,” see 
Pangle, Leo Strauss, 56–65; Laurence Lampert, “Strauss’s Recovery of Esotericism,” in The Cambridge Companion to Leo 
Strauss, ed. Steven B. Smith, Cambridge Companions to Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 63–
92.
169. Strauss, Tyranny, 181. Strauss’s approach has been adopted by a number of modern scholars; see, e.g., 
Christopher Whidden, “The Account of Persia and Cyrus’s Persian Education in Xenophon’s Cyropaedia,” Review of 
Politics 69.4 (2007): 539–67; Christopher Whidden, “Deception in Xenophon’s Cyropaedia,” Int 34.2 (2007): 129–56; 
Christopher Whidden, “Cyrus’s Imperial Household: An Aristotelian Reading of Xenophon’s Cyropaedia,” Polis 25.1 
(2008): 31–62; Christopher Whidden, “Hares, Hounds, Herds, and Hives in Xenophon’s Cyropaedia,” Int 35.3 (2008): 225–
39; Laura K. Field, “Xenophon’s Cyropaedia: Educating Our Political Hopes,” JPol 74.3 (2012): 723–38; Christopher 
Nadon, Xenophon’s Prince: Republic and Empire in the Cyropaedia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).
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Cicero, Cyrus represents a “model of just government” with “impressive dignity of ... character” and 
“matchless courtesy.”170 This positive image of Cyrus has also formed the basis of modern studies.
Bodil Due’s literary analysis of the Cyropaedia leads her to conclude that “Xenophon’s main aim 
and purpose was to describe Cyrus as the ideal leader.”171 Similarly, Deborah Gera concludes, 
“throughout most of the Cyropaedia there is little doubt that Cyrus is meant to be an ideal figure, a 
successful ruler whose model conduct is well worth emulating.”172 In these readings, Xenophon 
provides his contemporaries with a positive model for imitation rather than an ironic character whose 
actions are to be avoided.173  
In attempting to establish the intellectual context out of which Xenophon wrote, Vivienne Gray 
investigates Xenophon’s literary presentation of leadership as it occurs throughout his works.174 
Xenophon’s Socratic texts are used to sketch a pattern of leadership (pp. 5–24) which is then 
confirmed in the narrative/historical writings, including the Cyropaedia (pp. 24–44).175 Gray argues 
that seven elements are foundational to Xenophon’s theory of leadership. (1) Any community—indeed, 
any group of people, it would seem—is divided into those who lead and those who follow. Leaders rule 
and give orders while other must obey. This is a foundational assumption; Xenophon sees no need to 
argue this point (Mem. 3.9.10–11). (2) The goal of leadership must be the success of the organisation 
(Mem. 3.2.1–4). For Xenophon’s Socrates, “ the impulse to be led comes from the group and ... they 
define the success they wish to achieve.”176 Only a poor leader seeks his or her own happiness at the 
expense of the group. (3) Success is defined in terms of “increase.” This increase can be material or 
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170. Cicero, Quint. fratr. 1.1.8 (23). Cicero goes on to note in this passage that Xenophon’s writing inspired the 
leadership of Scipio Africanus, cf. Tusc. 2.26. For an explanation of Cicero’s expressed admiration for Cyrus in light of his 
republican ideals, see Timothy W. Caspar, “‘The Image of a Just Ruler’: Cicero, Monarchy, and Xenophon’s Cyropaedia,” 
paper presented at the 107th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Seattle, 2011). For the role that 
Cyrus played in Stoic thought, see J. Rufus Fears, “Cyrus as a Stoic Exemplum of the Just Monarch,” AJP 95.3 (1974): 265–
67.    
171. Bodil Due, The Cyropaedia: Xenophon’s Aims and Methods (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1989), 147.
172. Deborah Levine Gera, Xenophon’s Cyropaedia: Style, Genre and Literary Technique, OCM (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1993), 280, cf. 1–2.
173. So Philip Stadter in an essay in which the Cyropaedia is described in terms of a utopian narrative (“Fictional 
Narrative in the Cyropaedia,” in Xenophon, ed. Vivienne J. Gray, ORCS [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010], 367–
400). See also Winston Weathers, “Xenophon’s Political Idealism,” CJ 49.7 (1954): 317–21, 330; Paula Winsor Sage, 
“Dying in Style: Xenophon’s Ideal Leader and the End of the Cyropaedia,” CJ 90.2 (1994–95): 161–74, both of whom 
accept that Xenophon is portraying Cyrus as an ideal leader.
174. Gray, Mirror of Princes.
175. The fact that Xenophon presents Socrates as virtuous and wise when Socrates discusses leadership means that we 
can assume these match Xenophon’s thoughts on the matter and that we can trust Socrates’ voice. Since we are concerned 
with Xenophon, the question as to whether or not the voice of the “historical Socrates” is represented is not of concern. We 
note, furthermore, that Socrates and the other ideal figures in Xenophon’s writings share a set of qualities and it is those we 
are investigating (Gray, Mirror of Princes, 8–9). Deborah L. Gera argues that Xenophon presents his reader with various 
“Socrateses” (“Xenophon’s Socrateses,” in Socrates from Antiquity to the Enlightenment, ed. Michael Trapp [Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2007], 33–50). She observes, however, that “The great leaders found in Xenophon’s non-Socratic writings are in 
many ways much of a muchness and Socrates seems to be just one more instance of this ideal type” (p. 34). For a discussion 
of Socratic as it is evidenced in the Cyropaedia, see Gera, Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, 26–131. Thomas L. Pangle (“Socrates in 
the Context of Xenophon’s Political Writings,” in The Socratic Movement, ed. Paul Vander Waerdt [Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1994], 127–50) argues that Xenophon seeks to contrast the philosophic Socrates with his political 
counterparts, especially Cyrus. 
176. Gray, Mirror of Princes, 12.
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moral and is determined in relation to the community rather than the leader. The sage Simonides tells 
Hiero to increase the polis (Hiero 11.13; cf. Mem. 3.6.2). Socrates sought to increase the virtue of his 
students and friends (Mem. 4.3.18). (4) The leader must be able to gain “willing obedience” from those 
being led. This is usually achieved when the leader is able to demonstrate that he has greater 
knowledge than the rest about how to achieve what is best for them (Mem. 3.3.8). (5) Knowledge is 
therefore a crucial aspect of leadership. Using dialectic, Socrates instructs Euthydemus in the art of 
ruling (Mem. 4.2) and Xenophon himself writes didactic texts.177 But knowledge can also be gained 
through imitation (Mem. 1.3.1; 4.2.40). (6) Not only free men, but also women and slaves, are capable 
of exercising leadership, according to Xenophon (Mem. 3.9.11; Oec. 7.37). (7) Leadership is universal. 
Leadership skills might be transferred from one domain to another since the proper management of 
people lies at the core of successful leadership (Mem. 3.4). 
Although this pattern of leadership will not form the basis of my discussion of the ideal king, it 
will become clear as this discussion progresses that these elements are important in Xenophon’s 
narrative about Cyrus. The consistency with which Xenophon applies this pattern throughout his 
writings indicates that he is working with a relatively stable theory of leadership which is transferred to 
monarchy in the Cyropaedia.178 Cyrus is therefore meant to provide the reader with an instance of ideal 
leadership within the context of monarchy. This allows us to interrogate the text regarding Xenophon’s 
teaching about the ideal king. The difficulties and problems raised in the text and highlighted by those 
who adopt ironic readings of the Cyropaedia cannot be ignored, but they do not require an ironic 
reading. It is possible to read the text within this framework of Xenophon’s portrait of an ideal leader 
while still allowing the possibility that Xenophon is at times ambiguous, allusive, and subtle.179
A detailed study of Xenophon’s Cyropaedia is beyond the scope of this dissertation. In what 
follows I will discuss the prologue (1.1), epilogue (8.8), as well as the first (1.2–1.6) and third (7.5.37–
8.7) major sections of the Cyropaedia.180 The first section is important since it describes explicitly 
Cyrus’ education in Persia (1.2, 1.5–6) and in Media (1.3–4). The formation of the ideal king is 
foundational for the rest of the narrative. The third major section (7.5.37–8.7) explicitly identifies 
kingship as one of its central concerns (7.5.37): having conquered Babylon, Cyrus now sets out to 
establish himself in a manner fitting for a king. This final section of the narrative exposes Xenophon’s 
idea of what absolute monarchy looks like.181
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177. For the argument that even these “minor” didactic texts are about leadership, see Oliver Stoll, “For the Glory of 
Athens: Xenophon’s Hipparchikos «Logos», a Technical Treatise and Instruction Manual on Ideal Leadership,” Studies in 
History and Philosophy of Science 43 (2012): 250–57. 
178. Atack (“Debating Kingship,” 98) observes in Xenophon’s Socratic writings “a (largely) consistent set of 
interlinked values that the individual capable of good leadership and rule in various contexts exemplifies.” Due 
(Cyropaedia, 185–206) comes to a similar conclusion about the consistency of Xenophon’s pattern of leadership through a 
study of other leaders across his body of work.
179. Melina Tamiolaki, “Virtue and Leadership in Xenophon: Ideal Leaders or Ideal Losers?” in Xenophon: Ethical 
Principles and Historical Enquiry, ed. Fiona Hobden and Christopher Tuplin, MnSup 348 (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 565.
180. For the structure of the Cyropaedia, see Bodil Due, “Xenophon of Athens: The Cyropaedia,” in The Novel in the 
Ancient World, ed. Gareth Schmeling, MnSup 159 (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 583–85.
181. According to Atack, it is in this final section that we find Xenophon’s “most careful analysis of kingship” 
(“Debating Kingship,” 159); so also Due, Cyropaedia, 96.
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The central part of the work (2.1–7.5.36) is concerned primarily, although not exclusively, with 
Cyrus’ military exploits. As we shall see, generalship is certainly a significant part of Xenophon’s 
kingship ideal. Cambyses’ lessons at Cyropaedia 1.6 are concerned largely with the military qualities a 
ruler should possess and these qualities are exemplified in the central section of the narrative.182 But, 
given the length of the central section, we run the risk of skewing our analysis of kingship by allowing 
the martial portrait of Cyrus to become the centre of gravity. This section will therefore not be 
considered in detail in the following discussion, although I will refer to it on occasion in my 
examination of the work’s framework. Furthermore, since the military traits necessary for successful 
leadership are discussed in both the first and third sections, our analysis of Xenophon’s portrait of 
kingship will necessarily take these elements into account. We cannot ignore that one of the reasons 
that Xenophon chose to write about Cyrus was his success in building an empire through military 
victory. Our focus, however, must remain on Cyrus the king. 
Prologue (1.1.1–6)
The opening chapter establishes the difficulty of rule as the problem the Cyropaedia sets out to 
address. Here and in the closing chapter (8.8), Xenophon writes in the first person, thus creating the 
impression that he is not producing an abstract treatise on ideal leadership but rather presenting the 
results of his own experience.183 Neither democracy, nor monarchy, nor oligarchy guarantees a stable 
government (1.1.1), and so traditional political philosophy which debated the best regime would seem 
to offer no solution to this problem.184 Those responsible for ruling over animals seem not to have 
similar difficulties (1.1.2), suggesting that the problem lies with those who are ruled and not the rulers. 
Nevertheless, since Xenophon’s writings address those who would expect to rule, questions about the 
possibility of leadership remain central in his work.
The unique success of Cyrus in ruling a multitude of subjects, cities, and nations (see 1.1.4) 
suggests to Xenophon “that to rule men might be a task neither impossible nor even difficult, if one 
should only go about it in an intelligent manner (η»ν τις ε piισταµε'νως τουñτο piρα' ττη, )” (1.1.3). The rest of 
the Cyropaedia illustrates what such intelligent rule looks like in the person of Cyrus. Xenophon 
undertakes to present what he has learned about Cyrus’ origin/family (γενεα' ), his nature (φυ' σις), and 
his education (piαιδει'α). Each of these three elements will be addressed in the discussion that follows. 
Before proceeding to this discussion, though, we must address a potential difficulty raised in these 
opening paragraphs. 
 
Obedience and/or Fear.  The opening chapter of the Cyropaedia contains a statement that seems 
inconsistent with Xenophon’s theory of leadership and which threatens the thesis that Cyrus is 
Xenophon’s ideal king. Pierre Carlier’s methodological note is important when investigating these 
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182. Due, Cyropaedia, 94–95.
183. Christian Mueller-Goldingen, Untersuchungen zu Xenophons Kyrupädie, BzA 42 (Leipzig: Teubner, 1995), 56.
184. The opening passage might suggest that Xenophon aims to contribute to fourth-century politeia-literature, but it 
soon becomes clear that the Cyropaedia is not concerned with constitutions as much as it is concerned with monarchical 
leadership (Gera, Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, 11–13). 
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potential difficulties: “In order to count as a criticism, a description of  Cyrus’ behaviour must 
contradict an ideal that Xenophon himself maintains, not merely one that a modern reader holds.”185 
The elements of Cyrus’ character or rule that modern readers find troublesome or repugnant (and there 
are certainly a number of these!) do not disqualify him as an ideal leader unless there is some clear 
indication that Xenophon is equally troubled or repulsed by them.  
The suspect behaviour in the first chapter is Cyrus’ use of fear. Intelligent rule consists in 
persuading people to submit to one’s rule willingly, which Cyrus managed to do despite the extent of 
the empire (1.1.3). Further on we are informed that Cyrus’ success was due to his ability to cloak his 
empire with such fear that no one would resist him (1.1.5). The very next sentence states again that “he 
was able to awaken in all so lively a desire to please him, that they always wished to be guided by his 
will” (1.1.5).  
At first glance this assertion might easily be mistaken for confusion on Xenophon’s part or 
careless editing. Alternatively, it might be an example of irony in which the reader is meant to 
understand that Cyrus was only able to generate “obedience” through fear and that this made him, in 
reality, a poor leader. A closer look at other passages in which obedience and fear are discussed 
suggests that this is not the case, and that Xenophon means what he says at this point.
In 1.6, an important passage to which we will return, Cyrus’ father instructs him in a number of 
matters pertaining to leadership, including obedience (1.6.20–24). Cyrus was taught obedience by his 
father, then by his teachers (cf. 1.2.8), and finally by the law (1.6.20). 
Cambyses distinguishes between two forms of obedience. There is a form of compulsory 
obedience which comes about through reward—the obedient are praised and honoured. The 
disobedient, on the other hand, are subject to punishment and dishonour (1.6.20). Compulsory 
obedience of this type, while still obedience, is considered by Xenophon to be an inferior type of 
obedience. It is characteristic of slaves and animals (Oec. 13.6–12). 
There is, however, a “shortcut” consisting of willing obedience. This second type of obedience is 
generated when a leader is seen to be concerned with his followers’ well-being and is considered by 
them to be more able than they are to do something about it (Cyr. 1.6.21–24). Socrates taught that 
people are willing to obey those whom they believe to be the best (Mem. 3.3.9). Cambyses explains 
that in the context of ruling, the best person is the one who is able to project wisdom and for this there 
is no shortcut—one needs truly to be wise if one wants to be perceived as wise (Cyr. 1.6.22).
This theory of obedience is complicated by the nature of those who are being ruled. While those 
who are good might be willing to obey the best, in his debate with Tigranes, Cyrus argues that the 
wicked cannot be expected to respond in the same way (3.1.20–21). Only the first type of obedience 
can be wrought from this group. It is also this recalcitrant group that, at times, needs to be disciplined 
through fear. This is illustrated at 8.3.5 where the king’s procession is designed to be beautiful in the 
sight of those who are loyal, but frightening to those who are hostile to him. Fear is thus shown to be an 
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185. Gabriel Danzig, “The Best of the Achaemenids: Benevolence, Self-Interest and the ‘Ironic’ Reading of 
Cyropaedia,” in Xenophon: Ethical Principles and Historical Enquiry, ed. Fiona Hobden and Christopher Tuplin, MnSup 
348 (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 505–6.
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appropriate tool in the maintenance of obedience in those who are wicked or hostile or generally less 
inclined to be ruled.186
Xenophon’s theory of obedience takes into account both the ruler and the ruled. All other things 
being equal, it is proof of a king’s excellence when his subjects obey him willingly (Oec. 4.19). 
However, there are some who will never respond to positive leadership of this nature and they need to 
be dealt with differently. For this group, reward and punishment—or the fear of potential 
punishment—are appropriate tools in the hand of the good king. Cyrus declares at a later stage in the 
narrative that he prefers those who serve him out of love and goodwill over those who do so out of 
compulsion (Cyr. 3.1.28). A good leader will, nevertheless, be able to manage both classes of 
subordinates.
One final concern must be addressed: fear is usually associated with tyrannical rule. A good 
general will be able to generate willing obedience from his soldiers while despotic or tyrannical 
leadership is marked by unwilling subjects (Oec. 21.4–8, 11–12). This being the case, does Xenophon 
present Cyrus as a mixture of good and bad kingship? So Carlier: “Cyrus is a king who does not 
overlook certain traditional methods of tyrants ... He wins thus the advantages of a king—the sympathy 
of his subjects—and those of a tyrant—fear.”187 At this point, Carlier would seem to be correct. I will 
argue, however, that this does not make Cyrus a bad ruler in Xenophon’s sight, but rather serves to 
highlight his adaptability in the context of empire. This is discussed in more detail below (see page 87). 
In order to make this argument, though, a fuller picture of Cyrus’ rule is necessary. 
With regard to the question of Cyrus’ use of fear, Gray’s assessment of Xenophon is an accurate 
summary of the conclusion we have reached on this point: 
Xenophon addresses the realities of the limitations on governance by assent perhaps more than 
modern theory when he acknowledges that the leader chooses to win willing obedience but will 
always need to consider coercion or other indirect methods on those who strive more for their 
own success than that of the group.188
As promised (1.1.6), Xenophon begins his nuanced portrait of this leader with a description of his 
origin, nature, and education. 
Education (1.2.1–1.6.46)
Following the prologue (1.1), the first book of the Cyropaedia contains a brief discussion of 
Cyrus’ family and birth (1.2.1), and then moves into an extended description of the Persian education 
system (1.2.2–16). Part of Cyrus’ youth is spent in Media with his grandfather, Astyages,  (1.3.1–
1.4.28), but Cyrus returns to Persia to complete his education (1.5.1). The rise of Assyrian aggression 
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186. See also Mem. 3.5.5–6 where confidence is contrasted with fear: the former breeds carelessness and disobedience, 
while the latter makes people attentive, obedient, and more easily disciplined. Fear of punishment is raised again in the 
(in)famous passage about the king’s “ears and eyes” (8.2.10–12). Xenophon chooses not to dwell on the impact that these 
spies had on the general population, but focuses the reader’s attention on the fact that they served Cyrus willingly as a result 
of his largesse (Gray, Mirror of Princes, 277–79).
187. Pierre Carlier, “The Idea of Imperial Monarchy in Xenophon’s Cyropaedia,” in Xenophon, ed. Vivienne J. Gray, 
ORCS (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 357.
188. Gray, Mirror of Princes, 373–74.
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and Cyaxares’ ascent to the Median throne following Astyages’ death provides the context for Cyrus’ 
first leadership role as an adult (1.5.2–14). As Cyrus prepares to lead his army, his father, Cambyses, 
teaches him about leadership (1.6).
Γενεα'  and Φυ'σις (1.2.1)189. Xenophon reports Cyrus’ royal lineage in a straightforward manner. His 
father was Cambyses, king of the Persians, who belonged to the Persidae, who derived their name from 
Perseus. Despite this allusion, there is no claim to divine ancestry.190 Cyrus’ mother was Mandane, 
daughter of Astyages, king of Media (1.2.1). This brief description is in stark contrast to Herodotus’ 
account of Cyrus.191 
We note, first, that Xenophon has removed the dreams and omens that accompanied Cyrus’ birth 
in Herodotus. This is not because Xenophon wants to remove the divine from his narrative—on the 
contrary, religion and the divine is important in his portrait of Cyrus.192 Rather, Xenophon wants to 
remove the possibility that Cyrus’ success can be attributed to the favour of the gods. Only Cyrus’ 
leadership qualities (and Xenophon’s theory of leadership) are allowed to explain his remarkable 
achievements.193 This is in keeping with Cambyses’ later teaching that “those only who had made 
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189. According to Dover (Greek Popular Morality, 84), φυ' σις lies somewhere between birth/“nature” and 
education/“nurture.” On the basis of 1.2.2, it seems that Xenophon considers γενεα'  and φυ' σις to be closely related, since this 
is what he claims to deal with in 1.2.1.
190. Cyrus’ divine lineage is hinted at on three occasions and, contra Lynette G. Mitchell (“Alexander the Great: 
Divinity and the Rule of Law,” in Every Inch a King: Comparative Studies on Kings and Kingship in the Ancient and 
Medieval Worlds, ed. Lynette Gail Mitchell and Charles Peter Melville, RULE 2 [Boston: Brill, 2013], 95), none of these 
show conclusively that Xenophon is drawing on the topos of the king’s divine descent. First, Artabazus considers Cyrus the 
noblest and best man, descended from the gods (4.1.24). Second, Croesus says that Cyrus (1) is descendent from the gods; 
(2) of royal lineage; and (3) has practised virtue since childhood (7.2.24). Artabazus’ and Croesus’ flattery are “a hyperbolic 
echo of the narrator’s prologue” (Tatum, Xenophon’s Imperial Fiction, 158, cf. 264–65 n. 18), but it is not clear that the 
reader is meant to accept either voice as authoritative. If Xenophon had wanted to counter Herodotus’ more negative account 
of Cyrus’ lineage with these exalted claims (so Gera, Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, 275–76), one might have expected them at  
1.2.1, not hidden away in a later part of the narrative. Third, Cyrus’ prayers to “ancestral Zeus” (∆ιο`ς piατρωñ, ος; 7.1.1) 
highlights Zeus’ care of the Persians as a people, not Cyrus’ divine parentage (cf. 6.4.20; Plato, Leg. 881d). For Xenophon’s 
use of mythological ancestry, see Ages. 1.2–5; cf. Isocrates, Evag. 13–18. 
191. Herodotus’ story is filled with violence and supernatural omens. Cyrus first appears at 1.46 in relation to Croesus, 
but the bulk of Cyrus’ story is told in 1.95–130. Cyrus’ birth and early life is described in 1.108–113. In response to a vision 
that Astyages has, Mandane is married off to a Persian who is socially far below the Median royal family. At birth, Cyrus is 
taken from his mother in response to another dream Astyages has. The baby is not exposed as the Median king had ordered 
but is raised by a herdsman and his concubine in the mountains of Media. Through an unexpected series of events, the ten-
year-old boy appears before the king and is recognized. Astyages foolishly allows Cyrus to live, but sends him to Persia, 
where he is reunited with his parents. Upon entering adulthood, Cyrus persuades the Persians to rebel against Astyages, 
whose army Cyrus defeats with the help of the Mede Harpagus. For a discussion of the fragments of Ctesias’ version of 
Cyrus’ life as preserved in Nicholas of Damascus and Photius see Due, Cyropaedia, 135–39; Mueller-Goldingen, Xenophons 
Kyrupädie, 6–10. The Ctesias fragments relating to Cyrus are translated in Lloyd Llewellyn-Jones and James Robson, 
Ctesias’ History of Persia, Routledge Classical Translations (London: Routledge, 2010), 159–76.
192. Upon his deathbed, for example, Cyrus is receives a vision foretelling his imminent departure from this world 
(8.7.2). And this was nothing new—throughout his career he had received omens, signs, and auguries from the gods (see, 
e.g., 1.6.1, 2.1.1) and he had been faithful in offering sacrifices (8.7.3). See Due, Cyropaedia, 156–58; Gera, Xenophon’s 
Cyropaedia, 54–59. John Dillery discusses Xenophon’s understanding of divine agency in history (Xenophon and the History 
of His Times [1995; repr., London: Routledge, 2003], 179–94). 
193. Carlier, “Imperial Monarchy,” 336–37.
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themselves what they ought to be had a right to ask for corresponding blessings from the gods” (1.6.5–
6).
Second, Xenophon has provided us with a rose-coloured history of his hero’s past. The negative 
elements in which Herodotus seems to delight have been removed and we are left with a sanitized 
version highlighting the royal elements of Cyrus heritage on both his father’s side (contra Herodotus) 
and his mother’s side of the family. The slave-to-king motif that forms the backbone of Ctesias’ version 
of Cyrus’ origins has also been removed. Nothing must be allowed to detract from Xenophon’s ideal 
leader.194
The fact that the Cyrus’ ancestry is even mentioned raises the question as to whether the 
leadership envisaged by Xenophon is inherent or whether it is something that can be taught. Later in 
the narrative, one of Cyrus’ soldiers states that, like a queen bee, Cyrus was indeed born to be a king 
(βασιλευ`ς γα`ρ ε»µοιγε δοκειñς συ` φυ' σει piεφυκε'ναι; 5.1.24), as demonstrated by the willingness with 
which men follow and obey him (5.1.24–26). The qualities mentioned by Xenophon in 1.2.1 support 
this statement since they all seem inherited or inherent. The remainder of the chapter, focusing as it 
does on the Persian education system which formed Cyrus, suggests that acquired qualities are also 
important. Xenophon refuses to choose sides in the nature-or-nurture debate.195 Support for this point 
of view is found at Oeconomicus 21.10–12 where “royal rule” comes through education and a noble 
nature. The final two chapters of the Cyropaedia in which Cyrus’ sons are shown to fail as leaders 
despite receiving an education from their father (see below, pp. 89–92) suggest that education and 
genetics are necessary but not sufficient elements for exemplary leadership. 
The sketch of Cyrus’ ancestry is followed by a very brief “encomium” which serves to link his 
heritage to the following section in which his education is discussed.196 The “barbarians” who tell and 
sing of Cyrus’ excellences speak of both physical and spiritual aspects of the Persian.
With regard to his physical nature, Cyrus is described as handsome (ειòδος κα' λλιστος). This is part 
of Xenophon’s idealisation of his hero (cf. 1.4.27–28; 3.1.41),197 but the theme is also encountered in 
Herodotus’ report that when Cyno, the cowherd’s wife, first laid eyes on Cyrus, seeing “how fine and 
fair the child was” (το` piαιδι'ον µε'γα τε και` ευ  ειδε'ς), she wept and begged her husband not to expose 
him (Hist. 1.112).198 The physical aspect of Cyrus’ nature will play a role in his visual presentation of 
himself (Cyr. 8.3.14), but most of Xenophon’s writing focuses on the moral aspects of Cyrus’ person.
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195. Due (Cyropaedia, 147–52), following Dover’s general observations about the question in fifth- and fourth-
century literature (Greek Popular Morality, 83–95), suggests that Xenophon’s distinction between inherent and acquired 
qualities are not as clear as they might be.
196. Mueller-Goldingen, Xenophons Kyrupädie, 64–65.
197. So Due, Cyropaedia, 150 n. 10. As Gera observes: “an ideal Xenophontic hero is as perfect physically as he is 
morally, as beautiful in body as he is noble in spirit” (“Xenophon’s Socrateses,” 36). At 1.3.1 we read that the boy’s 
grandfather was eager to see him because he had heard he was καλο`ς κα  γαθο' ς. The Greek phrase indicates more than just 
physical beauty (see Werner Jaeger, Archaic Greece: The Mind of Athens, vol. 1 of Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, 3rd 
ed., trans. Gilbert Highet [Oxford: Blackwell, 1946], 11–12), but it includes it.
198. The “beautiful king” topos can also be seen at Isocrates (see, e.g., Evag. 22), but it was not encountered in the To 
Nicocles.
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In what might be read as a programmatic statement, Cyrus is described as having a soul that is 
most loving of humanity, devoted to learning, and desirous of honour (ψυχη`ν δε` φιλανθρωpiο' τατος και` 
φιλοµαθε'στατος και` φιλοτιµο' τατο; 1.2.1). The three traits mentioned here are the focus of Norman 
Sandridge’s book-length study of Xenophon’s leadership theory.199 Sandridge shows how the accounts 
that follow the introduction illustrate these traits. Even when explicit traits are not often mentioned, we 
are to understand the king’s nature on the basis of his deeds, because it is there, according to 
Xenophon, that true virtue is most clearly exposed (cf. Mem. 1.5.6, 4.4.10; Symp. 8.43).200 Given the 
prominence that these three traits are given in Xenophon’s account, it is worthwhile pausing to 
consider them in some detail.
Three Royal Virtues. An examination of Cyrus’ deeds at key points in his career leads Sandridge to 
conclude that Xenophon’s construction of Cyrus’ φιλανθρωpiι'α is best described as  
a fondness for humans that involves feelings of pity, sympathy, affection, and care. It entails 
gift-giving, tokens of honor, matchmaking, and attention to illness. It may be grand, civilizing, 
and long-lasting, coming as it does with associations of divinity.201
Cyrus shows this trait even as a young boy in Media (1.4.1; cf. 4.2.10) and in the penultimate chapter 
of the book, as lies on his death bed, he claims to have been φιλα' νθρωpiος towards others and that he 
now looks forward to joining that which benefits humanity (κοινωνηñσαι τουñ  ευ  εργετουñντος 
α  νθρω' piους). This is not an allusion to the divine, but an acknowledgment that in his burial he will be 
“united to the earth”—that which brings forth and nourishes the good and the beautiful (8.7.25). Even 
in his death, Cyrus will be seen to benefit his subjects and his φιλανθρωpiι'α will be on display, as it has 
been throughout his life (see below).
Cyrus’ generosity and benefaction, summarized again as φιλανθρωpiι'α, is displayed at the micro-
level during a victory banquet (8.4.6–8; cf. 8.2.4). After seeing the king share the best of what he had 
available, Gobryas observes that Cyrus’ φιλανθρωpiι'α excels even his generalship. Cyrus explains that 
this is because he is required to harm people in exercising the latter, but to do only good in the case of 
the former. And doing good to others is a crucial part of Cyrus’ success as a leader since it contributes 
to bringing about willing obedience through demonstrating love and good will towards those who are 
being ruled. It is only when they are convinced of his love towards them and his ability to bring about 
what is in their best interests, that the king’s subjects will respond to him with love and obedience 
(1.6.21; 8.2.1).
This good will extends even to those whom Cyrus has defeated. He suggests that his soldiers deal 
with those they conquered on the basis of φιλανθρωpiι'α rather than δικαιοσυ' νη. Even if the persons, 
possessions, and property of the conquered city is theirs by law, they will be far better off if they act 
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199. Norman B. Sandridge, Loving Humanity, Learning, and Being Honored: The Foundations of Leadership in 
Xenophon’s Education of Cyrus, HellSt 55 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012), E-book (http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-
3:hul.ebook:CHS_SandridgeN.Loving_Humanity_Learning_and_Being_Honored. 2012). See also Due, Cyropaedia: 
φιλανθρωpiι'α (163–70), φιλοµαθι'α and φιλοτιµι'α (181–83). 
200. For the significance of deeds as part of characterization in biography, see Hägg, Art of Biography, 5.
201. Sandridge, Foundations of Leadership, 61/189. See also Due, Cyropaedia, 163–70.
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with generosity/kindness towards their new subjects (7.5.73).202 It is far better to have old enemies as 
new friends than to attempt to disarm and destroy them (8.1.48).203
Xenophon’s narrative suggests that φιλανθρωpiι'α is the pre-eminent kingly virtue.204 It occurs at 
significant points in the story and is seen in much that Cyrus does. It is a broad virtue, encompassing 
other traits like generosity, beneficence, mercy and, clemency. But this doesn’t mean that it stands apart 
from other virtues. In order for φιλανθρωpiι'α to be rightly exercised in victory, for example, it must be 
accompanied by other important virtues like σωφροσυ' νη and ε γκρα' τεια.205 Still, the significance for 
φιλανθρωpiι'α in Xenophon’s theory of leadership cannot be underestimated, primarily because of its 
link to the keystone of the entire theory: willing obedience. Cambyses tells his son that willing 
obedience comes from those who believe that their leader is wiser in matters related to their own 
welfare than they themselves are (1.6.21). The discussion turns to what this wisdom might look like 
and how it might be achieved (see below, p. 78), but the point is clear: to be obeyed willingly, a good 
leader must be seen to be concerned with his subjects’ good (cf. 1.6.42). And doing good for others in 
this way is foundational to φιλανθρωpiι'α.
At 1.2.1 two other traits—φιλοτιµι'α  and φιλοµα' θεια—are mentioned alongside φιλανθρωpiι'α. If 
φιλανθρωpiι'α is as significant as I have suggested, are these other two equally important in Xenophon’s 
construction of ideal kingship?
 Despite the emphasis given to φιλοτιµι'α in the title and thesis of Sandridge’s book, the virtue is 
treated quite briefly in Sandridge’s first chapter, which is devoted largely to φιλανθρωpiι'α.206 The virtue 
is rarely explicitly ascribed to Cyrus: in addition to 1.2.1, where Xenophon calls him φιλοτιµο' τατος, 
the king is identified with this virtue only at 1.3.3 (cf. 1.4.1), where the young Cyrus wins the affection 
of the young Median boys and their fathers. Like the English word “ambition,” φιλοτιµι'α can have 
negative as well as positive connotations. While the trait is used positively in the Cyropaedia of the 
king and his soldiers,207 perhaps the negative possibilities (and the frequent examples of the wrong sort 
of kingly ambition) have led Xenophon to be more cautious of using φιλοτιµι'α in relation to Cyrus.208 
Nevertheless, Due is correct when she observes that “Cyrus’ whole life, his career and his success 
bears witness to his φιλοτιµι'α.”209   
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202. See also the important speech that Cyrus gives to his soldiers in 4.2 which alludes to some of the same ideas. 
Gera’s negative reading of φιλανθρωpiι'α at this point (Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, 183–84) seems to go against the grain of 
Xenophon’s narrative and his nuanced approach to warfare. More generally, φιλανθρωpiι'α can oppose and correct strict 
adherence to the law (Vincent Azoulay, Xénophon et les grâces du pouvoir. De la charis au charisme, Histoire Ancienne et 
Médiévale 77 [Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2004], 322). 
203. This attitude of good will also informed Cyrus’ approach to war and plunder: while it is morally acceptable to 
defend yourself against others, aggressive wars are not considered acceptable. For Xenophon’s attitude to war, see Due, 
Cyropaedia, 158–63). Due shows how φιλανθρωpiι'α informed this view (Cyropaedia, 163–70).
204. “Un thème de prédilection,” according to Azoulay, Xénophon, 320, see 320–23.  
205. Due, Cyropaedia, 169–81.
206. Sandridge, Foundations of Leadership, 34–70/189; see also Due, Cyropaedia, 182–83.
207. Although see Joseph Reisert’s argument that Cyrus exploits his subjects’ love of honour in order to subjugate 
them to his will (“Ambition and Corruption in Xenophon’s Education of Cyrus,” Polis 26.2 [2009]: 296–315).
208. J. Joel Farber, “The Cyropaedia and Hellenistic Kingship,” AJP 100.4 (1979): 505. Farber notes that Xenophon 
uses the term negatively in his other writings; see Mem. 1.2.14, for example.
209. Due, Cyropaedia, 182.
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Sandridge’s summary definition is useful in understanding the role of the virtue in Xenophon’s 
narrative:
[φιλοτιµι'α] is a love of being honored, but more than just a desire for tokens of distinction. It is 
often a love of being praised, approved of, or appreciated. Cyrus wants others to feel the 
fondness for him that he feels for others.210
If we accept this definition, then it becomes apparent why this is the companion virtue to φιλανθρωpiι'α. 
If φιλανθρωpiι'α describes the king’s actions towards others, φιλοτιµι'α is related to the desire for a 
positive response from those to whom the former has been displayed.211 
More often than not, φιλοτιµι'α is a characteristic Cyrus sought to instill in his soldiers and those 
responsible for leadership in his armies.212 In 8.1.34–39 we see how Cyrus uses his men’s desire for 
honour—especially their desire to be honoured by the king—in order to encourage them to compete in 
training, and through this training, to instill other key leadership virtues in them. Cyrus serves as their 
primary paradigm of leadership (8.1.39) and his φιλοτιµι'α drives him to strive to remain their superior 
in all things. But since praise and honour can be used to bring about obedience (1.6.20), the desire to 
be praised and the love of honour are also important characteristics for those under Cyrus to exhibit.213 
The final of the three traits mentioned at 1.2.1, φιλοµα' θεια/φιλοµαθι'α, is only attributed explicitly 
to Cyrus here, at 1.4.3 and 1.6.38, but, like the other two, it is implied throughout Xenophon’s 
narrative.214 The account of the Persian education system (1.2.2–16) concludes with the observation 
that Cyrus was superior to his classmates and that he learned quickly and thoroughly (1.3.1). When 
visiting his grandfather in Media, the young Cyrus is eager to learn how to ride in order that he might 
excel the Medes who ride better than he (1.3.14–15). And he once again excels in his Persian education 
upon his return from Media (1.5.1).
The lessons about riding foreshadow Cyrus’ ability to learn in a military context. In 4.3 he sees the 
benefit of having a cavalry and successfully exhorts his army to adopt this method of warfare. Cyrus 
pursues the Assyrian king by adapting the way in which chariots are used (6.1.25–30). These examples 
stand as explanations for why the Persian military is structured as it is in Xenophon’s time (4.3.23; 
6.1.30), yet in the narrative, they serve to portray Cyrus as learning from others and being willing to 
adapt his armaments and strategies to the advantage of his army, thus illustrating his φιλοµα' θεια.215
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211. The danger, of course, is that kindness and generosity might simply be seen as a means to achieve honour or 
praise or respect, so Tamiolaki, “Virtue and Leadership,” 574–76. Sandridge recognises this possibility, but shows that this is 
not the case in Xenophon’s Cyropaedia (Sandridge, Foundations of Leadership, 49–58/189).
212. In the Cyropaedia it is the ideal soldier who exhibits φιλοτιµι'α; see, e.g., 1.6.26; 2.1.22; 3.3.10, 59. In his speech 
to the two-hundred men who go to Media with him (1.5.7–14), Cyrus identifies their love of praise as their possession “most 
suitable to war” (1.5.12). Wilhelm Schubart, “Das hellenistische Königsideal nach Inschriften und Papyri,” APF 12 
(1937): 8, 19 shows that in Hellenistic papyri φιλοτιµι'α was more often used of the ideal official than of the ideal king. 
213. Xenophon again shows his knowledge of psychology when he has Cyrus observe that φιλοτιµι'α can easily turn 
into jealousy if it is not correctly managed (3.3.10).
214. Sandridge’s chapter dealing with Cyrus’ φιλοµα' θεια is entitled “Curiosity, Aptitude, and Intense Awareness” 
(Foundations of Leadership, 71–89/189). He includes under this trait, “a desire and aptitude to master subjects that bring 
honor ... abiding attentiveness (epimeleia) [pp. 78–83/189] ... self-awareness [pp. 83–85/189].”
215. Due, Cyropaedia, 181–82.
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While φιλανθρωpiι'α, φιλοτιµι'α, and φιλοµα' θεια are used at 1.2.1 to summarise Cyrus’ character, 
this brief survey suggests that they are not equally important in Xenophon’s presentation of the Persian 
king. Cyrus’ φιλανθρωpiι'α is highlighted throughout the narrative and is shown to be the sine qua non 
of good leadership. While the other two traits are certainly present in the remainder of Xenophon’s 
account, they do not enjoy the same pre-eminence as φιλανθρωpiι'α and belong, instead, to the 
collection of other virtues which define ideal kingship in Xenophon’s writings. The next important 
virtue, justice, is introduced in the account of Cyrus’ Persian education.
Justice in Cyrus’ Persian Education. The Persian system of education is described in 1.2.2–16. This is 
said to be the education that Cyrus receives up until the age of 12 (1.3.1), but surprisingly, the young 
prince is absent from the narrative. Instead, Xenophon presents a general description of the four stages 
of life through which Persian males pass. The focus on education occurs primarily in the sections on 
the youth and ephebes (1.2.5–12). With regard to the youth, the emphasis falls on justice (1.2.6–7) and 
self-control (1.2.8). The self-control will be discussed below216 and so we turn at this point to justice.
Justice is so important in Persian education that Xenophon contrasts the emphasis on teaching 
justice with the Greek desire to teach literacy (1.2.6) and notes that the institutions of learning can be 
called “public schools of justice” (τα` κοινα` τηñς δικαιοσυ' νης διδασκαλειñα; 1.2.15). The youth are 
tutored in justice through the example of their leaders (α»ρχοντες), who judge cases of theft, cheating, 
slander, and the like (1.2.6–7). And by the time they join the rank of the elders (γεραι'τεροι), they are 
expected to judge public and private cases (τα'  κοινα` και` τα` ι»δια) involving those who have failed in 
some way or another in their duties as prescribed by the law (1.2.14).
The inclusion of ingratitude (α  χαριστι'α) within a discussion of justice (1.2.7) might seem odd. 
According to Xenophon’s Socrates, however, the greatest injustice that one might perpetrate is 
ingratitude (Mem. 2.2), since it entails the refusal to return a favour or requite a benefit when one is 
able to do so (Cyr. 1.2.7; cf. Mem. 4.4.24). Gratitude, by this definition, is an important instance of 
distributive justice in which each person receives that which is due to him or her.217 The question of 
how this distribution might be made justly—in other words, how to decide who receives what and how 
much—is answered by Xenophon in the person of the ideal leader:218 the ideal leader knows how to 
distribute goods, offices, and honours justly. Cyrus’ ability to inhabit this role is illustrated in an 
incident that forms part of the account of his stay with his grandfather, Astyages, in Media (1.3–4).
Cyrus decides to remain in Media when his mother prepares to return to Persia (1.3.13–15). She is 
concerned about his continuing education in justice but he assures her of his precise (perfect?) 
understanding of justice (α  κριβωñ ς ταυñτα'  γε οιòδα; 1.3.16). He reminds her that he had already been 
appointed by his teachers as a judge because of this understanding, but he then proceeds to narrate a 
case in which he was flogged for not deciding a case correctly (1.3.17). A bigger boy exchanged his 
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small tunic with that of a small boy who had a larger tunic. Cyrus decided that each boy should keep 
the tunic that best fit him, but his teacher rebuked him, saying that he should have judged the matter on 
the basis of rightful possession. The question should turn on whether the tunic rightfully belonged to 
the boy who obtained it by force/violence (βι'α, ) or to the one who had made or bought it. The teacher 
summarized the legal principle as follows:
ε piει` δε` ε»φη το` µε`ν νο'µιµον δι'καιον ειòναι, το` δε` α»νοµον βι'αιον, συ`ν τωñ,  νο'µω,  ε κε'λευεν α  ει` το`ν 
δικαστη`ν τη`ν ψηñφον τι'θεσθαι. 
And since, he said, what is lawful is right and what is unlawful is violent,219 he bade the judge 
always render his verdict on the side of the law. (1.3.17)
Cyrus concludes the story by reaffirming his precise understanding of all matters relating to justice (τα'  
γε δι'καια piαντα' piασιν η»δη α  κριβωñ ; 1.3.17). The topic of law is not often raised by Xenophon in the 
Cyropaedia and this passage is therefore important for one’s understanding of Cyrus’ attitude towards 
law and justice.
Deborah Gera argues that the coat incident shows the difficulty of reconciling what is lawful with 
what is just, but that “Cyrus needs to be taught especially that the law may seem unfair or unreasonable 
at times, but must none the less by obeyed if justice is to prevail.”220 This position would seem to 
match  that of Xenophon’s Socrates (Mem. 4.4). Socrates’ own obedience to the law is firstly 
emphasized (4.4.1–4) and in his subsequent discussion with Hippias (4.4.5–25), Socrates declares what 
is lawful and what is just to be the same thing (το` αυ  το` α  piοδει'κνυµαι νο' µιµο' ν τε και` δι'καιον ειòναι; 
4.4.18).221 This is the same language used by Cyrus’ teacher at Cyropaedia 1.3.17, suggesting that the 
teacher and Socrates (and therefore Xenophon) hold this position. Does this mean that Cyrus’ initial 
judgement was wrong in so far as he ignored property rights? Cyrus’ statement that he was flogged for 
judging incorrectly (1.3.16) must be understood to mean that he judged incorrectly in the eyes of his 
teacher. It would be strange if Cyrus’ assertion that he understands justice precisely (1.3.17) was 
supported by an example in which he was mistaken.222
Rather than being incorrect, Cyrus’ desire to give each boy a coat appropriate to his size is 
illustrative of proportional justice. As the dialogue with Chrysantas (2.2.18–22) shows, the principle of 
proportionality in the just distribution of goods and offices is applied in Cyrus’ leadership of his army 
and later his empire (2.3.4–8; 7.5.35; 8.1.19–20, 39; 8.4.3–5). This principle is clearly foreshadowed in 
Cyrus’ decision in the coat incident of 1.3.
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The tension between law and (proportional) justice in the coat incident is thus not unambiguously 
resolved in favour of law. So too, in his discussion with Hippias in Memorabilia 4.4, Socrates needs to 
extend the legal realm to include divine, unwritten law in order to ameliorate this tension, even if the 
tension is not adequately resolved.223 An important characteristic of divine law is that it is beneficial, 
and it is this which explains Cyrus’ decision. Both boys are better off following his judgement—
regardless of what the property laws declare—because they both have a coat that fits them well. But 
even if proportional justice has been done, the bigger boy’s actions cannot be condoned. 
The teacher’s conclusion about the case (1.3.17) does not contrast justice and injustice, but justice 
and violence (το` βι'αιον). The bigger boy’s use of force, violence, and compulsion is the most 
problematic aspect of this case. What the teacher’s response highlights is a preference for non-violence. 
Justice, in this case, the fair distribution of goods, should ideally be brought about through persuasion 
and coercion rather than force and compulsion. There seems to be some irony, then, in Cyrus’ 
recollection that he was beaten (presumably by the teacher) for judging incorrectly (1.3.16; cf. 1.3.18). 
It would seem that in Xenophon’s thinking, violence is undesirable, but sometimes necessary and 
unavoidable, especially in the realm of international politics.224
The question of what justice towards enemies might look like is answered by Cambyses in his 
dialogue with Cyrus in 1.6. The discussion starts with a question from Cyrus about how a leader might 
gain an advantage over the enemy (1.6.26). Cambyses answers that a successful leader will exhibit a 
number of negative traits: he will be “designing and cunning, wily and deceitful, a thief and a robber, 
overreaching the enemy at every point” (δειñ το`ν µε'λλοντα τουñτο piοιη' σειν και` ε piι'βουλον ειòναι και` 
κρυψι'νουν και` δολερο`ν και` α  piατεωñνα και` κλε'piτην και` α«ρpiαγα και` ε ν piαντι` piλεονε'κτην τωñν piολεµι'ων; 
1.6.27, cf. Mem. 3.1.6). When Cyrus rejects this advice, presumably because it seems to go against all 
that he has been taught about justice, Cambyses goes on to say that he must nonetheless still be the 
most righteous and law-abiding man (δικαιο' τατο' ς τε και` νοµιµω' τατος α  νη`ρ; 1.6.27). He appeals to the 
Persian education system to show what he means (1.6.28–29). The youth are trained to hunt animals 
through trickery and deceit, and this is nothing other than preparation for war. At the same time, they 
are taught not to harm their friends. Cambyses recalls a teacher who attempted to use the same 
techniques in the realm of justice, teaching boys to be honest and to lie, to slander and not to slander, 
and so forth (1.6.31–32). This was ultimately unsuccessful since the youth were liable to use the 
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violence or compulsion. For the argument that Xenophon uses this scene to show Cyrus twisting justice, see Tamiolaki, 
“Virtue and Leadership,” 572–74.
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negative skills against one another, instead of reserving them for enemies. Cambyses says that now the 
system focuses only on the positive, and boys are taught that if they ever act contrary to the law, they 
are liable to be punished (1.6.33). At a suitable age, though, when they are no longer likely to “break 
away and degenerate into savages,” young men are taught that which is lawful towards enemies (τα` 
piρο`ς του`ς piολεµι'ους νο' µιµα), namely, deceit, cunning, and the like (1.6.34). When dealing with 
enemies, justice takes on a different form to that taught to young Persian boys.225
But even when dealing with enemies, it would seem that a ruler might act justly or unjustly. Cyrus 
argues that his army did not act unjustly (α  δι'κως) in marching against Babylon since the Babylonians, 
and not the Persians, were the aggressors (7.5.77). The implication is that the aggressor acted unjustly 
while the army that acted in self-defence acted justly. Bodil Due rightly observes about Xenophon that, 
He accepts war, as all Greeks did, as a necessity which can impose itself on a nation and which 
has to be faced and dealt with. In this case a war can be termed δι'καιος, but not an aggressive 
war.226
This discussion of justice still leaves the question of the king's relationship to the law of the city 
unanswered.
Christopher Whidden is incorrect when he argues that “Cyrus went on to make a career of 
ignoring and subverting it [viz. the law] when he thought his will produced a better result.”227 The 
examples he cites certainly show Cyrus imposing his will in order to achieve his goals, but the 
emphasis in the narrative is on Cyrus’ ability to achieve these goals, rather than on law-breaking. 
Furthermore, it is not clear that all of the examples would have been considered negatively by 
Xenophon. While the United Nations of the twenty-first century might decry looting, the νο' µος of 
ancient warfare—according to Cyrus, “a law established for all time among all men” (7.5.73)—decrees 
that the spoils of war go to the victor.228 The “law” in this case is closer to the universal law of which 
Socrates speaks in Memorabilia 4.4 rather than the constitutional law of a state. There is a well-known 
passage in the final book which has some bearing on the question of Cyrus and the law.
Following the observation that Cyrus holds himself up as a model of virtue (for which, see below, 
p. 85), Xenophon notes the following:
For he thought he perceived that men are made better through even the written law (του`ς 
γραφοµε'νους νο'µους), while the good ruler he regarded as a law with eyes for men (βλε'piοντα 
νο'µον α  νθρω' piοις), because he is able not only to give commandments but also to see the 
transgressor and punish him. (8.1.22)
This passage has been read negatively, showing Cyrus as one who supersedes the law.229 It is possible, 
though, that Xenophon means for the reader to admire the good ruler as one who is not only able to 
establish the law (which is what the written law does), but who is also able to pursue and prosecute 
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225. The paradoxical nature of justice is an important topic in the Memorabilia (4.2.12–23). See also Gera, 
Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, 67–71; Mueller-Goldingen, Xenophons Kyrupädie, 126–28.
226. Due, Cyropaedia, 163.
227. Whidden, “Cyrus’s Persian Education,” 547.
228. For Cyrus’ attitude to war, see Due, Cyropaedia, 158–63.
229. Gera, Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, 290.
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those who transgress the law.230 Rather than remove the king from the realm of law, this passage serves 
to identify the king with law.231 Despite the fact that “[Cyrus] is ruthlessly self-serving and subversive 
of the status quo,”232 what Xenophon shows is that when Cyrus chooses to change existing laws, his 
alterations are always improvements.233 The assumption behind this state of affairs is that Cyrus has the 
requisite knowledge both to apply the laws, but also to adjust or even abrogate them as necessary for 
the mutual advantage of himself and his subjects.234 The possibility that these powers might be abused 
is not considered by Xenophon in relation to his ideal leader.   
Ideally, the law is considered as a source of instruction and moral development, rather than 
punishment. The law is mentioned in this regard together with fathers, teachers, and exemplary figures 
(1.6.20; 2.2.14). Since the king often serves as the most important exemplary figure (see below, p. 85), 
he can be seen as fulfilling a similar role to the law-as-tutor, even if he is superior to the law in this 
paedagogical role (3.3.49–55).
The ambiguity with regard to Cyrus’ relationship to law is evident in the final scene of 1.3. In her 
closing words to her son, Mandane suggests that there are different principles of justice and therefore 
different laws at work in Media, a tyranny, and Persia, which is marked by kingship (Cyr. 1.3.18). In 
Media, Astyages is master of all and is able to command the greatest share of goods. In contrast, 
equality is considered just (το` ι»σον ε»χειν δι'καιον νοµι'ζεται) in Persia, and the king acts in accordance 
with the polis and its law, not his own will.235 This is a restatement of Socrates’ famous distinction 
between kingship, defined as rule through consent and in accordance with the laws, and tyranny, which 
is rule of unwilling subjects in which the rulers is not controlled by the laws (Mem. 4.6.12). The 
following scene opens with the departure of Cyrus’ mother from Media and the observation that “Cyrus 
remained behind and grew up in Media” (1.4.1). The reader is not surprised, therefore, to find 
something of the Median tyrant alongside the Persian king in Cyrus as the narrative of his education 
progresses.236 This theme will be explored in more detail in the discussion of Book 8 of the 
Cyropaedia.
A Father-to-Son Chat. Cyrus the learner is most clearly on display in the dialogue with Cambyses (1.6) 
which follows Cyrus being given his first command (1.5). He is put in charge of thirty-one thousand 
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230.  See Gray, Mirror of Princes, 288–89, who appeals to the parallels between this passage and the positive 
description of the νοµοφυ' λακες in Oec. 9.14 and the ε»φοροι in Lac. 8.3–4. 
231. Carlier, “Imperial Monarchy,” 357; Atack, “Debating Kingship,” 100.
232. Tatum, Xenophon’s Imperial Fiction, 98.
233. Danzig, “Best of the Achaemenids,” 504–5.
234. Waller R. Newell, Tyranny: A New Interpretation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 194–95. In 
this way, the law is trumped by φιλανθρωpiι'α (Azoulay, Xénophon, 322). 
235. Cyrus’ response that Astyages thus teaches his subjects to be content with little can be taken ironically. But if 
Cyrus is indeed Xenophon’s ideal leader, then we might take the young prince’s words as face value and accept that he truly 
believes that the Medes can learn to be content with little through their experience of tyranny. Perhaps it is the inexperience 
of youth speaking, since even the slaves are cared for by the elder Cyrus (8.1.43–44).
236. Gera notes a number of ways in which Cyrus has become his grandfather in the final book of the Cyropaedia 
(Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, 293). The transformation is made explicit at 8.1.40–41 (Tatum, Xenophon’s Imperial 
Fiction, 197).
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soldiers in response to a call from his uncle, Cyaxares, who had succeeded Astyages as the Median 
king. Before departing, he plans to meet with his father (1.5.14).
The significance of the Cambyses-dialogue in Xenophon’s narrative is evident from the ring-
structure created by Cambyses’ “return” in 8.5.21–27.237 Cambyses’ instructions to his “child” (piαιñς; 
8.5.22) in Book 8 warn against tyrannical traits to which a successful general might be attracted. 
Cambyses’ second speech concludes Cyrus’ education and the narrative very quickly concludes as 
Cyrus becomes an old man and dies (8.7). Similarly, the dialogue in 1.6 also concludes with a brief 
warning against tyranny (see the discussion of 1.6.45 below) but contains more positive instruction. 
Furthermore, much of what Cyrus is taught by his father in 1.6 is illustrated in his military career 
described in Books 2–7. The education of the prince that is on display here thus forms a key 
component of Xenophon’s theory of the ideal leader.238 The popularity with later readers of this section 
of the Cyropaedia is clear from the papyrological evidence: of approximately a dozen papyri witnesses 
to the Cyropaedia, five contain parts of this dialogue.239 
The dialogue is framed by the question of piety and relationship to the gods (1.6.2–6, 44–46). In 
addition to showing his piety through prayer and sacrifice, the successful leader must be educated in 
reading auguries and auspices so that he will be able to obey the will of the gods and not be led astray 
by false oracles. He will also understand that the gods do not respond to those who are not first willing 
to fulfil their own human responsibilities. We have already seen (above, p. 66) how Xenophon hints at 
this doctrine by excluding any mention of omens at Cyrus’ birth. As Xenophon’s paradigmatic leader, 
Cyrus must do everything in word and deed that a good leader needs to do in order to lead well. Only 
once he has done this, may he turn to the gods for aid and for insight into what is humanly unknowable. 
Cambyses observes, “those only who had made themselves what they ought to be [have] a right to ask 
for corresponding blessings from the gods” (1.6.5).  
As the ideal leader, Cyrus begins his first military expedition with due attention to the gods (1.5.6, 
14; 1.6.1; cf. Eq. mag. 1.1) and is shown the supreme god’s favour in the form of auspicious thunder 
and lightning (1.6.1–2). Not only Cyrus’ entry into Media (2.1.1), but indeed the rest of his career is 
marked by similar care with regard to divine matters (3.3.20–22; 8.1.23–24), and this attitude continues 
until the end of his life (8.7.1–3). Cyrus’ piety is regularly met with positive omens from the gods 
(2.4.18–19; 7.1.3; 8.7.2). This is not indicative of a mechanistic view of religion from Xenophon,240 
but illustrates the favour which Cyrus finds with the gods. It also confirms Cambyses’ teaching in 1.6. 
Xenophon’s ideal leader is marked by piety and a concomitant humility which is seen in 
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237. Tatum, Xenophon’s Imperial Fiction, 75–91. Whidden suggests that Cambyses represents the voice of Xenophon 
in the Cyropaedia and the it is he, and not Cyrus, who is the trule sage in the narrative (“Cyrus’s Persian Education,” 554).
238. The discussion between teacher and pupil, father and son, king and prince, recalls the Socratic dialogues in 
Xenophon’s Memorabilia (Gera, Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, 50–54; Mueller-Goldingen, Xenophons Kyrupädie, 109).
239. P.Oxy. 697, 698, 1018, 2101, P.Varsov. 1 = Pack2 1545–9 (Gera, Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, 49 n. 90). Stobaeus 
also quotes large parts of Cambyses’ dialogue (Cyr. 1.6.3–6, 8, 10, 14, 17–19, 20–21, 23–28) in a section entitled υ piοθηñκαι 
piερι` βασιλει'ας (4.7.68–75); see Gera, Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, 50 n. 91 for further discussion.
240. So Gera, Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, 58–59.
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acknowledging the limitations of human knowledge and wisdom.241 These traits are received 
favourably by the gods, who respond with omens and reward the leader with success.
Piety is an important virtue of the ideal leader, but the discussion now turns to more earthly 
matters related to  “ruling well” (το` καλωñ ς α»ρχειν; 1.6.8). The Socratic motif that leadership is 
interchangeable—that the skills needed to lead men and women in one realm, the home, for example, 
are the same as those needed to lead in another realm—is raised at 1.6.7, but Cambyses turns his 
instruction more specifically towards what it means to rule well as a political and military leader.
In keeping with what was observed regarding the ruler’s φιλανθρωpiι'α, Cambyses will teach that 
good rule is characterized primarily in terms of concern for one’s subordinates: “how to govern other 
people so that they might have all the necessaries of life in abundance and might all become what they 
ought to be, this [seems] to us worthy of all admiration” (1.6.7). In order to achieve this, the good ruler 
will be marked by piρο' νοια and φιλοpiονι'α (1.6.8). The leader’s forethought here seems to be 
synonymous with the careful attention necessary to look after his subordinates’ needs, and the love of 
labour is necessary if he is to work continuously to bring about their good.242 This leadership stands in 
contrast to the rule of the Medians, who are marked by their desire for more sumptuous food, greater 
wealth, more sleep, and, generally speaking, a life of greater luxury than their subjects (1.6.8). The 
Median rulers show no desire to care for their subjects.
Care for subordinates, in the case of an army, includes the question of supplies (1.6.9–11), the 
army’s health, the location of camps, diet, exercise, friendly competition, and morale (1.6.15–19). 
Cyrus recalls what he had learned about these things from those who were truly “masters of military 
science” (1.6.14–15). Their example stands in contrast to the fraudulent teacher who claimed to know 
the art of being a general, but who taught only tactics (1.6.12–14).243 The point could not be clearer: a 
real general needs to acquire knowledge beyond that which is usually associated with military 
leadership. In particular, the ideal general needs to understand how to care for those under his 
command. He needs to understand and practice φιλανθρωpiι'α above everything else.
We have already had occasion to discuss Xenophon’s teaching about obedience in this passage 
(1.6.20–22). The connection with the preceding section now becomes clear: people are willing to be 
obedient when they believe the ruler is better able to look after their own interests than they are. Or, put 
negatively, no one is deliberately disobedient when they believe such disobedience will lead to their 
disadvantage. Xenophon illustrates this point with the well-known examples of a physician and pilot of 
a ship, to which he adds a guide (1.6.21).244 In each case, these leaders are obeyed willingly because 
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241. As one might expect, the degenerate Persian empire of Xenophon’s day is marked by impiety (8.7.7).
242. A love of labour is an especially important military trait and is closely related to the need for a military leader to 
show endurance and self-control; see below on 1.6.25.
243. Cf. Mem. 3.1.1–11 where a very similar scenario is presented with Socrates playing the role that Cambyses plays 
in Cyr. 1.6; for fuller discussion and a comparison between the two episodes, see Gera, Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, 61–64.
244. The same point about willing obedience is made at Mem. 3.3.8–9 in the context of training a cavalry officer and 
here Socrates uses the example of a doctor, pilot of a ship, and a farmer. The farmer will appear in the following paragraph in 
the Cyropaedia (§22). Xenophon’s transference of these chunks of ideas (Gedankenblöcken) from one context to another 
(Mueller-Goldingen, Xenophons Kyrupädie, 123) illustrates, again, the unity of his leadership theory within his larger 
oeuvre.
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their subordinates believe that the leaders are more capable of serving the needs of the subordinates 
than they, the subordinates, are. Cyrus’ summary of this teaching identifies superior knowledge as the 
necessary trait to elicit willing obedience (1.6.22).
Cambyses asserts that this knowledge cannot be imitated. The only way to acquire a reputation for 
being knowledgeable (φρο' νιµος) is to be truly knowledgeable. A poor leader will be seen as such just 
as quickly as a bad farmer, horseman, doctor, or musician.245 In each of these situations, appearance 
and reputation are not sufficient since each situation requires action, and the result of that action will 
show up the ability of the one performing it. Learning all that it is possible to learn is the only path to 
the sort of knowledge demanded of the ideal leader (1.6.23). And knowledge of that which cannot be 
learned should be sought from the gods.246
Knowledge of what is good for one’s subordinates needs to be translated into action. Cyrus 
considers it necessary to treat subjects in the same way one would treat friends: doing good for them 
(1.6.24). Cambyses agrees, but extends this into situations when one is unable to do good. A leader 
should also rejoice with those who are rejoicing, mourn with those who mourn, help those in distress, 
and ensure that they are not put at any disadvantage. The good leader empathizes with his subordinates, 
even to the point of placing himself in the same situation as they are. In the military context, this means 
that the general must be willing to endure the same hardships that his soldiers are enduring (1.6.24). In 
fact, because of his superior virtue—in this case, his καρτερι'α—he is even better suited to enduring 
these things than they are (1.6.25). But the greater honour that is ascribed to the general for facing the 
same toils (piο' νοι) as his soldiers also contributes to lightening this burden—his φιλοτιµι'α drives him 
towards good leadership practices.247 We pause our discussion of Cambyses’ teaching to investigate 
virtues related to καρτερι'α.
The heat and cold, hardship and toil that is endured through καρτερι'α at 1.6.25 is withstood 
through ε γκρα' τεια at 8.1.36–37. The distinction between these two traits is not consistently or clearly 
made248 and both describe avoiding pleasure in the present for the sake of greater future benefits.249 At 
8.1.30–39, ε γκρα' τεια is an important part of Cyrus’ training of his soldiers and of himself. The virtue is 
essential if a soldier is to survive heat and cold, hunger and thirst, hardship and toil.250 For Persians, 
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245. This, again, mirrors the teaching of Xenophon’s Socrates: Mem. 1.7.1–3 (flautist, general, pilot); 2.6.38–39 (pilot, 
general, jurist, politician); 3.3.9 (physician, pilot, farmer); 3.9.11 (pilot, farmer, physician, athletic trainer). The teaching 
might be summarized as follows: reputation that is not based on fact is worthless and even dangerous;  “if you want to be 
thought good at anything, you must try to be so” (Mem. 2.6.39).
246. So Mem. 1.1.7–9: “In short, what the gods have granted us to do by help of learning, we must learn; what is 
hidden from mortals we should try to find out from the gods by divination (δια` µαντικηñς): for to him that is in their grace the 
gods grant a sign” (1.1.9). 
247. The term φιλοτιµι'α  is not used here but the concept is clearly present, showing, again, the coherence of 
Xenophon’s theory of leadership.
248. Due, Cyropaedia, 174. Aristotle considers ε γκρα' τεια superior to καρτερι'α since the latter only consists of resisting 
something whereas the former implies mastery of it (Eth. nic. 1150a).
249. 8.1.32; cf. 1.5.9: “I believe that those who abstain from present pleasures do this not that they may never enjoy 
themselves, but by this self-restraint (δια` ταυ' την τη`ν ε  γκρα' τειαν) they prepare themselves to have many times greater 
enjoyment in time to come.”
250. Similarly, in his speech to his army at 7.5.72–79, Cyrus emphasizes the need for ongoing training in moderation 
and self-control in matters related to heat and cold, food and drink, toil and rest (§78).
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lessons in self-control start with training in matters related to food and drink (1.2.8), and their success 
in learning these lessons is seen in the way they control themselves while hunting (1.2.10–11). Despite 
his temporary stay in luxurious Media, the young Cyrus retains the virtues he had been taught in Persia 
and his endurance and self-control soon win him the respect of his Persian peers (1.5.1). 
In the Cyropaedia, σωφροσυ' νη is often associated with ε  γκρα' τεια (1.2.8; 4.1.14–15; 7.5.76; 
8.1.30, 32). Thus, σωφροσυ' νη  plays a central role in the Persian education system where it is once 
linked to martial skills and exemplified in moderation and even abstinence from food and drink (1.2). 
Little wonder, then, that the Persians are characterized by this virtue (4.1.14; cf. 1.3.2, 4). There are 
two extended passages in which the virtue is discussed as it pertains to war (3.1.16–18; 4.1.15–18). 
The former occurs in Cyrus’ dialogue with Tigranes. Xenophon associates Tigranes with a philosopher 
whom Cyrus admires (3.1.14), thus making Tigranes someone worth listening to. Thus, σωφροσυ' νη is 
something that can be taught and learned, unlike the emotions which simply wash over one. 
The passage describing Abradatas’ death and the mourning of Panthea, his widow (7.3), is 
insightful for two reasons. First, we see Xenophon ascribe σωφροσυ' νη and all virtue to Panthea 
(7.3.12). Although there is no direct line drawn to leadership at his point, the narrative has repeatedly 
connected σωφροσυ' νη to leadership. The ascription of this virtue to Panthea opens up the potential for 
her to be a leader, but her suicide removes her from the scene before this theme can be properly 
developed. We know from other examples that Xenophon thought that women could indeed be leaders 
and that they were capable of learning the necessary virtues.251 Second, the passage serves to highlight 
the importance of σωφροσυ' νη in Xenophon’s thought since it stands as the chief virtue at this point. 
This is because self-control is the most important means of bringing about virtue, as Cyrus teaches in 
the speech to his soldiers at 7.5.72–86.252 
Not surprisingly, Cyrus exhibits this cluster of virtues in his youth and throughout his life as 
general and king. The leader’s moderation and self-control in matters of eating and drinking are evident 
not only when these virtues are explicitly mentioned,253 but also when they are demonstrated by his 
actions in, for example, his conduct at banquets (4.2.38; 5.2.14–19). Cyrus’ actions (or inaction) 
towards the beautiful Panthea serve to illustrate his piety and sexual σωφροσυ' νη (6.1.47; cf. 5.1.8).254 
Most strikingly, within the empire he creates, Cyrus undertakes to be the very paradigm of σωφροσυ' νη 
and ε γκρα' τεια which he expects his subjects to emulate (8.1.30–33; cf. 8.1.12, 21). That these virtues 
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251. Gray, Mirror of Princes, 20–22. See, e.g., the dancing slave at Symp. 2.1–14 who has been taught the “manly” 
virtue of courage (Emily Baragwanath, “The Wonder of Freedom: Xenophon on Slavery,” in Xenophon: Ethical Principles 
and Historical Enquiry, ed. Fiona Hobden and Christopher Tuplin, MnSup 348 [Leiden: Brill, 2012], 636–38) or the 
Socratic discussion at Oec. 7 which shows something of this “enlightened” attitude towards women but is still unable to 
transcend the patriarchy of the time. For a summary of the evidence in Xenophon, see Stewart Irvin Oost, “Xenophon’s 
Attitude Toward Women,” CW 71.4 (1977–78): 225–36. For a discussion of the portrayal of women in classical Greek 
literature, see Sarah B. Pomeroy, Goddesses, Whores, Wives, and Slaves: Women in Classical Antiquity (1975; repr., New 
York: Schocken Books, 1995), especially pp. 93–119.
252. Due, Cyropaedia, 179–81.
253. For a more detailed analysis of Cyrus’ self-control in these “eating and drinking” passages, see Due, 
Cyropaedia, 170–79. The five symposia in the Cyropaedia (1.3; 2.2; 5.2; 8.3; 8.4) are examined by Gera (Xenophon’s 
Cyropaedia, 132–91). 
254. For an ironic reading of Cyrus’ dealings with Panthea, see Whidden, “Cyrus’s Persian Education,” 551–53.
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are important for Xenophon’s ideal leader is once again confirmed by a comparison with the figure of 
Socrates, of whom Xenophon writes:
in control of his own passions and appetites he was the strictest (ε γκρατε'στατος) of men; 
further, in endurance of cold and heat and every kind of toil he was most resolute 
(καρτερικω' τατος); and besides, his needs were so schooled to moderation (piρο`ς το` µετρι'ων 
δειñσθαι piεpiαιδευµε'νος) that having very little he was yet very content. (Mem. 1.2.1; cf. 1.3.5–
15)
Xenophon’s military heroes exhibit similar traits (Anab. 3.1.23), as does Agesilaus (Ages. 5.2–3). 
Conversely, the opponents of the Persian army are poor soldiers and will be easily defeated because 
they do not possess these virtues (Cyr. 1.5.11). The consistency with which moderation and self-
constrol occur in, and are practised by, Xenophon’s most significant characters confirm their centrality 
in his theory of leadership.255
Returning to the dialogue between Cyrus and Cambyses, we are confronted with a long section in 
which the king and the prince discuss military tactics (1.6.26–44). While Xenophon’s military 
knowledge and experience is on display at this point, there is not much that relates to our attempts at 
sketching Xenophon’s ideal king, other than to point out once again the significance of military 
leadership in this portrait.256
The final paragraph of the dialogue begins and ends with a reminder to Cyrus to heed divine 
omens and respect the omniscience of the gods (1.6.44, 46). Wedged between this teaching, though, is 
a collection of brief “lessons from history” (1.6.45). Cyrus is warned to keep a watchful eye on those he 
has armed and befriended lest they turn on him. Despite the exchange of favours, even friends are 
likely to turn on those who treat them like slaves. Those leaders who fail to be satisfied with their 
proper share and instead desire to be “lords of all” are likely to lose everything they had gained. And 
those who have gained great wealth have often been ruined by it.
These “lessons from history” read like a warning against tyranny. In these brief statements we are 
provided with the opposite of the ideal ruler portrayed in the dialogue. The negative portrait becomes 
even clearer if we remember the most important virtues necessary for the success of the ideal leader: 
φιλανθρωpiι'α and καρτερι'α/ε γκρα' τεια/σωφροσυ' νη. Instead of exhibiting φιλανθρωpiι'α and caring for 
his friends/subjects, the tyrant treats them like slaves. Instead of self-control and moderation, the bad 
ruler seeks to control “all” and is characterized by an inordinate desire for wealth.257 The fact that 
Cyrus maintains until death his hold over the empire he creates indicates that he learned these lessons 
from his father. He exercises the royal virtues throughout his life, as the narrative in Books 2–7 
indicates, and shows himself to be the ideal leader described by Xenophon’s Cambyses. As we 
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255. The self-control and moderation exemplified by Cyrus is largely physical and is somewhat distinct from the 
personal, moral configuration of similar virtues that characterize much of  the Socratic legacy (Due, Cyropaedia, 225–28). 
This is due to the nature of the narrative with which Xenophon provides his reader. The strong military emphasis and the 
virtues related to these pursuits is inevitable, given that his hero is Cyrus.   
256. Cambyses discussion of justice has already been dealt with; see above, p. 73.
257. The contrast is evident in the characters of Socrates (self-control) and Simonides (greed) who teach about 
kingship and tyranny, respectively (Strauss, Tyranny, 33).
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investigate Book 8 of the Cyropaedia we will have further opportunity to return to the question of 
whether Cyrus ever ventured into the realm of tyranny.
In 1.6, we see Cyrus receiving an education from Cambyses “that is partly Socratic but not 
explicitly philosophic.”258 The Socratic form and even certain Socratic elements can be clearly seen in 
the dialogue, but the focus is exclusively on good leadership. The dialogue between Cambyses and 
Cyrus is programmatic in that it exemplifies the “education of Cyrus” and also raises specific topics 
and themes that relate to Xenophon’s description of the ideal leader.259 It is specifically military 
leadership that is in view since the good king is required to be a good general. Xenophon’s knowledge 
of, and attention to the details of, martial tactics and logistics is on display here as it is in the Anabasis, 
De equitum magistro, and elsewhere in his writings.260 This does not mean that it should be read as a 
military handbook or a call for military reform.261 The focus of Xenophon’s narrative remains Cyrus’ 
education which is used as a means to portray his ideal leader. In Cambyses’ teaching, the ideal leader 
must instill obedience of one sort or another. The primary virtue in this regard is φιλανθρωpiι'α since 
people are most willing to obey leaders whom they believe are serving the interests of their 
subordinates. Alongside this concern for subordinates, the cluster of virtues that contribute to self-
control, endurance, and moderation must be nurtured in the ideal leader. This group of virtues are 
discussed by Cambyses and Cyrus in the light of military leadership, but they are shown throughout the 
Cyropaedia to be important virtues for the king to fix in himself and his subjects. It is above all in the 
final book of the Cyropaedia that we see Cyrus the king.
Kingship (7.5.37–8.7.28)
This last part of the Cyropaedia presents the reader with “a lesson in how to follow up a military 
victory with the reorganization of a post-war world.”262 Having subdued his enemies, Cyrus must now 
organize his subjects into an orderly empire. At 7.5.37, Cyrus determines to establish himself in a 
manner fitting for a king (ω ς βασιλειñ η γειñτο piρε'piειν) and much of what we see in final section of the 
Cyropaedia provides us with a description of this kingship.
As indicated by the  νυñν δε'  of 7.5.47 and 7.5.56, from this point onwards, Cyrus’ leadership has 
entered a different era which necessitates a different mode of rule. The king begins by distancing 
himself from the crowd and establishing intermediaries between himself and the people (7.5.37–57). 
Whereas the demands of war made it necessary for the good general to be amongst his soldiers, now 
the good king needs time alone with his advisors and friends. Cyrus does not demand this new freedom 
but manipulates his friends in order that they come up with the suggestion. Xenophon also has 
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258. Newell, Tyranny, 204.
259. For an examination of how Xenophon uses recurrent themes and repeated patterns to create a coherent work, see 
Due, Cyropaedia, 92–114. 
260. Other texts, such as the De equitande ratione and Cynegeticus are also related to military matters. Near the end of 
the treatise on hunting, for example, Xenophon reminds his reader that hunting “affords the best training for war” (Cyn. 
12.1).
261. So Paul Christesen, “Xenophon’s Cyropaedia and Military Reform in Sparta,” JHS 126 (2006): 47–65. 
262. Tatum, Xenophon’s Imperial Fiction, 76.
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Chrysantas urge Cyrus to take a palace for himself. The way in which Cyrus’ kingship is inaugurated is 
meant to highlight a point made at 7.5.47: that all of these changes are made in the interest of 
harmonizing the interests of the leader and those for whom he must care. The new era has the same 
goal as the former era, even if the means by which this goal is reached might look different. The 
continuity between “before” and “now” is observed in the continuing importance of virtue. 
Virtues. Cyrus issues the following warning to his army:
Therefore, we dare not become careless nor give ourselves up to the enjoyment of the present 
moment; for, while I think it is a great thing to have won an empire, it is a still greater thing to 
preserve it after it has been won. (7.5.76)
The empire had been won by an army possessed of these virtues263 and the empire can only be 
preserved in so far as virtue is practised. Cyrus exhorts his soldiers to continue to practise virtue as they 
had in the past (70, 77) for two reasons. First, it is only through virtue that the Persians can establish 
themselves as superior over others, and therefore as rightful rulers over those whom they have subdued 
(78, 83). This is an attitude that Cyrus himself held and put into practice (8.1.37, 40). Second, virtue is 
both the means and the safeguard of true happiness (80–86). Imperial power will bring with it many 
temptations which can only be resisted through these virtues. Cyrus proclaims that there are no new 
tricks to be learnt; virtue is still to be practised by the older generation and instilled in the younger 
generation as it had been in Persia (85–86).264 And as before, the example of the older men, but 
especially of Cyrus, serve as the source and model of this educational programme.
The importance of virtue has been demonstrated in our survey of the various virtues considered 
essential for the ideal leader to possess.265 We need only note at this point that Xenophon continues to 
ascribe these virtues to Cyrus in this final major section of the Cyropaedia. Even in his newfound role 
as emperor, he continues to exhibit piety (8.1.23–25), piρο' νοια and φιλοpiονι'α (8.2.2; cf. 1.6.8), 
σωφροσυ' νη (8.1.30), and ε  γκρα' τεια (8.1.32), to mention only some of the key virtues central to 
Xenophon’s depiction of the Persian king. There is thus also continuity in Cyrus’ own practice of these 
leadership virtues.266
We have already seen the centrality of φιλανθρωpiι'α in Xenophon’s picture of the ideal king and 
that virtue is once again on display in this section (e.g., 8.2.1). There is a related virtue that needs to be 
mentioned at this point because of its importance in other kingship texts. If φιλανθρωpiι'α usually 
involves doing good to others in order to win their favour, piραο' της can be considered “the practice of 
not harming others in situations where harshness or violence might be expected” and “the tendency not 
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263. The Persian army had already been described as being filled with enthusiasm, ambition, strength, courage, 
exhortation, self-control, obedience (piροθυµι'ας, φιλοτιµι'ας, ρω' µης, θα' ρρους, piαρακελευσµουñ , σωφροσυ' νης, piειθουñς; 
3.3.59).
264. Xenophon’s emphasis on continuity shows that it is not the case, as Pangle argues, that “the virtue that the new 
Persians practice is a grotesque counterfeit of the old Persian virtue” (“Socrates,” 149). As I will argue below, Xenophon is 
sensitive to the different leadership needs of republic versus empire, but is not critical of those who need to rule the latter.
265. See also Due for a synthesis and discussion of Cyrus’ virtues (Cyropaedia, 156–84).
266. While it might be possible in other contexts to distinguish between military and moral virtues (so Tamiolaki, 
“Virtue and Leadership,” 565–66), that distinction is not made with regard to Cyrus.
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to retaliate when contradicted, rivaled, threatened, or betrayed.”267 The king’s gentleness can also be 
seen as the practical outworking of forgiveness. Cyrus exhibits these traits in his treatment both of 
those close to him (Araspas; 6.1.31–37) and those who are distant, like prisoners of war (4.4.6–8; cf. 
7.5.73). In the trial of the Armenian king (3.1)268 who was in rebellion against the Medes, Cyrus shows 
gentleness both in his response to king’s treatment of the σοφιστη' ς (3.1.14) who had stolen his son’s 
affection (3.1.38–40)269 and in his treatment of the Armenians (3.1.37). Cyrus’ approach to dealing 
with the Armenians leads to another passage in which his virtues are praised:
And when they got home they talked, one of Cyrus's wisdom (σοφι'α), another of his strength 
(καρτερι'α), another of his gentleness (piραο' της), and still another of his beauty and his 
commanding presence (το` κα' λλος και` το` µε'γεθος). (3.1.41)
Cyrus is willing to show gentleness and clemency270 in his various relationships and dealings with 
others. These virtues form part of the cluster of virtues that are centred on his φιλανθρωpiι'α. As is the 
case with his φιλανθρωpiι'α, Cyrus’ piραο' της is often a means to a greater end. In the case of the 
Armenians, for example, Cyrus gains greater financial and military support by making them his friends 
than he might have had they remained conquered enemies (3.1.31–34). The mutually beneficial nature 
of Cyrus’ treatment of others is thus characteristic of Cyrus’ entire career and is not limited to the final 
book, although there is one image of this reciprocal relationship that seems especially egregious to 
some: the shepherd who benefits from his sheep. 
Opportunistic Shepherd. The second chapter of Book 8 contains a lengthy display of Cyrus’ generosity 
and gift-giving (8.2.1–9). Cyrus’ father had linked φιλανθρωpiι'α to ευò piοιειñν (1.6.24) and the image of 
Cyrus the benefactor is dominant in the first part of Book 8. The term is found at 8.1.25 and 8.2.9, but 
the concept is extended beyond these examples. 
Whereas food and drink had already been shown to be an important site for the practise and 
display of self-control and moderation, they now afford Cyrus the opportunity to display generosity and 
care for his subjects in the form of lavish banquets, the apotheosis of which occurs in 8.4. It is in 
connection with Cyrus’ generosity, however, that Xenophon presents another common royal theme: the 
king as shepherd (8.2.13–14). Xenophon’s Socrates taught that, following the example of Agamemnon, 
the good general must care for his flock and ensure that his soldiers fulfill their proper function (Mem. 
3.2.1). The leader’s primary focus must be to ensure that his subordinates are ευ  δαι'µων. But Cyrus is 
distinguished not only by the desire for his subjects’ ευ  δαιµονι'α, but also by deriving benefit from his 
flock. This leads Deborah Gera to suggest that Cyrus is closer to Plato’s Thrasymachus (Resp. 343a–b) 
than he is to Socrates at this point.271
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267. Sandridge, Foundations of Leadership, 99/189.
268. Discussed in detail by Gera, Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, 78–98.
269. It is likely that Xenophon has the trial and death of Socrates in view at this point (Mueller-Goldingen, Xenophons 
Kyrupädie, 160–62). Xenophon’s perspective on the matter is not clear (Gera, “Xenophon’s Socrateses,” 39–41): does he 
sympathise with Tigranes, who lost a beloved teacher, the Armenian king, who lost his son’s affection, Cyrus, who 
understands both positions, or the teacher himself, who does not hold the king culpable because he acts out of ignorance?
270. The virtue ε piιει'κεια is not mentioned explicitly in the Cyropaedia but the concept is present in the person of 
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Although it is possible to read this statement as irony on Xenophon’s part, Cyrus’ discussion with 
Croesus about the nature of a king’s wealth suggests otherwise (8.2.15–23). Cyrus states that he uses 
his wealth to enrich his friends which, at the same time, ensures his own safety: “by enriching men and 
doing them kindnesses I win with my superfluous wealth their friendship and loyalty, and from that I 
reap as my reward security and good fame (ε κ του' των καρpiουñµαι α  σφα' λειαν και` ευ»κλειαν)” (8.2.22; 
cf. 8.2.19). Is it possible that Cyrus is being disingenuous here? Is he simply saying these things 
because they are the sorts of things that politicians say in order to maintain their grasp of power? Is 
Xenophon intent on portraying the Persian emperor as “a distant, paternalistic despot whose authority 
rests on lavish gift giving”?272 Xenophon allays these concerns by being quite explicit about the fact 
that Cyrus practised what he preached (και` ταυñτα µε`ν δη` φανερο`ς ηòν ω« σpiερ ε»λεγε και` piρα' ττων; 
8.2.23). His use of wealth is in keeping with his φιλανθρωpiι'α (see p. 68) which, as we have seen, 
means that he desires the good of his subjects even as he benefits himself. The king and his subjects 
exist in a mutually beneficial relationship. One way in which this relationship is conceptualized is by 
comparing it to that between a father and the members of his household. 
Father. Xenophon has Chrysantas state that a good ruler should care for his subjects like a good father 
does for his children and that this is indeed what Cyrus has done (8.1.1).273 Both slaves and nobles 
alike call him father because of his provision for them, and Cyrus’ love for his subjects is so great that 
even those he has conquered call him “father” (8.2.9).274 These passages recall Cambyses’ teaching at 
1.6.7, where the old king teaches his son that while it is a great task, worthy of the  καλο`ς κα  γαθο' ς, to 
provide for his household, it is an even greater task “to understand how to govern other people so that 
they might have all the necessaries of life in abundance and might all become what they ought to be” 
(1.6.7). Cyrus agrees and states that this is what it means to govern well (1.6.8).275
It is in keeping with the transferable nature of  Xenophon's leadership theory276 that governing a 
household well and governing an empire well bear numerous similarities, the big difference between 
the two being the size of the οιòκος that must be governed. It is not surprising, therefore, to find in 
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271. Gera, Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, 295.
272. Pangle, “Socrates,” 149.
273. Is Xenophon influenced by Herodotus at this point? With regard to the matter of tribute, Herodotus notes “that the 
Persians called Darius the merchant, Cambyses the master, and Cyrus the father; for Darius made petty profit out of 
everything, Cambyses was harsh and arrogant, Cyrus was merciful (η»piιος) and always worked for their well-being” (3.89.3).
274. At Ages. 7.3, Xenophon employs the same father-metaphor, but here the emphasis is on the fact that Agesilaus 
was a father to his political enemies. It is their status as citizens that guarantees their decent treatment. In the Cyropaedia it is 
Cyrus’ nature that ensures his subjects will be treated well.
275. If Cambyses in 1.6 serves as a model father and teacher to Cyrus (Gera, Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, 280), then Cyrus 
is also in many respects a model son and pupil. As Tatum observes, “In his relationship with Cambyses, Cyrus is the 
antithesis of the recalcitrant subjects Xenophon says human beings are disposed to be. The seemingly effortless way he 
comes to rule others is shaped by a complementary and equally effortless submission to the power of his father” (Xenophon’s 
Imperial Fiction, 82).  
276. Gray, Mirror of Princes, 22–23.
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Xenophon’s Oeconomicus a number of ideas that are later applied in the Cyropaedia.277 Cyrus’ 
solution to the problem of ruling an empire is to establish himself as the father within his political 
household, the borders of which circumscribe millions of subjects. “Paternalism conceived in a broad 
sense is the solution to the problem Xenophon raised in the prologue.”278 This new household will be 
run on the basis of imitation rather than law. 
Imitation. The laws which are central to the Persian education system do not consist of prohibitions, 
like those of other states, but focus instead on forming the character of Persian citizens (1.2.2–3), 
which they do in conjunction with other figures of authority like fathers and teachers (1.6.20; 2.2.14). 
But if character formation is central to the goals of the state, the most effective form of instruction 
comes through the provision of models for imitation (3.3.49–55). So, too, Xenophon’s Socrates:
To be sure he never professed to teach this [viz. the virtues]; but, by letting his own light shine, 
he led his disciples to hope that they through imitation of him would attain to such excellence. 
(Mem. 1.2.3)
    As part of establishing and maintaining his imperial “household,” Cyrus trains his subjects, but 
especially his lieutenants. This is an important step in ensuring a stable government since the nature of 
any organization is determined by the nature of its leadership (8.1.8; cf. 8.1.12). Cyrus accomplishes 
this training by presenting himself as a model for imitation (8.1.30–39). The initial focus in these 
paragraphs (30–33) is on the virtues that have been so central throughout the Cyropaedia: self-control 
and moderation. By practising these through imitating the king, subjects become obedient towards their 
superiors and well disposed towards one another. The outcome of this training almost has a 
philosophical ring to it as Xenophon notes that upon seeing Cyrus’ subjects “you would have judged 
that they were in truth making a noble life (κα' λλος ζηñν) their aim” (33).  But the martial nature of the 
empire is never allowed to recede into the background (34–39). Cyrus again sets the example for his 
lieutenants to follow as he continues to train himself and them “in the arts and pursuits of war” (37). 
Cyrus now embodies that which he had taught his soldiers earlier (7.5.86): those who practise virtue 
and establish themselves as models for others to imitate are also improved by the process, thus 
establishing a virtuous cycle in which both the model and the imitators are improved. 
Within this virtuous cycle, though, the leader is always superior since improvement only occurs 
when something or someone superior is imitated. Cyrus and a number of other characters within the 
Cyropaedia all assert this foundational assumption: that the leader must be superior to his or her 
subordinates (Cyrus: 7.5.78; 8.1.37, 40; Tigranes: 3.1.20; Cyaxares: 5.5.34). The very fact of imitation 
suggests that there exist traits that can be learnt through such imitation. We have already shown, 
however, that the monarch—the leader who occupies the apex of the leadership pyramid—is 
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277. Newell describes Hiero and the Oeconomicus as prologomena to the Cyropaedia (Tyranny, 190–98). Carlier 
(“Imperial Monarchy,” 358) notes that, “In the Cyropaedia, Cyrus governs his empire as Ischomachus administers his estate 
in the Oeconomicus.” See also Oec. 4.4–12 where Socrates demonstrates to Critobulus that the “Persian king” pays as much 
attention to farming and he does to war.  
278. Tatum, Xenophon’s Imperial Fiction, 89, cf. 189–92; cf. Newell, Tyranny, 188; Robert C. Bartlett, “How to Rule 
the World: An Introduction to Xenophon’s The Education of Cyrus,” American Political Science Review 109.1 (2015): 151.
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characterized by certain inherent traits and abilities which ensure his success. Even if the young Cyrus 
is inferior to his Median companions in horsemanship, for example, his inherent love of learning and 
honour means that he is willing and able to work hard to become the best at those activities in which he 
did not excel (see, e.g., 1.4.4–5), thus ensuring amongst them the superiority he had enjoyed amongst 
his Persian peers (1.3.1). For Xenophon, then, the superiority of the ideal leader is both necessary and 
inevitable.
The importance of imitation explains a puzzling aspect of Cyrus’ rule. His insistence that he be 
paid court by his subjects might strike some as an example of extreme narcissism, but Xenophon 
suggests an alternative reading of the king’s actions. Following a description of how Cyrus dealt with 
those who absented themselves from his court, Xenophon observes:
But in those who did present themselves he believed that he could in no way more effectively 
inspire a desire for the beautiful and the good (τα` καλα` και` α  γαθα`) than by endeavouring, as 
their sovereign, to set before his subjects a perfect model of virtue in his own person. (8.1.21)
It is only in his presence that his subjects are able to appreciate fully the majesty of the king as they 
look upon the model placed before them  and are transformed as they strive to imitate him. We have 
already had occasion to mention Cyrus’ physical appearance (see p. 67); here it is the effect that this 
appearance has on his subjects that is important.279
Cyrus is aware of the importance that his image plays in maintaining imperial rule, not only 
through inspiring imitation, but also through creating a sense of awe in his subjects. Two examples of 
this are mentioned in Book 8. First, Cyrus adopts the Median style of dress to enhance his appearance 
and encourages his lieutenants to do the same (8.1.40–42; cf. 1.3.2–3).280 Second, Cyrus’ procession 
from the palace to the sanctuaries (8.3) is designed to communicate the dignity (σεµνο' της) and 
authority of the king (8.3.1, 21). 
As Tatum puts it, “the ceremonies of an empire [provide] proof of imperial power.”281 And this 
power is recognized:
And when they saw him, they all prostrated (piροσεκυ' νησαν) themselves before him, either 
because some had been instructed to begin this act of homage, or because they were overcome 
by the splendour of his presence (ε κpiλαγε'ντες τηñ,  piαρασκευηñ, ), or because Cyrus appeared so 
great and so goodly to look upon (τωñ,  δο' ξαι µε'γαν τε και` καλο`ν φανηñναι); at any rate, no one of 
the Persians had ever prostrated himself before Cyrus before. (8.3.14)
It is significant that Xenophon mentions this incident immediately after a physical description of Cyrus 
and his royal attire (8.3.13–14). The king’s majestic appearance is meant to convey his power; the 
response of his subjects makes it clear that the message has reached its audience.
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279. For a brief discussion of the significance of the “political gaze” in classical Athens, see Simon Goldhill, “The 
Seduction of the Gaze: Socrates and His Girlfriends,” in Xenophon, ed. Vivienne J. Gray, ORCS (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), 167–73; Baragwanath, “Xenophon on Slavery”.
280. Xenophon writes (8.1.40) that Cyrus means to “bewitch” (καταγοητευ'ω) his subjects through adopting this dress. 
At Anabasis 5.7.9 καταγοητευ'ω seems to be a synonym for ε ξαpiατα'ω, “deceive,” and that seems to be the sense here too. 
The garments are designed to hide physical defects and to make those wearing them appear taller or more handsome than 
they really are. Leaders must not only be superior they must also appear to be superior to their subordinates.
281. Tatum, Xenophon’s Imperial Fiction, 196.
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But Cyrus’ adoption of these costumes is odd given the way in which Median luxury and 
effeminacy is often contrasted with Persian frugality, itself a sign of self-control and willingness to 
endure hardship (1.3.2–3; 8.8.15–17; cf. Oec. 10.2–9). What are we to make of the contrast between 
the young Cyrus who leaves the Median robe behind when he returns to Persia (1.4.26) and the older 
tyrant who adopts Median makeup and dress, “an indulgence, an affectation of the idle?”282 Due 
focuses on the pragmatics of Cyrus’ dress, suggesting that while Cyrus occupies the role of a general in 
the field with his soldiers he maintains the Persian style of dress; once he is king, he adopts the Median 
style as a way of generating and maintaining the respect and admiration of his subjects.283 Due’s 
reading goes some way to maintaining Cyrus’ reputation as one worth imitating. There are other 
aspects of Cyrus’ behaviour in Babylon that have led others to suggest that the mature Cyrus has a 
darker side.
The Ideal Tyrant. The question of Cyrus’ dress is part of a collection of questions about the nature of 
his rule in Babylon. Gera details a number of ways in which Cyrus’ reign in Babylon is disturbing:284 
the way in which he manipulates his closest allies and friends, his use of eunuch bodyguards, the fact 
that he comes to supersede the law, his approach to Median dress, and his apparently new approach to 
food exemplified in the banquet of 8.4. Taken individually, each of these items might be justified and 
explained within Xenophon’s purposes in the greater narrative.285 The cumulative effect of these items, 
however, suggest  that Xenophon’s Cyrus has undergone something of a change. He seems to have 
been transformed into the image of his grandfather, Astyages.286
This transformation into the Median tyrant has been intimated at various points in the narrative. 
We noted the role that fear might play in a state in which willing obedience is not forthcoming, for 
example, and Cyrus’ stay in Media itself exposed him to that political culture. The clearest hint of what 
was to come is found in the words of Mandane when she warns her son not to return to Persia “with a 
knowledge acquired from your grandfather here [in Media] of the principles not of kingship but of 
tyranny” (1.3.18). These hints, when combined with the items mentioned in the previous paragraph, 
seem to point conclusively to the fact that by Book 8 Cyrus seems to have been transformed into the 
Median tyrant.287 
But the argument that Cyrus has been transformed into a tyrant is not without its problems. From 
the point of view of the narrative, when Cyrus does return to Persia (8.5.21–28) he does not receive the 
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282. Gera, Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, 291 
283. Due, Cyropaedia, 36.
284. Gera, Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, 285–99.
285. Detailed arguments relating to each of these matters can be found in the works of those who argue that Cyrus is an 
ideal leader, e.g., Due, Cyropaedia; Gray, Mirror of Princes. 
286. Tatum, Xenophon’s Imperial Fiction, 197.
287. Central to Nadon’s reading of the Cyropaedia (“From Republic to Empire: Political Revolution and the Common 
Good in Xenophon’s Education of Cyrus,” American Political Science Review 90.2 [1996]: 361–74; Xenophon’s Prince) is 
the transformation of the political realm from republic (exemplified by Persia) to empire (demonstrated by Cyrus’ rule in 
Babylon). 
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flogging his mother had warned him about.288 Instead, Cambyses warns him about ruling Persia as he 
does the other nations, that is, for his own personal advantage (piλεονεξι'α; 8.5.24).289 Cambyses is 
concerned for the Persian republic, and his concern is understandable, given Cyrus’ success. But 
Xenophon has already shown us that Cyrus has not ruled tyrannically in the nations he has conquered. 
In Babylon, as elsewhere, while benefitting himself, he has continued to seek his subjects’ well-
being—in other words, he has exhibited royal φιλανθρωpiι'α towards them (see above, p. 68). We have 
also seen the continued emphasis in Book 8 on the virtues that had been foundational throughout the 
rest of the book in defining Xenophon’s ideal leader. On the basis of this evidence we need to 
conclude, with Pierre Carlier, that the Cyrus of the Cyropaedia does not fit perfectly into the category 
of either king or tyrant—he is something of a hybrid, as is the regime he establishes.290
Throughout the Cyropaedia Cyrus easily adapt to whatever situation presents itself to him, a trait 
that forms part of his φιλοµα' θεια.291 As a child, he quickly learns to negotiate his new existence in 
Media, and is equally able to switch back to Persian ways upon his return (1.5.1). He is able to function 
in both republic and empire, as Persian king and Median tyrant. It is not the case that Cyrus is 
corrupted by empire,292 rather, Cyrus adopts certain practices necessary for successfully ruling an 
empire, some of which look tyrannical, but others of which were instilled in him as a result of his 
Persian (republican) education. 
Deborah Gera argues that for Xenophon, imperial rule thus consists of the right balance between 
kingship and tyranny.293 As she puts it: “both—benevolence and despotism—are needed to run a large 
empire successfully.”294 Except for the characterization of such rule as “corrupt,” her assessment of 
Xenophon’s argument is correct: an empire demands a different form of leadership from that which is 
best suited to a polis. Perhaps we need to distinguish between the ideal king and the ideal emperor. The 
former, the ruler of a willing people, is able to win obedience through persuasion and displaying his 
excellence for imitation. The latter needs to employ strength and fear at times, since he governs a large 
region in which not all the peoples exhibit the same level of “civilization” and therefore compliance. 
Xenophon’s theory of leadership, while transferable between different realms, is sensitive to the 
necessity of adapting itself to different contexts.
The fact that tyranny is used pejoratively in the twenty-first century (as it was, at times, in 
Xenophon’s day) should not blind us to the possibility that Xenophon was in fact advocating  
benevolent tyranny as an ideal form of leadership. We should also not dismiss his insistence that a good 
monarch seeks the welfare of his subjects even as he pursues his own goals. W. R. Newell argues that 
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288. This, of course, is not the return of which Mandane was speaking, but both the return to Persia and the dialogue 
with Cambyses serve to conclude Cyrus’ education (Tatum, Xenophon’s Imperial Fiction, 75–96). 
289. In most of the Cyropaedia “advantage” seems to be a better translation (LSJ s.v. piλεονεξι'α, II) rather than 
“greediness” (piλεονεξι'α I). It describes how one should treat enemies rather than friends or subjects (see 1.6.28 (bis), 35, 41; 
5.5.19; 6.1.55).  
290. Carlier, “Imperial Monarchy,” 356, 358.
291. Sandridge, Foundations of Leadership, ch. 2.
292. So Carlier, “Imperial Monarchy”.
293. Gera, Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, 285–99.
294. Gera, Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, 297.
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one of the things Machiavelli found so attractive in Xenophon’s Cyropaedia was this portrayal of “an 
alliance between the prince and the common people based on material self-interest, a project for 
turning republican virtue outward as the fuel for imperial expansion and prosperity.”295 Whereas 
Nadon treats this project as negative, and reads the Cyropaedia as a warning against this form of 
polity,296 Newell recognizes in Xenophon’s Cyrus a solution to some of the political questions left 
unanswered by Plato and Aristotle.297 More specifically, we are exposed to the potential advantages of 
an imperial monarchy in which the desires of the leader are properly controlled by suitable virtues.
In terms of the coherence of the narrative, Cyrus becomes the monarch Xenophon describes in the 
prologue: “By the end of his education (8.6.23) he is the perfect monarch Xenophon describes in the 
prologue, issuing orders to the willing subjects of an empire that embraces all the world worth living 
in.”298 This recollection of Xenophon’s introduction also reminds us of another observation that the 
author makes in the opening sections of his work. Cyrus is a unique figure in the political history of 
which Xenophon was aware (1.1.4). He is the embodiment of the ideal monarch in whom nature and 
education align perfectly in order to produce the virtues necessary for such a ruler. But his unique 
existence also explains why his empire did not last in this glorious state. 
Epilogue
The account of Cyrus’ death (8.7) is usually treated with 8.1–6 and the final chapter, 8.8, is 
discussed as either an epilogue/conclusion, palinode/retraction or forgery.299 The triumphant tones 
describing Cyrus’ vast empire (8.8.1) echo the introduction (cf. 1.1.4). The reader is reminded both of 
Cyrus’ irresistible will and his kind treatment of his subjects which led them to revere his as their 
father, thus calling to mind a major theme in Book 8.1–7. These thematic parallels serve to integrate 
8.8 with everything that came before.
Nevertheless, the very next verse (8.8.2) introduces a dark tone to the book’s finale. After Cyrus’ 
death his sons “immediately” (ευ  θυ' ς) begin to quarrel and the cities and nations “immediately” (ευ  θυ' ς) 
begin to drift away from the empire. The empire’s senescence begins even before the emperor’s body is 
cold. But before examining this decay, we must give some attention to Cyrus’ deathbed scene.
The Death of the King. It is unclear how much time passes between 8.6.23 and 8.7.1, but Chapter 7 
starts with Cyrus returning to Persia for the seventh time, long after his parents have died. He thus 
returns as the king of Persia, not only the emperor from Babylon. He presents the citizens with gifts and 
then proceeds to sacrifice to the gods (8.7.1–3). Even in his death, his φιλανθρωpiι'α and ευ  σε'βεια are in 
evidence, marking out his whole life as one of virtue.300
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295. Newell, Tyranny, 199.
296. See Nadon, “Republic to Empire”; Xenophon’s Prince.
297. Newell, Tyranny, 199–209.
298. Tatum, Xenophon’s Imperial Fiction, 189.
299. For a brief summary of the debate around the authenticity of 8.8, see Tatum, Xenophon’s Imperial Fiction, 220–
25, who accepts Xenophontic authorship. This position seems to represent the scholarly status quo, see, e.g., Due, 
Cyropaedia, 16–22; Gera, Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, 299–300; Mueller-Goldingen, Xenophons Kyrupädie, 262–71.
300. Cyrus dies a violent death on the battlefield according to Herodotus (1.204–214) and Ctesias (frag. 9.7–8), but 
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Cyrus’ deathbed speech (8.7.6–28) contains three major elements that need to be examined: 
kingship themes, Cyrus’ charge to his sons, and the theology of the passage.
First, the most important theme that was raised as part of Xenophon’s portrait of the ideal ruler is 
once again in view. Doing good to friends (and its mirror image, punishing enemies) forms an 
important part of rule (7, 28) because “faithful friends are a monarch's truest and surest sceptre” (13) 
and the surest way of ensuring their good will is through by showing them kindness (ευ  εργεσι'α) rather 
than compulsion (βι'α). Right up until the end of Cyrus’ life the nexus between the king’s well-being 
and the prospering of his subjects is central. The concern is shown in his desire to be buried in a 
modest grave, so that be might be united to the earth to continue to nourish the world and do good to 
humankind (8.7.26). The king as beneficent compost is an unusual image that serves to keep in the 
foreground Cyrus’ φιλανθρωpiι'α. The fact that Cyrus is succeeded by his own offspring and also has 
left his fatherland (piατρι'ς) and friends in a prosperous state means that he is blessed (µακαριζο' µενος) 
and will be remembered eternally (8.7.9; cf. 8.7.3). There seems to be very little else that a king could 
desire upon his deathbed.
Second, a large portion of this speech is given over to Cyrus’ instructions to Cambyses, his heir, 
and Tanaoxares, his second-born son. This is the first time these princes appear in the narrative and the 
Athenian stranger’s criticism of Cyrus’ poor education of these heirs and the role that this played in the 
subsequent deterioration of the empire seems well-founded (Plato, Leg. 694c–695b).301 A more 
sympathetic interpretation of Xenophon at this point is also possible, however.
The στα'σις between the two brothers is identified as the cause of the failure of the empire (ευ  θυ`ς 
µε`ν αυ  τουñ οι piαιñδες ε στασι'αζον; 8.8.2).302 It is not coincidental, then, that much of Cyrus’ deathbed 
charge is given over to urging concord between the two princes (8.7.13–17, 23–24). Self-interest forms 
part of the argument: 
Surely he that has forethought for his brother is taking care for himself; for to whom else is a 
brother's greatness more of an honour than to a brother? And who else will be honoured by the 
power of a great man so much as that man's brother? And if a man's brother is a great man, 
whom will any one so much fear to injure as that man's brother? (8.7.15)
And the choice between honour and shame arising from brotherly love or enmity, respectively, is also 
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Xenophon’s Cyrus dies peacefully “at home” in Persia. Herodotus claims that many other stories are known, but that his is 
the most credible (1.214). For Xenophon, Cyrus’ military exploits end in Book 7 and the remainder of his life is dedicated to 
ruling the empire well. It would damage his narrative to have Cyrus die in battle. 
Xenophon’s narrative presents us with “Socrates’ death scene, but considerably rewritten” (Tatum, Xenophon’s 
Imperial Fiction, 210). For a discussion of the Socratic nature of Cyrus’ “philosophic death” see Gera, Xenophon’s 
Cyropaedia, 115–31. For the influence of Persian sources on Xenophon at this point, see Sancisi-Weerdenburg, “Death of 
Cyrus”, although note the concerns of Due, Cyropaedia, 142–43.
301. See, further, Tatum, Xenophon’s Imperial Fiction, 225–30.
302. Historical evidence for this strife is lacking, although such strife was characteristic of the Achaemenids in general 
(Gera, Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, 124); for Cambyses’ rule, see Pierre Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the 
Persian Empire, trans. Peter T. Daniels (Winona Lake: Eisenbraun, 2002), 49–51. There is some ambiguity—possibly 
deliberate—at Cyr. 8.8.2. Cyrus’ subjects respond to his father care by honouring his as a father (8.8.1) and it is also his 
subjects’ στα' σις that leads to the empire’s destruction. 
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held out as an argument for Cyrus’ sons to get along (8.7.16). The final argument is historical (8.7.23): 
the past contains plenty of examples of what happens when families are torn apart and marked by 
enmity instead of love. Xenophon, of course, has the Persian past in view. In his reading of that past, it 
was the strife that existed between Cambyses and Tanaoxares that led to the downfall of the glorious 
empire that Cyrus had created. And so he has Cyrus focus almost exclusively on concord when 
addressing his sons from his deathbed. 
In allowing Cyrus to urge the two brothers to act peacefully towards one another Xenophon 
vindicates the emperor from the charges laid by Plato’s Athenian stranger.303 Cyrus foresaw what 
awaited his sons and he did his best to inoculate them against the envy and strife that presented the 
biggest threat to their success. The final chapter of the Cyropaedia shows that despite Cyrus’ education 
of his sons, they were unable to exercise the same rule that he had. They did not match Xenophon’s 
model of the ideal king.
Third, except when mentioned in relation to sacrifices and the importance of honouring the gods, 
the divine has been all but absent in the Cyropaedia. But if Xenophon wanted to show the ideal king 
forging his own way in this life without divine assistance (see p. 66), what is his understanding of the 
king’s journey following his death?
The account of Cyrus’ death begins with “a figure of more than human majesty” (κρει'ττων τις η  
κατα` α»νθρωpiον) visiting him in a dream and commanding him to prepare himself for his departure to 
the gods (8.7.2). He responds by offering sacrifices and thanking the gods for their faithfulness to him. 
Their care for him is seen in that they have protected him from hubris, thus ensuring a positive end to 
his life’s work (8.7.3). The final chapter of his life serves to demonstrate the positive relationship 
between Cyrus’ piety towards the gods and the favour shown him by them throughout his career.
Towards the end of his speech Cyrus begins to muse on his post-mortem future (8.7.17–22). He is 
not certain whether or not the soul survives death, although he seems to lean towards that conclusion. 
The final paragraph of this section is indicative both of his agnosticism (ει  µε`ν ... ει  δε` µη' ) and his 
desire that his sons’ recognition of the supernatural influences them for the good:
Now if this is true, as I think it is, and if the soul does leave the body, then do what I request of 
you and show reverence for my soul. But if it is not so, and if the soul remains in the body and 
dies with it, then at least fear the gods, eternal, all-seeing, omnipotent, who keep this ordered 
universe together, unimpaired, ageless, unerring, indescribable in its beauty and its grandeur; 
and never allow yourselves to do or purpose anything wicked or unholy. (8.7.22)
This discourse on the immortality of the soul  is not aimed primarily at metaphysical speculation; it is 
meant to threaten his sons into behaving themselves after his death, a role to which the gods also 
contribute. Cyrus needs to find additional means to manipulate his sons into following his teaching 
once he is no longer around; theology serves to meets this need.
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303. I am not arguing here that the Cyropaedia was written in response to Plato’s Laws, but only that Xenophon 
anticipates and answers the objection raised by the stranger. Sage argues that Xenophon generally portrays Cyrus in a 
positive light, but that this chapter still shows Cyrus’ failure to educate his sons adequately (“Xenophon’s Ideal Leader”).
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We have already seen how Cyrus’ divine ancestry, while not explicitly denied, is neither 
emphasized nor portrayed unambiguously (see above, n. 190). The piροσκυ' νησις Cyrus receives during 
his procession (8.3.14) is based on the image of majesty that he projects rather than a recognition of 
divinity.304 Given Cyrus’ agnosticism regarding the nature and future of the soul, the strange figure’s 
statement to Cyrus that he is soon to depart to the gods (η»δη γα`ρ ει ς θεου`ς α»piει; 8.7.2) should probably 
be interpreted simply as speaking of his death and not hinting at his apotheosis. One is hard-pressed to 
find in the Cyropaedia intimations of the divinity of the king, either before or after his death.
Cyrus’ death-bed scene serves two main purposes, then. It reminds the reader of Xenophon’s ideal 
king who is marked, above all, by φιλανθρωpiι'α shown in his concern, good will, and care for his 
friends and state. As Xenophon’s narrative draws to a close, Cyrus’ final scene also serves to exonerate 
him from any culpability for the unravelling of the empire described in 8.8. He prepares his sons to rule 
well by warning them against brotherly strife—the very thing that leads to the empire’s ruination 
(8.8.2). In Xenophon’s narrative, their ineptitude as rulers cannot be traced back to their father’s 
education. Xenophon’s king remains ideal through his death. It is only the matter of his legacy that 
Xenophon must still address.  
The Dissolution of the Empire (8.8.1–27). The final chapter of Xenophon’s Cyropaedia is a puzzle. 
Just as in Xenophon’s Spartan Constitution, the final chapter seems to undo or deny everything that 
came before it.305 Xenophon describes a moral and physical decline in which even those positive 
elements from the empire’s glorious past which remain have been perverted so that their form remains 
while their purpose has been lost. Does Xenophon mean this as a critique of Cyrus? Gabriel Danzig 
identifies four arguments that are usually made against the portrayal of Cyrus as an ideal ruler.306 Of 
these, the second is that he was unable to establish institutions that would outlast him. His leadership 
must therefore be considered a failure.
Contrary to this critique, Danzig defends a positive reading of the Cyropaedia for the following 
reasons: (1) it is an assumption, rather than something Xenophon asserts, that a good leader will create 
institutions that will survive his death; (2) the final chapter of the Cyropaedia is not an implicit critique 
of Cyrus, but simply brings the narrative into the present by linking Xenophon’s fictional leader to the 
situation in Persia with which his readers would have been familiar; (3) Xenophon did not believe that 
institutions would bring good governance, rather, he argued that good leaders ensured good 
governance.
The ending of the Cyropaedia is thus not a critique of Cyrus but should rather be understood as 
“eulogy” in which the loss of Cyrus is mourned and his greatness emphasized once again.307 In this 
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304. Xenophon’s Agesilaus reckons as arrogant and shameful those who accept worship and divine honours (Ages. 
1.34), and since Agesilaus’ piety is such a strong feature of his character (Ages. 3) we might add “impious” to that list. If we 
accept this as Xenophon’s position, then the argument that he does not wish the reader to perceive Cyrus as divine in any 
sense is strengthened.
305. For other surprising endings in Xenophon’s work, see Sage, “Xenophon’s Ideal Leader,” 163 n. 7.
306. Danzig, “Best of the Achaemenids,” 502  David M. Johnson, “Persians as Centaurs in Xenophon’s Cyropaedia,” 
TAPA 135.1 (2005): 179–81 provides a taxonomy of modern approaches to interpreting the final chapter of the Cyropaedia.
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final chapter, the reader is shown what an empire looks like when it is not ruled by someone like Cyrus. 
Xenophon draws on his knowledge of fourth-century Persia in order to present it as the dystopian 
reality that is the mirror image of the utopia over which his Cyrus presided.308 The opening paragraphs 
of this section speaks of Cyrus’ empire as “the greatest and most glorious of all the kingdoms in Asia” 
before describing the extent of the empire and the fact that it was governed solely by the will of Cyrus 
(8.8.1). There are echoes here of the opening chapter in which Cyrus’ unique ability to govern a huge 
empire (1.1.3) is placed alongside a description of the extent of the empire (1.1.4–5) The negative 
vision of empire in the final chapter therefore represents the chaos of a world without Cyrus described 
in the opening chapter. Without the singular rule of Cyrus, Endzeit ist Urzeit.309
Some of Xenophon’s audience would have been familiar with fourth-century Persia, and their 
vision of this state—especially in so far as it had been interpreted through Greek stereotypes—would 
have been difficult to reconcile with the glorious empire over which Xenophon’s Cyrus ruled. In the 
Cyropaedia’s penultimate chapter, Xenophon rescues Cyrus’ memory from the critique displayed in 
Plato’s Laws and shows, on the contrary, that Cyrus did indeed prepare his sons to inherit the empire. 
The failure of Cyrus’ progeny cannot be blamed on him. The final chapter serves to further exalt Cyrus 
as an ideal ruler when it describes what an empire without Cyrus looks like. Admittedly, Xenophon 
nowhere makes this argument explicit, but the same must be said for the negative argument. We are 
left, then, with interpreting this chapter within the context of Xenophon’s larger purpose in writing the 
Cyropaedia, and it is to this subject that we turn in the conclusion.  
Xenophon’s Persian King
Xenophon’s Cyrus unsettles us. His anti-democratic behaviour and sympathies are inconsistent 
with “civilized” politics and thus incoherent to many in the modern world. It is thus understandable 
that some are drawn to ironic readings of the Cyropaedia which explain the purpose of the book in line 
with modern sensibilities.310 But it is Xenophon’s agenda that must dictate our reading of the text if we 
are to understand its impact within the classical and Hellenistic world.311 The preceding investigation 
of Xenophon’s portrait of Cyrus suggests that the Persian king was indeed a model of ideal leadership 
and that Xenophon meant to portray him as such. Many of the traits considered negative by some are in 
fact part of the explanation of how Cyrus “so greatly excelled in governing men” (1.1.6). All of his 
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307. Due, Cyropaedia, 16–22; Sage, “Xenophon’s Ideal Leader”.
308. The epilogue is not deconstructing the  vision of the text as much as it is “reaffirming the necessity of the vision 
by recalling the real world” (Stadter, “Fictional Narrative,” 378).
309. William Edward Higgins, Xenophon the Athenian: The Problem of the Individual and the Society of the Polis 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977), 57.
310. For a recent example of this approach, see Whidden, “Cyrus’s Persian Education” who argues, for example, that 
the Cyropaedia is “a work of irony” that “provides a thoughtful critique of empire and imperial ambitions” (540) by showing 
“that rule by a single hegemonic individual is deeply problematic” (548).
311. I recognize that for many, this assumption might be considered hermeneutically naïve. For a defense of this 
approach, see Gray, Mirror of Princes, chap. 2.
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characteristics combine to present the reader with a unique figure who “reduced to obedience a vast 
number of men and cities and nations” (1.1.3)—Xenophon’s ideal emperor.
Xenophon’s observations about δηµοκρατι'αι, µοναρχι'αι, and ο  λιγαρχι'αι in the opening paragraph 
of the Cyropaedia (1.1.1) suggests to the reader that he or she is about to encounter a political treatise 
in which the various forms of government are discussed.312 But the absence of any further discussion 
along these lines indicates the futility of approaching the text in this way.  
Xenophon announces at 1.1.6 that he intends in the Cyropaedia to present what he has discovered 
about Cyrus, a man “deserving of all admiration.” It is this man who appears in almost every scene over 
the next eight books and who is clearly the focus of Xenophon’s attention. But this presentation of 
Cyrus serves to do more than simply inform and entertain. Cyrus stands as an example, paradigm, and 
model to be learnt from and imitated.313 While it is true that Xenophon wants to show his reader how it 
is that one person was able to govern such a huge empire successfully (1.1.3–6), behind this description 
of positive government lies a more didactic purpose.
We have already noted the political importance that Xenophon ascribes to the imitation of a leader 
(see above, p. 85), but does Xenophon mean for his reader also to imitate the ideal king? Can we say, 
with William Higgins, that Cyrus is both the subject and the object of Xenophon’s education?314 
Vivienne Gray argues that Xenophon has “a theory of instructional viewing” in which he “produces the 
actions of serious men for the consideration of serious men” through the use of various topoi.315 The 
presence of these topoi across Xenophon’s various works confirm their didactic purpose. Just as the 
characters in the Cyropaedia are educated as they gaze upon Cyrus and imitate him, so too the 
reader.316 
   It might seem odd that the reader is educated through imitating a Persian king. But Xenophon’s 
original audience consisted of Greek “gentlemen,” καλοι` κα  γαθοι', of the sort who benefitted from 
Socrates’ education (Mem. 1.2.48).317 It was this Socratic education, mediated through Xenophon’s 
writings, that taught them how to lead in the various spheres of life (see, e.g., Mem. 2.1.1, 4.1.2). And 
since Xenophon’s leadership theory is applicable across these different spheres of life318—household, 
farm, polis—the gentlemen who read these texts would be able to transfer what they learnt from Cyrus, 
the Persian emperor, into their own context and situation.319
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312. See, e.g., Herodotus 3.80–88, Plato, Pol. 291d–292a, 302c–303a, Aristotle, Pol. 3.7, 1279a22–1279b10. 
Although he does not focus on these constitutional forms, Newell (Tyranny, 186–88) argues that Xenophon wants to provide 
an example of good government by showing how tyranny can be transformed into legitimate leadership.
313. Stadter, “Fictional Narrative,” 370, 392, 398–99.
314. Higgins, Xenophon, 54. For the argument that Cyrus is being educated throughout the Cyropaedia, see Tatum, 
Xenophon’s Imperial Fiction, 90–91.
315. Mirror of Princes, 187–93, here 190 and 192; see also pp. 51–53.
316. If forced to provide a succinct description of the work, Momigliano’s identification of the Cyropaedia as “a 
paedagogical novel” seems to capture the spirit of the text accurately (Greek Biography, 55).
317. For a discussion of Xenophon’s audience, see Gray, Mirror of Princes, 51–54. Since large parts of the 
Cyropaedia serve to “entertain and amuse” in addition to instruct the reader, Due argues that it is “popular in the best sense 
of the word” and that it’s potential audience was fairly broad (Cyropaedia, 234–35).
318. Gray, Mirror of Princes, 22–24.
319. The fact that Cyrus’ expected his subjects to imitate him demonstrates that while it is true Xenophon considers 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
These gentlemen were not taught about the best regime in the Cyropaedia but about the best 
leader. The book’s tragic epilogue highlights the fact that an ideal king can establish laws and 
institutions, but that these are not sufficient to guarantee the longevity of the society over which he 
exercised leadership.320 The reader is left in no doubt as to the source of Cyrus’ success: it is not his 
monarchical rule but his character.321 We have seen how, throughout the Cyropaedia, Xenophon 
focuses on the virtues that contribute to Cyrus’ success. The narrative allows Xenophon to display 
these virtues in an entertaining way, offering an alternative to the dialogues found in the Memorabilia 
or Hiero, for example. The unity of Xenophon’s theory of leadership seen across his various works322 
shows that it is this combination of virtues, embodied in Cyrus, that the reader is expected to emulate if 
he or she is to learn from Xenophon.
We return to a quotation from Cicero’s letter to his brother Quintus:
The great Cyrus was portrayed by Xenophon not in accord with historical truth, but as a model 
of just government, and the impressive dignity of his character is combined in that 
philosopher's description of him with a matchless courtesy; and indeed it was not without 
reason that our great Africanus did not often put those books out of his hands [see Tusc. 2.26], 
for there is no duty belonging to a painstaking and fair-minded form of government that is 
omitted in them. (Quint. fratr. 1.1.8 [23])
Cicero has correctly identified Xenophon’s chief concerns with Cyrus’ character and his nature as a 
model. Cicero’s assessment of Cyrus’ imperial rule as “just” and a “fair-minded form of government” 
is unlikely to receive modern acceptance. This would most likely not have bothered Xenophon. His 
goal was not to present his reader with an ideal form of government, but rather, with an ideal king. 
Concluding Comments
In Herodotus’ famous debate about the best constitution, the historian has Darius argue that 
monarchy, the wise rule of the one best man (α  νδρο`ς ε νο`ς τουñ  α  ρι'στου), is superior to Otanes’ 
democracy and Megabyzus’ oligarchy (Histories 3.82). This skeletal vision of an ideal king was taken 
up by the following generation and given flesh in writings produced to educate and encourage sole 
rulers (Isocrates) and other leaders (Xenophon).323 This classical construction of the ideal king would, 
in turn, play a central role in European political thought about monarchy.   
The stereotype of the good king outlined by Francis Cairns324 provides a template for the 
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Cyrus unique (1.1.3–4), this does not mean that others are unable to learn from him and imitate him (contra Sage, 
“Xenophon’s Ideal Leader,” 164–65). 
320. Stadter, “Fictional Narrative,” 378.
321. Due, Cyropaedia, 236–37, cf. 25 See also Weathers, “Political Idealism”; Sage, “Xenophon’s Ideal Leader”; 
Danzig, “Best of the Achaemenids,” 502.
322. See Gray, Mirror of Princes, 7–24.
323. Luraghi, “One-Man Government” argues that the ideal king was constructed as a mirror image or imaginary 
opposite of the tyrant. Be this as it may, the paradigm of the ideal king could stand independently, as seen in these texts, and 
was taken up by subsequent writers. 
324. Francis Cairns, Virgil’s Augustan Epic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 19–21; see the 
discussion in Chapter 1.
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following brief comparison of Isocrates’ and Xenophon’s kingship ideas. Most elements of Cairns’ 
model are represented in Isocrates’ portrait in To Nicocles and Xenophon’s Cyropaedia. This suggests 
that they are contributing to a topos which extends well into the Roman imperial period.325 
Although it is important for Xenophon that the king worships the gods in order that they might 
provide him with auguries (see above, p. 76), a notable absence in both texts is the king’s imitation of 
the gods in order to reach virtue (K3) and related to that, his deriving kingship from Zeus (K12). The 
avoidance of these elements is all the more stark when compared to the Hellenistic models discussed in 
the following chapter in which the religious character of kingship is foundational.
Also missing in Isocrates’ portrait of the ideal king are a number of metaphors that Cairns groups 
under the heading of “care for his people” (K6). The most striking absence, given its Homeric 
pedigree,326 is the “king-as-shepherd” comparison.327 Generally absent between Homer and the fifth 
century, the image occurs again in Greek tragedy328 and is thereafter taken up by Plato and others, 
including Xenophon, as shown above (pp. 83–84). Although it often speaks of monarchical care for a 
people, it could also carry negative overtones. This attitude is best represented by Thrasymachus when 
he mocks Socrates for supposing that those who rule do so for any reason other than their own good 
(Plato, Resp. 1.343a–c), hints of which are present in Xenophon. It is perhaps because of these negative 
connotations that Isocrates chose to ignore the image in his writings. 
In contrast to Xenophon (p. 84, above), nowhere does Isocrates identify the ideal king as “father” 
of his people. Xenophon’s use of the concept shows that the comparison between the exercise of 
political authority and household management is well known in fourth-century literature,329 suggesting 
that Isocrates deliberately avoids this metaphor. However, the corollary to this image—that the king’s 
subjects are his family and that the realm over which he rules is his estate—is present at Ad Nic.19, 21. 
Isocrates’ potentially ominous assertion that “all the property of those who live in the state belongs to 
kings who rule them well” (21) needs to be balanced by the more positive exhortations focusing on the 
state’s well-being (9) and the king’s love and care for his subjects (15). Indeed, Isocrates praises 
politicians of a bygone era for being as careful with the common purse as they are with their own 
property (Paneg. 76). Isocrates is eager to emphasise the king’s concern and care for his subjects and 
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325. See, e.g., de Blois, “Traditional Virtues and New Qualities”.
326. Agamemnon, for example, is often called “shepherd of the people” (piοιµη`ν λαωñν; e.g. Il. 2.254, 772; 4.413), but 
the title is also used of other leaders. Johannes Haubold (Homer’s People: Epic Poetry and Social Formation, CCS 
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000], chap. 1) shows that the metaphor speaks of the leader’s care for his people, 
but that it was also commonly understood to point to a failure in this regard. The image has antecedents in the Near East 
(Martin L. West, The East Face of Helicon: West Asiatic Elements in Greek Poetry and Myth [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1997], 226–27). 
327. For the following paragraph, see Roger Brock, Greek Political Imagery from Homer to Aristotle (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2013), 43–52.
328. See, e.g., Anthony J. Podlecki, “Polis and Monarch in Early Attic Tragedy,” in Greek Tragedy and Political 
Theory; J. Peter Euben (Berkely; Los Angeles; London: University of California Press, 1986), 78–79 for Aeschylus’ use of 
this image in The Persians where to live under a shepherd is to be a slave.
329. For examples in Aristotle, and Plato, see Brock, Political Imagery, 25–35. Mark Griffith examines the portrayal of 
and relationship between the father and the ruler in Greek tragedy (“The King and Eye: The Rule of the Father in Greek 
Tragedy,” Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society 44 [1999]: 20–84).
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yet he avoids this apt metaphor. The negative authoritarianism sometimes associated with this image 
might have been unpalatable for his democratic audience.
While Isocrates is certainly familiar with the use of σωτηρι'α and its cognates in a political 
context,330 he does not use σωτη' ρ as a title or as a description of a role the king should play. The 
absence of the titular use of this term before the Hellenistic period331 suggests that we should not read 
too much into its absence. Xenophon, similarly, does not speak of Cyrus as σωτη' ρ, although he does 
say that the king must pay attention to the σωτηρι'α of his realm (8.1.13). There is one titular use of the 
lexeme: the name Ζευ`ς Σωτη' ρ is used as a watchword at one point (7.1.10). In general, it is the gods 
who give victory and salvation (3.3.34; 4.1.2). 
Some of the political images used in the classical period to speak of monarchical rule were open to 
misinterpretation or, more likely, mischievous reinterpretation. Isocrates avoided these images in his 
text addressed to Nicocles. This formed part of Isocrates’ attempts to advance a positive image of 
kingship. A key aspect of these attempts was his portrayal of kingship as a milder, and therefore more 
desirable, form of government. Xenophon’s portrait focuses on the traits the king must exhibit in order 
to rule as successfully as Cyrus did. He is thus less concerned with portraying the king in terms that 
subjects would find acceptable. When Xenophon’s king is generous or kind, this is because it 
contributes to his successful reign. 
Although To Nicocles lacks an explicit argument in favour of monarchy such as that found at 
Nicocles 12–26, the implication is not difficult to draw on the basis of Isocrates’ description of all that 
defines the good king. A leader marked by wisdom, justice, moderation and courage, who, furthermore, 
cares for his people (Ad Nic. 15) while prospering the state (9) must surely form an ideal or, at least, 
preferable government. Those who live under such a king must surely be envied by others just as 
Evagoras’ subjects were (Evag. 43). A milder government thus benefits both ruler and subject. The 
latter, for obvious reasons, and the former because it will ensure the longevity of his rule and his safety. 
Xenophon’s claims regarding the descriptive purpose of his work and regarding Cyrus’ ability to rule 
(1.1.3) assumes rather than argues for monarchy as the preferred form of government. 
A good government was not defined solely on the leader’s ability or desire to provide his people 
with a gentle government and a prosperous state. Fourth-century ethics and politics were closely related 
as it was considered of primary importance that the leader improve not only the lot of his people, but 
his people themselves, a pursuit that necessarily involves ethics. Athen’s ancient kings are credited 
with training the polis in virtue, justice, and moderation (Panath. 138), for example. And in To 
Nicocles we have observed how the ethical model provided by the king is central to Isocrates’ 
understanding of the king’s influence upon his subjects (Ad Nic. 31). Xenophon’s Cyrus provides the 
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330. The Athenian ancestors were the saviours of Hellas (Paneg. 80) and Isocrates hoped that his contemporaries could 
also fulfil that role (Peace 141). At Ad Nic.24 he states that the king’s subjects must be convinced that his plans for their 
σωτηρι'α are better than their own.
331. See Brock, Political Imagery, 22 n. 88. For examples of the Hellenistic titular use, see Donald Dale Walker, 
Paul’s Offer of Leniency (2 Cor 10:1): Populist Ideology and Rhetoric in a Pauline Letter Fragment, WUNT 2/152 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002), 127–28. 
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same sort of model for imitation (see p. 85). It is the character of the government—in the case of 
monarchy, the character of the king himself— rather than the  type of constitution or a particular set of 
laws that serves to define political excellence for Isocrates and Xenophon.332 
Both Isocrates and Xenophon write for political purposes. The advice offered by Isocrates adds an 
additional layer to this scheme. The king should stand above constitutions and laws, since these can 
only serve to hinder the virtuous leader (Phil. 14). But above the king stands the teacher, or, at a 
minimum, the teacher’s advice if it is adopted by the king.333 Tarik Wareh observes how the pedagogue 
pursues “a suprapolitical perspective and authority, what Isocrates would call philosophical,” in his 
relationship with the Macedonian king.334 The same perspective and authority is claimed in To 
Nicocles. Isocrates’ contribution to political philosophy and the nature of his piερι` βασιλει'ας treatise 
addressed to Nicocles needs to be understood against this background. 
Isocrates’ ideal monarch is the recipient and beneficiary of Isocrates’ paideia. Only a rightly 
educated ruler is able to educate his citizens and subjects. At Panathenaicus 30–32 Isocrates describes 
what an educated person looks like. The educated are able to manage the circumstances which they 
encounter because of their careful judgment and their ability to determine the correct course of action. 
They are decent and honourable as they encounter others (του`ς piρεpiο' ντως και` δικαι'ως ο µιλουñντας), 
displaying a high level of tolerance. They exhibit self-control with regard to pleasure and bear 
misfortune bravely. They rejoice in those things which belong to them by nature and intelligence rather 
than those they obtain through chance. Isocrates concludes:
Those who have a character which is in accord, not with one of these things, but with all of 
them—these, I contend, are wise and complete men (φρονι'µους ειòναι και` τελε'ους α»νδρας), 
possessed of all the virtues.
This passage serves to illustrate the parallels between Isocrates’ educated man and the portrait of the 
ideal king presented in this chapter on the basis of Isocrates’ To Nicocles.The parallels indicate that To 
Nicocles is indeed a philosophical text in the Isocratean sense—that is, it is primarily a means of 
paideia, of instructing the king so that he might become an educated person. Despite being sceptical of 
the extent to which virtue might be imparted through education, Isocrates nonetheless exhorted the 
young prince in the hope of changing him for the better.335
Xenophon’s narrative approach to educating leaders holds Cyrus up as a successful builder of an 
empire and thus, through Xenophon’s leadership analogy,336 as one worth emulating by those who seek 
to rule. As argued above (p. 94–95), Xenophon sought to place before his reader the most successful 
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332. Vivienne J. Gray, “Xenophon and Isocrates,” in The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought, 
ed. Christopher Rowe and Malcolm Schofield (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 146; Konstan, “Isocrates’ 
‘Republic’”; cf. Panath. 131–132; Cyr. 1.1.
333. Wareh notes that the discourse “casts [Isocrates’] royal addressee in the role of a student of Isocratean 
philosophia” (Isocrates and the Philosophers, 157); see also Livingstone, “Voice of Isocrates”.
334. Wareh, Isocrates and the Philosophers, 156–57.
335. Kehl identifies Isocrates as the foremost educator of leaders (“bedeutendsten Fürstenerzieher”) of the fourth 
century (“Monarchie,” 117).
336. I.e., the idea that leadership qualities are transferable between different realms, as explained by Socrates (Mem. 
3.4); see Gray, Mirror of Princes, 22–24.
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leader of whom he was aware in order to educate them in the art of ruling. In doing so, he also 
preserved for us a model of ideal kingship. 
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CHAPTER 3. KINGSHIP IN THE HELLENISTIC SCHOOLS
The writings of Isocrates and Xenophon examined in the previous chapter demonstrate that the 
figure of the ideal king forms part of Greek political thought in the classical period. However, it is one 
thing to be aware of monarchical rule, another to attempt to thrive under it. Following Alexander’s 
expedition to the east and his successors’ division of his empire amongst themselves, monarchical rule 
of one sort or another became the norm throughout the eastern Mediterranean. N. G. L. Hammond can 
go so far as to say, “The hallmark of the Hellenistic world was monarchy.”1 
In this chapter, I examine writings from Cynic, Stoic, Epicurean, and Pythagorean2 sources in 
an attempt to sketch a portrait of ideal kingship as it might have been constructed in each of these 
Hellenistic schools.3 Hellenistic kingship ideals might also be approached through the study of poetry4 
or sculpture,5 for example, but I examine philosophical texts that focus primarily on kings or kingship 
in order to suggest the shape of the now-lost piερι` βασιλει'ας treatises. Given the exiguous nature of the 
surviving sources, I am compelled to draw on the sometimes fragmentary evidence found in later 
collections like those of Arius Didymus and Diogenes Laertius.
In the first section, I begin by discussing Antisthenes who, even though he belongs in the 
classical period, serves as a bridge to Diogenes and the Hellenistic period.6 Chronologically speaking, 
Antisthenes should be considered before Isocrates and Xenophon.7 However, his influence on the 
Cynic tradition is generally accepted and he is thus discussed as a forerunner to the Cynic movement. 
The section concludes with a survey of what the Cynic Epistles teach about later Cynic thought 
regarding kingship.8 The Stoics are in view in the second section. As with Diogenes, attention is given 
to their general political thought before the place of kingship within that system is discussed. The third 
section in this chapter takes a bifocal look at Epicurean kingship. The sources that cluster around the 
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1. “The Macedonian Imprint on the Hellenistic World,” in Hellenistic History and Culture, ed. Peter Green (Berkely and 
Los Angeles; London: University of California Press, 1993), 12.
2. On the use of this adjective to speak of Pythagoreanism in the Hellenistic and imperial periods, see below, n. 219.
3. For a survey of Hellenistic philosophy, see Robert W. Sharples, Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics: An Introduction to 
Hellenistic Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1996) or A. A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics, 2nd 
ed. (Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1986). For political thought, see G. J. D. Aalders H. Wzn., 
Political Thought in Hellenistic Times (Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1975); John L. Moles, “The Cynics,” in The 
Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought, ed. Christopher Rowe and Malcolm Schofield (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 415–34; Malcolm Schofield, “Epicurean and Stoic Political Thought,” in The 
Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought, ed. Christopher Rowe and Malcolm Schofield (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 435–56. The existence of a Pythagorean school is questioned (see below, p. 137), but 
survival of the three Pythagorean texts entitled Περι` βασιλει'ας provide the impetus for their inclusion in this study. The 
Megarian, Sceptic, and Cyrenaic philosophers add nothing to this discussion (Aalders H. Wzn., Political Thought, 50–53). 
4. Susan A. Stephens, Seeing Double: Intercultural Poetics in Ptolemaic Alexandria, HCS 37 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2003); Silvia Barbantani, “Callimachus on Kings and Kingship,” in Brill’s Companion to Callimachus, ed. 
Benjamin Acosta-Hughes, Luigi Lehnus, and Susan A. Stephens (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 178–200.
5. R. R. R. Smith, Hellenistic Royal Portraits, Oxford Monographs on Classical Archaeology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1988).
6. W. K. C. Guthrie, The Sophists (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 304.  
7. For the possible influence of Antisthenes’ Cyrus on Xenophon, see Deborah Levine Gera, Xenophon’s Cyropaedia: 
Style, Genre and Literary Technique, OCM (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 8–10. 
8. These epistles give us a glimpse of imperial Cynicism (Abraham J. Malherbe, “Self-Definition Among the Cynics,” in 
Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays, 1959–2012, ed. Carl R. Holladay, 
et al., NovTSup 150 [Leiden: Brill, 2014], 635).
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person of Epicurus are examined first before attention is given to Philodemus’ tract addressed to Piso, 
On the Good King According to Homer. Finally, three Pythagorean texts identified by Stobaeus as 
containing piερι` βασιλει'ας treatises are examined.
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, a careful examination of the development of 
kingship in political thought during this period would require a far more extensive study than can be 
pursued here. My efforts in this chapter are far more modest. A study of the surviving evidence for 
political thought regarding kingship for the Cynics, Stoics, Epicureans, and Pythagoreans is undertaken 
in order to suggest a topos for each group against which Paul’s writings about Jesus might be 
compared. 
Cynic Kingship
While Diogenes of Sinope might lay claim to being the first Cynic, Diogenes Laertius finds in 
Antisthenes the origins of both Cynicism and Stoicism (D.L. 6.19). The relationship between 
Antisthenes and Diogenes forms part of Diogenes Laertius’ genealogy of Hellenistic philosophical 
schools and, in particular, it serves to link Socrates to the Stoics: Socrates > Antisthenes > Diogenes > 
Crates > Zeno (D.L. 1.15). Diogenes Laertius’ tendentiousness has raised doubts that a teacher-pupil 
relationship ever existed between Antisthenes and Diogenes.9 Nonetheless, there are enough 
similarities between Antisthenes and Diogenes to suggest the possibility of some sort of relationship10 
or, at least, influence.11 Our survey of the Cynic contribution to the piερι` βασιλει'ας topos therefore 
begins with Antisthenes’ political ideas. 
Antisthenes on Kingship
Diogenes Laertius’ catalogue of Antisthenes’ work (D.L. 6.15–18)12 includes at least one title 
that is overtly political—Περι` νο'µου η   περι` πολιτει'ας. Other titles in the same volume—Περι` νο'µου η   
περι` καλουñ και` δικαι'ου, Περι` ελευθερι'ας και` δουλει'ας, and Περι` νι'κης οικονοµικο' ς—suggest that this 
volume was concerned, broadly speaking, with political philosophy. The content of these treatises is 
lost. 
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9. Donald R. Dudley, A History of Cynicism: From Diogenes to the 6th Century A.D. (London: Methuen, 1937), 1–15.
10. Laertius claims that Diogenes, when he came to Athens after fleeing Sinope, became Antisthenes’ student (D.L. 
6.20). Antisthenes was not in the habit of acquiring students. Nevertheless, because of Diogenes’ persistence, Antisthenes 
relented and accepted him as such. “Once when he [Antisthenes] stretched out his staff against him [Diogenes], the pupil 
offered his head with the words, ‘Strike, for you will find no wood hard enough to keep me away from you, so long as I think 
you've something to say’” (D.L. 6.20).
11. See Ragnar Höistad, Cynic Hero and Cynic King: Studies in the Cynic Conception of Man (Uppsala: Bloms, 
1948), 8–12 for an argument against Dudley’s pessimistic view of the possibility of a relationship between Antisthenes and 
Diogenes. The relationship could have been established through Antisthenes’ writings (Moles, “Cynics,” 417). Susan Prince 
asserts that Diogenes would have learnt from Antisthenes face-to-face, but not necessarily within a (formalized?) pupil-
teacher relationship (“Socrates, Antisthenes, and the Cynics,” in A Companion to Socrates, ed. Sara Ahbel-Rappe and 
Rachana Kamtekar [Malden: Blackwell, 2006], 78). Much in this argument hinges on the tricky matter of dating Diogenes’ 
life. The resolution of this problem does not affect my argument one way or another since the influence of Antisthenes on 
Diogenes is generally accepted even by those who deny that a formal relationship existed.
12. The systematic arrangement of this catalogue suggests the work of someone with access to the texts (Prince, 
“Socrates, Antisthenes, and Cynics,” 79)
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While a fragment preserved by Stobaeus suggests that Antisthenes was cautiously optimistic 
about participation in political life,13 Athenaeus (Deipn. 5.63) records that Antisthenes’ “Political 
Dialogue” (ο   πολιτικο`ς δια' λογος) comprised an attack on all the Athenian demagogues.14 A similarly 
cautious attitude is preserved in Aristotle’s discussion of the futility of making laws for those of pre-
eminent excellence. Aristotle mentions “a fable of Antisthenes” in which the hares claim equality with 
the lions (Aristotle, Pol. 1284a11–17). Aristotle fails to reproduce the punch line. The lions’ response, 
according to one of Aesop’s fables, is “Where are your teeth and claws?” Antisthenes is wary of those 
who wield too much power in the political realm and since these are, more often than not, the people 
responsible for creating laws, the sage would not necessarily act in accordance with the established 
laws (ου  κατα` του`ς κειµε'νους νο'µους), but according to α ρετη'  (D.L. 6.11).
The titles of Antisthenes’ fourth and fifth volumes recorded in Diogenes Laertius’ catalogue 
read as follows: Κυñρος, Η  ρακληñς ο   µει'ζων η   περι` ισχυ' ος, Κυñρος η   περι` βασιλει'ας, and Α σpiασι'α.The 
first three of these works suggest a link to kingship,15 as do the seven works listed as part of the tenth 
volume ( Η  ρακληñς η   Μι'δας, Η  ρακληñ ς η   περι` φρονη' σεως η   ισχυ' ος, Κυñρος η   ερω' µενος, Κυñρος η   
κατα' σκοποι, Μενε'ξενος η   περι` τουñ α»ρχειν, Α λκιβια' δης, Α ρχε'λαος η   περι` βασιλει'ας).
This list16 establishes the fact that, in addition to other kingship texts, Antisthenes produced at 
least two works considered to fall within the περι` βασιλει'ας genre: one linked to Cyrus, the other to 
Archelaus. 
Cyrus. As our study of Xenophon demonstrates, the founder of the Achaemenid empire was a common 
subject of kingship treatises of this time. Antisthenes produced a number of texts that apparently deal 
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13. When asked about how one might approach civil life (πωñς α»ν τις προσε'λθοι πολιτει'α, ), Antisthenes recommended 
approaching it like a fire: not too close, lest one got burnt; but also not too far, lest one froze (Stob. 4.4.28 = WH 4, p. 197, 
7–9).
14. See also D.L. 6.6: “It is strange,” said he [scil. Antisthenes], “that we weed out the darnel from the corn and the unfit 
in war, but do not excuse evil men (του`ς πονηρου' ς) from the service of the state.”
15. It is difficult to account for the presence of a work entitled Α σpiασι'α at this point in the catalogue, if the thesis about 
the political nature of these volumes is correct. According to Athenaeus (Deipn. 5.63), Antisthenes’ Α σpiασι'α contains an 
attack on the characters of Pericles’ sons from his first marriage, Xanthippus and Paralus. In this section Athenaeus attributes 
to Antisthenes other attacks on Athenian politicians, leaders, and philosophers, so perhaps the Α σpiασι'α was a critique of 
Pericles containing, amongst other elements, a critique of his sons. The fullest ancient account of Aspasia’s life is found in 
Putarch, Pericles 24, 32. Following her study of the Aspasia tradition, Madeleine M. Henry concludes: “I think we can do no 
better than distinguish what is provable from what is not and what is knowable from what is not. This having been done, we 
can say remarkably little about Aspasia of Miletus.” (Prisoner of History: Aspasia of Miletus and Her Biographical 
Tradition [New York: Oxford University Press, 1995], 127). Was Antisthenes’ treatise a critique of Aspasia’s sexuality 
(alluded to at Athenaeus, Deipn. 13.56?) and her position as a strong female subject (so Henry, Aspasia, 30–32)? This 
assumes that the treatise’s position in the catalogue alongside kingship texts is unimportant. 
16. Three other works of Antisthenes are mentioned as sources for Aeschines: το' ν τε µικρο`ν Κυñρον και` το`ν Η  ρακλε'α το`ν 
ελα' σσω και` Α λκιβια' δην (D.L. 2.61). The works listed here probably represent alternative titles for those found in the 
catalogue at D.L. 6.15–18 (G. Karl Galinsky, The Herakles Theme: The Adaptations of the Hero in Literature from Homer to 
the Twentieth Century [Oxford: Blackwell, 1972], 123 n. 11).
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with Cyrus in one way or another,17 but most significant for our purposes is the existence of a treatise 
entitled Κυñρος η   περι` βασιλει'ας (D.L. 6.16), pointing to the significance of Cyrus in Antisthenes’ 
kingship discourse.
The remains of Antisthenes’ writings on Cyrus are unfortunately negligible. Cyrus is a model 
(together with Heracles) of the idea that toil (πο' νος) is good (D.L. 6.2). Epictetus attributes to 
Antisthenes the saying: “It is the lot of a king, O Cyrus, to do well, but to be ill spoken of” (Epict. diss. 
4.6.20).18 Arsenius preserves a fragment in which Cyrus is asked about what is “most necessary.” The 
king responds: “to unlearn the bad things (το` α ποµαθειñν ... τα` κακα' )” (Caizzi 21A). The same saying is 
preserved by Stobaeus, who attributes it to Antisthenes (Stob. 2.31.34 = WH 2, p. 207, 22–23; Caizzi 
21B). It is therefore quite possible that this represents a saying from Antisthenes’ work on Cyrus in 
which the emperor has been transformed into a philosopher–king who dispenses advice to those around 
him.19 
The limited data available to us20 suggests that, through his toil and suffering, which include 
being spoken of badly despite his good deeds, Cyrus has been transformed into a sage and a true king.21 
He provides Antisthenes’ reader with an ethical model rather than a political one. The king as sage 
presents us with the inverse image of the sage as the only true king, a topos we will encounter 
repeatedly in Stoic thought.
Archelaus. The second of Antisthene’s περι` βασιλει'ας treatises takes Archelaus as its subject. The 
emphasis on rulers and kingship in this part of the collection suggests that the Archelaus on view is 
Antisthenes’ contemporary, the Macedonian king who ruled from ca. 413–399.22 Archelaus’ reputation 
amongst Greek thinkers was ambiguous. Plato (Gorgias 471a–d) portrayed him rather negatively, while 
Thucydides (War 2.100) considered Archelaus superior to those who had come before him. However, 
we need not consider these portraits as contradictory, since the former focuses on Archelaus’ character 
as evidenced by his ruthless dealings with his political opponents, while the latter has as its focus his 
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17. D.L. 6.16: Κυñρος; D.L. 6.18: Κυñρος η   ερω' µενος, Κυñρος η   κατα' σκοποι, and D.L. 2.61: ο   µικρο`ς Κυñρος. Cicero Att. 
12.38 mentions Books 4 and 5 of Antisthenes’ Cyrus. Athenaeus Deipn. 5.63 notes that Antisthenes speaks ill of Alcibiades 
in another work on Cyrus. Antisthenes describes Alcibiades as strong, manly, boorish, daring, and beautiful ( ισχυρο`ν αυ το`ν 
και` α νδρω' δη και` α παι'δευτον και` τολµηρο`ν και` ω  ραιñον)(Athenaeus, Deipn. 12.43). Although it is possible that one or more of 
these texts speak of Cyrus the Younger (son of Darius II), the significance of Cyrus the Great in Greek kingship discourse is 
illustrated by Xenophon’s Cyropaedia. See Höistad, Cynic Hero, 73–75 for arguments that these Cyrus-texts do not speak of 
anyone other than the Persian king. According to Photius, Phrynicus records only one work on Cyrus and one on Odysseus 
(Caizzi 10). 
18. At D.L. 6.3 this saying is attributed to Antisthenes in an argument against Plato; cf. Ajax 5. With reference to 
Alexander the Great and without mention of Antisthenes, the saying occurs in another form at Plutarch, Alex. 41.1.; see also 
Marcus Aurelius (Med. 7.36), again, with no reference to Antisthenes.
19. Höistad, Cynic Hero, 75–76.
20. One passage has been ignored: Athenaeus informs us that one of the Cyrus-treatises was critical of Alcibiades’ 
dealing with women “after the fashion of the Persians” (Deipn. 5.63). It more likely that the text to which Athenaeus refers 
has to do with Cyrus the Younger and not Cyrus the Great, especially since Alcibiades and Cyrus the Younger were 
contemporaries.
21. Ragnar Höistad comes to this conclusion by employing Xenophon’s portrait of Cyrus, together with references in Dio 
Chrysostom, to fill out Antisthenes’ portrait of the Persian king (Cynic Hero, 92–94).
22. For Archelaus, see Eugene N. Borza, In the Shadow of Olympus: The Emergence of Macedon (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1990), 161–79; Joseph Roisman, “Classical Macedonia to Perdiccas III,” in A Companion to Ancient 
Macedonia, ed. Joseph Roisman and Ian Worthington, BCAW (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 154–58.
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military leadership. Another positive aspect of Archelaus noted in our sources is his patronage of the 
arts.23 This patronage was reciprocated, for example, by Euripides, whose play of that name flatters the 
Macedonian king by changing the name of the founder of the Argead dynasty from Perdiccas to 
Archelaus.24 
The only extant discussion of Antisthenes’ Archelaus notes that it contains an attack on 
Gorgias (Athenaeus, Deipn. 5.63).25 Our knowledge of Antisthenes’ idea of kingship is not advanced 
in any way.
What, if anything, might be said of the possible content of Antisthenes’ Archelaus? Might 
Antisthenes’ antipathy towards Gorgias’ sophistry and rhetoric have spilled over into disdain for poetry 
and drama? If so, perhaps the treatise was critical of the king as patron. Archelaus’ dealings with his 
family, while distasteful, were not uncommon amongst the Argeads. A number of Antisthenes’ sayings 
allegedly recorded by Diocles (D.L. 6.12–13) have a military ring to them. The statement that “virtue is 
a weapon that cannot be removed,” however, indicates that we are once again in the realm of ethics and 
not warfare.26 It was unlikely, then, to have been Archelaus’ military leadership that made him a 
suitable subject for Antisthenes’ περι` βασιλει'ας treatise. We can only guess as to the contents of this 
work. 
Unlike the Cyrus treatise, the Archelaus treatise is named after a contemporary. This raises the 
possibility that Antisthenes wrote for the king, or at least hoped that the king would read what he had 
written. If this text was indeed meant as a formal Fürstenspiegel, it might have advised Archelaus to 
pursue Socratic philosophy, or accept advice along those lines, for the benefit of himself and his 
people. It is also possible that Antisthenes’ work adopted the name of a well-known monarch (as he did 
in his Cyrus), albeit on this occasion a contemporary monarch, in order to produce a philosophical-
ethical treatise in which the persons of the king and the sage are united. It is significant that both 
Antisthenes’ περι` βασιλει'ας treatises have “biographical” titles and not theoretical or abstract titles.27 
These two titles contributed to the περι` βασιλει'ας topos through biography, suggesting that Antisthenes 
is instructing his readers by holding up exemplary figures for imitation. 
Odysseus. In addition to a book on Homer and various Homeric characters (D.L. 6.15–18), Antisthenes 
wrote at least three works about Odysseus himself.28 One of these Odysseus-texts (Caizzi 15) has 
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23. Borza, In the Shadow of Olympus: The Emergence of Macedon, 171–77.
24. Roisman, “Classical Maceodnia to Perdiccas,” 157. Although dated, William Ridgeway, “Euripides in Macedon,” 
CQ 20.1 (1926): 1–19 still provides a useful discussion of these matters. More recently, Scott Scullion has challenged the 
traditional account of Euripides’ “exile” to and death in Macedonia (“Euripides and Macedon, or the Silence of the ‘Frogs’,” 
CQ NS 53.2 [2003]: 389–400).
25. Gorgias was Antisthenes’ teacher before Socrates (D.L. 6.2). Perhaps in this attack we see nothing more than a 
convert’s loathing of his former way of life.
26. For Antisthenes’ use of a different military image in a philosophical context, see Abraham J. Malherbe, “Antisthenes 
and Odysseus, and Paul at War,” in Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected 
Essays, 1959–2012, ed. Carl R. Holladay, et al., NovTSup 150 (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 135–66.
27. Antisthenes was not adverse to more abstract titles. Diogenes Laertius’ catalogue (6.15–18) includes works such as 
Περι` α γαθουñ, Περι` α νδρεαι'ας, and Περι` νο' µου η   περι` πολιτει'ας. 
28. Ο δυσσευ`ς η   περι` Ο δυσσε'ως, Κυ' κλωψ η   περι` Ο δυσσε'ως, Περι` τουñ Ο δυσσε'ως και` Πηνελο' πης και` περι` τουñ κυνο' ς. 
The first of these is mentioned in the first volume after Αι»ας η   Αι»αντος λο' γος (D.L. 6.15); these are the two works dealt with 
in this section.
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survived and forms a companion to Ajax (Caizzi 14). The two monologues portray an event from the 
Ilias Parva in which Ajax and Odysseus argue over the right to Achilles’ armour.29
Ragnar Höistad considered these two works “the oldest examples of the discussion of the ideal 
king.”30 But just below the surface of this kingship discourse sits a debate over the nature of virtue as 
seen from the perspective of two very different moral types.31 The outcome of this case is not disclosed, 
although the reader is presumably meant to be aware that it ended with Ajax’ descent into madness 
and, finally, suicide. Odysseus is allowed to respond to Ajax and, in addition to having the longer 
speech, is thereby given the final word. The reader is meant to side with Odysseus and adopt the virtues 
represented by this character.32  
In this portrayal of Odysseus, Antisthenes’ highlights his self-abasement and philanthropy.33 
These Cynic topoi characterize Antisthenes’ ideal king in the person of Odysseus rather than Ajax.34 
With regard to this first of these topoi, the king’s self-abasement consists of two significant 
elements. First, Odysseus dresses in rags (τα` ρ α' κη) as part of his disguise (Ajax 6; Odysseus 10). The 
king-dressed-as-a-slave would have resonated with Cynic thought, renown as Cynics were for their 
tattered clothing. This topos is taken up in different ways by subsequent generations of Cynics,35 but 
seems to highlight the same “fundamental antithesis between exterior and interior” of which 
Xenophon’s Antisthenes speaks (Symp. 4.34).36 
This antithesis can also be understood in terms of the physical and spiritual.37 In his closing 
words (Odysseus 13–14), Odysseus claims that wisdom and bravery in battle should not be confused 
with being strong (ισχυ' ω). A lack of learning (α µαθι'α), which turns one away from that which is 
excellent, is the greatest evil. Despite Ajax’ virtues as a warrior, he will be remembered as a dumb 
beast of burden, enslaved by others.38 Physical strength is again shown to be secondary to spiritual 
strength.39 Prowess on the battle field is meaningless if it is accompanied by ignorance. A person in this 
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29. The so-called ο«πλων κρι'σις, see Aristotle, Poet. 1459a30–b7.
30. Cynic Hero, 95. Höistad also identifies these writings as “a surprisingly rich accumulation of Socratic-Cynic motifs 
in a Gorgianic form” (p. 99).
31. Prince, “Socrates, Antisthenes, and Cynics,” 82–85 Prince argues that Antisthenes’ use of language elsewhere points 
to a desire “to show rather than tell,” an approach which is “continuous with the later Cynic interest in nondiscursive 
linguistic genres” (p. 83).
32. This conclusion might be challenged by comparing Ajax’ insistence that the case be judged according to deeds and 
not words with the statement attributed to Antisthenes that virtue has to do with deeds and nor words (D.L. 6.11). This 
contrast should not be understood in absolute terms. To Antisthenes is also attributed the opinion that virtue can be taught 
(D.L. 6.10)—an opinion which is affirmed by his voluminous writings, some of which, presumably, were meant to teach 
virtue through words. His conversion from Gorgias to Socrates did not mean that he abandoned rhetoric, but subordinated it 
to philosophy; see, e.g., Stob. 2.31.76 = WH 2, 215 ( Α ντισθε'νης ερωτηθει`ς υ  πο'  τινος, τι' διδα' ξει το`ν υι ο' ν, ειòπεν, “ει µε`ν 
θεοιñς µε'λλει συµβιουñν, φιλο' σοφον, ει δε` α νθρω' ποις, ρ η' τορα.”).
33. Höistad, Cynic Hero, 96–98. See also Malherbe, “Antisthenes, Odysseus, Paul,” 140–46.
34. This is not to say that the figure of Ajax makes no contribution to our understanding of kingship. The theme of the 
king as physician is a particularly important topos (Ajax 4) which Höistad (Cynic Hero, 101–2) compares to Xenophon, Cyr. 
1.6.15, where the physician’s “sufficiency” (and unique ability as the only one able to fulfil the role he plays) is transferred to 
the king, who alone is able to fulfil the monarchical roles given to him.
35. See Malherbe, “Antisthenes, Odysseus, Paul,” 151–58.
36. Höistad, Cynic Hero, 100.
37. According to Augustine, Aristippus gave pre-eminence to the physical while Antisthenes emphasized the mind (Civ. 
dei. 18.41).
38. There is possibly an allusion here to Ajax’ strategic retreat at Illiad 11.544-574.
39. At the end of his speech, Odysseus description of himself as “much-enduring, of many counsels, and inventive” 
(πο' λυτλας, µολυ' µητις, πολυµη' χανος; 14) highlights his intellect over Ajax’ physical superiority. While these epithets could 
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state is no better off than a donkey or ox which is chained up and forced to do the bidding of others. 
Odysseus, the man who dresses like a slave, is truly free, while the powerful and successful Ajax is, in 
reality, enslaved. In the later tradition, this contrast would manifest itself in other ways, but always 
along similar lines: “outward frugality—inward riches.”40 This emphasis on the spiritual over the 
physical should not be understood in an absolute way—just as the soul must be exercised through 
education, so too the body needs physical exercise.41 We will have occasion to return to this “double 
training” when discussing Heracles. 
Odysseus’ self-abasement is highlighted, secondly, by his lack of concern with the opinions of 
others.42  In the face of Ajax’ accusation that he was willingly humiliated for gain (Ajax 5), Odysseus 
claims (Odysseus 9) to have acted decisively in battle, even if it was in a manner some might consider 
shameful (αιχρο' ς).43 He acted in this matter because he was not concerned with earning a reputation. 
Rather, he was willing to go about as a slave (δουñλος), a beggar (πτωχο' ς), and a rogue (µαστιγι'ας) in 
order to harm the enemy (Odysseus 9). This α δοξι'α was an important part of Antisthenes’ 
understanding of the toil needed to advance in virtue.44  
The other important royal topos, the king’s care for his subjects (φιλανθρωπι'α), is most evident 
in Odysseus 8, where Odysseus claims to be a στρατηγο' ς, φυ' λαξ and κυβερνη' της who saves Ajax and 
the others. Even at night, while Ajax is snoring, Odysseus keeps him safe and attacks the enemy (10). 
The contrast is once again evident. It was not the strength and courage of Ajax on the battlefield that 
saved the Achaeans, but Odysseus’ craftiness. Those best suited to saving their fellow human beings 
are marked by brains, not brawn.
Antisthenes’ kingship discourse is not about ruling per se. Rather, ethical matters are examined 
through the prism of ruling figures. Antisthenes’ Ajax–Odysseus diptych, for example, examines type 
different ways of being: “the straightforward and honorable Ajax ... and the crafty Odysseus ... who 
always comes off best by his inventiveness, adaptability and shamelessness.”45 Society might consider 
these traits unbecoming of a king, but Antisthenes shows that Odysseus is not concerned with his 
reputation, but rather, with saving the community. Susan Prince notes that Ajax is moulded by his 
society and behaves according to its code, whereas Odysseus “appropriates and manipulates social 
categories ... to promote the real interests of society.” The texts thus serve to show “the superior 
individuality of Odysseus”.46 There is not a great distance between Odysseus thus portrayed and the 
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all be understood pejoratively, Odysseus claims that should a wise poet arise, he would memorialize Odysseus for these 
virtues.
40. Höistad, Cynic Hero, 100.
41. Stob. 2.31.68: Α ντισθε'νουσd δειñ του`ς µε'λλοντας α γαθου`ς α»νδρας γενη' σεσθαι το` µε`ν σωñµα γυµνασι'οις α σκειñν, τη`ν δε` 
ψυχη`ν παιδευ' σει.
42. In contrast, Ajax is concerned with the opinion the judges might form about him and asks for judgment of his deeds 
instead (Ajax 8, 9).
43. The rags Odysseus wears and lashes he bears as part of his disguise, rather than being a source of shame (insinuated 
at Ajax 6), are his weapons (Odysseus 10).
44. D.L. 6.11: τη' ν τ’ α δοξι'αν α γαθο`ν και` ι»σον τωñ,  πο' νω, .
45. Höistad, Cynic Hero, 95–96.
46. Prince, “Socrates, Antisthenes, and Cynics,” 84.
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Cynic sage as enacted by Diogenes. The king is again transformed into a sage. Antisthenes has found 
Homeric precedent for the figure who will become the Cynic sage.
Heracles. Although not linked directly to a περι` βασιλει'ας treatise, the figure of Heracles contributes to 
Antisthenes’ model of true kingship. Antisthenes’ construal of Heracles forms part of what Karl 
Galinsky has called the “intellectualization” of Heracles, a process seen in a number of classical texts.47 
Isocrates had portrayed Heracles as an ideal for both Philip (Phil. 109–115) and Demonicus (Demon. 
8) to imitate.48 In the case of Philip, Heracles’ alliance with the Greeks against an eastern foe is 
highlighted, for obvious reasons. Heracles military exploits are not forgotten and Isocrates holds up 
Heracles’ ordeals (αòθλοι) as exemplifying toil (πο' νος) which is considered praiseworthy. But alongside 
Heracles’ physical nature, Isocrates commends the qualities of Heracles’ ψυχη' , his φιλανθρωπι'α,49 and 
his ευ»νοια (Phil. 114). Similarly, in a discussion of the superiority of the spiritual over the physical, 
Xenophon’s Socrates holds up Heracles as an example of someone in whom Zeus delighted for his  
ψυχη'  (Symp. 8.29). Heracles has become a model of virtue, the warrior transformed into a 
philosopher.50
Antisthenes observes in both Cyrus and Heracles an example of the truth that  toil (πο' νος) is 
good (D.L. 6.2). On the face of it, this saying might speak of the physical labours for which Heracles is 
well known. The saying in D.L. 6.11 that “the strength of Socrates” brings about virtue shows that 
physicality and its associated labours could also be conceived of metaphorically.51 That this was so 
seems likely from the alternative titles of the work Η  ρακληñς η   περι` φρονη' σεως η   ισχυ' ος. Xenophon’s 
Socrates recalls Prodicus’ famous parable of Heracles at the crossroads (Xenophon, Mem. 2.1.21–34) 
in order to illustrate the Socratic teaching about the necessity of toil with regard to self-control. Both 
toil and self-control are crucial aspects of the attainment of virtue. It is also significant that this parable 
comes in a section concerned with the education of a ruler.
If the surviving Heracles fragments52 belong to the same treatise or are concerned with 
commentary on the same treatise, what we seem to have is a description of the hero’s education.53 The 
first stage of Heracles’ education comes, like that of Achilles, Asclepius, and others, from the centaur 
Chiron (Caizzi 24A = SSR V A 92).54 Chiron’s teaching was concerned with  hunting, music, 
medicine, astronomy—“normal human culture and science.”55 In another fragment (Caizzi 27 = SSR V 
A 96 ), Heracles receives a philosophical education from Prometheus in which a contrast is drawn 
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47. Galinsky, Herakles Theme, 101.
48. Galinsky, Herakles Theme, 103.
49. Isocrates remembers Heracles for his philanthropia, among other things, but this aspect of Heracles is absent in the 
Cynic and Stoic writings (Galinsky, Herakles Theme, 103).
50. Prince (“Socrates, Antisthenes, and Cynics,” 79) suggests that Antisthenes’ rewriting of Heracles myths along 
philosophical lines might be traced to his pre-Socratic life.
51. See also Odysseus 13.
52. For the Heracles fragments, see Caizzi 22–28; SSR V A 92–99.
53. Höistad, Cynic Hero, 34–37; Menahem Luz, “Antisthenes’ Concept of Paideia,” Twentieth World Congress of 
PhilosophyBoston, MA, 1998), Www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Anci/AnciLuz.htm.
54. Chiron: “the wisest of the Centuars” (Homer, Il. 11.831); Asclepius: Pindar, Nem. 3.54–55; Pyth. 3.6; Homer, Il. 
4.215; Jason: Pindar, Nem. 3.54; Pyth. 4.101–119;  Achilles: Homer, Il. 11.831; Pindar, Nem. 3.43–53; Plato, Resp. 391C; 
Pausanias, Descr. 3.18.12; healing/medicine: Homer, Il. 4.215; 11.831; Pindar, Pyth. 3.45–46
55. Luz, “Antisthenes’ Concept of Paideia.”
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between concern for the things of this world and those which are greater than this world.56 Another 
echo of this teaching survives in the saying that establishes rhetoric as necessary for living among 
human beings and philosophy as necessary for living with the gods (Stob. 2.31.76 = WH 2, 215).
It is with regard to Heracles that Antisthenes teaches that “life according to virtue” is the 
sought-after goal (D.L. 6.104), that virtue can be taught (D.L. 6.105), and that one ought to be wary of 
flatterers (Plutarch, Vit. pud. 18). An important part of virtue is to be self-sufficient in one’s “self-
image”: just as α δοξι'α should be welcomed,57 flatterers should be avoided.58 This advice is related to 
that given with regard to frank speech (παρρησι'α). On the one hand, harsh words should not injure the 
sage, on the other, the temptation to be influenced by flattery is so great that it should be avoided. 
Although these sayings are not found alongside discussions of frank speech, they would seem to be 
mirror images of one another. The safe practice of frank speech requires its recipient to accept it gladly. 
In terms of the one offering it, frank speech is, by definition honest; it is neither unjustly critical nor 
unduly flattering.
As the discussion of the fragments of Antisthenes’ writing about Heracles has shown, 
Antisthenes’ focus was largely on ethics and virtue rather than on political philosophy as it is 
commonly conceived. Höistad’s assessment that these writings provide “an allegorical re-interpretation 
of the myth of Heracles along purely individualistic [ethical] lines”59 is sound.
Antisthenes’ Contribution. Diogenes Laertius only catalogues two περι` βασιλει'ας treatises written by 
Antisthenes: Cyrus and Archelaus. In this section I have investigated other works that seem to hold 
promise to fill out the picture. In some cases, this investigation results in question-begging: by 
examining an ethical text (Ajax–Odysseus) I conclude that Antisthenes’ kingship writings must have 
been ethical. This is unavoidable, but also warranted on the basis that the rest of the (fragmentary) 
material supports the ethical emphasis with regard to Antisthenes’ writings.
The little evidence that remains suggests that these kingship treatises (especially those that 
focus on Heracles) contained advice of a general kind (“don’t be grateful towards flatterers”), or 
ethical/philosophical discussion of virtue, rather than explicitly political advice. Prince suggests that 
Antisthenes’ Cyrus and Heracles “were not discussions about virtue, but fictional dialogues in which 
virtue was demonstrated through the mimesis or literary representation of virtuous (and possibly 
vicious) characters.”60 This is certainly the case with the Ajax and Odysseus, and we might suppose 
that the Cyrus or Archelaus treatises employed the same discursive strategy.  
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56. Luz, “Antisthenes’ Concept of Paideia”; Adam Drozdek, Greek Philosophers as Theologians: The Divine Arche 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 141 
57. See the discussion of α' δοξι'α in relation to Odysseus, p. 106.
58. D.L. 6.4 (=Stob. 3.14.17, WH 3, p. 474, lines 3-6): He [sc. Antisthenes] said it is better to fall in with ravens than 
flatterers (εις κο' ρακας η   εις κο' λακας εµπεσειñν) since the former devour the dead while the latter devour the living.
59. Höistad, Cynic Hero, 37, cf. p. 47.
60. “Socrates, Antisthenes, and Cynics,” 80.
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Cynics and Kingship
Much Cynic discussion of kingship takes place in the form of shorter sayings (χρειñαι,61 
α ποφθε'γµατα) and longer anecdotes (α ποµνηµονευ' µατα), rather than through more abstract discourse. 
Two characteristics generally mark these accounts. The first characteristic is described as το` 
σpiουδογε'λοιον. In the ancient world the term was associated with the Cynic Menippus,62 but has come 
to be used more generally to speak of Cynic seriocomic discourse.63 Through humour, Cynics were 
able to engage in transgressive speech and behaviour without risking the social consequences that these 
would usually attract. It was this which stood at the heart of Cynic παρρησι'α, allowing the Cynic sage 
to “speak truth to power.”64
The second characteristic is related to the first. It is the tendency to appropriate for Cynic 
purposes the language used by others.65 The most obvious example of this is Diogenes’ subversion of 
Homeric quotations.66 But at a more basic level, Diogenes “defaced the currency” of language by 
assuming his own definitions for words common to the rest of society. Rhetors, for example, he called 
“thrice-human” meaning “thrice-wretched” (D.L. 6.47). Or again, good men are nowhere to be found 
in Greece, but one might find good boys in Sparta (D.L. 6.27). The redefinition of “king” and “slave,” 
in particular, will be important in our analysis of the Cynic anecdotes to which we now turn.
Of Sages and Kings. The encounter between Diogenes and Alexander the Great is recorded by a num-
ber of different writers (Cicero, Tusc. 5; Diogenes, Ep. 33; Plutarch, Alex. 14.1–3; Alex. fort. 1.5; 
Princ. iner. 5; Dio Chrysostom, Or. 4; D.L. 6.38) and each gives to the story a slightly different 
emphasis.67 There are a number of interesting elements that occur across the various versions. In these 
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61. One of the definitions offered by Aelius Theon is that a chreia is “a brief saying or action making a point, attributed 
to some specified person or something corresponding to a person” (cited by George A. Kennedy, Progymnasmata: Greek 
Textbooks of Prose Composition and Rhetoric, WGRW 10 [Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2003], 15).
62. The most important occurrence for our purposes: in relation to his coming from Gadara, Menippus is identified as ο   
σpiουδογε'λοιος by both Strabo (Geography 16.2.29) and Stephanus (Ethnica 3.9.3; cf. p. 193 of the epitome of the Ethnica  
[A. Meineke (ed.), Stephani Byzanti. Ethnicorum Quae Supersunt. Berlin: Reimer, 1849]). In the same work, Stephanus 
writes of Βλαιñος σpiουδογελοι'ων ποιητη' ς (p. 357). Diogenes Laertius also uses the word to identify a certain Heraclitus (D.L. 
9.17). These are the only five occurrences of the word in the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae (as of 28 April 2014). For 
Menippus, see D.L. 6.99–101; Dudley, Cynicism, 69–74. Lucian (Bis acc. 33) calls Menippus ”a really dreadful dog who 
bites unexpectedly because he grins when he bites.”
63. For the rhetorical significance of this mode of discourse and its centrality to the Cynic project, see Robert Bracht 
Branham, “Defacing the Currency: Diogenes’ Rhetoric and the Invention of Cynicism,” in The Cynics: The Cynic Movement 
in Antiquity and Its Legacy, ed. R. Bracht Branham and Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé, HCS 23 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1996), 81–104; Ineke Sluiter, “Communicating Cynicism: Diogenes’ Gansta Rap,” in Language and 
Learning: Philosophy of Language in the Hellenistic Age: Proceedings of the Ninth Symposium Hellenisticum, ed. Dorothea 
Frede and Brad Inwood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 139–63; Philip R. Bosman, “Selling Cynicism: The 
Pragmatics of Diogenes’ Comic Performances,” CQ 56.1 (2006): 93–104.
64. Bosman, “Selling Cynicism,” 103–4.
65. Bosman, “Selling Cynicism,” 102.
66. M. D. Usher, “Diogenes’ Doggerel: Chreia and Quotation in Cynic Performance,” CJ 104.3 (2009): 207–23.
67. Cicero’s work, for example, argues that virtue is sufficient for happiness. He brings out Diogenes, along with 
Epicurus, Anacharsis, Socrates, and Xenocrates, to show that money cannot buy happiness and that, on the contrary, 
happiness is obtained through being content with little. Dio Chrysostom turns the encounter into an opportunity for Diogenes 
to educate Alexander on the intricacies of Hellenistic kingship ideology. As Richard Stoneman observes with regard to this 
anecdote, it is “the essence of a good story that it can be used in many contexts, can bear multiple meanings” (“The Legacy of 
Alexander in Ancient Philosophy,” in Brill’s Companion to Alexander the Great, ed. Joseph Roisman [Leiden: Brill, 
2003], 330).
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anecdotes, Alexander approaches Diogenes yet, as Ineke Sluiter notes, subjects usually approach 
kings.68 This non-verbal element of the anecdote highlights Diogenes’ superiority. Furthermore, his 
response to Alexander emphasizes the important Cynic virtues of frank speech and self-sufficiency.69 
The king has nothing to offer the philosopher, and the philosopher is not afraid of letting the king know 
this. 
In the classical polis, παρρησι'α described the citizen’s right to have his voice heard within the 
city’s political system.70 As democracy was replaced by monarchy, the term came to be used to indicate 
the honesty and frankness with which one friend could speak to another. “Παρρησι'α as a private virtue 
replaced παρρησι'α as a political right.”71 In the philosophical context, the virtue was essential in a 
teacher’s instruction of a disciple or amongst philosophical “friends” who would hope to make moral 
progress. Philodemus’ treatise Περι` παρρησι'ας is illustrative of this category. Plutarch’s  Quomodo 
adulator ab amico internoscatur addressed to Prince Philopappus72 suggests yet another context in 
which παρρησι'α is an essential virtue: the Hellenistic royal court. It is here that we see most clearly 
both frank speech and its opposite, flattery.73 
An example of Diogenes’ frank speech is illustrated in his comment on a letter sent from 
Alexander to Antipater through Athlios: “α»θλιος παρ’ α θλι'ου δι’ α θλι'ου προ`ς α»θλιον”—“From a 
wretch born of a wretch, through a wretch, to a wretch.”(D.L. 6.44). This response leaves the audience 
in no doubt as to Diogenes’ opinion of kings and those who serve them. Multiple alleged encounters 
between Cynics and rulers embody this tradition of frank speech and self-sufficiency. There are stories 
of Diogenes interacting with Philip (D.L. 6.43), Craterus (D.L. 6.57), and Perdiccas (D.L. 6.44). Crates 
is similarly portrayed in conversation with Alexander (D.L. 6.93). This tradition does not show the 
Cynic sage giving the king honest, practical advice on governing; for this we will have to wait for the 
Cynic Epistles (see below). Rather, we see the sage exercising his freedom by criticizing kingship 
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68. Sluiter, “Language and Learning,” 143. Laertius simply says that Alexander came to Diogenes ( Α λε'ξανδρος επιστα' ς 
φησιν; D.L. 6.38; cf. 6.60). Plutarch, however, says that Alexander had expected Diogenes to join the politicians and 
philosophers who had come to congratulate him. And when Diogenes did not come to Alexander, “Alexander went to him” 
(αυ το`ς επορευ' ετο προ`ς αυ το' ν; Alex. 14.2). The significance of this was not lost of Dio Chrysostom who starts to say that 
Alexander went off to pay court to Diogenes, and then tones down this statement by pointing out that, in fact, Diogenes had 
no court, nor house, nor city of his own (Or. 4.12–13). He does not correct himself, however, by pointing out that Diogenes 
was a philosopher and that it would be totally inappropriate for the king to pay court to a Cynic philosopher. In Ep. 24, 
Diogenes “summons” Alexander.
69. Branham, “Diogenes’ Rhetoric,” 88 n. 23. The former virtue, αυ τα' ρκεια, was attributed to Antisthenes (D.L. 6.11), 
but it was Diogenes’ dogged pursuit of αυ τα' ρκεια that leaves the strongest trace in the tradition.  For a discussion of classical 
antecedents to Cynic αυ τα' ρκεια, see Audrey N. M. Rich, “The Cynic Conception of αυ τα' ρκεια,” Mnemosyne 4/9.1 
(1956): 23–29.
70. For this paragraph, see David Konstan, et al., “Introduction,” in On Frank Criticism; Philodemus, TAT 43 (Atlanta: 
Scholars Press, 1998), 1–24; David Konstan, “Friendship, Frankness and Flattery,” in Friendship, Flattery, and Frankness of 
Speech: Studies on Friendship in the New Testament World, ed. John T. Fitzgerald, NovTSup 82 (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 7–19.
71. Arnaldo Momigliano, “Freedom of Speech in Antiquity,” in Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies of Selected 
Pivotal Ideas, ed. Philip P. Wiener (New York: Scribner, 1973–74), 2.259 quoted in David Konstan, et al., “Introduction,” 3.
72. Troels Engberg-Pedersen, “Plutarch to Prince Philopappus on How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend,” in Friendship, 
Flattery, and Frankness of Speech: Studies on Friendship in the New Testament World, ed. John T. Fitzgerald, NovTSup 82 
(Leiden: Brill, 1996), 61–79 argues that this treatise was meant to be read by the prince and that it contained real advice to 
him from Plutarch.
73. Following a discussion of “parasites” (περι` παρασι'των), Book 6 of Athenaeus’ Deipnosophists contains a discussion 
of flatterers (περι` κολα' κων) (6.53–80). The majority of the anecdotes and sayings are placed in the context of Hellenistic 
courts.
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itself. These anecdotes contribute to a significant literary topos in which the philosopher confronts a 
ruler and emerges victorious from their verbal exchange. They illustrate how the Cynic virtues enable 
the sage “to resist the coercion of tyrants and to expose the pretensions of ‘intellectuals’ and 
politicians.”74 Kingship was antithetical to the achievement of Cynic ends and was therefore to be 
ridiculed and resisted. Tyrants and those who paid them court were the special object of Cynic scorn 
(Plutarch, An seni 1 (783d); D.L. 6.50; Diogenes, Ep. 29, Ep. 45; Antisthenes, Ep. 8). This resistance 
by Cynics to what are considered illicit forms of rule forms an essential part of the “anarchist” strand of 
Cynic political thought which, in turn, is linked to Cynic cosmopolitanism.75 If the cosmos is the only 
true politeia, and if nature dictates that the sage does not owe allegiance to any other state, then it 
follows that forms of power exercised in these illegitimate states must themselves be illegitimate. 
This form of Cynicism has been described as “hard” Cynicism. It is marked by hostility and 
unrelenting critique of kingship.76 Alongside anecdotes critical of kings, a number of stories serve to 
ridicule those who would pay court to the rich and powerful. For example, contrary to those who view 
Callisthene’s relationship with Alexander as fortunate, Diogenes considered the historian hapless 
(κακοδαι'µων) since he would be at the king’s beck and call (D.L. 6.45). Or consider this story:
Plato saw him [sc. Diogenes] washing lettuces, came up to him and quietly said to him, “Had 
you paid court (εθερα' πευες) to Dionysius, you wouldn't now be washing lettuces,” and that he 
with equal calmness made answer, “If you had washed lettuces, you wouldn't have paid court 
to Dionysius.” (D.L. 6.58)
These anecdotes illustrate the difference between apparent and real freedom and self-sufficiency seen 
from a Cynic point of view. As long as one was beholden to those in power and dependent upon their 
benefaction, one could not claim to be truly free or self-sufficient.77
Given Cynic antagonism towards rulers and those who pay court to them, the presence of 
Cynics in Hellenistic courts or in royal retinues—Onesicritus, Bion, and Cercidas, for example—is 
initially puzzling.78 Moles argues for a form of “soft” Cynicism in which philosophers accommodate 
themselves, to greater or lesser degrees, to the various forms of rule they experience: the “general 
process of fudging a reconciliation between Cynicism and worldly power” begins with Onesicritus and 
it reaches a climax in the kingship orations of Dio Chrysostom (Or. 1–4).79
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74. Dudley, Cynicism, 28.
75. William D. Desmond, Cynics, APh (Durham: Acumen, 2008), 185–88.
76. John L. Moles, “The Cynics and Politics,” in Justice and Generosity: Studies in Hellenistic Social and Political 
Philosophy: Proceedings of the Sixth Symposium Hellenisticum, ed. André Laks and Malcolm Schofield (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 145–46; John L. Moles, “Cynic Cosmopolitanism,” in The Cynics: The Cynic Movement 
in Antiquity and Its Legacy, ed. R. Bracht Branham and Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1996), 108.
77. For this theme in the Cynic Epistles, see Diogenes, Ep. 46; Antisthenes, Ep. 8.
78. Onesicritus: D.L. 6.84; Plutarch, Alexander 65; Strabo, Geography 15.65. Dudley, Cynicism, 39–40; Truesdell 
Sparhawk Brown, Onesicritus: A Study in Hellenistic Historiography, UCPH 39 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1949); Bion: D.L. 4.46–58; Dudley, Cynicism, 62–69; Jan Fredrik Kindstrand, ed., Bion of Borysthenes: A Collection of the 
Fragments with Introduction and Commentary, Studia Graeca Upsaliensia 11 (Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Uppsalensis 
(distributed by Almqvist & Wiksell), 1976); Cercidas: Dudley, Cynicism, 74–84.
79. Moles, “Cynics and Politics,” 148; cf. Stoneman, “Legacy of Alexander,” 332. In this, according to Moles, 
Onesicritus was following the examples of Antisthenes and Xenophon.
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Within soft Cynicism philosophers often act as royal advisers rather than critics.80 The 
argument might have run as follows: since the Cynic claims freedom of speech and action before a 
ruler, the sage will be best placed to act as a royal counsel. Given this assumption, what sort of advice 
might a Cynic sage give a ruler? A number of the Cynic Epistles addressed to rulers adopt the voice of 
ancient Cynics81 and serve to illustrate the advice that a sage might have given a Hellenistic king.
The King as Sage: Advice to Kings. In order to act as adviser to the king, the sage must first convince 
the king that such a role is necessary. This is done using two different metaphors. In the first, the king 
is in need of a “master,” someone to whip him into shape:
Consequently you need a whip and an overlord (δεσpiο' του) and not someone who will admire 
and flatter (θαυµα' σει και` κολακευ' σει) you. Indeed, how would anyone ever be benefited by 
this sort of person, and how would such a person benefit anyone? Only if he chastise (κολα' ζοι) 
him like a horse or an ox and at the same time recall him to his senses and pay heed to what is 
lacking. (Diogenes Ep. 29)
 The king needs a master since he is, in reality, a slave (cf. Anacharsis, Ep. 6). This metaphor is related 
to the Cynic claim that the sage is the only true king (see below).  
The second metaphor compares the Cynic sage to a doctor, specifically, a doctor for the soul 
(Anacharsis Ep. 9; Diogenes, Ep. 40, 49). A doctor is necessary because, as Diogenes writes in Epistle 
29, tyranny is a sickness.82 To mix the two metaphors, then, we might say that the cure for this 
condition is found in the rebuke and chastisement of a suitable teacher, such as “one of the 
paedagogues of Athens” whom Diogenes promises to send to Dionysius.83 
The advice proffered by these advisers consists of a blend of general admonition and 
exhortation to the Cynic virtues. The king must battle δο' ξαι, appearances or opinions (Diogenes, Ep. 5; 
Ep. 40), which comprise the real dangers facing a king since to be concerned with appearances is at 
odds with a life lived according to nature (Diogenes, Ep. 6). Bodyguards and citadels only add to fear84 
and are thus not really able to contribute to the security of the king’s soul (Diogenes, Ep. 29).85 Real 
security is found only in the Cynic virtues and in actions that accord with these. The king is warned 
against drunkeness (Anacharsis, Ep. 3), greed (Anacharsis, Ep. 9), sexual pleasure (Diogenes, Ep. 24), 
and other excesses. War is senseless (Diogenes, Ep.40; cf. D.L. 6.85). Like a shepherd is concerned for 
his sheep, a good ruler is concerned about his subjects (Anacharsis, Ep. 7; Diogenes, Ep. 4[?]); to rule 
means “to know how to deal with men and to do something for the most noble reason” (Diogenes, 
Ep.40). Cynic φιλανθρωπι'α is a necessary virtue for the king to adopt. 
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80. Sulochana Asirvatham, “Alexander the Philosopher in the Greco-Roman, Persian and Arabic Traditions,” in The 
Alexander Romance in Persia and the East, ed. Richard Stoneman, Kyle Erickson, and Ian Netton, Ancient Narrative 
Supplementum 15 (Eelde: Barkhuis; Groningen: Groningen University Library, 2012), 313.
81. To take the letters attributed to Diogenes as an example: we find in that collection epistles addressed to Antipater 
(Ep. 4, 14, 15), Perdiccas (Ep. 5, 45), Agesilaus (Ep. 22), Alexander (Ep. 24, 40), Dionysius (Ep. 29).
82. In Anacharsis, Ep. 9, Croesus’ immoderate love of pleasure is said to affect his body and soul, but while he has 
doctors for the former, the latter is ignored. For a king to be truly healthy requires that he tends to this malady.
83. Cf. Diogenes, Ep. 40 in which he proposes to send to Alexander a “judge” (δικαστη' ς) from Athens, since this is the 
sort of person who ensures that others neither experience nor perpetrate evil.
84. They are unable to protect against disease, for example (Diogenes, Ep. 40).
85. See Malherbe, “Antisthenes, Odysseus, Paul” for discussion of this trope in early Cynicism.
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In brief, these letters show the sage urging the king to submit to Cynic philosophy. The most 
important piece of advice that is given to a king is simply to become a disciple of a Cynic master in 
order to achieve the Cynic way of life (Diogenes, Ep. 5). As Dio Chrysostom points out to Trajan, such 
a “wise and prudent” person 
can prove a competent and perfect guide and helper of a man endowed with a tractable and 
virtuous nature, and can lead it toward all excellence by fitting encouragement and direction. 
(Or. 1.8)
“Soft” Cynicism does not represent a total abandonment of Cynic philosophy but is rather a pragmatic 
response to Hellenistic monarchy. The sage’s παρρησι'α no longer consists purely of criticism and 
mockery; it has been replaced by protrepsis and paraenesis. This Cynic exhortation is based on the 
assertion that only the sage is truly a king.
The Sage as King. In a letter addressed to Anaxilaus, Diogenes writes:
I have recently come to recognize myself to be Agamemnon, since for scepter I have my staff 
and for a mantle the double, ragged cloak, and by way of exchange, my leather wallet is a 
shield. (Ep. 19)
In Cynic writings kingship is described as slavery, while true freedom is found only by those who 
following the Cynic philosophy and concomitant lifestyle (Anacharsis, Ep.5; Ep. 6). One of the most 
dramatic examples of this comes in a story recounted by Diogenes Laertius: 
Further, when he was sold as a slave, he endured it most nobly. For on a voyage to Aegina he 
was captured by pirates under the command of Scirpalus, conveyed to Crete and exposed for 
sale. When the auctioneer asked in what he was proficient, he replied, “In ruling men 
(α νθρω' πων α»ρχειν).” Thereupon he pointed to a certain Corinthian with a fine purple border to 
his robe, the man named Xeniades above-mentioned, and said, “Sell me to this man; he needs a 
master (ουðτος δεσpiο' του χρη', ζει).” Thus Xeniades came to buy him, and took him to Corinth 
and set him over his own children and entrusted his whole household to him. And he 
administered it in all respects in such a manner that Xeniades used to go about saying, “A good 
genius (α γαθο`ς δαι'µων) has entered my house.” (D.L. 6.74)86 
In Crates’ the retelling of this story, those who hear Diogenes’ claim to be a master to those who need 
one respond by saying to him, “And who is there who, since he is free, needs a master?” Diogenes’ 
reply is, “All who are base (οι  φαυñλοι) and who honor pleasure and despise toil, the greatest 
incitements to evils.” In this account Diogenes is not sold but taken home by the pirates to whom he 
proceeds to teach philosophy.
The point could not be clearer. In these stories of reversal the Cynic sage is a true ruler while 
those who would purchase him from the pirates are enslaved by their vices. A similar point is made in 
the anecdotes mentioned above in which Cynic philosophers confront Hellenistic kings. The sages’ 
moral and intellectual superiority over the rulers is emphasized in order to drive home the point that it 
is the sages and not the rulers who exhibit true royal virtues.
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86. Cf. D.L. 6.29–32. The popularity of this story suggests its importance in the ancient world’s understanding of 
Diogenes (see Philo, Good Person 121–124; Crates, Ep. 34; Musonius, fr. 9; Plutarch, Tranq. an. 4; Lucian, Vit. auct. 7; 
Arrian, Epict. diss. 3.24.66; 4.1.111; Gellius, Noctes Atticae 2.18; Clement, Paed. 3.3).
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While the insistence on the kingship of the sage is not simply “Cynic pretention [sic]” or “a 
metaphor for the guiding and counseling function of the philosopher,” neither is it a description of the 
ideal Cynic politeia.87 If kingship is defined in terms of excellence (α ρετη' ) and its components, if the 
king is superior in comparison to all others, then it follows from a Cynic point of view that the sage is 
rightly described in terms of kingship.88 Only the sage exhibits the virtues necessary to live a life 
according to nature. 
Only the Cynic virtues allow one to rule over one’s own life and, therefore, over others. By 
exercising self-control and insensitivity to the passions, the Cynic sage denies external forces any 
influence over his or her life. Similarly, being content with little and learning to live off the land (or its 
inhabitants!) demonstrates independence and freedom. Kings lived in constant fear, as evidenced by 
their bodyguards and fortresses. The Cynic, able to sleep without concern in public, showed that he 
was not controlled by fear. Who, they would ask, is the slave and who is truly free?
In Epictetus’ discourse On the calling of a Cynic, a similar idea is worked out. The sage asks, 
“And how do I face those persons before whom you stand in fear and awe? Do I not face them as 
slaves? Who, when he lays eyes upon me, does not feel that he is seeing his king and his  master?” 
(3.22.49; trans. Oldfather [LCL]). Here the Cynic has been sent from the gods as a scout. Once the 
wretchedness of his or her fellow human beings has been ascertained, the Cynic assumes the role of a 
divine messenger, bringing to earth the message that a better way of life is possible. In assuming this 
role, the Cynic becomes an overseer or leader of humanity. This leadership does not consists of rule, 
though, but of exemplifying this way of life and urging others to follow.89
Both of these cases—the kingship of the sage and the slave-like nature of kings—rely on the 
Cynics’ reversal of common language and ideas. Rulers and others are described as “slaves,” while 
only the sages are truly free and are therefore kings. Kingship is no longer about ruling and power over 
the masses; it has become an ethical and individual matter. The Cynic sage is truly king because he is 
able to rule himself in freedom, endurance, self-control, and self-sufficiency. For the Cynic, a kingdom 
of one is the most significant kingdom over which anyone could ever desire to rule.
Conclusion: Cynic Conceptions of Kingship
Doyne Dawson writes: “The commonest impression left by the anecdotes is that Cynics were 
antimonarchic.”90 If practical monarchy is in view, Dawson’s statement is correct. John Moles suggests 
three reasons why kingship would be criticized by Cynics:91 (1) the king is rich; (2) his kingship is 
external rather than internal; (3) his kingship represents nomos. All three elements are antithetical to 
Cynic life. 
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87. Aalders H. Wzn., Political Thought, 59–60. The guiding element certainly plays a role in this metaphor (see the 
discussion of Epictetus in what follows) but it is not primary or even central.
88. Desmond, Cynics, 193–99.
89. Those who lack the Cynic virtues will soon be found out by their fellow-citizens and overthrown, just like bees throw 
out drones who parade as the queen (Epic. Diss. 3.22.90).
90. Cities of the Gods: Communist Utopias in Greek Thought (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 140.
91. Moles, “Cynics,” 432; Moles, “Cynics and Politics,” 145.
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One section within the Cynic tradition—“hard Cynicism”—seems to have been unashamedly 
antagonistic towards those in power who did not live up to this ideal. In the wordplay and dramatic 
actions attributed to Diogenes, kings and their courtiers are critiqued. In so far as they failed to exhibit 
the Cynic virtues and concomitant lifestyle, their lives were not lived according to nature and therefore 
deserved such criticism. Diogenes’ encounter with Alexander became paradigmatic of this attitude. 
At the other end of the spectrum we see “soft Cynicism” attempting to deal with autocratic 
power through advice and suggestion. Dio Chrysostom attempted to put into practice what the Cynic 
Epistles had portrayed: kings would do well to appoint Cynic advisers that they might be tutored in the 
Cynic way of life.
Doyne Dawson observes that the early Cynic tradition exhibits “a surprising degree of con-
sistency, and at the same time a number of puzzling inconsistencies.”92 The later tradition found in the 
Cynic epistles is also characterized by “puzzling inconsistencies.” Abraham Malherbe argues that this 
demonstrates the great diversity found in imperial Cynicism.93 
The second of Moles’ reasons why Cynics would be critical of kingship, that political kingship 
is external rather than internal, highlights an important contribution that Cynic thought makes to the 
idea of kingship. True kingship that accords with nature rather than custom consists of self-rule;94 other 
virtues should proceed from this important trait. The idea that the sage is the only true king is worked 
out in Stoic thought, to which we now turn.   
Stoic Kingship95
Three Stoics are credited by Diogenes Laertius (7.175, 36, 178) with writing περι` βασιλει'ας 
treatises: Cleanthes (331–232), Persaeus (c. 306–c. 243), and Sphaerus (c. 285/265–c. 221). All three 
philosophers are associated with Hellenistic courts. 
Cleanthes’ meagre biography (D.L. 7.168–176; SVF 1.463–480) contains very little reference 
to his dealings with or opinion of rulers. Diogenes Laertius reports that the Stoic lectured Antigonus II 
Gonatas and that at one point the king gave him a gift of three thousand drachmas (D.L. 7.169). 
Whether true or not, these stories owe their origin to Antigonus’ early association with Athenian 
philosophers—especially Zeno—and his later support of poets, philosophers, and historians as he 
attempted to turn Pella into “a minor centre of patronage and culture.”96
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92. Cities of the Gods, 116. While Dawson argues for two different “levels” of philosopher (Cities of the Gods, 120–30), 
John Moles argues that “hard” and “soft” Cynicism describe two ends of a spectrum along which any particular Cynic might 
be found (“Cynics and Politics,” 145–46).
93. “Self-Definition”.
94. For the claim that this self-mastery, εγκρα' τεια, αυ τα' ρκεια, stands at the centre of the Socratic project, see, e.g., A. A. 
Long, “Hellenistic Ethics and Philosophical Power,” in From Epicurus to Epictetus: Studies in Hellenistic and Roman 
Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), 3–22. 
95. An earlier draft of this section was presented as “Wisdom and Kingship in Hellenistic Philosophy” at the Humboldt 
Kolleg: Worldview and Way of Life in the Ancient World, held at Stellenbosch on 10–12 September 2012. I am grateful to 
the participants for the insightful discussion on that occasion.
96. Frank W. Walbank, “Macedonia and Greece,” in The Hellenistic World, 2nd ed., ed. F. W. Walbank, et al., CAH 7.1 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 228. For Gonatas’ teachers, see W. W. Tarn, Antigonos Gonatas (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1913), 21–36; for his “circle” at Pella, see pp. 223–56. Janice J. Gabbert, Antigonus II Gonatas: A Political 
Biography (London: Routledge, 1997) provides a more recent, albeit brief, biography of Gonatas. 
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Persaeus had been sent by Zeno to Gonatas’ court where he acted as secretary and tutor to the 
king’s son, Halcyoneus (D.L. 7.6, 36; cf. Aelianus, Var. hist. 3.17).97 It was perhaps in this role that 
Persaeus produced the περι` βασιλει'ας treatise for the prince, just as Euphantus of Olynthus had for his 
Gonatas (D.L. 2.110).
Sphaerus was associated with the Spartan reformer Cleomenes III (Plutarch, Cleomenes 2, 11) 
and the Ptolemaic court. Athenaeus records that Sphaerus was summoned to Alexandria by “King 
Ptolemy” (Deipn. 8.354e–f). According to Diogenes Laertius (who mentions nothing of Cleomenes 
III), this was Ptolemy IV Philopator (D.L. 7.177). However, there are discrepancies between this 
account and the one found at D.L. 7.185 which records that Sphaerus was sent by Cleanthes to Ptolemy 
after Chrysippus had refused to go. In all likelihood, following his defeat at Sellasia in 223, Cleomenes 
fled to Alexandria where he was received by his erstwhile supporter, Ptolemy III Euergetes.98 If 
Sphaerus’ relationship to the Spartan king was as close as Plutarch suggests, it is likely that the 
philosopher accompanied him to Egypt and to the Ptolemaic court. It was here that he would have 
associated with both Ptolemy III and, after 221, Ptolemy IV, either of whom might have been the 
recipients of a περι` βασιλει'ας treatise.99
Not one of the Stoic περι` βασιλει'ας writings has survived. We are thus forced to investigate 
Stoic political writings more broadly in order to gauge the shape of Stoic thought on kingship.
The Stoic Republic
Zeno and Chrysippus each wrote a treatise entitled Πολιτει'α (D.L. 7.4, 34, 188).100 The 
contents of these are mentioned at D.L. 7.32–34 (Zeno) and D.L. 7.187–189 (Chrysippus). The 
treatises are discussed by Philodemus (On the Stoics = P.Herc. 339 and 155), they are mentioned at 
various points by Plutarch in his anti-Stoic writings (De communibus notitiis contra stoicos and De 
Stoicorum repugnantiis), and certain elements are also commented upon by Sextus Empiricus in the 
Pyrrhoniae hypotyposes. The polemical nature of these sources account for the emphasis on the 
rebarbative elements in the writings of Zeno and Chrysippus101 and present us with a somewhat skewed 
and biased version of their texts. 
The doxographic remains of Zeno’s Republic might be sifted into three groups:102 (1) those 
that are more abstract, such as the idea that only the virtuous are true citizens, friends, family, and free 
(D.L. 7.32–33); (2) those that speak of institutions, including marriage (cf. D.L. 7.131; Sextus 
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97. See Andrew Erskine, “Between Philosophy and the Court: The Life of Persaios of Kition,” in Creating a Hellenistic 
World, ed. Andrew Erskine and Lloyd Llewellyn-Jones (Swansea: Classical Press of Wales, 2011), 177–94 for a discussion 
of Persaeus’ career at Pella. Erskine characterizes Persaeus as something of a hapless figure, “adequately fitted neither for the 
court nor the philosophic life” (“Persaios of Kition,” 185).
98. Plutarch, Cleomenes 32–37.
99. It is possible that Sphaerus went to the court of Ptolemy III Euergetes at an earlier stage in his career (so F. H. 
Sandbach, The Stoics, 2nd ed. [1975; repr., London: Duckworth, 1989], 140–41).
100. The passages which mention Zeno’s work by name are collected at H. C. Baldry, “Zeno’s Ideal State,” JHS 79 
(1959): 3–5; see also SVF 1.259–271.
101. In Sextus Empiricus, (Pyr. 3), for example, the examples are chosen to show that the Stoics do not dare practice 
what they preach (see Katja Maria Vogt, Law, Reason, and the Cosmic City: Political Philosophy in the Early Stoa [New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2008], 34–51).
102. I am adopting this framework from Vogt, Cosmic City, 29.
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Empiricus, Pyr. 3.245), education, temples, law courts, and gymnasia (D.L. 7.33); and (3) those that 
speak of ways of acting/living. This final group includes burial practices (Sextus Empiricus, Pyr. 
3.248),103 incest (D.L. 7.188; Sextus Empiricus, Pyr. 3.205, 246), and cannibalism (D.L. 7.188; Sextus 
Empiricus, Pyr. 3.207–208, 247). 
With one or two notable exceptions, the modern scholarly consensus is that Zeno’s Republic, 
like that of Plato,104 was never meant to be implemented.105 Reports of Zeno’s critique of Plato suggest 
that the former’s Republic was written with the latter’s in view.106 Just as Plato’s goal in writing the 
Republic had more to do with understanding the nature of justice at an individual level, so
Zeno’s purpose in the Republic is not to provide a model for a world-state, but to describe how 
an individual may attain his natural end and perfection in the true polity governed by natural 
law, even while living out his life in inferior regimes.107
Zeno’s primary concern is with the individual sage’s existence as it is experienced between two 
communities: one to which the sage belongs by virtue of being wise and within which sages and gods 
share citizenship—the “natural” community—and the other, that community to which the sage belongs 
“by accident of birth”—the “conventional” community.108 
The second group of teachings within the doxographic remains of Zeno’s work proclaim the 
absence or removal of the institutions of the Greek polis: marriage,109 gymnasia, education, law-courts, 
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103. Cf. Herodotus 3.38; Plutarch, Alex. fort. 328c.
104. See, for example, Resp. 592a–6; 472c–e; Cicero, Rep. 2.52; pace Vogt, Cosmic City, 66 who says that Plato’s city 
could and should be established, but recognizes the controversial nature of her claim.
105. For the argument that Zeno has a real city in view, see Baldry, “Zeno’s Ideal State” and Malcolm Schofield, The 
Stoic Idea of the City, with a foreword by Martha C. Nussbaum (1991; repr., Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1999). In a subesquent essay, Schofield describes Zeno as an “anti-outopian eutopian” who thinks it possible to bring about 
the society he is describing. “Zeno of Citium’s Anti-Utopianism,” in Saving the City: Philosopher-Kings and Other Classical 
Paradigms (London: Routledge, 1999), 179 n. 29 Zeno “intended it [sc. Republic] as a practical (but of course demanding) 
recipe for virtue and community.” “Zeno of Citium’s Anti-Utopianism,” 60.
For the contrary view: Dirk Obbink sees the Stoic cosmic city as the world as it is experienced by the Stoic sage (“The 
Stoic Sage in the Cosmic City,” in Topics in Stoic Philosophy, ed. Katerina Ierodiakonou [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1999], 178–95). John Sellars argues that the Republic provides an “individual cosmopolitan ethic ... a pragmatic ethic 
following the example of Diogenes” (“Stoic Cosmopolitanism and Zeno’s Republic ,” History of Political Thought 28.1 
[2007]: 16). While disagreeing with one another one certain fundamental issues, Andrew Erskine, The Hellenistic Stoa: 
Political Thought and Action (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), Paul A. Vander Waerdt, “Politics and Philosophy in 
Stoicism: A Discussion of A. Erskine, The Hellenistic Stoa: Political Thought and Action ,” OSAP 9 (1991): 185–211 (see 
also his “Zeno’s Republic and the Origins of Natural Law,” in The Socratic Movement, Ed Paul Vander Waerdt [Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1994], 272–308) and Vogt, Cosmic City all propose that the concept of the polis is used primarily 
for thinking and is not meant to be implemented.
106. Plutarch, Stoic. rep. 1034e–f; Numenius (ap. Eusebius, Praep. ev. 14.732c–d); see also Plutarch, Lycurgus 31 in 
which Plato, Diogenes, and Zeno are presented as having based their Republics on Lycurgus’ Spartan model. According to 
Erskine (Hellenistic Stoa, 27–33), Zeno’s Republic is a critique of Plato’s social programme, especially his emphasis on class 
distinction. Vander Waerdt (“Origins of Natural Law”) shows that Zeno proposes a theory of “natural law” as a solution to 
some of the problems of “natural justice” raised by Plato.
107. Paul Vander Waerdt, “Origins of Natural Law,” 296; cf. Murray: “Zeno's description is a description both of an 
ideal polis of the wise and of the attitude of the individual wise man to present society” (“Review of H. C. Baldry [1965] The 
Unity of Mankind in Greek Thought,” Classical Review 16.3 [1966]: 369). While arguing that Zeno’s polis looks back to 
Cynic rather than Academic forbears, Sellars nonetheless describes the purpose of Zeno’s Republic along similar lines: “an 
individual cosmopolitan ethic that would, in theory, form the foundation for a future world-wide community in which 
everyone would be a sage” (“Stoic Cosmopolitanism and Zeno’s Republic ,” 16). 
108. So Seneca, De otio 4.1; cf. Arius Didymus (ap. Eusebius, Praep. ev. 15.15). For the argument that this idea goes 
back to the early Stoa, see Paul Vander Waerdt, “Origins of Natural Law,” 290. Vogt, Cosmic City, 111–60 discusses the 
gods in relation to sages and wisdom.
109. It is unclear to me whether the teaching regarding the community of wives belongs in the second or third group. An 
argument can be made for both: marriage and its concomitant regulations are a function of nomos and the sage might also 
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temples, currency (D.L. 7.33). This forms part of Zeno’s attack on convention and his promotion of 
natural law which is equated with right reason (Stob. 2.7.11i = WH 2, 102).110 Once it is accepted that 
the city consists only of gods and sages who always act in accordance with right reason, it follows that 
these institutions are no longer needed.111 Law-courts, to take one example, are not needed since sages 
will not need others to judge between them. Their morally perfect actions will inevitably lead to the 
best possible situation for themselves and others.112 Chrysippus’ assertion (D.L. 7.129) that the usual 
form of Greek education (τα` ε γκυ' κλια µαθη' µατα' ) is “serviceable” (ευ χρηστε'ω) makes sense if that 
passage comes from a discussion of a non-ideal polity.
The reason for the final group of elements becomes clearer when it is recognized that these 
examples are not meant to be prescriptive, but that they are illustrative or descriptive of the Stoic sage’s 
ability to always choose the best option in every situation, even when that option is objectionable to 
almost everyone: “he [the sage] will even turn cannibal under stress of circumstances” (γευ' σεσθαι' τε 
και` α νθρωπι'νων σαρκωñ ν κατα` περι'στασιν; D.L. 7.121; cf. 7.109).  Cannibalism, incest, and other 
actions of this sort are not encouraged,113 but neither are they prohibited without exception. Stoic right 
reason is always dependent on circumstances.114 Even in sub-optimal circumstances, then, the sage will 
make the correct choice according to right reason which will enable the sage to live according to 
nature. It is within this framework that we need to understand Stoic political thought as it pertains to 
the second community, the “conventional” community to which a Stoic belonged through birth.
Advising the King
Chrysippus wrote four volumes On Lives (Περι` βι'ων; D.L. 7.121, 129; Plutarch, Stoic. rep. 2, 
9, 10, 20) and at least two On Life and Livelihood (Περι` βι'οι και` πορισµουñ, D.L. 7.188) in which he 
explored the sage’s life in the conventional community. In keeping with the observation that the sage is 
by nature suited for society and action (κοινωνικο`ς γα`ρ φυ΄σει και` piρακτικο΄ς), not the hermetic life 
(D.L. 7.123), Chrysippus establishes that the sage may engage in the political life “as long as nothing 
hinders him” (α ν µη'  τι κωλυ' η, ; D.L. 7.121).115 These hindrances would include unspecified “great and 
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consider polyamory to be appropriate in certain exceptional situations (see the discussion with regard to the third group 
below).
110. Paul Vander Waerdt, “Origins of Natural Law,” 302–7. For an account that focuses on wisdom rather than natural 
law, see Vogt, Cosmic City, 56–62. These are not mutually exclusive accounts, but they do emphasise different elements 
within Stoic ethical and political thought.
111. Critics often misunderstood this aspect of Stoic political thought and they applied these teachings to the ordinary 
person; in Stoic thought, these things are only true within the community of sages; see Paul Vander Waerdt, “Origins of 
Natural Law,” 285–86.
112. Stob. 7.11b = WH 2, 93–94: “the man who benefits any of his neighbours also benefits himself.”
113. One is reminded here of the Cynics’ public displays which seem to be enacted examples of similar shocking actions, 
see Vogt, Cosmic City, 53.
114. Paul Vander Waerdt, “Origins of Natural Law,” 300–301; Vogt, Cosmic City, 62–64.
115. Seneca (De otio 3.2) attributes this view to Zeno: “Accedet ad rem publicam, nisi si quid impedient.” This is 
contrasted to Epicurus’ position which prohibits political engagement except in an emergency: “Non accedet ad rem 
publicam sapiens, nisi si quid intervenerit.” The balanced way in which these two clauses have been phrased suggests that 
Seneca has formulated them. They present the Stoic and Epicurean positions in contrast to one another and are probably not 
meant to be understood as quotations from the scholarchs concerned. That this was indeed the default Stoic position can be 
seen from Plutarch’s critique of the Stoics who wrote much about the desirability of partaking in political life without doing 
so themselves (Stoic. rep. 1033b–c).
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difficult dangers” or the situation in which the sage’s participation had no benefit to the community 
(Stob. 2.7.11m = WH 2, 111). It is expected, though, that the sage’s participation in political life will 
promote virtue and restrain vice (D.L.7.121). All the sage’s actions flow from perfect virtue and are in 
accordance with right reason, thus anything the sage does in the city will promote virtue. The exact 
nature in which the sage might accomplish these lofty goals is not spelled out, but Chrysippus seems to 
have suggested three potential ways of procuring a livelihood: by living with a king, from friends, and 
through wisdom (D.L. 7.189).116  
The first of way of life, kingship, entails the sage either being a king himself or enjoying mon-
archical resources through association with a king, resources that are presumably made available to 
those advising the king in royal matters (Stob. 2.7.11m = WH 2, 111). If we ask about the types of 
kings with whom the Stoic sage would consort,117  we are told that the sage will want to advise a king 
who demonstrates a naturally good disposition and a willingness to learn (Stob. 2.7.11m = WH 2, 111). 
This is in keeping with the idea that a sage will participate in the political life of a polis that is making 
progress towards perfection (Stob. 2.7.11b = WH 2, 94). In the case of monarchy, much of the state’s 
ability to progress will be determined by the ruler. Therefore, the best way for the Stoic sage to benefit 
the polis—and thus to experience benefits in return—is to advise such a king as is able to make 
progress himself in the philosophical life.118 Plutarch, however, cites a passage from Chrysippus 
showing that making progress was not always a defining trait in the kings with whom the Stoics 
associated.119 The realities of having to deal with less-than-ideal kings in pursuit of a livelihood seems 
to have made its way into Chrysippus’ work at this point.120 
The Best Regime
The reality of imperfect kingship raises the question whether monarchy is indeed the best form 
of government. A monarchical government would certainly reflect the way in which the cosmos is 
governed (see below), but Zeno’s ideal polis (best regime?) is arranged along egalitarian lines 
(although this should not automatically be equated with democracy121). But is an alternative form of 
government perhaps better suited to the conventional polis? At first glance it might seem that the report 
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116. Schofield (Stoic Idea, 18–20) understands the negative assessments of these modes of making money in D.L. 7.189 
to be due to a later commentator and not from Chrysippus; see also Erskine, Hellenistic Stoa, 64–65. Arius Didymus also 
notes three preferred ways of life: the royal, political, and intellectual life which seem to correspond to three ways of making 
money (Stob. 2.7.11m = WH 2, 109). Plutarch records only two of these in Chrysippus’ writing: living with kings and being 
paid for lecturing (Stoic. rep. 30).
117. For the argument in this paragraph, see Erskine, Hellenistic Stoa, 67–68. What Erskine doesn’t say is that there are 
clues in the language of some of these Stoic fragments that, as in Plato’s Republic, there were certainly analogies to be drawn 
between the polis and the sage.
118. If teleios here is used of the city in the same way as it is to discuss the perfection of the sage, then it is referring to 
that which is morally good. Similarly, prokopē is read analogously to the progress that a bad person makes towards being 
good ; see Erskine, Hellenistic Stoa, 67 n. 8, for the argument that teleios here refers to that which is perfect and morally 
good.
119. SVF 3.693 = Plutarch, Stoic. rep. 1043e + 1047f. Plutarch claims that Chrysippus’ claims are made solely for the 
purpose of profit.  
120. This is perhaps reflected in Chrysippus’ reason for not partaking in the political life: he argued that it was 
impossible to please both the gods and human citizens for, if he did evil, he would displease the gods and if he did good, the 
citizens (Stob. 4.3.29 = WH 4, 192). This saying reflects a negative view of the conventional polis rather than a principled 
refusal to partake in political life.
121. See Paul A. Vander Waerdt, “Politics and Philosophy,” 200, contra Erskine, Hellenistic Stoa, 70–74.
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at D.L. 7.131 provides conclusive evidence regarding Stoic political thought: “The best form of 
government they hold to be a mixture of democracy, kingship, and aristocracy.” The Early Stoa’s 
admiration for Sparta has led some to argue that it was this city’s constitution that drew Stoic 
admiration for the mixed constitution.122 
The best known argument for a mixed constitution comes from Polybius, writing a century 
after the early Stoics, although the theory of mixed constitutions had already appeared in fifth- and 
fourth-century political thought.123 Cicero associates the Stoic Panaetius with Polybius, suggesting the 
Middle Stoa as the most likely origin for the Stoic theory of mixed constitutions.124
Among the early Stoics, Chrysippus argues that the laws and constitutions of all states are 
wrong.125 Cities that do not meet the Stoic ideal are not even considered cities.126 It is unlikely that the 
Stoics would feel the need to develop hypotheses regarding the best regime in this context. Unlike 
other philosophers, the Stoics did not seem to have much interest in the discussion of the merits and 
demerits of existing constitutions and regimes. The Stoic city was the only institution deserving of the 
name and, presumably, of careful philosophical discourse. Attention was given to how one might live 
in less-than-perfect “cities,” but there was nothing to be gained by studying their political organization 
or proposing incremental changes to an entity that would always remain sub-optimal. As we saw in the 
previous section, the Stoics’ focus was on the sage as he negotiated these inferior polities.127
The Sage as King
A superficial reading of the Stoic texts suggests that the sage was a multi-talented individual.  
Only the Stoic sage was the true king, general, admiral (D.L. 7.122; Stob.2.7.11m = WH 2, 108), 
magistrate, judge, or orator (D.L. 7.122). That this Stoic teaching was well known can be seen in its 
use by a number of different authors from various traditions and backgrounds—Philo (Names 152; 
Migration 197), Lucian (Vit. auct. 20), Clement (Strom. 2.4), to name but a few. It forms part of the 
larger Stoic doctrine that “Only the Stoic sage is x,” where x might also include concepts like “rich,” 
“free,” “citizens,” or “friends” (see, e.g., D.L. 7.33). Many of these sayings are counterintuitive and 
were regarded as Stoic “paradoxes.”128 Plutarch has his characters mock these paradoxes and they 
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122. Aalders H. Wzn., Political Thought, 92–93; Miriam T. Griffin, Seneca: A Philosopher in Politics (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1976), 202–4.
123. See David E. Hahm, “The Mixed Constitution in Greek Thought,” in A Companion to Greek and Roman Political 
Thought, ed. Ryan K. Balot, BCAW (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 178–98.
124. So Francis Edward Devine, “Stoicism on the Best Regime,” JHI 31.2 (1970): 323–36; see Cicero, Rep. 1.34. 
Diogenes notes that he is presenting a synthetic view of Stoic doctrine in Zeno’s biography: Κοινηñ,  δε` περι` πα' ντων τωñν 
στωικωñν δογµα' των (7.38) and the summary of Stoic ethics (D.L. 7.84–131) does so too. Although Zeno and Chrysippus are 
mentioned in D.L. 7.131, they are not linked directly to the assertion of the superiority of the mixed constitution.
125. Diogenianus ap. Eusebius, Praep. ev. 6.8: “How say you, too, that the established laws and the constitutions of 
states have all been wrong?” (trans. Gifford); see also Paul A. Vander Waerdt, “Politics and Philosophy,” 202.
126. Clement, Strom. 4.26: “For the Stoics say that heaven is properly a city, but places here on earth are not cities; for 
they are called so, but are not. For a city is an important thing, and the people a decorous body, and a multitude of men 
regulated by law” (ANF 2:441). 
127. So Paul A. Vander Waerdt, “Politics and Philosophy,” 199–202; Paul Vander Waerdt, “Origins of Natural 
Law,” 292–93. Despite his suggestion that the Stoics conceived of a mixed constitution as the best form of government, 
Aalders observes, correctly, that “they seemingly too little interest in the debate about the form of the constitution of the polis 
... The Stoics were interested in the moral behaviour of the rulers, not in the form of the constitution” (Political Thought, 92, 
93).
128. Zeno: When some accused Zeno of speaking in paradoxes (ο»τι παρα' δοξα λε'γει) he replied that at least he was not 
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refuse to engage the Stoics at this point since, “who has not already had his fill of the arguments in 
refutation of those paradoxes?” (Comm. not. 1060b; cf.  Stoic. abs. 1058b–d). The widespread 
quotation of these teachings, combined with the Stoic concern for language and logic,129 suggests that, 
as we investigate Stoic thought about kingship, we should not dismiss these statements as easily as 
Plutarch has. 
The Stoic teaching that “only the sage is king” is found in Diogenes Laertius and Arius 
Didymus:
Moreover, according to them not only are the wise free, they are also kings; kingship being 
irresponsible rule (τηñς βασιλει'ας ου»σης α ρχηñς α νυπευθυ' νου), which none but the wise can 
maintain: so Chrysippus in his treatise vindicating Zeno's use of terminology. For he holds that 
knowledge of good and evil is a necessary attribute of the ruler, and that no bad man is 
acquainted with this science. Similarly the wise and good alone are fit to be magistrates, 
judges, or orators, whereas among the bad there is not one so qualified. (D.L. 7.122)130
Katja Vogt has argued that statements of the form “only the sage is x” do not illustrate the nature of the 
sage, but rather serve to define x along Stoic lines, that is, in terms of knowledge, wisdom, and 
virtue.131 While it is true that certain passages define leadership in terms of wisdom and virtue,132 other 
passages indicate that Stoic thought included an “ideal” or correct model of certain offices—for 
example, priesthood (Stob. 2.7.5b12 = WH 2, 67–68)—consisting of specific attributes. These 
attributes, in turn, serve to define the sage (piety) and, conversely, the fool (impiety).
In the context of D.L. 7.122, the argument seems to be that since (1) knowledge of good and 
evil is necessary for a ruler, and since (2) only the sage has this knowledge, therefore (3) only the sage 
is truly a king. From this follows that (4) only the sage is truly free since (5) only kings enjoy “absolute 
rule” or “rule that in answerable to no one.”133  In the Stoic formulation of the sage’s wisdom (1), (2), 
and (3) are true for magistrates, judges, orators, and other tasks. Vogt’s assessment holds at this point. 
However, the conclusion drawn in (4) follows from (5) which relies on a specific predicate of king-
ship.134 Arius Didymus’ summary (Stob. 2.7.11m = WH 2, 108) draws the conclusion (3) on the basis 
of (5), adding that kingship is the highest office and the one controlling all others (τη`ν α νωτα' τω και` 
τη`ν επι` πα' σαις). Here, as in (4) and (5) at D.L. 7.122, certain aspects of kingship are assumed which 
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speaking lawlessly/indecently (ου  παρα' νοµα) (SVF 1.281). Cleanthes: “Possibly the philosophers say what is contrary to 
opinion (παρα' δοξα), but assuredly not what is contrary to reason (παρα' λογα)” (apud Arrian, Epict. diss. 4.1.173 = SVF 
1.619). See also Cicero, Paradoxa Stoicorum; De fin. 3.75–76, 4.74–80; Mur. 61.  
129. The paradox about kingship is discussed, for example, in Chrysippus’ treatise defending Zeno’s use of terminology 
(D.L. 7.122).
130. This is repeated in a very similar form at Stob 2.7.11m = WH 2, 108; cf. DL 7.33; Stob. 2.7.11i = WH 2, 102.
131. Vogt, Cosmic City, 126–30.
132. So Chrysippus’ assertion that knowledge of good and evil are necessary attributes of those who would rule (D.L. 
7.122).
133. Trans: LS 67M, p. 432.
134. See Philo (Dreams 2.244) where the Stoic formulation regarding the sage as king is repeated in relation to the idea 
of α ρχη` α νυπευ' θυνος. The phrase also occurs in the Platonic Definitiones (∆εσpiοτει'α α ρχη` α νυpiευ' θυνος δικαι'α) and is used 
by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Ant. rom. 3.50.3, 6.2.3, 10.49.5, 11.41.2, 19.16.5) and elsewhere in Philo (Embassy 28, 190) 
to speak of absolute monarchy. For similar ideas see Plato, Laws 9.875b (neg.); 6.761e no judge is α . unless he forms the 
final court of appeal, like the king; Aristotle, Pol. 1295a where it is used to describe tyrannical rule; Dio Chrys. Or. 3.43; 
56.5.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
enable something more to be said about the nature of the Stoic sage. Political language is used in a 
larger ethical discourse. As A. A. Long puts it, “The concepts of authority, power, ruler and subject, 
stable government and insurrection have become ways of analysing the self.”135
The Stoic formulation of self-rule begins with the idea that only the sage is truly free while the 
foolish are slaves (D.L. 7.122; cf. Stob. 2.7.11i = WH 2, 101; SVF 3.618). Chrysippus’ appropriation 
of the Cynic saying that one should acquire either intelligence or a harness highlights the link between 
the noetic faculties and concepts of freedom and slavery.136 Concepts of self-sufficiency (αυ τα' ρκεια) 
and self-control (ε γκρα' τεια), both of which characterize Zeno (DL 7.27, 29, 30), form part of this 
complex of ideas relating to freedom. The sage’s freedom is also defined in terms of independent 
action  (DL 7.121): it is only the wise who are truly able to choose what they really desire.137
The Stoics assert that a foolish person can neither rule nor be ruled since such a person is 
stubborn (αυ θα' δης) and unmanageable (α να' γωγος) (Stob. 2.7.11i = WH 2, 102). In contrast, the 
virtuous sage will both rule and be ruled. The sage always rules “by disposition,” (κατα` δια' θεσιν) even 
if not in reality. This refers to self-rule as mentioned above. The sage will always exhibit the virtues of 
an ideal ruler, both in regard to himself or herself, and in relation to others. Alongside this, and in 
contrast to the fool, only the sage is obedient (πειθαρχικο' ς) and capable of following (α κολουθητικο' ς) a 
ruler. This saying presupposes a community such as Aristotle’s democratic politeia within which 
citizens enjoy the liberty of ruling and being ruled in turn (Pol. 1317b3). The main point is that the 
sage, and not the fool, is suited to a communal existence of this nature. The polis is the institution 
within which such an existence must occur.
Two corollaries regarding the fool follow: the fool is, seen from one perspective, rustic, wild, 
and animal-like, and, from another perspective, tyrannical (Stob. 2.7.11k = WH 2, 104). The first part 
of this description contrasts these negative political terms with the idea that the sage is political by 
nature (Stob. 2.7.6 = WH 2, 75; SVF 3.314), suited to life in the polis and all that is entailed in that 
common life. In contrast, the fool is unable to act co-operatively, amicably, or spontaneously (Stob. 
2.7.11k = WH 2, 104). The foolish life is lived, as it were, in exile (Cicero, Parad. 27–32), outside of 
the city, the true dwelling place of the Stoic sage.138 The second part of the description of the fool, in 
which the vicious life is described as tyrannical, contrasts tyranny with kingship. If the latter 
  
 122 
———————————
135. Long, “Hellenistic Ethics and Philosophical Power,” 9. 
This doctrine might be traced back to certain Socratic ideas. It is in the Socratic circle that sages are encouraged to rule 
themselves before ruling others. Part of the “Socratic legacy” (A. A. Long, “The Socratic Legacy,” in The Cambridge History 
of Hellenistic Philosophy, ed. Algra Keimpe, et al. [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999], 617–41) is that the 
individual has become a political entity. 
For Zeno, following the Socratic paradigm, see Long, “Hellenistic Ethics and Philosophical Power,” 10–11 Vogt 
(Cosmic City, 129 n. 30) cites the work of Rachel Barney (Names and Nature in Plato’s Cratylus, Studies in Philosophy 
[New York: Routledge, 2001]) who sees in the Stoic paradoxes “an expression of [the] Socratic project run amok.” See also 
Eric Brown, “Socrates in the Stoa,” in A Companion to Socrates, ed. Sara Ahbel-Rappe and Rachana Kamtekar, Blackwell 
Companions to Philosophy (Malden: Blackwell, 2006), 275–84.
136. Plutarch Stoic. rep. 1039e; for the Cynic tradition see Antisthenes (67 [Caizzi]), Diogenes of Sinope (DL 6.24; Ep. 
28.6), and Crates (Gnomologium Vaticanum 386.
137. There are echoes here of the Socratic idea that only the wise are truly able to choose what they really want. 
Schofield, Stoic Idea, 49.
138. See also Stob. 2.7.11i where the exile is described in terms of being deprived of law and an appropriate government 
according to nature (στε'ρεται νο' µου και` πολιτει'ας κατα` φυ' σιν εpiιβαλλου' σης ).
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exemplifies all that is associated with positive monarchical rule, the former is marked by cruelty, 
violence, and lawlessness (Stob. 2.7.11k = WH 2, 104). If the sage is described in the idealistic terms 
of kingship, the misanthropic, individualistic nature of tyranny marks out the fool. The image of one 
unsuited to the common life of the polis and the image of the degenerate monarch both serve to inform 
our understanding of the antithesis of the Stoic sage.
As a moral agent, then, the sage is king. The sage is enabled, through right reason, to exercise 
supreme authority in his or her own life, choosing that which is right in every situation. This also 
makes the sage fit for life in community, life in the polis. In contrast, the fool is unable to exercise this 
authority of his or her own life and is not suited to communal life. We might consider one example of 
how kingship ideals were mapped on to the person of the sage.
When examining the ideal kings in Isocrates and Xenophon, we noted that clemency was 
included beneath the larger rubric of the king’s care for his subjects (φιλανθρωπι'α). This topic was also 
considered by the Stoics. For the sage to act with clemency (ε πιει'κεια)139 is an implicit 
acknowledgment that established laws are too harsh and therefore incorrect (Stob. 2.7.11d = WH 2, 96; 
cf. D.L. 7.123). But the law is worthwhile and in accordance with right reason and therefore cannot be 
wrong. Any attempt to change the law through the application of clemency must therefore be 
considered misguided and unacceptable for a sage.140 However, the evidence from the Imperial period 
suggests that there was not a single position regarding this question.141 In contrast to the unyielding 
judgment of the sage noted above, Seneca tries to convince Nero that “clemency (clementia) suits no 
one better than a king or prince” (Clem. 1.3.3; trans. Kaster). This concession is achieved through 
distinguishing between clemency and pity (misericordia). The former is marked by Stoic rationality, 
while the latter represents emotionalism as displayed by “old or foolish women” (2.5.1).142 The kingly 
ideal of clemency is discussed in the context of the sage and then re-applied, in this case, to the king in 
his role as judge.  
God as King
One final source for insight into the Stoic concept of kingship needs to be considered: the 
monarchical language used in certain Stoic texts to discuss god.143 That Stoics considered the gods in 
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139. The passage in Arius Didymus begins with a discussion of forgiveness (συγγνω' µη) and then moves to talking about 
clemency/tolerance (επιει'κεια). At this point the two concepts are used in the same way.
140. See Oswyn Murray, “Philodemus on the Good King According to Homer,” JRS 55.1–2 (1965): 168, 176–77; 
Erskine, Hellenistic Stoa, 73–74. Erskine’s conclusion that the Stoics could not have had an ideal king in mind since they 
denied the possibility of clemency is incorrect since it fails to allow that the Stoics could be redefining the Hellenistic 
kingship ideal at this point. 
141. For a brief discussion, see Donald Dale Walker, Paul’s Offer of Leniency (2 Cor 10:1): Populist Ideology and 
Rhetoric in a Pauline Letter Fragment, WUNT 2/152 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002), 192–95.
142. Walker, Paul’s Offer of Leniency, 195.
143. See G. J. D. Aalders H. Wzn., “Political Thought in Plutarch’s ‘Concicium Septum Sapientum’,” Mnemosyne 30.1 
(1977): 89–90 who draws on Margaret E. Reesor, The Political Theory of the Old and Middle Stoa (New York: Augustin, 
1951). For recent survey and discussion of Stoic theology see Keimpe Algra, “Stoic Theology,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to the Stoics, ed. Brad Inwood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 153–78; Keimpe Algra, “Stoic 
Philosophical Theology and Graeco-Roman Religion,” in God and the Cosmos in Stoicism, ed. Ricardo Salles (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), 224–51; Christoph Jedan, Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Theological Foundations of 
Stoic Ethics (London: Continuum, 2009), 21–30.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
monarchical terms is clear. In Cleanthes’ Hymn, Zeus is addressed as the “first cause and ruler 
(α ρχηγο' ς) of nature, governing (κυβερνα'ω) everything with your law” (2), the “highest king” (υ«πατος 
βασιλευ' ς, 14), and the one “governing (κυβερνα'ω) everything with justice” (35; trans. Thom). A text 
from the Later Stoa makes explicit the relationship between the earthly and heavenly king: “[The good 
king must be] a true imitator (ζηλωτη' ς) of Zeus” (Muson., frag. 8 Lutz). 
A fragment from Book 1 of Chrysippus’ Περι` θεωñν (SVF 2.1076 = Philodemus, De pietate 11) 
contains a number terms found elsewhere in the context of discussion of Hellenistic kingship: διοικε'ω, 
ευ νοµι'α, δι'κη, ο µο' νοια, ειρη' νη. Similarly, Plutarch notes that Chrysippus and other Stoics rely on the 
common assumption that the gods are ευ εργετικο' ς and φιλα' νθρωπος in order to counter Epicurean 
arguments against providence (Stoic. rep. 1051e).144
Unfortunately, there is nothing specifically Stoic in these epithets or the concepts they 
describe. As we shall see when examining more explicit kingship texts, this language formed part of a 
shared vocabulary regarding ideal Hellenistic kingship.145 If human kingship was indeed thought to be 
a copy of divine kingship, then these terms will most likely have constituted part of the Stoic kingship 
ideal and would have found their way into treatises addressed to human rulers. The example of 
clemency, discussed above, suggests that these royal virtues would have been transformed, where 
appropriate, through the figure of the Stoic sage-ideal.   
Concluding Remarks on Stoic Kingship
Although at least three Stoics produced περι` βασιλει'ας treatises, not one of these works nor any 
Stoic text focusing on kingship is known to be extant. I have therefore attempted to provide an outline 
sketch of Stoic political thought and the possible role kingship played within that system. Historically, 
the Stoic stance toward politics was ambivalent. While some philosophers joined the courts of 
Hellenistic kings, others were more cautious.Their political writings, too, exhibit a similar sense of 
caution. The Cynic-like critique of society is tempered by the recognition that humanity can only thrive 
within the context of the polis. 
Some of the confusion in the interpretation of Stoic political thought comes from a failure to 
distinguish between the two communities present in their writing. On the one hand there it the city of 
sages, represented by the πολιτει'α treatises of Zeno and Chrysippus, and on the other, the non-ideal 
cities in which the Stoic writers found themselves. Stoic writings do not indicate an obvious preference 
for monarchy in either of these communities, but neither is there an aversion to kingship in favour of 
either democracy or a mixed constitution. The Stoics were more concerned with the morality of the 
city’s citizens and government than they were with the particular form of that government.146
Stoic use of kingship language with regard to the sage must be understood within this ethical 
framework. Political metaphors are used (along with others) to describe the nature of the sage. At no 
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144. See also Cicero’s discussion of Stoic theology of which the third part focuses on the gods’ government of the world, 
while the fourth that they care for humankind (Nat. d. 2.3).
145. For an example of how these common ideals were translated into specific contexts, see Murray, “Philodemus on the 
Good King”; Oswyn Murray, “Aristeas and Ptolemaic Kingship,” JTS 18 (1967): 337–71.
146. So Aalders H. Wzn., Political Thought, 93.
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point, however, are these metaphors transformed into the impetus for exhorting the sage to enter the 
political life. As this study progresses, the concept of kingship that emerges from these and other 
passages will be seen to correspond, with one or two exceptions, to a general ideology of Hellenistic 
kingship.
Epicurean Kingship
Epicurus is credited with writing a περι` βασιλει'ας treatise (D.L. 10.28). In a critique of the 
Epicurean view of music, Plutarch has preserved the only fragment identified explicitly as belonging to 
this περι` βασιλει'ας text (Suav. vit. 1095b–e). According to Plutarch, Epicurus dissuaded rulers from 
engaging in discussions of poetry and music, urging them, instead, to be entertained by military 
adventures and coarse buffoonery (στρατιωτικα` διηγη' µατα και` φορτικα`ς βωµολοχι'ας).147 From 
Plutarch’s polemical text we might conclude that Epicurus’ treatise took the form of an address to a 
king. Epicurus’ exhortation is problematic when viewed against Plutarch’s observation elsewhere that 
the Epicureans write about kingship in order to encourage their readers to flee the company of kings 
(Adv. Col. 1127a) and that the Epicureans teach that reigning as a king (το` βασιλευ' ειν) is a mistake and 
a failure (Adv. Col. 1127c–d). Careful consideration of Epicurean political thought suggests a way in 
which these apparent contradictions might be resolved. 
The Epicurean Sage and the Epicurean Statesman
All Epicurean thought begins and ends with pleasure (η  δονη' ). Pleasure is the starting point and 
the goal of the blessed life (Ep. Men. 128), and the principle according to which all other actions must 
be referred (RS 25). In keeping with the general trend in Hellenistic ethics, the Epicurean “pleasant” 
life is linked to the virtuous life (RS 5). Against the eristic caricatures of some, Epicurus defines 
pleasure in terms of “freedom from pain in the body and from trouble in the mind” (Ep. Men. 131; cf. 
128).
“Freedom from pain in the body” implies a level of physical safety, and so a concern for 
security (α σφα' λεια) and being safe (θαρρειñν) lie at the core of Epicurean political thought.148 Safety is 
secured through retreating from the masses and living the quiet life (RS 14). The Epicureans did not 
entreat a solitary life, however. Friendship is essential for the good life (RS 27, 28) and safety is 
possible within a specific type of community (RS 40). Nevertheless, while Chrysippus could 
recommend political life as an acceptable means of making a living, this arrangement was unacceptable 
for the Epicureans. It amounted to servility to either the mob or a monarch (Sent. Vat. 67; cf. 81) and 
was therefore to be avoided. It is for these reasons that Epicurus advised in his Περι` βι'ων that ου δε` 
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147. This advice is at odds with the description of the Epicurean sage as the only one able to converse properly on music 
and poetry (D.L. 10.121b). The polemical nature of Plutarch’s text and the lack of context makes it impossible to know 
exactly what Epicurus might have been advising at this point.
148. This is not to say that mental security and safety are excluded, as the inclusion of α ταραξι'α indicates; see below. For 
recent summary discussions of Epicurean political thought, see Malcolm Schofield, “Social and Political Thought,” in The 
Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, ed. Algra Keimpe, et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), 748–56; Schofield, “Epicurean and Stoic Political Thought,” 437–43.
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πολιτευ' σεσθαι [το`ν σοφο' ν] (D.L. 10.119).149 The “political quietism” described in this paragraph is 
how Epicurean political philosophy is frequently characterized.150 There is, however, another way in 
which the Epicurean desire for safety and security might be conceptualized and established.
Epicurus sought to develop a theory of justice which ensured that, through the establishment of 
laws, those who lived in community would be stopped or, at least, hindered from harming one another 
(RS 31–38).151 This theory of justice lies behind the positive assessment of laws and governments in 
Colotes, who writes
The men who appointed laws and usages and established the government of cities by kings and 
magistrates brought human life into a state of great security and peace (πολλη`ν α σφα' λειαν και  
η`συχι'αν) and delivered it from turmoil. But if anyone takes all this way, we shall live a life of 
brutes (θηρι'ων βι'ον βιωσο'µεθα), and anyone who chances upon another will all but devour 
him. (Plutarch, Adv. Col. 1124d)152
Laws and government would thus have a positive role to play since they promote the general well-
being of the sage by providing physical security and peace of mind (α ταραξι'α) (cf. RS 40). In the words 
of A. A. Long: “an Epicurean will value political communities insofar as they are conducive to the 
stable provision of those things he regards as supremely worthwhile.”153 
The Epicurean sage navigates this tension between the sequestered life and the good brought 
about through the political community by a cost/benefit analysis, or a “rational calculus”:154
It is, however, appropriate to make all these decisions by comparative measurement 
(συµµε'τρησις) and an examination of the advantages and disadvantages. For at some times we 
treat the good thing as bad and, conversely, the bad thing as good. (Ep. Men. 130; trans. 
Inwood and Gerson)
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149. Other texts express similarly negative views: “We must release ourselves from the prison of affairs and politics” 
(Sent. Vat. 58).
150. Jeffrey Fish points out that one reason Usener thought that the Ratae sententiae were compiled by a lesser mind 
than Epicurus was because the collection failed to emphasize what Usener took to be the central political tenets of 
Epicureanism: µη` πολιτευ' εσθαι and λα' θε βιω' σας (“Not All Politicians Are Sisyphus: What Roman Epicureans Were Taught 
About Politics,” in Epicurus and the Epicurean Tradition, ed. Jeffrey Fish and Kirk R. Sanders [Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011], 73; see Hermann Usener, Epicurea [Leipzig: Teubner, 1887], xliv). Aalders depicts the Epicureans 
as dissenting from the existing political order through “political quietism” (Political Thought, 39–50). However, quietism 
does not necessarily imply an apolitical position. Epicurus argues that his philosophy retains everything needed for society to 
thrive—justice, friendship, economic co-operation—while eliminating those things which were not truly conducive to 
happiness. As A. A. Long and David Sedley put it, “Epicureanism would be better regarded as a radical but selective critique 
of contemporary politics, rather than the apolotical posture with which it is frequently identified” (Translations of the 
Principal Sources, with Philosophical Commentary, vol. 1 of The Hellenistic Philosophers [Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987], 136–37). 
151. For recent discussions of the Epicurean theory of justice and law, see Antonina Alberti, “The Epicurean Theory of 
Law and Justice,” in Justice and Generosity: Studies in Hellenistic Social and Political Philosophy: Proceedings of the Sixth 
Symposium Hellenisticum, ed. André Laks and Malcolm Schofield (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 161–90; 
John M. Armstrong, “Epicurean Justice,” Phronesis 42.3 (1997): 324–34; Tim O’Keefe, Epicureanism, APh (Durham: 
Acumen, 2010), 139–46.
152. On the generally conservative nature of the Epicurean epigones and for methodological considerations regarding the 
use of polemical sources such as Plutarch, see Geert Roskam, Live Unnoticed (Λα'θε βιω' σας): On the Vicissitudes of an 
Epicurean Doctrine, PhA 111 (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 30–33. For similar thoughts expressed by Hermarchus, see Porphyry, 
Abst. 1.7–12; discussion in Roskam, Live Unnoticed, 76–79.
153. A. A. Long, “Pleasure and Social Utility: The Virtues of Being Epicurean,” in From Epicurus to Epictetus: Studies 
in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), 184 This relative (see, e.g., RS 36) and very general 
description of justice suggests a reason why there is no developed Epicurean political philosophy (Eric Brown, “Politics and 
Society,” in The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism, ed. James Warren [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009], 195).
154. See Roskam, Live Unnoticed, 35–36. The phrase “rational calculus” is his.
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 The importance of this principle in Epicurus’ system becomes clear when one notices that it occurs 
elsewhere in his writings (e.g. RS 8; Sent. Vat. 16, 71). Following Geert Roskam, we might charac-
terize Epicurus’ approach as “a moral philosophy of conditional qualifying.”155 Seneca’s summary of 
Epicurus’ position with regard to public life provides an illustration of one such conditional quali-
fication: “The wise man will not go into public life, unless something interferes” (Otio 3.2; trans. 
Cooper and Procopé).
Roskam has shown how the Epicurean rational calculus allows one to give full force to the 
maxim λα' θε βιω' σας (frag. 551 Usener), while at the same time accounting for those texts which 
suggest that the sage might engage in politics or benefit from the political order.156 Following 
Roskam’s lead at a number of points, Sean McConnell has produced an essay in which he reconstructs 
the “nuanced and sophisticated” Epicurean view of kingship.157 Kingship is mentioned in the sixth of 
Epicurus’ Κυ' ριαι ∆ο' ξαι (= Ratae sententiae): 
The natural good of public office and kingship (α ρχηñς και` βασιλει'ας 158 ) is for the sake of 
getting safety from [other] men (τη`ν εξ α νθρω' πων α σφα' λειαν), [at least] from those from 
whom one is able to provide this. (RS 6; trans. Inwood and Gerson, p. 32; slightly modified)
 And the subsequent maxim is closely related: 
Some men want to become famous and respected, believing that this is the way to acquire 
security against [other] men (τη`ν εξ α νθρω' πων α σφα' λειαν). Thus if the life of such men is 
secure, they acquire the natural good; but if it is not secure, they do not have that for the sake 
of which they strove from the beginning according to what is naturally congenial. (RS 7; trans. 
Inwood and Gerson, p. 32)
 We have already seen that this security is indeed a key element in Epicurean political thought. The 
question is whether rule159 or kingship is able to provide this security and, if so, in what way. 
The phrases τουñ θαρρειñν εξ α νθρω' πων (RS 6) and τη`ν εξ α νθρω' πων α σφα' λειαν (RS 7) have 
usually been understood negatively: “security against or from other people.”160 Roskam has argued that 
these should be read positively: “security coming from other people.”161 The preceding translation of 
RS 6 is sufficiently ambiguous at this point, but RS 7 should read “believing that this is the way to 
acquire security from [other] men,” if Roskam is followed. Read this way, the argument in RS 6 and 
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155. Roskam, Live Unnoticed, 35, emphasis removed.
156. Roskam, Live Unnoticed, see esp. 33–62. Roskam has also produced a volume that examines Plutarch’s engagement 
with this theme: Geert Roskam, A Commentary on Plutarch’s De Latenter Vivendo (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 
2007), see pp. 19–27 for a summary discussion of the Epicurean approach to political activity. The view that Epicurean 
political activity is not absolutely forbidden but accepted in certain situations seems to be the current consensus, see, for 
example Eric Brown, “Politics and Society,” 180–82; Fish, “Not All Politicians,” 72–73, 96–98.
157. Sean McConnell, “Epicureans on Kingship,” Cambridge Classical Journal NS 56 (2010): 178.
158. The phrase α ρχηñς και` βασιλει'ας was excised by Usener (Epicurea, 72) who argued that it was a gloss on εξ ωð ν. 
Usener has been followed by Cyril Bailey (Epicurus: The Extant Remains. With Short Critical Apparatus, Translation and 
Notes [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926], 352) and Robert D. Hicks (in Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 
trans. Robert Drew Hicks, LCL 184–185 [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1925], 664). McConnell, “Kingship,” 180 
rejects the phrase because of the grammatical awkwardness caused by its inclusion, but suggests that rule and kingship would 
have been considered potential goods. Both Roskam (Live Unnoticed, 37) and Tiziano Dorandi (Diogenes Laertius: Lives of 
Eminent Philosophers, CCTC 50 [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013], 816) accept the phrase as genuine.  
159. Or “public office” (Roskam, Live Unnoticed, 37).
160. See, e.g., Bailey, Epicurus, 352–53, 356–57. 
161. Live Unnoticed, 37–38. He is followed by McConnell, “Kingship,” 179 n. 3.
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RS 7 is that political power is able to provide security to those who wield it, in which case it is a natural 
good. On the other hand, one might observe that history is filled with examples where such power did 
not bring about the desired safety. In those cases, political office should not have been sought. What we 
find in these two maxims is “an application of the rational calculus to the domain of politics.”162 Where 
political rule, including kingship, provides the sort of safety and confidence that leads to α ταραξι'α, it is 
considered a good and something to be pursued and desired. This is not an absolute rule, though, and 
each situation needs to be assessed carefully by the Epicurean sage.163 
The manner in which security is brought about by public office is not examined or explained 
carefully in our extant sources. We have already  mentioned Colotes’ assertion that kings and 
magistrates can bring security and peace (Plutarch, Adv. Col. 1124d), presumably through establishing 
laws that are beneficial to all their subject and by exercising their political power to ensure that those 
laws are obeyed. Similarly, in the remains of Hermarchus’ argument (Porphyry, Abst. 1.7–12), the role 
of leaders is to establish laws that protect individuals from each other and from “external” disturbances, 
whether marauding beasts or enemies.164 Our texts are silent on the constitutional makeup of the 
polities envisaged by Colotes and Hermarchus, but monarchies, it would seem, are best positioned for 
establishing and enforcing laws.  
All other things being equal, it would seem that Epicureans would prefer monarchy above 
other political systems. The fact that there is no explicit statement to this effect has led some to surmise 
that the school had no preference when it came to systems of governance.165 But if monarchy offers the 
Epicurean the best possible chance of avoiding entanglement in public affairs, it must be the most 
attractive option.166
There is little indication in the early Epicurean writings as to the nature of the ideal king. 
Under normal conditions the king, for his own sake, would not be an Epicurean since the sequestered 
life represents the “default position” in Epicurean thinking. However, the king would act so as to 
ensure that the Epicureans under his rule were able to live a life marked by α ταραξι'α.167 A comment by 
Plutarch suggests that Epicurus did recognize that for those who are by nature “lovers of honour and 
fame” (του`ς φιλοτι'µους και` φιλοδο' ξους), to live the quiet life would lead to more disturbances than to 
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162. Roskam, Live Unnoticed, 39.
163. Roskam, Live Unnoticed, 36–39; McConnell, “Kingship,” 179–82.
164. A “mixed” community of sages and others is envisaged here since sages would never harm one another and would 
therefore not have any reason for protective laws of this nature (RS 21; D.L. 10.117). Nevertheless, such a community would 
still need justice; see Eric Brown, “Politics and Society,” 191–96).
165. Schofield, “Social and Political Thought,” 743–44, pace Marcello Gigante and Tiziano Dorandi, who argue that the 
Epicureans had a preference for monarchy (“Anassarco e Epicuro ‘Sul regno’,” in Democrito e l’atomismo antico: atti del 
convegno internazionale Catania 18–21 apr. 1979; Francesco Romano [Catania: Facoltà di lettere e filosofia, Università di 
Catania, 1980], 479–97; see Roskam, Live Unnoticed, 54; McConnell, “Kingship,” 182–87). Much of Gigante’s and 
Dorandi’s argument hinges on a dubious emendation of D.L. 10.121b (see below) and must be rejected.
166. Roskam, Live Unnoticed, 54–56; McConnell, “Kingship,” 188–89. In an ideal situation there would be no need of 
kings or law. What is envisaged here is the Epicurean response (or desire), given the practical realities of the day.
167. Epicurean philosophy assumes a certain environment within which the goods can be obtained and within which the 
Epicurean community can exist in safety. As Long observes, “It needs a neighbouring environment which will tolerate the 
Epicurean community ..., and provide it with any basic materials absent from the Garden that its members require in order to 
‘live as happily as Zeus’ (Sent. Vat. 33 = LS 33.1)” (“Pleasure and Social Utility,” 179–80). 
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engage in politics (Tranq. an. 465f–466a).168 The ideal king would presumably be such a person who 
would be unsuited to the quiet life.169
Would an Epicurean sage pay court to a “good king” of this sort? Plutarch’s assessment of the 
Epicureans is that they write about kingship to discourage their readers from consorting with kings 
(Adv. Col. 1127a). We might ask, again, whether this should be understood in an absolute sense. The 
polemical nature of Plutarch’s works, together with his own observation that Colotes dedicated a work 
to “King Ptolemy” (Ptolemy II?) (1107e) should give us pause for thought. The way in which Diogenes 
Laertius has recorded a similar saying gives us a better sense of how Colotes might have qualified his 
pronouncement (10.120b): just as the sage,when in need,170 would make money through wisdom, so in 
due measure and only at the appropriate time (ε ν καιρωñ, ), will the sage serve a monarch. The 
“appropriate time” will presumably be that moment when to refuse to pay court to a king would do 
more harm than good to the sage. As an example of this in the life of Epicurus, Roskam cites the sage’s 
decision to approach the king (albeit through emissaries) when slandered (Plutarch, Adv. Col. 
1126c).171 We also have the example of Colotes, who dedicated at least one treatise to a Ptolemy. This 
does not necessarily mean that he paid court to the king, but it is indicative of a desire to influence the 
king and thereby, if only tangentially, partake in politics. The title of Colotes’ treatise—“On the point 
that conformity to the doctrines of the other philosophers actually makes it impossible to live” (περι` τουñ 
ο«τι κατα` τα` τωñν α»λλων φιλοσο'φων δο' γµατα ου δε` ζηñν ε»στιν; Plutarch, Adv. Col. 1107e)—suggests a 
work that is both philosophical and polemical, perhaps indicating a certain competitiveness amongst 
philosophical groups for the king’s ear (and purse!).
The Epicurean sage would, in certain circumstances, pay court to a ruler and, by extension, 
influence politics through advice and counsel.172 The sage should guard against performing these 
services out of a desire for wealth or honour (Sent. Vat. 67, 81). Perhaps his service in this regard might 
be done out of concern for that which is beneficial to all humankind (Sent. Vat. 29).
Philodemus’ Good King
We turn finally to a text that most closely approximates an Epicurean περι` βασιλει'ας treatise.173 
Philodemus’ treatise Περι` τουñ  καθ’ Ο« µηρον α γαθουñ  βασιλε'ως (On the Good King According to 
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168. Epicurus himself also seems to leave open the possibility of some attaining safety through being esteemed and 
admired (RS 7), although this will always represent the exception rather than the rule. 
169. See McConnell, “Kingship,” 191–93.
170. The sage recognizes that destitution does not bring happiness but that being content with what is sufficient makes 
one as happy as the gods (Sent. Vat. 33; cf. RS 15). For a discussion of Epicurean thought on these matters with a focus on 
Philodemus’ writing on poverty and wealth, see Elizabeth Asmis, “Epicurean Economics,” in Philodemus and the New 
Testament World, ed. John T. Fitzgerald, Dirk Obbink, and Glenn S. Holland, NovTSup 111 (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 133–76; 
David L. Balch, “Philodemus, ‘On Wealth’ and ‘On Household Management:’ Naturally Wealthy Epicureans Against Poor 
Cynics,” in Philodemus and the New Testament World, ed. John T. Fitzgerald, Dirk Obbink, and Glenn S. Holland, NovTSup 
111 (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 177–96. It is important not to privilege Philodemus’ perspective, though. As Asmis notes (p. 176): 
“Philodemus’ economics fits squarely into Epicurean ethics. At the same time, he offers a new vision of an Epicurean society 
that is suitable for Roman aristocrats.”
171. Roskam, Live Unnoticed, 54–55.
172. Roskam (Live Unnoticed, 54–55) argues against placing too much emphasis on µο' ναρχον. Epicurean engagement 
with leaders like Idomeneus and Mithres show that the saying has wider applicability. 
173. See Murray, “Philodemus on the Good King,” for the argument that Philodemus’ treatise draws heavily on the 
conceptual framework of Hellenistic kingship treatises.
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Homer) exists in one manuscript discovered at Herculaneum: P.Herc. 1507.174 Only the second half of 
the text survives in a somewhat mutilated form.175
The poor state of the scroll makes it difficult to determine Philodemus’ main line of argument. 
Unlike Philodemus’ other writings, there is no evidence that he drew upon Epicurean texts when 
composing this treatise.176 Rather, as the final column suggests, Homer is his primary point of 
departure: “... of the starting points, Piso,177 which it is possible to take from Homer for the correction 
of positions of power (επανο' ρθωσιν δυναστειωñ ν) ...” (col. 43).178 Philodemus draws on Homeric 
examples (both negative and positive) to prove that a good life—although not the ideal life of the 
Epicurean sage—is possible if a ruler moderates his power through the exercise of the royal virtues. It 
provides “a positive case for a form of Epicurean statesmanship.”179 
In Oswyn Murray’s estimation, The Good King does not truly represent Imperial Epicureanism 
and, instead,  points to a contradiction between Epicurean theory (quietism) and Epicurean practice 
(active political participation) of that time.180 It is the case that not all Epicureans of the first century 
chose the quiet life. In the 40s there were Epicureans in the factions for and against Caesar, with 
Cassius standing as the most famous example of the latter.181 But our discussion above has shown that 
Epicurean theory was not as clear-cut as “µη` πολιτευ' εσθαι” would suggest, thus allowing for a rather 
broad approach to political life. It is not the case, as Murray states, that “the Epicureans despised both 
poetry and politics.”182 Epicurean political philosophy allows for its adherents to participate politically 
(albeit it in exceptional circumstances) and this is born out by first-century followers of that school.183 
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174. See Tiziano Dorandi, Filodemo. Il buon re secondo Omero, Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici: La Scuola di 
Epicuro 3 (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1982) which replaces Alexander Olivieri, ed., Philodemi Περι` τουñ καθ’ Ο« µηρου α  γαθουñ 
βασιλε'ως libellus (Leipzig: Teubner, 1909). Dorandi’s numbering is used by modern scholars; texts written before 1982 use 
Olivieri’s numbering. English translation and brief commentary in Elizabeth Asmis, “Philodemus’s Poetic Theory and ‘On 
the Good King According to Homer’,” ClAnt 10.1 (1991): 1–45. I use this translation unless otherwise noted. For a fuller 
reading of cols. 21–31, with English translation and commentary, see Jeffrey Fish, “Philodemus’ On the Good King 
According to Homer: Columns 21–31,” CErc 32 (2002): 187–232. I have cited Fish’s Greek text for cols. 21–31. For the 
sake of legibility, I have removed the editorial sigla and substituted the medial and final sigma for the lunate sigma.
175. Murray, “Philodemus on the Good King,” 162–64.
176. This is not to say that Philodemus did not write from an Epicurean perspective. With regard to his writings in 
general, Roskam observes that “crucial importance is given to loyalty to Epicurus ... Philodemus’ main purpose is not to 
develop new insights, but to interpret Epicurus’ view correctly” (Live Unnoticed, 102). 
177. The addressee in question, “Piso,” is Lucius Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus, a leading political figure in the Late 
Republic and Julius Caesar’s father-in-law; see Murray, “Philodemus on the Good King,” 179–80; John T. Fitzgerald, 
“Introduction: Philodemus and the Papyri from Herculaneum,” in Philodemus and the New Testament World, ed. John T. 
Fitzgerald, Dirk Obbink, and Glenn S. Holland, NovTSup 111 (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 1–12.
178. Murray (“Philodemus on the Good King,” 178) sees Philodemus’ use of “rule” as being a veiled reference to Roman 
principes. For Asmis (“‘On the Good King’,” 45) that which needs “correction” is Homer’s description of how those in 
power behave, and it is in Homer himself that one finds such correction. 
179. Fish, “Not All Politicians,” 75, cf. 89–104. Murray (“Philodemus on the Good King,” 178) observes that “the work 
is a description of the duties and moral behaviour of a princeps in private and public life, not a political pamphlet” (pace 
Arnaldo Momigliano, “Review of Benjamin Farrington, Science and Politics in the Ancient World,” JRS 31 [1941]: 149–
57).
180. Murray, “Philodemus on the Good King,” 165.
181. Momigliano, “Review of Science and Politics”; David N. Sedley, “The Ethics of Brutus and Cassius,” JRS 87 
(1997): 41–53.
182. Murray, “Philodemus on the Good King,” 173.
183. For a more nuanced discussion of the Epicurean attitude towards poetry, see Asmis, “‘On the Good King’”. 
Philodemus thought poetry useful for entertainment but generally not for instruction. Although instruction through poetry is 
not completely impossible, prose is preferable (13–17). In this regard, then, “The Good King” is somewhat odd since 
Philodemus goes on to draw positive moral teaching from Homer.     
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Jeffrey Fish argues that, far from being contradictory and void of true Epicurean philosophy, 
Philodemus’ text exhibits remarkable similarity to the Epicureanism of his day, as seen, for example, in 
Cicero’s Epicurean spokesperson, Torquatus (De finibus 1, 2).184
Despite the presence of these specifically Epicurean elements (discussed below), Murray’s 
assessment of the treatise’s dependency on general Hellenistic kingship theory remains accurate.185 The 
importance of certain virtues in those who would rule successfully and the exhortation to cultivate 
those virtues are standard elements within kingship writings. It is to these virtues we now turn.
The importance of the royal virtues is predicated on the assumption that the king’s nature is 
essential for the welfare of his subjects. Part of Odysseus’ speech before Penelope (Odyssey 19.109–
114) is quoted twice in The Good King (cols. 4 and 30). In the speech, Odysseus speaks of:
some blameless king (βασιληñος α µυ' µονος), who with the fear of the gods in his heart, is lord 
over many mighty men, upholding justice (ευ δικι'ας α νε'χη, σι); and the black earth bears wheat 
and barley, and the trees are laden with fruit, the flocks bring forth young unceasingly, and the 
sea yields fish, all from his good leading; and the people prosper under him (εξ ευ ηγεσι'ης, 
α ρετωñσι δε` λαοι` υ  pi αυ τουñ). (Od. 19.109–114; trans. Murray [LCL])
 The point is clear: a good king—defined here as one who is blameless, fears the gods and upholds 
justice—benefits and brings blessing to the land and people over whom he rules. The well-being of the 
people is tied to the king’s fitness to rule.
We might fill out the nature of this good king by investigating the advice given in column 24 
of The Good King:
... let us advise that which is good for a king (το` σpiουδαιñον βασιλειñ piαραινωñµεν): to hate a 
severe, harsh, and bitter character (αυ στηρο`ν µε`ν και` τραχυ'  τι ηòθος και` piικρο`ν εχθραι'ρειν), and 
to practice mildness, fairness, royal gentleness and leniency (πραο' τητα διασκειñν και` εpiιει'κειαν 
και` το` βασιλε'ως η«µερον και` συγγνωµονικο' ν) to the greatest extent possible, as leading to a 
stable monarchy and not to a despotic exercise of power by fear. (trans. Asmis; modified)
 In the same passage the Persian king Cambyses is held up in contrast to the Homeric king who is 
“gentle like a father,” πατη`ρ δ ω ς η»πιος ηòεν (Homer, Od. 2.47).186
The recommendation of virtues, combined with a warning of their inverse vices, were stock 
elements in kingship treatises. The careful cultivation of these virtues leads to a stable monarchy since 
the people governed by such a king will love their leader187 and not feel the need to rise up against him 
as they might against tyrannical rule exercised through fear.188 From an Epicurean perspective, in 
which safety is central to living the good life, a good king must be marked by these virtues since they 
ensure the longevity of his reign through the love of his subjects.
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184. “Not All Politicians,” 89–91. Fish draws on both The Good King and On Rhetoric in his analysis. In Asmis’ 
reading, The Good King contains no real philosophical analysis nor does it explicitly expound any Epicurean doctrine (“‘On 
the Good King’”). 
185. Murray, “Philodemus on the Good King,” passim.
186. Philodemus observes that political careers often end in misfortune (Roskam, Live Unnoticed, 113–14). Examples of 
poor or bad kingship would have been used to illustrate this point.
187. For references to this topos, see Fish, “Not All Politicians,” 89 n. 63.
188. Col. 5 also seems to contain a critique of those who would rule through fear. Hector is held up at this point as one 
who was loved by his people. This love is displayed most vividly by their mourning at his death.
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The specific virtues which lead to this type of safety include πραο' της, η πιο' της, and 
επιει'κεια.189 Since Epicureans understand law and justice in terms of utility and advantage,190 it is not 
surprising that a certain amount of flexibility in interpreting and applying law is not only allowed but, 
indeed, recommended, as suggested by these virtues. Epicurean praise for these virtues contrasts 
strongly with the Stoic assertion that the sage is αυ στηρο' ς and that it is wrong to act with συγγνω' µη 
and επιει'κεια.191 Not only does the application of gentleness and clemency accord with Epicurean 
thinking on law and justice, it also contributes to the king’s safety by engendering love in his subjects 
for him. The recognition that excessive leniency might also bring about bitterness among the king’s 
subjects explains the fragment in col. 25:   
... so that he may appear gentle (πραñος), not through laxity, but through discernment; because 
of gentleness (η πιο' τητα) he may be loved, but because of firmness (επι'τασιν) when necessary, 
he may not be despised. (my translation)
The virtues commended in Philodemus’ treatise are commonplace, yet they are reconfigured along 
Epicurean lines. The instrumentality of the virtues is an additional example of Epicurean influence. 
The virtues are not ends in themselves, but rather serve the goal of bringing about the king’s security.  
This instrumentality is missing in other philosophical systems in which the virtues are telic.192 
The activities apart from ruling in which a king might appropriately engage formed another 
common topos in Hellenistic literature.193 Columns 16–24 of The Good King are concerned with the 
king’s leisure activities. The section began with a discussion of the king’s attendance of and behaviour 
at symposia (περι` τωñ ν συµpiοσι'ων; col. 16). The mention of Nestor’s cup (col. 17) introduces a 
discussion of drunkenness and perhaps gluttony. This topos is extended through reference to the 
Phaeacians (cols. 18–19), often portrayed as “proto-Epicureans.”194 An Epicurean would be especially 
sensitive to accusations of excess and it is not surprising, therefore, that Philodemus seeks to 
rehabilitate the Phaeacians as characterized by moderation and decorum. Furthermore, the king’s 
symposia will not be marked out by vulgar entertainment (col. 20) or the coarse laughter of a 
“scoundrel” (col. 21).195 In addition to symposia, the king and his courtiers will spend their time in 
worthwhile pursuits: “in some athletic activity or armed competition” like the suitors on Ithaca (col. 
22). 
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189. Epicurus is remembered for his η  µερο' της and αυ τα' ρκεια (Sent. Vat. 36).
190. RS 31–38; see Alberti, “Epicurean Theory” for a full discussion of law and justice in the Epicurean philosophical 
system.
191. See, for example, D.L. 7.117; Stob. 2.5.11d = WH 2, 95–96. 
192. Fish, “Not All Politicians,” 89–90.
193. Murray, “Philodemus on the Good King,” 168; see, e.g., Let. Aris. 284–285.
194. Asmis, “‘On the Good King’,” 36. See also the ancient sources cited by Asmis at p. 36 n.141: Seneca, Ep. 88.5; 
Athenaeus, Deipn. 12.513a–c; ps-Plutarch, De Vita et Poesi Homeri 2.150, amongst others.
195. At first glance, Plutarch’s report at Suav. viv. 1095c–d seems to contradict this. He asserts that Epicurus’ περι` 
βασιλει'ας dissuaded rulers from engaging in discussions of poetry and music, urging them, instead, to be entertained by 
military adventures and coarse buffoonery. As mentioned above, it is impossible to know exactly what Epicurus was arguing 
since the context of his advice is missing. We are also dealing with a hostile source. It is possible that Epicurus was simply 
discouraging conversation about the arts and encouraging the king to listen to those who would discuss matters that were 
useful for ruling: politics, military strategy, or kingly virtues (so Fish, “Not All Politicians,” 103 n. 125). If this is indeed the 
case, then the characterization of this discourse as “buffoonery” would belong to Plutarch and not Epicurus.
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Philodemus’ approval of martial pursuits raises the more general question of the way in which 
the good king is to relate to war itself. In col. 27 he writes that 
it is necessary, for this reason, that a good ruler to be a lover of victory (φιλο' νικον ειòναι το`ν 
α γαθο`ν δυνα' στην), not a lover of war or a lover of battle (my translation)
War was to be a means and not an end. A king who behaved otherwise was likely to bring trouble upon 
his subjects (col. 27). Philodemus exonerates Homer from asserting anything different by pointing out 
that, because of their love of war, Ares and Achilles were loathed by Zeus and Agamemnon, 
respectively. Similarly, in col. 29, we read that Homer and his heroes hate those who love war and 
strife (του`ς πολε'µου και` του`ς ε»ριδος φι'λους).
The thread of security that is woven throughout this treatise is visible again in col. 28 where 
the king who thinks that internal strife will protect him in some way is considered196 to be thoroughly 
depraved and lazy. “Divide and conquer” is a foolish strategy for dealing with internal matters since, as 
Nestor says, “friendless, lawless, homeless is the one who loves terrible civil strife” (col. 28, trans. 
Fish; cf. Il. 9.63–64). In addition to this speech given before Agamemnon, col. 28 also mentions to 
Nestor’s dealings with the ambassadors (Il. 9.179–181) and Patroclus (Il. 11.656–803) as examples of 
one who advocates an end to strife.197 In col. 29 Nestor and Odysseus are put forward as wise leaders 
who, because they do not exhibit any envy or love of war or strife, are able to work together for the 
good of their subjects.
The section on warfare ends, fittingly, with a picture of peace. The exemplar in this case is the 
Phaeacian people whose idyllic land, free from strife, illustrates the benefits that accompany peace. The 
insertion of Odysseus’ speech before Penelope (also found in col. 4, see above) highlights the 
importance of a just king in this regard. Philodemus is not a pacifist, nor does he have a naïve view of 
how such a situation might be brought about. The Phaeacians enjoy peace and ensure that it will last 
because they are constantly preparing for war through training and physical exercise (col. 31). 
Philodemus’ portrayal here challenges the common view of the Phaeacians (and therefore Epicureans, 
see above) “as self-indulgent idlers.”198 Peace and security in a community, both internally and 
externally, are of central importance to Epicureans (RS 14, 40). Internal strife is to be avoided at all 
costs, yet it might become necessary to prosecute a war against those on the oustide who threaten to 
disturb the community. A good king will pursue victory for the sake of peace; war is never to be an end 
in itself. 
Columns 32–34 deal with the matter of good counsel.199 Wisdom, in particular, is the most 
important virtue that a good counsellor should possess.200 Nestor and Odysseus are once again 
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196. Dorandi restores the text as [φη]µιστε'ον, but I have followed Olivieri, Asmis, and Fish who all read [νο]µιστε'ον. 
197. See Asmis, “‘On the Good King’,” 40–41.
198. Asmis, “‘On the Good King’,” 41.
199. The theme seems to have been raised towards the end of col. 31 which concludes with a discussion of the council of 
the Phaeacians.
200. The focus, according to Asmis (“‘On the Good King’,” 41–42), is on the good king’s wisdom. However, those who 
are mentioned by Philodemus in this section are praised for their wisdom as counsellors, not for their wisdom in general. The 
section also refers to Alcinous coming to a council (col. 31) and to “good counsels for kings” (ευ βουλι'ας τοιñς βασιλευñσι) 
(col. 33). Furthermore, it would seem that Philodemus has added βουληñι to Πρια' µοιο πο' λιν διεπε'ρσαµεν αιpiη' ν, a phrase 
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Philodemus’ heroes (col. 32): if Agamemnon had ten counsellors (συµφρα' δµονες) such as Nestor, Troy 
would have fallen easily (Il. 2.371–374); Odysseus is described as being godlike in wisdom (Od. 
13.89), and it this, presumably, that makes him superior in counsel and in war (Il. 2.273). Nestor 
praises Agamemnon and Achilles not only for their military prowess, but also because they excel in 
counsel (Il. 1.258). Philodemus also alludes to the invitation extended to Meriones and Antilochus to 
attend the counsel because of their φρο' νησις (col. 33; cf. Il. 10.196–197). As Asmis points out, 
φρο' νησις was, for Epicurus, the supreme virtue from which all other virtues flowed (Ep. Men. 132).201 
What did Philodemus have in mind when including this section in his treatise? In Homer, the 
council often consists of a meeting of those who generally relate to one another as equals. Murray 
argues that this is how Philodemus has understood the council since he writes with one eye on the 
Roman senate.202 Be this as it may, if Philodemus is writing to and for Piso, one who had held positions 
of authority in which such counsel would be important, then it is not impossible that he is speaking of a 
ruler accepting wise counsel from subordinates. 
We have already seen (p. 129) that the Epicurean sage will consort with rulers under certain 
circumstances, presumably to provide wise counsel.203 The desirability of a philosophically informed 
ruler is highlighted by Philodemus in his third book on rhetoric:
it would be a fine thing, to be sure, if the politician were also practised in philosophy, that he 
might be still more vividly and energetically a good man; and for this reason we [sc. 
Epicureans] say that philosophy, both generally, when it accompanies a personal disposition 
for politics and when it gives suggestions appropriate for political arrangements, will make an 
astronomical difference for the better.204
 The sage’s philosophical tutelage will therefore be the most valuable contribution he or she might 
make in such a relationship. Philodemus’ work On Frank Criticism provides further insight into the 
nature of Epicurean practice in this regard.205 Those who, by nature, are suited to leadership, would do 
well to appoint an Epicurean advisor/tutor so that the ruler might benefit from wise counsel. The nature 
of this advice would, no doubt, be tempered by Philodemus’ teaching that philosophy and politics are 
autonomous pursuits.206 Even if the sage cannot—and therefore will not—give political advice, he or 
she can offer the politician “general moral advice which may free the politician from his moral troubles 
... and which may (but need not) contribute indirectly to his political success.”207
  
 134 
from (Od. 3.130), in order to draw attention to the fact that it was wise counsel and not military might that defeated Troy. It is 
the wisdom of the king’s council that is in focus in this section.
201. “‘On the Good King’,” 42. The semantic distinction between φρο' νησις and σοφι'α varied with time and between 
authors in the same period.
202. Murray, “Philodemus on the Good King,” 176.
203. See Oswyn Murray, “Philosophy and Monarchy in the Hellenistic World,” in Jewish Perspectives on Hellenistic 
Rulers, ed. Tessa Rajak, et al., HCS 50 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 26 in which this matter is discussed 
in general terms.
204. Rhet. 3 col. 15a, 16–31. I cite the translation provided by Fish, “Not All Politicians,” 95.
205. Although Epicurean friendship provides the context for this treatise, this does not preclude situations characterized 
by unequal power and status; see David Konstan, et al., “Introduction,” 23–24. 
206. Roskam, Live Unnoticed, 104–9.
207. Roskam, Live Unnoticed, 121–25, here 122.
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The king’s physical appearance is the subject of cols. 37–38. Demetrius Poliorcetes “who 
prided himself on his beauty” is held up as an anti-hero, alongside Paris (cf. Il. 3.54–55). The example 
of both show that beauty alone is not sufficient to guarantee success. It is difficult to make sense of the 
remaining part of col. 37. The paragraph mark between line 23 and 24 might suggest a change of topic 
or, as is more likely here, “mark off a general remark from its instances.”208 The text that follows reads:
... make the kings godlike (θεοειδειñς), which pleases me at any rate. For this strikes awe into 
the base (το`ν χυδαιñον) and makes [kings] similar to the best [beings], whom it is necessary to 
imitate. That is why he addresses them as godlike and god-resembling (θεοειδειñς και` 
θεοεικε'λους). (trans. Asmis; slightly modified)
If, in addition to power and awesomeness, being godlike implies something about the king’s 
appearance, it would seem that his visage did have a positive role to play in the king’s person. 
Philodemus agrees with Homer’s description of the Greek kings as “godlike” since, like the gods, their 
visage causes the masses to be awestruck, while the comparison encourages kings to emulate the gods. 
Examples are cited where both Agamemnon and Achilles vindicate this opinion (col. 38; cf. Il. 2.477–
483; 22.26; 5.5–6; 22.31). The king’s appearance thus has a practical, utilitarian benefit.209
Odysseus is offered as a counter-example to show that this statement should not be understood 
in an absolute sense. Odysseus appears in the guise of a beggar or as someone unimpressive. 
Nonetheless, he is successful and his superiority inevitably comes to the fore because it consists in his 
wisdom, not his outward appearance. It is “the inner imprint of the soul” that is essential to good 
rule.210
Before concluding, one final item in Philodemus’ treatise needs to be given attention. 
Fame/glory (κλε'ος) is a central theme in the Iliad where it is frequently linked to war and, ultimately, 
death.211 First mentioned in relation to the drinking songs of the symposia (col. 19), it seems to have 
been an important part of the final section of the treatise (cols. 39–43). Col. 41 lines 7–8 speak of those 
yearning for a reputation (δο' ξη), a line reminiscent of RS 7, which cautions those who seek to be 
esteemed and admired that safety is not always achieved in that manner.  We have seen how Epicurean 
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208. Murray, “Philodemus on the Good King,” 166.
209. Asmis, “‘On the Good King’,” 43. A utilitarian view of beauty (or nobility?) and the virtues (το` καλο`ν και` τα`ς 
α ρετα' ς)—acceptable as long as they provide pleasure—is attributed to Epicurus’ περι` Τε'λους (Athenaeus, Deipn. 12.67, 
546f).
210. Asmis, “‘On the Good King’,” 43–44 Odysseus is not named in col. 38, but he appears in the first part of what 
remains of col. 39. Asmis’ identification of Odysseus as the subject of the last part of col. 38 is therefore warranted.
211. See M.S. Silk, Homer, The Iliad (1987; repr., Landmarks of World LiteratureCambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), 61–69 and Michael Clarke, “Manhood and Heroism,” in The Cambridge Companion to Homer, ed. Robert 
Fowler, Cambridge Companions to Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 74–90  for recent discussion 
of these themes.
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teaching allowed a place for those whose nature compelled them to follow that route to safety.212 As an 
end in itself, however, this desire for honour is misguided (Sent. Vat. 81).213  
It is unclear how Philodemus deals with the theme of glory/fame in The Good King. While the 
Homeric citations he includes are usually positive with respect to fame, there is a negative example 
(Od. 24.200–201) as well as a possible mention of “correction”(επανορθω' σεις col. 42 line 20, cf. col. 
43 line 18).214 Does Philodemus caution his reader against the excessive desire for fame expressed by 
Homer’s heroes? Or, as Asmis suggests, does he perhaps argue against the pursuit of fame while at the 
same time recognizing its inevitable accompaniment of good rule?215 Elsewhere Philodemus seems to 
agree with Epicurus’ assessment of the potential (albeit precarious) that fame has for providing security 
(RS 7).216 
Concluding Remarks on Epicurean Kingship
Our survey of Epicurean political thought has shown that, under certain circumstances, 
kingship is able to provide an Epicurean community with the safety and security that is so central to the 
Epicurean telos. Although the Epicurean sage will choose the quiet life over political engagement, this 
is not an absolute rule. Again, under certain circumstances, the latter might serve to minimize 
disturbances and should therefore be chosen. It is possible to imagine a situation in which an Epicurean 
might be king, but it is more likely that an Epicurean sage might serve in the court of a king by 
advising him in philosophical matters. No Epicurean περι` βασιλει'ας treatise has survived to indicate 
what such philosophical advice might look like, but a related text provides clues as to what might have 
been included.   
In the middle of the first century BCE, as Rome was transformed from republic to empire, 
Philodemus, produced an analysis of kingship in Homer in order to advise his patron, Lucius 
Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus, on matters of good rule and leadership. On the Good King According to 
Homer provides an Epicurean analysis and defence of Homer’s portrayal of rulers and an example to 
be followed. Philodemus reads Homer through the lens of Hellenistic kingship ideology. His Epicurean 
commitments can be observed at various points but they do not overwhelm the more generic nature of 
his advice. To be sure, Philodemus would have had one eye on the political situation in the late 
Republic,217 yet he produces a piece of literary analysis that avoids technical philosophy and political 
thought in order to encourage his benefactor to think about how a ruler might best ensure his safety. In 
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212. RS 7, cf. McConnell, “Kingship,” 179–82. Lucretius seems to think it highly unlikely that fame will ever contribute 
to a peaceful life (DRN 5.1120–1126).
213. Pace Murray, “Philodemus on the Good King,” 174 for whom the mention of κλε'ος as a posthumous reward 
provides “[t]he only cogent instance of Epicurean influence.” Cicero found in Epicurus an inconsistency on this point: his 
will, making provision for his followers to remember him after his death, contradicts other statements concerning death (De 
fin. 2.100–101. Julia Annas notes that Epicurus is not inconsistent if the primary goal of the remembrance is so that his 
followers might imitate him (in Cicero, On Moral Ends, trans. Raphael Woolf; ed. Julia Annas, Cambridge Texts in the 
History of Philosophy [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001], 59 n. 67).   
214. Lines 18–29 of column 42 are very poorly preserved, however, and not too much weight should be given to this 
reading since there is no context for it.
215. Asmis, “‘On the Good King’,” 44.
216. De adul. 4.1–12, see Roskam, Live Unnoticed, 111–13.
217. Murray, “Philodemus on the Good King,” 173–82.
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this way, Philodemus might have attained the Epicurean ideal of contributing to political life while 
limiting his exposure to that which might bring pain and disturbances.
Pythagorean Kingship
Stobaeus’ florilegium contains three περι` βασιλει'ας treatises attributed to Pythagorean writers: 
Diotogenes (Stob. 4.7.61–62 = WH 4, 263–270), Ecphantus (Stob. 4.6.22 = WH 4, 244–245 + Stob. 
4.7.64–66 = WH 4, 271–279), and Sthenidas (Stob. 4.7.63 = WH 4, 270–271). These kingship texts 
form part of the Pythagorean pseudepigrapha, a collection of pseudonymous works attributed to 
Pythagoras and his followers.218 As yet, no clear consensus regarding the authorship, provenance, or 
date of these Pythagorean writings has emerged.219
Pythagoras and his followers were the subjects of a number of biographical-philosophical 
investigations in the Classical and Hellenstic period. Aristotle, Xenocrates, Aristoxenus of Tarentum, 
and Zeno of Citium all produced works relating to this early stage of Pythagoreanism. This interest 
stands in contrast to the ancient sources’ silence regarding the existence of a Pythagorean “school” in 
the Hellenistic period.220 Walter Burkert argues that the Hellenistic period saw a flood of Pythagorean 
writings (including the pseudonymous texts mentioned above) but no Pythagoreans.221 The absence of 
evidence of a school and an obvious Pythagorean genealogy has meant that Hellenistic Pythagoreans 
have not fared well in the twentieth century.222 The Pythagorean school is supposed to have died out in 
the middle of the fourth century BCE, only to be revived as Neopythagoreanism in Alexandria in the 
second or first century BCE and Rome in the first century.223
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218. The texts are collected in Holger Thesleff, The Pythagorean Texts of the Hellenistic Period., Acta Academiae 
Aboensis 30.1 (Åbo: Åbo Akademi, 1965). References to page and line numbers are from this edition.
219. The lack of consensus regarding the dating of these fragments makes it difficult to know how to refer to them. Those 
who argue for an early date refer to them as “Hellenistic Pythagorean” (i.e., Holger Thesleff, An Introduction to the 
Pythagorean Writings of the Hellenistic Period., Acta Academiae Aboensis. Humaniora. 24.3 [Åbo: Åbo Akademi, 1961]). 
Johan Thom opts for “Neopythagorean” (“The Passions in Neopythagorean Writings,” in Passions and Moral Progress in 
Greco-Roman Thought, ed. John T. Fitzgerald, RMCS [London: Routledge, 2008], 67–68) while Bruno Centrone prefers the 
adjective “pseudo-Pythagorean” (“The Pseudo-Pythagorean Writings,” in A History of Pythagoreanism, ed. Carl A. Huffman 
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014], 315–40). Since the writers of these texts were attempting to be 
“Pythagorean” (whatever that might have meant for them—see Peter Kingsley, Ancient Philosophy, Mystery, and Magic 
[Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995], 320) I will simply use the adjective “Pythagorean,” without thereby implying any 
continuity or discontinuity with the earliest Pythagorean tradition. Similarly, while acknowledging that these Pythagorean 
texts were pseudonymous. I will refer to the authors of the περι` βασιλει'ας treatises as Ecphantus, Diotogenes, and Sthenidas, 
rather than as Pseudo-Ecphantus, etc.
220. Christoph Riedweg, Pythagoras: His Life, Teaching, and Influence, trans. Steven Rendall (2002; repr., Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2005), 119–20. Whether we should even expect a “school” is another question that deserves closer 
attention. For an attempt at more a more careful definition, see Walter Burkert, “Craft Versus Sect: The Problem of Orphics 
and Pythagoreans,” in Self-Definition in the Graeco-Roman World ed. Ben F. Meyer and Ed Parish Sanders, vol. 3 of Jewish 
and Christian Self-Definition (London: SCM, 1982), 1–22.
221. Walter Burkert, “Hellenistische Pseudopythagorica,” Phil 105.1–2; 3–4 (1961): 234.
222. For a recent survey of the history of scholarship on Pythagoreanism, see Gabriele Cornelli, In Search of 
Pythagoreanism: Pythagoreanism as an Historiographical Category, StPr 4 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013), 7–51 and Gabriele 
Cornelli, “Pythagoreanism as an Historiographical Category: Historical and Methodological Notes,” in On Pythagoreanism, 
ed. Gabriele Cornelli, Richard McKirahan, and Constantinos Macris, StPr 5 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013), 3–45.
223. Edward Zeller, Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy, 2nd ed., trans. Sarah Frances Alleyne and Evelyn 
Abbott (1883; repr., London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1909), 300–305. Burkert summarizes the matter as follows: “in 
Greece Pythagoreanism was a unique experiment that failed and disappeared again, but for a vague ideal that lived on in 
literature” (“Craft Versus Sect,” 22).
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This account has been challenged at a number of points by Peter Kingsley.224 He argues that 
the differences between early Pythagoreanism and Neopythagoreanism are not as great as scholars 
often claim. The thesis that the former was characterized by reason and logic while the latter was highly 
influenced by oracular revelation and divination cannot be sustained. In both periods the mathematician 
and the scientist belong together with the prophet and the priest. With regard to the Hellenistic 
Pythagorean texts, Kingsley notes (contra Burkert) that it is difficult to imagine the production of 
Pythagorean texts without Pythagoreans:
In the absence of evidence to the contrary it must be assumed that writers of literature 
purporting to be Pythagoreans will have had sympathies with Pythagoreanism and will very 
probably have considered themselves as standing in the line of Pythagorean tradition.225
 The extant Pythagorean texts have been assigned dates spanning six centuries: from the early 
Hellenistic period to the third century CE.226 Erwin Goodenough examines four Pythagorean treatises 
in order to flesh out “a great philosophy of royalty ... the official political philosophy of the Hellenistic 
age”227 and places them in the Hellenistic period on the basis of their conception of kingship. The 
language of these περι` βασιλει'ας treatises—an archaic or archaizing Doric—is analyzed by Louis 
Delatte in the second part of his study.228 He finds that the dialect, vocabulary, syntax, and style of the 
three περι` βασιλει'ας treatises all belong in the first or, more likely, second century CE. In his review, 
Goodenough agrees with Delatte’s linguistic analysis (and dating) while voicing dissent with Delatte’s 
conclusion that much of the philosophical theory is Stoic; Goodenough holds to the argument in his 
1928 essay that the treatises are, instead, “Platonic-Pythagorean.”229 One would hope that Delatte’s 
linguistic analysis might provide a solid foundation for establishing the date of these texts, but Holger 
Thesleff’s study leads him to disagree with Delatte and to suggest the middle of the third century BCE 
as the date of composition of the Pythagorean texts in general.230 In the same year that Thesleff’s book 
appeared, Burkert published a two-part article, “Hellenistische Pseudopythagorica,” in which he argued 
that some of the Pythagorean texts might be as early as the third century BCE and that, in general, these 
texts contributed to, rather than resulted from, first-century Roman Pythagoreanism.231 A decade later, 
in the published proceedings of a symposium on pseudepigrapha, Burkert argued that the Pythagorean 
texts were written between 150 BCE and the third century CE, while Thesleff, unwilling to abandon 
his view that these are essentially Hellenistic texts, nevertheless agreed that they might have been 
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224. Ancient Philosophy, Mystery, and Magic, see especially 317–34. Kingsley’s assessment of the continuity of 
Pythagoreanism in the Hellenistic period is cited favourably in Cornelli, In Search of Pythagoreanism, 193–94.
225. Kingsley, Ancient Philosophy, Mystery, and Magic, 320.
226. Thesleff, Introduction, 72; Walter Burkert, “Zur geistesgeschichtlichen Einordnung einiger Pseudopythagorica,” in 
Pseudepigrapha I, ed. Kurt von Fritz, EnAC 18 (Vandœuvres-Genève: Fondation Hardt, 1972), 25–55. 
227. Erwin R. Goodenough, “The Political Philosophy of Hellenistic Kingship,” YCS 1 (1928): 53–102; the quotation is 
from page 102. In addition to the three περι` βασιλει'ας treatises mentioned above, he considered Archytas’ περι` νο' µου και` 
δικαιοσυ' νης (Stob. 4.1.135–138; 4.5.61), which also contains a handful of passages discussing kingship.
228. Louis Delatte, Les Traités de la Royauté d’Ecphante, Diotogène et Sthénidas, Bibliothèque de la Faculté de 
Philosophie et Lettres de l’Université de Liége 97 (Paris: Droz, 1942).
229. Erwin R. Goodenough, Les Traités de la Royauté d’Ecphante, Diotogène et Sthénidas, CP 44.2 (1949): 129–31.
230. Thesleff, Introduction, esp. 99–101, 113–16. For Thesleff’s interaction with and critique of Delatte’s linguistic 
arguments, see pp. 65–71.
231. Burkert, “Hellenistische Pseudopythagorica.”
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produced towards the end of the second century BCE.232 In a published version of a 1991 doctoral 
dissertation, John Martens reviews the various arguments about the dating of the Hellenistic 
Pythagorean kingship texts233 and concludes that linguistic analysis is unable to determine definitively 
the date of the kingship treatises. He proposes that a comparison of the ideas found in the texts point in 
the direction of a date in the Hellenistic period.
A growing number of scholars are content to place these works in the early Imperial period 
(first century BCE to first century CE), seeing in them affinities with Middle Platonism.234 Bruno 
Centrone argues that this group of pseudepigrapha demonstrates a systematic philosophical 
coherence.235 The texts represent a “Platonizing system” into which Aristotelian doctrines have been 
introduced, a situation which is best explained if they were produced in the first century BCE to first 
century CE.236   
 While a definitive answer to the question of the dating of these texts might be impossible, 
given the complexity and paucity of the evidence, the discussion that follows will proceed on the 
assumption that a late Hellenistic or early Imperial date for the Pythagorean περι` βασιλει'ας treatises is 
possible and that they provide us with examples of the topos of ideal kingship.
In what follows I will provide a summary discussion of each of the three Pythagorean kingship 
treatises. This will be followed by a synthetic exploration of some of the key ideas found in these 
writings. Through this approach I hope to highlight the similarities as well as the significant difference 
between these three texts in order to establish a sketch of the ideal king in Pythagorean thought. 
Extensive commentary on these texts can be found in the works of Erwin Goodenough, Louis Delatte, 
and Bruno Blumenfeld.237 Each of these scholars suggest numerous antecedents and parallels to the 
vocabulary and ideas found in the Pythagorean texts. The discussion that follows will only draw 
attention to these elements when they contribute to the attempt to define the Pythagorean ideal king.
Ecphantus
The longest Pythagorean περι` βασιλει'ας treatise is that of Ecphantus.238 Although a 
Pythagorean named Ecphantus was known in antiquity, he is not the author of the kingship treatise 
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232. Burkert, “Pseudopythagorica”; Holger Thesleff, “On the Problem of the Doric Pseudo-Pythagorica: An Alternative 
Theory of Date and Purpose,” in Pseudepigrapha I, ed. Kurt von Fritz, EnAC 18 (Vandœuvres-Genève: Fondation Hardt, 
1972), 59–87.
233. John W. Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, SPhAMA 2 
(Leiden: Brill, 2003), 165–67 This material is found in an appendix (pp. 165–174) discussing the date of the Pythagorean 
περι` βασιλει'ας treatises.
234. With regard to the political treatises, see Bruno Centrone, “Platonism and Pythagoreanism in the Early Empire,” in 
The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought, ed. Christopher Rowe and Malcolm Schofield (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 567–75. Francesca Calabi (God’s Acting, Man’s Acting: Tradition and Philosophy in 
Philo of  Alexandria, trans. Helen C. Tooke, SPhA 4 [Leiden: Brill, 2008], 185–88) provides a useful summary discussion of 
the debate around dating before agreeing with Centrone’s position. Thesleff modified his 1961 position arguing, in 1972, that 
the Pythagorean texts should be dated to the late second century BCE and that they were composed in Italy,  “at the periphery 
of the Scipionic Circle” ( “Doric Pseudo-Pythagorica,” 83–84).
235. Centrone, “Pseudo-Pythagorean Writings.”
236. Centrone, “Pseudo-Pythagorean Writings,” 336–40.
237. Goodenough, “Hellenistic Kingship”; Delatte, Traités, 164–281; Bruno Blumenfeld, The Political Paul: Justice, 
Democracy and Kingship in a Hellenistic Framework, JSNTSup 210 (London: T &T Clark, 2001), 189–274\.
238. Four fragments (about 1480 words) of the treatise have been preserved (the first of which is not included in 
Goodenough’s 1928 article). The text can be found at Thesleff 79.1–84.8 (= Stob. 4.6.22; 4.7.64–66 = WH 4, 244–245, 271–
279). For commentary on the Ecphantus text, see Delatte, Traités, 164–244; Blumenfeld, Political Paul, 191–234.
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preserved by Stobaeus.239 Ecphantus places kingship within the harmony and good order that defines 
the cosmos (79.8–80.7). Within this sphere the king is a unique individual who shares in both humanity 
and the divine. Kingship is spoken of in abstract and personified terms (80.7–21) as something pure 
and radiant which only a true king will be able to bear. The one who occupies this particular office is 
an intermediary between God and humanity, not only in terms of his being, but also as he purifies his 
subjects. This happens as they imitate the king just as the king imitates God. This is a prime example of 
a pattern seen in various Pythagorean treatises in which each “system” imitates the one above it 
(80.22–82.6).240 Imitation relies on the good will that must exist between ruler and subject; the 
opposite end of this spectrum is defined by a complex of ideas that includes compulsion, force, and 
fear (82.28–83.9). The king’s logos serves as an antidote to his subjects’ forgetfulness from their 
“indwelling wickedness” (ταñς κακι'ας ενοικευñσαν; 83.13).
Self-sufficiency (αυ τα' ρκεια) is the primary divine and thus royal virtue (82.7–27) which is also 
linked to ruling oneself. Justice is an essential part of the way in which the king relates to his subjects 
(83.18–24) and Ecphantus concludes (83.25–84.3) by adding self-control (εγκρα' τεια/εγκρατη' ς) to self-
sufficiency and contrasting these virtues to the vices of extravagance (πολυτε'λεια), incontinence 
(α κρασι'α), and arrogance (υ«βρις). All of the virtues have the king’s intelligence (φρο' νησις) as their 
source, just as God is the intelligence of the cosmos (83.4–8).
Ecphantus provides us with a prime example of what Carol Atack refers to as “cosmic 
monarchy”—the idea that kingship is part of cosmic order and that the king brings this cosmic order to 
bear upon a society.241 The means by which the king participates in this cosmic order and benefits his 
subjects is through his imitation of the divine. This is discussed in more detail below. Cosmic 
monarchy is contrasted with virtue monarchy in which the excellence of the king’s character is what 
entitles him to rule and also forms the basis of his subjects’ imitation. It would seem that Pythagorean 
kingship represents an attempt synthesize these two models.  
Diotogenes
Stobaeus preserves two fragments (4.7.61 and 4.7.62 = WH 4, 263–270) from a treatise 
entitled περι` βασιλει'ας attributed to a certain Diotogenes.242 It is possible to read the opening and 
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239. Ecphantus was a Pythagorean from Syracuse (Hippolytus and Aëtius; apud DK 51) and was most likely a 
contemporary of Plato’s. Iamblichus groups him with the Pythagoreans from Croton (VP 267), but this is incorrect  (Leonid 
Zhmud, Pythagoras and the Early Pythagoreans, translated from Russian by Kevin Windle and Rosh Ireland [Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012], 113, 130). For a brief discussion of what is know about Ecphantus and his philosophy, see 
W. K. C. Guthrie, The Earlier Presocratics and the Pythagoreans, vol. 1 of A History of Greek Philosophy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1962), 323–27. 
240. Centrone, “Pseudo-Pythagorean Writings,” 321.
241. “Debating Kingship: Models of Monarchy in Fifth- and Fourth-Century BCE Greek Political Thought” (Ph.D. diss., 
Cambridge University, 2014), 10–35. Atack identifies this model in Herodotus and traces its origins back to Near Eastern 
models of monarchy.
242. These fragments run to 112 lines in H. Thesleff’s edition (Pythagorean Texts, 72.25–75.16). For commentary, see 
Goodenough, “Hellenistic Kingship,” 64–73; Delatte, Traités, 245–73; Blumenfeld, Political Paul, 234–53. Except for some 
fragments from a work entitled περι` ο σιο' τητος (Stob. 3.1.100 = WH 3, 50; Stob. 4.1.96 = WH 4, 36–38; Stob. 4.1.133 = WH 
4, 79–81), we have no other texts produced under this name. The περι` ο σιο' τητος fragments present political ideas that are 
quite different from those of the περι` βασιλει'ας fragments (Goodenough, “Hellenistic Kingship,” 64–65). There is no 
evidence of a Pythagorean named Diotogenes in the list recorded by Iamblichus (VP 267).This raises the intriguing question 
why the author would have chosen an unknown name for this text. The same question can be asked of the Sthenidas text.
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closing lines of this short treatise as a brief introduction and conclusion to a relatively informal text 
which begins with the theme of justice and ends with a discussion of the divinity of the king. At first 
glance it might seem that Stobaeus has preserved an entire text in two parts (Stob. 4.7.61 and 4.7.62). 
However, it is not obvious that the second fragment follows the line of thought from the first.243 There 
is an even more abrupt break in the flow of the text at 73.9: a discussion of the king’s virtues (72.29–
73.9) turns into a discussion of the people as a reflection of the soul (73.9–19). It would seem that we 
are dealing with a lacuna in the text both here and at 73.15.244 We are therefore dealing with a number 
of fragments or excerpts and not a complete text. Nonetheless, the major features of Diotogenes’ 
portrait of the ideal king can still be perceived quite clearly.
Diotogenes establishes kingship on the concepts of justice and law (71.18–23), portraying the 
king as “embodied law” (see below) and a legal ruler. The duties (ε»ργα) of the king are tripartite in 
nature, consisting of military, judicial, and religious functions (71.23–72.6). The author expounds each 
of these in what follows (general: 72.6–9; judge: 72.9–15; priest: 72.15–23). In each of these cases, the 
duty can only be performed well if the king gives attention to acquiring the abilities required within 
each field through intellectual effort. The relationship between God and king is explained by means of 
an analogy: as the polis is to the world, the king is to God (72.19–20). The king is thus a god among 
human beings (72.22–23). Like Ecphantus, Diotogenes emphasizes the king’s virtues. He chooses to 
stress the king’s self-control (especially with regard to pleasure) and his proper use of wealth. The 
king’s virtue defines his superiority and thus his position of authority (72.25–73.9). The vices of the 
king’s subjects are discussed in Platonic terms as the disordering of the various parts of the person.  
The goal of this section is to point out the need for the king to bring the various parts of society into 
harmony with one another, just as the parts of the individual person must be brought into harmony 
(73.9–19).
The final section prepares the “prince” for the political role he will be required to play (73.19–
74.4). The king must prepare both body and mind that he might present himself positively before his 
people. He must appear σεµνο' ς (majestic), χρηστο' ς (gracious), and δεινο' ς (fierce) in order to rule 
successfully (73.19–75.8). The final part of the fragment (75.8–16) concludes with the observation that 
these virtues characterize the gods, especially Zeus, “the Father of gods and men.” The essence of 
Diotogenes’ kingship theory is presented at 75.15–16: “It is necessary to remember, with regard to all 
of these things, that royalty is the imitation of the divine” (επι` παñσι δε` του' τοις µναµονευ' εν δειñ ο«τι 
θεο'µιµο' ν εντι piραñγµα βασιλει'α). Starting with the king’s close adherence to justice achieved through 
enacting law in his own person, the king is to imitate God in each and every way possible, including 
fatherly care for his subjects, thus bringing about harmony in his realm. 
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243. In Thesleff’s edition the first fragment (71.18–72.23) is separated from the second (72.25–75.16) by editorial 
notation (72.24).
244. Goodenough reads the sentence at 73.14–15 with what follows (“Hellenistic Kingship,” 71) but it seems that the 
theme of injustice belongs with the discussion of vices found at 73.9–14. 
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Sthenidas
In this brief text,245 the otherwise-unknown Sthenidas of Locri246 asserts that monarchical rule 
is achieved as the king imitates God in his wise and kindly relationship to his subjects. In addition to 
emulating God’s wisdom, the king, like God, be high-minded (µεγαλο' φρων), gentle (η«µερος), and 
content with little (ο λιγοδεη' ς). Like God, the king should evidence a fatherly disposition towards his 
subjects. God is also described as nourisher (τροφευ' ς), teacher (διδα' σκαλος), and lawgiver (νοµοθε'της) 
(188.7–9). As Blumenfeld puts it, “God’s fatherhood covers the entire developmental cycle of the 
human being and of the polis—from the nursery to political maturity and from foundation to law 
reform.”247 Finally, Sthenidas comments that nothing which lacks a ruler is good, that rule is only 
possible with wisdom, and therefore, that the wise and lawful king will be an imitator and servant of 
God.
The king’s imitation of God is central in all three περι` βασιλει'ας treatises and can rightly be 
considered as a foundational element of the Pythagorean theory of kingship.248 In the following 
sections, this element of Pythagorean kingship will be discussed in more detail, together with other 
important themes that emerge from these texts. The first matter relates to the relationship between the 
king and the law.  
The King and Law: Nο'µος ε»µψυχος
Questions surrounding the nature of law are at the heart of ancient Greek political 
philosophy.249 The Pythagorean kingship tracts, focused as they are on the nature of the king, have less 
to say on the relationship between the king and law than one might expect. There are glimpses, 
however, of an intriguing development in Hellenistic political philosophy in which the king is 
considered the embodiment of law.250 If, as suggested above, these texts belong to the late Hellenistic 
or early Imperial period, then Diotogenes’ writing contains the first occurrence of the term νο' µος 
ε»µψυχος (71.21–22; 72.23) to describe this aspect of ideal kingship.
Although the phrase νο'µος ε»µψυχος is not found in the extant literature of the classical period, 
certain elements that contribute to this concept can be traced back to that time. The outline of what 
would become the νο' µος ε»µψυχος theory can be seen when Isocrates tells Demonicus that he should 
follow the laws set down by the king but, more importantly, consider the king’s “manner of life” 
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245. The text runs to only 200 words—18 lines in Thesleff’s edition (187.9–188.13) = Stob. 4.7.63 = WH 4, 270–271. 
Commentary can be found in Goodenough, “Hellenistic Kingship,” 73–75; Delatte, Traités, 274–81; Blumenfeld, Political 
Paul, 254–64.
246. Iamblichus mentions a certain Σθενωνι'δας amongst the Locrians (VP 267). 
247. Blumenfeld, Political Paul, 260–61.
248. Oswyn Murray, “Peri Basileias: Studies in the Justification of Monarchic Power in the Hellenistic Period” (Ph.D. 
diss., Oxford University, 1971), 272–73.
249. As Richard Winton observes, “The contrast between nomos and phusis ... constitutes the single most fertile and 
most influential idea to emerge in fifth-century Greece” (“Herodotus, Thucydides and the Sophists,” in The Cambridge 
History of Greek and Roman Political Thought, ed. Christopher Rowe and Malcolm Schofield [Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000], 98).
250. For a survey of the development of the concept, see G. J. D. Aalders H. Wzn., “ΝΟΜΟΣ ΕΜΨΥΧΟΣ,” in Politeia 
und Res Publica: Beiträge zum Verständnis von Politik, Recht und Staat in der Antike., ed. Peter Steinmetz, Palingenesia 4 
(Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1969), 315–29; Glenn F. Chesnut, “The Ruler and the Logos in Neopythagorean, Middle Platonic, and 
Late Stoic Political Philosophy,” ANRW 16.2: 1310–32 and Martens, One God, 31–66.
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(τρο' πος) the highest law (Demon. 36). Xenophon’s Cyrus famously considers the good ruler to be a 
“seeing law”  (Cyr. 8.1.22), contrasting the king’s ability to identify and punish transgressors with that 
of the written law, which is only able to bear testimony to commands without enforcing sanctions for 
their transgression. 
However, it is Plato’s philosophical foundation upon which the Hellenistic theory would be 
built.251 For Plato, as elsewhere in the Socratic tradition, rule consists, above all, of the correct exercise 
of the intellect. In the Statesman, the interlocutors agree (Pol. 293b-d) that ruling is an “expertise” 
(τε' χνη) and that the only true constitution is “the one in which the rulers would be found truly 
possessing expert knowledge” (του`ς α»ρχοντας α ληθωñ ς επιστη' µονας). This knowledge raises the ideal 
ruler above the law. Written laws are flawed because they are unable to address every situation at all 
times, and so the wise king is the best ruler (294a–b), able to act in the best possible way through his 
expertise, without taking any notice of written laws (300c–d).
This ideal king—“some natural genius” who enjoys true freedom and knowledge (Leg. 875c–
d)—would seem to have many affinities with the philosopher-king described in the Republic. His 
vision of the Good leads to imitation of, and assimilation to, what is organized, constant, just, and 
rational (Resp. 500c–d). Similarly, Aristotle argues that a being who excels the rest of humanity in the 
same way that the gods do deserves to rule and not to be ruled (Pol. 7.1332b16–27). Indeed, such a 
person would be like a god among men (ω« σpiερ γα`ρ θεο`ν ε ν α νθρω' ποις εικο`ς ειòναι το`ν τοιουñτον); 
people of this nature are themselves law (αυ τοι` γα' ρ εισι νο' µος) and cannot be expected to obey laws 
(Pol. 3.1284a3–14).
Plato is pessimistic about the possibility of coming across this sort of ruler—unlike the “king 
bee” [sic], a superior human being of this nature does not appear spontaneously in a city—and so 
written laws are indeed necessary (Pol. 301d–e). It follows, then, that “when [imperfect] monarchy is 
yoked in good written rules, which we call laws, it is best of all six [constitutions]; but if it is without 
laws, it is difficult and heaviest to live with” (Pol. 302e).252 Those who read these words in the 
generations after Plato were all too familiar with imperfect monarchy and the scarcity of the ideal ruler.
The Stoic concept of the sage as king is as additional stream flowing into this conceptual 
pool.253 As already shown above (see p. 120), the Stoic development of this concept has more to do 
with understanding the sage than it does with understanding kingship. Nevertheless, this does not 
preclude the Pythagorean writers from exploiting Stoic concepts for their own purposes.  
While classical thinkers had wrestled with the theory of absolute monarchy, it was exactly this 
sort of ruler that eventually came to dominate the Hellenistic world. The three Pythagorean piερι` 
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251. This is the main argument in Ilaria L. E. Ramelli, Il basileus come nomos empsychos tra diritto naturale e diritto 
divino. Spunti platonici del concetto e sviluppi di età imperiale e tardo-antica, Memorie dell’Istituto Italiano per gli Studi 
Filosofici 34 (Naples: Bibliopolis, 2006), for which I rely largely on Peter Van Nuffelen’s review (Bryn Mawr Classical 
Review 2007.06.21; http://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/2007/2007-06-21.html). See also Aalders H. Wzn., “ΝΟΜΟΣ ΕΜΨΥΧΟΣ”; 
Martens, One God, 31–66. Chesnut, “Ruler and Logos,” 1311–12 considers the νο' µος ε»µψυχος concept to be a philosophical 
response to the claims of the divine ruler cult. It served to weaken claims of divinity since the king was an image of God, not 
God himself. While the concept would, no doubt, have provided the sort of justification envisaged by Chesnut, the work of 
Aalders and Ramelli demonstrates that its roots lie, instead, in the perennial philosophical discussion of νο' µος.
252. For the importance of the law and a law-abiding ruler, see Plato, Leg. 715b–d.
253. Murray, “Peri Basileias,” 276.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
βασιλει'ας texts conceptualize absolute monarchy within this milieu, even if they do not have in view a 
definite historical king.254 From the standpoint of political thought, the question of the relationship 
between king and law must be addressed. Diotogenes approaches this question through the νο' µος 
ε»µψυχος concept.
The precise nature of what it means for the king to be νο'µος ε»µψυχος is not spelled out in any 
of the treatises being examined.255 Oswyn Murray has also shown that the use of νο' µος ε»µψυχος in 
Cicero, Philo, Musonius Rufus, and later writers is so diverse that one cannot speak of the history of an 
idea but only identify “the changing use of a phrase.”256   
Diotogene’s treatise begins by declaring that the king is (per definition) “most lawful” and 
“most just” by virtue of being “living law” and “legal ruler” (71.18–23). His distribution of justice in 
both public and private spheres imitates God’s rule of the cosmos (72.9–15),257 an important theme to 
which we will return below. Through justice, the king is to bring his realm into harmony with his rule 
(το` ποτι` µι'αν α ρχα' ν τε και` α  γεµονι'αν το` ο«λον ξυναρµο'σθαι; 72.12). The precise nature of this harmony 
is not described. But since the next sentence (72.14–15) speaks of the king acting positively for the 
sake of his subjects, we should probably assume that this harmony relates to the well-being of those 
over whom the king rules.258 As “living law,” however, the king’s actions towards his subjects must be 
marked by justice and law.259
There is no indication in the Pythagorean texts that the king is accountable to a council for his 
actions. A lesser form of consultation—that the king surround himself with wise and honest advisors—
is also not mentioned. As “living law,” the king’s rule is absolute. It is therefore accurate to 
acknowledge his power as being α νυπευ' θυνος—beyond criticism and not accountable to anyone260—
and to recognize that this transforms him into a god among the rest of humanity (72.22–23).261
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254. A text like the Letter of Aristeas, in contrast, places its discussion of kingship very clearly within the Ptolemaic 
dynasty, see Jonathan More, “Kingship Ideology: A Neglected Element in Aristeas’ Charter Myth for Alexandrian Judaism,” 
in Septuagint and Reception, ed. Johann Cook, VTSup 127 (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 299–319. Although there are no explicit 
links to historical rulers in the Pythagorean texts, in Marten’s estimation, the ideas they espouse clearly belong in the 
Hellenistic period (One God, 168). 
255. So Blumenfeld: “this is a given, assumed known and not explained, a self-evident axiom requiring no 
demonstration” (Political Paul, 235 n. 200). As mentioned above, however, Diotogenes does link the king as νο' µος ε»µψυχος 
to his absolute power and his being like a god among the rest of humanity (72.22–23).
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virtue who brings justice through establishing laws (Off. 2.41–42) and who offers his own exemplary life as law (Resp. 1.52). 
Cicero also conceptualizes the magistrate as speaking law (Leg. 3.2–3). In the first century CE, the phrase can be found in 
Philo (Mos. 1.162; 2.4; Abr. 5) and Musonius Rufus (8.81 = Stob. 4.7.67 = WH 2, 283). Plutarch writes that the king should 
be ruled not by written laws but by ε»µψυχος ... λο' γος (Princ. iner. 780c). For Clement of Alexandria’s use, see John W. 
Martens, “Nomos Empsychos in Philo and Clement of Alexandria,” in Hellenization Revisited: Shaping a Christian Response 
Within the Greco-Roman World, ed. Wendy E. Helleman (Lanham: University Press of America, 1994), 323–38.
257. The king is thus able to do what Plato’s lawgiver is not: balance the interests of the common good and the private 
individual (Leg. 875a–b).
258. That the king should treat his subjects justly and act in their best interests is an important aspect of the piερι` 
βασιλει'ας topos and is discussed more fully below.
259. Diotogenes recognizes the potential tension between justice and mercy but does not attempt a resolution. See p. 157 
for further discussion of this point as it pertains to 74.26–75.8.
260. The Platonic definitions of βασιλευ' ς and δεσpiοτει'α both include α νυπευ' θυνος as characteristic of monarchical rule 
(Def. 415b; 415e); see also Chrysippus’ definition of the kingship of the wise (D.L. 7.122): τηñς βασιλει'ας ου»σης α ρχηñς 
α νυpiευθυ' νου. 
261. For Diotogenes’ use of piαρασχηµατι'ζω, transform, see below (p. 150). 
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However, for the king to be a “legal ruler” (νο' µιµος α»ρχων; 71.22) suggests that there is a 
certain law against which he can be measured. It is presumably this law from which he must not depart 
when attempting to benefit his subjects (72.12–15). Before he is able to bring harmony to the polis he 
must establish an order of law within himself (73.16–17). Implicit in all of these statements is the idea 
that the king does not define law, but is subject to some other law with which he must align himself.  
Unfortunately, Diotogenes does not provide us with a description or discussion of the law 
against which the king might be measured. It is possible to argue that the law in view is the law of 
nature or some sort of divine law, and this would preserve the king’s absolute authority amongst 
humanity. Diotogenes is clear that the king derives his authority from God (73.17–18). This divine 
right to rule ensures that the king’s authority cannot be usurped by any other human being, while at the 
same time establishing God as an authority above the king.262 The king as νο'µος ε»µψυχος is thus not 
equated with natural or divine law but must conform to it. He does not define the law at this point but 
is defined by it.
Nevertheless, as νο'µος ε»µψυχος, the king is the embodiment of the divine law for his subjects. 
From their perspective, he is the law. There is no higher authority to which they might appeal, since the 
king stands between the divine and human, and it is only by gazing upon him that his subjects are able 
to glimpse the divine (see below, p, 150).
It is also possible, however, that this tension between king and law as it appears in Diotogenes’ 
writing represents the same tension caused by the transition of authority from written code to monarchy 
that John Martens recognizes in Archytas.263 This is not to argue that Diotogenes writes in a period in 
which monarchy is in some way subservient to the law. Rather, his writing has yet to reflect the 
philosophical justification of absolute monarchy.
Ecphantus does not use the phrase νο'µος ε»µψυχος and has even less to say than Diotogenes on 
the subject of law. Viewed from a cosmic perspective, the king is the being most suited to rule because 
of his share in divinity (79.15–17; cf. 80.4–5). This might suggest the king’s absolute authority since 
the one most suited to rule should not be ruled by anyone or anything else. But like Diotogenes, there 
are certain points at which Ecphantus’ allows his readers an unintentional glimpse of another type of 
rule.
At one point Ecphantus asserts that humanity can be purified through becoming like that which 
rules them, whether law or king (80.22–24). This statement recognizes that one might live either under 
(written) law or under a king, but it does not say that these two might exist within one system. 
Ecphantus is emphatic about the necessity and goodness of rule within the cosmic order (81.2–3), but 
fails to specify the nature of that rule. A further discussion of the necessity of law within the political 
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262. See Delatte, Traités, 262–63.
263. Martens, One God, 35–37. Archytas distinguishes between two forms of law: the king as ε»µψυχος and the written 
law as α»ψυχος (Thesleff 33.8–9). Like Diotogenes, Archytas also understands the king to be accountable to the unwritten 
law; see below. Hayes’ “Discourse 4” summarizes various discussions around the contrast between the “flexible, unwritten, 
‘living law’” and the “inflexible, written, ‘dead letter’” (What’s Divine About Divine Law? Early Perspectives [Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2015], 66–70). The Platonic solution, taken up by the Pythagoreans, is found in the νο' µος 
ε»µψυχος concept. Hayes’ focus is more philosophical in contrast to Martens’ more historical analysis. 
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community (81.22–24) is not any more illuminating with regard to the nature of that law, since it could 
refer either to the “embodied law” or to the written law. Nevertheless, we see that Ecphantus’ portrayal 
of the ideal king is also unable to do away completely with all law external to the king.
The only contribution that Sthenidas makes to this topic is the observation that God is lawgiver 
(νοµοθε'της; 188.9) and the king should imitate him in this. The “lawgiver” title is ambiguous. It could 
refer to a leader, like Solon or Lycurgus, who created laws for his people, but if Sthenidas’ conception 
of the king is similar to that of Diotogenes’ in this regard, then the king as “lawgiver” refers to the way 
in which the king embodies law in the midst of his people. Of interest at this point is the connection to 
imitation of the divine that Sthenidas draws with regard to this function. Before addressing this topic in 
the following section, it is worth noting that another Pythagorean text offers a discussion of king and 
law that clarifies the development of political thought as it is reflected in the piερι` βασιλει'ας we are 
examining. 
In Archytas’ Περι` νο' µου και` δικαιοσυ' νης264 the author distinguishes between written law and 
unwritten law. The latter is the law of the gods, which is also equated with nature (33.19–28). Archytas 
elsewhere identifies law with both the written, inanimate law (α»ψυχος γρα' µµα) and the living king 
(ε»µψυχος βασιλευ' ς) (33.8). Both written law and embodied law function to harmonize the community 
and to bring about concord and virtue. Implied in Archytas’ view of the law is that whichever law is in 
place, whether it be the written law or the embodied law, it needs to conform to divine law. When this 
divine law is transgressed, the king becomes a tyrant and his people are slaves (33.11–12). Later in this 
treatise Archytas goes on to praise the mixed constitution of Sparta as exemplifying the best 
constitution (34.16–27). The concept of divine law in Archytas’ treatise serves to remove the tension 
that might arise between constitution and king since both written and embodied law, if they are good, 
will always be in harmony with the divine law and thus with each other.
If the king is merely one of the elements in Archytas’ political philosophy, within the piερι` 
βασιλει'ας treatises we have been examining the king has moved to the foreground and become the 
focus. Nevertheless, the vestiges of the law are still on display in Diotogenes and, to a lesser degree, 
Ecphantus. It seems impossible for these thinkers to rid themselves of the idea that the king needs to be 
measured against something. The spectre of the tyrant—the lawless monarch—lurks in the 
background.265 The writers examined in this chapter seem incapable of moving away from the idea that 
something is needed to temper the ruler’s absolute authority. These treatises are not addressed directly 
to kings and no explicit advice is offered in this regard. Nevertheless, the divine law remains as a 
possible standard against which a ruler might be measured or measure himself. Even if the abstract 
concept of divine law remains implicit and undeveloped in the piερι` βασιλει'ας treatises, the 
Pythagorean writers suggest that the ideal king should be measured against God himself.266
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264. The text can be found in Thesleff, Pythagorean Texts, 33–36 (Stobaeus 4.1.135–138, 4.5.61 = WH 4.82–88, 218–
219). For discussion, see Martens, One God, 35–37; Blumenfeld, Political Paul, 124–39.  
265. Martens, One God, 37.
266. Martens, One God, 65–66.
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Imitation of God
The most striking and, perhaps, defining characteristic of the king in the Pythagorean texts is 
his imitation of God. The idea is mentioned by Sthenidas (187.11; 188.2, 12–13) and occurs 
throughout Ecphantus’ text (80.3–5; 81.4; 82.20). Diotogenes draws on the analogy between God’s 
rule over the cosmos and the king’s rule over the state (72.18–23) to explain that the king is νο' µος 
ε»µψυχος and, therefore, like a god among men. His concluding statement, however, places the whole 
treatise into the context of imitation: “It is necessary to remember with regard to all of these things, that 
royalty is an imitation of the divine (θεο'µιµο' ν267 εντι πραñγµα βασιλει'α)” (75.15–16).
Plato, most famously, speaks of assimilation268 to God (ο  µοι'ωσις θεωñ, ; Theaet. 176b) in the 
context of distancing the soul from the body through acquiring virtue and avoiding vice (cf. Phaed. 
64e). The assimilation process is also in view in the Timaeus (90a–d) and Republic (500b–d; 613a–b), 
albeit with a slightly different emphasis in each text.269 This concept contributed to the telos within 
Aristotle’s thought and that of the Epicurean and Stoic schools, even if it was modified slightly in each 
case.270
Amongst certain Middle Platonic thinkers, the source of the idea of assimilation to the divine 
was traced back, via Plato, to Pythagoras; more specifically, the Pythagorean command to “Follow 
God” was understood as seminal to this doctrine.271 Eudorus of Alexandria (see Stob. 2.7.3 = WH 2, 
49), for example, cites Plato’s Timaeus, Republic, and Theaetetus as expounding this Pythagorean 
doctrine. Plato’s qualifier in Theatetus 176b (“as far as possible”) is thought to refer to the faculty by 
which humanity can imitate God, that is, through the intellect and its virtue, wisdom.272
As the example of Eudorus indicates, imitation of God became an increasingly important part 
of ethics in the Platonisms of the Hellenistic and Graeco-Roman periods, often being cited as the τε'λος 
of human life.273 The one striking difference between the way in which these thinkers applied this 
concept and the way it was used in the Pythagorean piερι` βασιλει'ας texts is that the latter predicate it 
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267. In the TLG corpus θεο' µιµος occurs only here and at 73.28, where the king’s majesty is an imitation of the divine (α   
µε`ν γα`ρ σεµνο' τας θεο' µιµον υ  πα' ρχουσα piραñγµα). Other words used in the Pythagorean treatises to speak of this concept 
include: Ecphantus: α ρχε'τυπον (80.3–4); τυ' πος  (80.5); µιµε'οµαι (81.4 bis);  God is described as α ξιοµι'µητος “worthy of 
imitation” (82.20); Sthenidas: εσσειñται α ντι'µιµος και` ζηλωτα`ς τωñ  πρα' τω θεωñ  (187.11);   κα µιµε'οιτο τουñτον (188.2);  
µιµατα`ς ... εσσειñται τωñ  θεωñ  (188.12–13). Diotogenes also speaks of “drawing near” (συνεγγι'ζω) to the gods (74.10).
268. There is not too much of a distinction to be made between ο µοι'ωσις and µι'µησις in the context within which these 
are being considered here (see George H. Van Kooten, Paul’s Anthropology in Context: The Image of God, Assimilation to 
God, and Tripartite Man in Ancient Judaism, Ancient Philosophy and Early Christianity, WUNT 232 [Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 2008], 159). If anything, µι'µησις might imply a slightly more active process, but this should not be overemphasized 
since ο µοι'ωσις θεωñ,  as the pursuit of virtue is itself active.   
269. David N. Sedley, “The Ideal of Godlikeness,” in Plato 2: Ethics, Politics, Religion, and the Soul, ed. Gail Fine, 
Oxford Readings in Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 309–28. In response to the question whether 
assimilation consists in removing oneself from human affairs (Theaetetus) or governing well (Timaeus), the Pythagorean 
texts suggest the latter. 
270. Dominic J. O’Meara, Platonopolis: Platonic Political Philosophy in Late Antiquity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2003), 31–34. For Aristotle, see also Sedley, “Godlikeness,” 324–28.
271. Charles H. Kahn, Pythagoras and Pythagoreans: A Brief History (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2001), 96.
272. John M. Dillon, The Middle Platonists: A Study of Platonism 80 B.C. to A.D. 220, Classical Life and Letters 
(London: Duckworth, 1977), 122–23. For a fuller discussion of this passage in Eudorus, see Van Kooten, Paul’s 
Anthropology, 141–48.
273.  See, for example, Dillon’s observation that, “As regards the telos, on the other hand, the ideal of Likeness to God is 
adopted by Plutarch as by everyone else after Eudorus” (The Middle Platonists, 229); see also 43–44, 192, 299–300.
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primarily of the king and not of humanity in general.274 Even if men and women do come to imitate 
God through their imitation of the king, it is primarily the king who is called upon to imitate God in his 
rule over the cosmos and his virtues.
Sthenidas links the king’s imitation of God to wisdom and virtue (187.9–188.4). In these brief 
passages Sthenidas portrays the king as a sage, drawing links similar to those we saw in the Cynic and 
Stoic writings earlier in this chapter.275 Imitation of the divine also has a significant rational component 
in Ecphantus for whom God is the intelligence (φρο' νησις) of the cosmos (84.4–5). Unless he imitates 
God’s intelligence, the king will be unable to maintain the order of his realm, since the virtues 
necessary for such rule are impossible to attain without intelligence (84.4–8).276  The emphasis on the 
mind should not lead us to conclude that the Pythagoreans argued for passive imitation through 
contemplation leading to flight from the world. Rather, the mind’s assimilation to the divine is 
displayed in ruling well, just as God rules the cosmos well.277 Diotogenes also links imitation of the 
divine to virtue and the mind (74.10–12), but this forms part of the king’s imitation of God’s majesty. 
In addition to being majestic, the king must imitate God in being gracious, and fear-inspiring (73.23–
74.4; 75.8–16). The focus in the latter part of Diotogenes’ text (73.15–75.8) is very much on how the 
king presents himself to his subjects and his actions towards them. The nature of the king is not 
primarily in view.278
Ecphantus describes something of the king’s nature when he explains (79.20–80.4) that since 
the king is a copy of God, who created the king using himself as an archetype, the king is unique 
amongst humanity. Created out of the same material (υ«λη) as the rest, he is, nonetheless, most divine 
(θειο' τερον). At first glance, then, it would seem that the king is (at least) a semi-divine being. The 
following phrase (80.1–2) limits this: his divine status exists because he enjoys the greatest part of the 
good that is found in common human nature (θειο' τερον δ’ ο   βασιλευ`ς εν ταñ,  κοιναñ,  φυ' σει piλεονεκτωñν 
τωñ  κρε'σσονος). It is possible that the “image of God” concept is at work here even though the precise 
phrase it not used.279 The way in which the fragment at 79.3–7 is interpreted will influence our 
understanding of Ecphantus at this point.280
The fragment281 begins by establishing the plight of humanity: despite having God as a 
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274. It is therefore possible to distinguish between a royal model and a more general anthropological model of 
assimilation to God. For the latter, see Centrone, “Pseudo-Pythagorean Writings,” 332. Van Kooten, Paul’s 
Anthropology, 95–112 discusses the evidence for the “image of God” as it pertains to both king and humanity in general.
275. So Chesnut, “Ruler and Logos,” 1317–18. This point is discussed in more detail below on p. 152.
276. For the imitation of God’s virtue, see also Ecphantus 81.4; 82.20–27.
277. For a summary of the evidence of Plato’s ambivalence on this question, see Kathleen Gibbons, “Moses, Statesman 
and Philosopher: The Philosophical Background of the Ideal of Assimilation to God and the Methodology of Clement of 
Alexandria’s Stromateis 1,” VC (2015): 162–65. Van Kooten (Paul’s Anthropology, 128–29) describes the problem in terms 
of being “genuinely ethical” or an otherworldy “intellectual enterprise.” In the Pythagorean texts the ethical and intellectual 
cannot be separated. 
278. Earlier in the treatise, Diotogenes had also described the king in terms of three functions—military, judicial, and 
cultic—rather than in terms of his nature.
279. For the link between “image of God” and “assimilation to God,” see Van Kooten, Paul’s Anthropology, 124–81.
280. For commentary on this passage, see Delatte, Traités, 184–95; Blumenfeld, Political Paul, 200–204.
281. Despite the superscript ( Ε κφα' ντου εκ τουñ Περι` βασιλει'ας) Stobaeus includes the fragment (79.3–7 in Thesleff’s 
edition) in the sixth chapter of his fourth volume (4.6.22) and not in the seventh, where the other piερι` βασιλει'ας fragments 
have been collected (4.7.64–66). The surviving fragments lack a coherent “narrative” or logical structure, making it difficult 
to discern any definite order into which they may be placed. The context of the fragment currently being discussed (79.3–7) 
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father/progenitor (γεννη' τωρ), the human race has been weighed down and oppressed in its migration to 
earth (79.3–5).282 Humanity’s corrupt nature implies the inability to see God (79.7). It is only through 
the mediation of the king, who shares something of the divine spirit (θεοµοιρη' ς τις εµπνοι'ησις, 79.5–
6),283 that humanity is able to ascend in contemplation of the divine. The exact way in which the king’s 
mediation works is not spelled out at this point, but the language of revelation, sight, and 
contemplation (δει'κνυµι, προ' οψις, θεα' οµαι; 79.6, 7) suggest the idea of gazing upon the king and 
imitating him.284 
Much hinges on one’s reading of θεοµοιρη' ς εµπνοι'ησις at this point. In Delatte’s interpre-
tation, Ecphantus has melded religious ideas from Hellenistic mysticism with philosophical Stoicism 
and applied what was originally predicated of all humanity to the person of the king. In the earlier form 
of this idea, humanity was infused with the divine breath in order that it might ascend to God.285 In 
Ecphantus’ model, it is only the king who receives the divine breath; humanity’s ascent occurs through 
the king’s mediation.      
The “king-as-mediator” model has been critiqued by Thesleff who identifies the θεοµοιρη' ς 
εµπνοι'ησις as reference to “the universal soul with, perhaps, a touch of the Stoic piνευñµα.”286 Thesleff 
argues against the notion that the king exhibits a soteriological function at this point. In light of the 
prominence given to the king’s salvific function at 83.11–17, Thesleff is perhaps too quick to dismiss 
this reading.287 The king’s ability to ameliorate the human condition (see also 80.22–81.10) suggests 
that Delatte’s reading is in line with Ecphantus’ conception of the king that unfolds through the rest of 
the treatise.288
If we attempt to harmonize 80.1–2 with 79.3–7, we must conclude that the divine inspiration 
which the king enjoys is nothing other than his being formed in the likeness of the divine. This element 
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has been further confused as Stobaeus has appended two sections from other fragments to it (WH 4, 244.19–245.5 = 4, 
272.9–14 = Thesleff 79.20–80.4 and WH 4, 245.5–8 = 4, 278.2–5 = Thesleff 83.1–4).
282. For discussion of the migration theme in other literature, see Calabi, Tradition and Philosophy, 196–98.
283. The king is not mentioned explicitly at this point, but I follow Delatte in assuming that this expression refers to the 
king (Traités, 184–85). Delatte argues that Ecphantus has attributed to the king what is attributed to humanity’s νουñς or 
piνευñµα by other writers (Traités, 191–93). But the passage might also be translated without any reference to the king, so 
Menahem Stern, ed., Appendixes and Indexes, vol. 3 of Greek and Latin Authors on Jews and Judaism, Fontes Ad Res 
Iudaicas Spectantes (Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1984), 37. Given the focus of the remaining 
fragments, however, it seems more likely that Ecphantus has the ideal king in view at this point. This seems to have been 
Stobaeus’ reading of the fragment since he appended two other kingship fragments to it (see n. 281).
284. In the following section I discuss the subjects’ imitation of the king and the work of his logos (p. 151).
285. Delatte cites Philo (Alleg. Interp. 1.37; Worse 84, 86) as a parallel (Traités, 192).
286. Thesleff, Introduction, 69–70. This also seems to be the implication of Chesnut’s translation (“Ruler and 
Logos,” 1318 n. 32).
287. The date of composition of the text is tied in to the question of influence. Delatte (Traités, 191–92) considers these 
texts late and therefore, finding similar concepts in Philo, he argues that the Alexandrian writer stands behind Ecphantus at 
this point. Thesleff (Introduction, 70), on the other hand, argues that Ecphantus is early and that the Pythagorean and Philo 
share a common source that might be found in the Early Academy. Calabi also argues that these writers share certain sources, 
but that these show Middle-Platonic influences. Like Thesleff, she rejects the possibility that either of these writers 
influenced the other (Tradition and Philosophy, 215).
288. Burkert, “Pseudopythagorica,” 52–53 (followed by Stern, Greek and Latin Authors, 33–37) argues that Ecphantus 
was influenced at this point by Jewish creation literature (esp. about Gen 1 and 2). See Calabi, Tradition and 
Philosophy, 185–215 for an argument against Philo being an influence on Ecphantus. George van Kooten also argues against 
any Jewish influence on the Pythagorean writings (Paul’s Anthropology, 118–24), but suggests that their might be a 
“perceived dependency” arising from common ideas held by both Jews and Pythagoreans (122).
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of divinity, in turn, is seen to be the superior part of human nature, which adheres to the king more than 
any other human being. The king’s mediation must therefore consist in enabling his subjects to imitate 
him in such a way that they come to imitate the divine and, through this, to attain to the highest state of 
humanity. Elsewhere, Ecphantus describes the king as something foreign and alien (α piο' δαµο' ν τι εντι` 
χρηñµα και` ξε'νον) that has come to humanity from the heavenly king (81.10–13). The description here 
further highlights the king’s distance from humanity but does so without ignoring his role as 
intermediary. It must be granted at this point that Ecphantus’ concept of the ideal king—especially the 
king’s origin and the nature of his salvific role—exudes more mysticism than that of either Diotogenes 
or Sthenidas. We have certainly progressed some distance from Plato’s assimilation described in terms 
of the acquisition of virtue (see above, p. 147). 
Diotogenes’ observation that the good king will draw near to the gods through separating 
himself from human passions and exceeding in virtue (74.9–12) is closer to Plato’s ideal. This, in turn, 
cautions us against taking too literally Diotogenes’ assertion that through imitating the divine order and 
ruling with absolute authority,289 the king has been changed into a “god among people” (θεο`ς ε ν 
α νθρω' ποις παρεσχαµα' τισται; 72.22–23). The king’s status is delimited by the phrase “among people” 
and might be better translated as “like a god among people.”290 He is superior, but only within the 
human and earthly realm (72.18–19). As such, he is the object of his subjects’ imitation and, through 
this imitation, they are able to make moral and spiritual progress. This does not make him “a divine 
savior figure,”291 at least, not a divine saviour figure in the same way that Ecphantus’ king is.  
Finally, the king’s imitation of the divine ensures that he is superior to other human beings 
(Ecphantus 79.20–80.1; Diotogenes 72.18–23) and thus best suited to rule. That the better should rule 
and the worse obey is taken as axiomatic in these and other Pythagorean texts.292 The next point to 
consider is the relationship between the king and his subjects. 
The King and His Subjects
The king’s imitation of God follows a pattern found in the Pythagorean pseudepigrapha in 
which the lower or lesser system imitates the one above it. “Thus the political community ought to 
reproduce within itself the harmonization of the cosmos.”293 If imitation describes how the king is to 
relate to God, it follows that the king’s subjects must imitate him (Ecphantus 82.3–6; Diotogenes 
72.19–20).
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289. It is this which makes the king νο' µος ε»µψυχος, see above.
290. Priam mourns the deceased Hector as ος θεο`ς ε»σκε µετ α νδρα' σιν “one who is a god among men” (Il. 24.258); see 
the remarks by R. Brock (Greek Political Imagery from Homer to Aristotle [London: Bloomsbury, 2013]) regarding the 
divinity of Homeric leaders. At Theaetetus 176b, Plato’s insistence that assimilation to God be understood as “becoming like 
God,” not “becoming (a) god” is indicated by κατα` το` δυνατο' ν, “as far as this is possible.”
291. Chesnut, “Ruler and Logos,” 1317: “the king was beginning to turn into a divine savior.”
292. Centrone, “Platonism and Pythagoreanism,” 571; Centrone, “Pseudo-Pythagorean Writings,” 334. For this idea in 
Plato, see Resp. 4.431b, 443b. However, in Plato’s Laws it is ultimately the law that should rule over willing subjects 
(3.690b).
293. Centrone, “Platonism and Pythagoreanism,” 571; see also Centrone, “Pseudo-Pythagorean Writings,” 320–21, 334; 
Blumenfeld, Political Paul, 207.
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Ecphantus envisages two ways in which subjects might be controlled (82.28–83.9): the one 
way is characterized by force (βι'α), necessity (α να' γκη), and obedience/persuasion (piειθω' ), all of which 
are linked to fear. The second, superior way is marked by imitation that arises within a relationship of 
goodwill (ευ»νοια).294 Delatte’s attempt to argue that persuasion stands between spontaneous imitation 
and fear arises from his observation that a number of other elements in the Pythagorean texts follow a 
tripartite scheme.295 While this is certainly correct at other points in the treatise, the argument at 82.28–
83.9 proposes a binary scheme in which subjects follow the king willingly or unwillingly. The first of 
these is described in terms of imitation, and the king alone is able to produce good in human nature as 
his subjects come to imitate him (83.9–10)—he is a “saviour by example.”296  Ecphantus relates this 
salvation process to the king’s logos (83.11–17).297
In both the passage concerning the king’s logos and the fragment found at 79.3–7, Ecphantus 
portrays the king as a mediator between his subjects and God. Ecphantus’ language of wickedness and 
sin is used in contrast to the good (83.9–10). If humanity was once pure (καθαρο' ς; 79.4), this state is 
not regained through priestly mediation and sacrifice, but through contemplation of the divine in the 
ruler. When the language of sin is used in combination with purity (80.22–81.2), the latter is  achieved 
through imitation of the ruling element (king or law) that embodies the divine.298
Diotogenes, when writing of the king bringing his subjects into harmony with himself (72.12–
14; cf. 73.15–16), develops the imitation theme along similar lines as Ecphantus.299 According to 
Diotogenes, the community’s “harmony” should be attuned to the king (73.18–19), a state which is 
achieved by the king through presenting himself properly to his subjects. His majesty, graciousness, 
and fearsomeness should be evident to all. Those who gaze upon him will be suitably ordered 
(κατακοσµε'ω) because of the superiority not only of his appearance (as important as that is for 
Diotogenes), but also of his mind and soul (74.12–19). Although Diotogenes does not use the language 
of persuasion, the relationship between the king and subjects described here fits comfortably within 
Ecphantus’ prescriptions in this regard.
Plato’s Timaeus (90c–d) provides a potential model for the king-subject relationship. There the 
divine part of human nature is perfected through contemplating the cosmos. As a human being comes 
to understand “the harmonies and revolutions” of the universe, so the “revolutions” in his or her own 
head are corrected and understanding is restored to its original condition. Through contemplating that 
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294. In Plato’s Statesman (276d–e), the distinction between king and tyrant is made on whether subjects are governed 
willingly (ε κου' σιος) or by force (βι'αιος). So, too, in Aristotle (Pol. 1285a27–28), kings rule the willing (ε κω' ν) according to 
law  while tyrants rule the unwilling (α ε'κων). As discussed in Chapter 2, this neat pattern is destroyed by Xenophon’s Cyrus 
who rules through fear as well as by instilling in his subjects the desire to please him (Cyr. 1.1.5), see Goodenough, 
“Hellenistic Kingship,” 90.
295. Traités, 232–34. Centrone, “Pseudo-Pythagorean Writings,” 333 points to the presence of triadic divisions 
throughout the Pythagorean pseudepigrapha.
296. Chesnut, “Ruler and Logos,” 1320.
297. See above, p. 148, for a fuller discussion of this somewhat obscure passage.
298. Contra Blumenfeld, Political Paul, 209–11, the ideas here are closer to Plato than to Paul. At Resp. 500b the ruler 
reproduces the likeness of the Good within his subjects.
299. For Ecphantus, communion, love, and goodwill are essential components of the harmony that should exist between 
a king and his subjects, but in each case these exist in the earthly realm as a copy of their heavenly counterparts (81.13–82.6).
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which is excellent, humanity is restored.300 The Pythagorean model, in keeping with the theme of the 
king as mediator, would have humanity contemplate the royal example in order to be restored.
Even though contemplation and influence flows in one direction, there is also a bilateral aspect 
to the king-subject relationship. Diotogenes exhorts the king to treat his subjects well. Justice (72.9–15; 
74.19–26) tempered with mercy (74.26–75.16) define a good king, and to these he should add 
benefaction (72.14–15; 73.26). Sthenidas’ king is described as a father who is merciful (η«µερος; 
188.3), gentle (η»piιος; 188.6), a step-father or nurse (τροφευ' ς)301 and teacher (διδα' σκαλος) of all that is 
good for his subjects (188.8). 
We find in these descriptions the common concern for kings to act in their subjects’ best 
interest. History confirms that Hellenistic kings did not always behave in this way. The inclusion of this 
element in the piερι` βασιλει'ας topos achieves two things: First, it paints an ideal picture and indicates 
something of the desires of the masses. Second, by framing these concerns within a treatise about the 
ideal king, those who produced these writings were perhaps able to give expression to these desires 
which might not otherwise be possible within an absolute monarchy. 
Noetic Rule
There is a strong noetic component to ruling, according to the Pythagorean writers.302 
Sthenidas insists that if the king imitates God, thus fulfilling his role as earthly ruler, he must 
necessarily be a sage (χρη` το`ν βασιλε'α σοφο`ν ηòµεν;187.10). We have already come across this idea in 
Cynic and Stoic thought, although the Pythagorean author seems more concerned with the imitation of 
divinity at this point than with the king-as-sage theme.303 When contrasting the earthly ruler with God, 
Sthenidas notes (187.11–13) that God possesses wisdom (σοφι'α) while the king only has understanding 
(εpiιστη' µη). But even if the king might never achieve divine wisdom, the intellectual component of 
kingship is still acknowledged.304
In Ecphantus this idea is cast in moral (as opposed to philosophical) terms. Since proper rule is 
predicated upon the virtues, and the royal virtues—δικαιοσυ' ναν ... και` εγκρα' τη, αν και` κοινωνι'αν “and 
their sisters” (84.7–8)—exist only through intelligence/wisdom (φρο' νησις), it follows that intelligence 
is crucial for the king to exercise his reign. The God-king parallel is again at work here: since God is 
the φρο' νησις of the cosmos by virtue of his using his νο' ος in ordering it (Ecphantus, 84.4–6), so the 
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300. For a brief discussion of this, see Sedley, “Godlikeness,” 316–24; Van Kooten, Paul’s Anthropology, 93–95.
301. It is difficult to decide on an English gloss since both nurturing and nourishing are in view. See Abraham J. 
Malherbe, “‘Gentle as a Nurse’: The Cynic Background the 1 Thessalonians 2,” in Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic 
Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays, 1959–2012, ed. Carl R. Holladay, et al., NovTSup 150 (Leiden: Brill, 
2014), 60–63 for a discussion of the cognate τροφο' ς in the context of Hellenistic philosophical guidance.
302. This is, again, a concern within the Socratic circle. In Plato, the king is marked out by his knowledge (εpiιστη' µη;  
Pol. 258b): “the power of any king to maintain his rule has little to do with the use of his hands or his body in general in 
comparison with the understanding and force of his mind (τη`ν τηñς ψυχηñς συ' νεσιν και` ρ ω' µην)” (259c; trans. C. J. Rowe in 
Cooper). Similarly, Xenophon’s Socrates attributes kingship not to those defined by sceptres, the choice of a people, fate, or 
force. True kings are those who know how to rule (του`ς επισταµε'νους α»ρχειν) (Mem. 3.9.10).
303. So Blumenfeld, Political Paul, 256 n. 298 contra Goodenough, “Hellenistic Kingship,” 74–75 and Delatte, 
Traités, 274–75.
304. Chesnut, “Ruler and Logos,” 1318.
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king should use his mind in ordering his realm. The king’s divine mind enables him to bring about 
good and avoid evil (83.18–20).
Diotogenes says more about the specific knowledge necessary for a king to govern well. The 
king should give careful attention to the art of war (piολεµε`ν καλωñς επισταθει'ς; 72.1), studying the law 
(νο' µω καλωñ ς εκµαθω' ν; 72.2), and reflecting on the nature of God and virtue (φυ' σιν θεωñ  και` α ρετα`ν 
εκλογισα'µενος; 72.3). This intellectual effort is necessary in order that he might fulfil the royal offices 
of general, judge, and priest (71.23–72.23).
As important as the king’s intellect is, there is no mention in these treatises of the education of 
the prince. The closest one gets to the idea of education is the ruler’s imitation of the divine, and even 
here the process or means to this end is not spelled out by any of our authors. However, if the piερι` 
βασιλει'ας text is meant to be read as a Fürstenspiegel, then it functions as part of royal education. In 
that case, one would not necessarily expect explicit reference to the prince’s education, but might find, 
instead, a suitably humble exhortation to heed the text’s teaching. Unfortunately, the fragmentary 
nature of our texts means that none of them contains a formal introduction or conclusion where such an 
exhortation would most naturally be found.
Since kingship is primarily a matter of the king’s mind and his imitation of the divine, it is not 
surprising that there is nothing said about dynasties and hereditary kingship. It is the excellence of the 
individual king that makes him fit for kingship and not his relationship to his successors.305 The one 
possible exception is glimpsed in Sthenidas’ contrast between God who is king and ruler “by nature” 
and the earthly ruler who is king “by origin (γε'νεσις) and imitation” (187.11–13). Does γε'νεσις here 
refer to the king’s genealogy, thus hinting at the idea of hereditary rule? Nothing else in the 
Pythagorean treatises suggest this reading. On the contrary, the emphasis is always on the extraordinary 
nature of the individual, rather than on his family or any inherited power or right to rule.306  
In keeping with the philosophical tradition, the Pythagorean piερι` βασιλει'ας texts portray ruling 
as primarily an intellectual endeavour. Diotogenes indicates an element of study or attention necessary 
for the king to excel in certain essential activities. Ecphantus chooses to highlight the set of royal 
virtues that arise from and cannot exist apart from the king’s intelligence. These intellectual virtues are 
an indispensable part of the Pythagorean concept of the ideal king. , but they form only part of a larger 
complex of virtues ascribed to the king.
The King’s Character
In their portrayal of the ideal king, the Pythagorean piερι` βασιλει'ας treatises resort to a number 
of virtues and metaphors that are commonplace in Hellenistic descriptions of kings and kingship. The 
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305. For two case studies of dynastic succession, see Matthias Haake, “Agathocles and Hiero II: Two Sole Rulers in the 
Hellenistic Age and the Question of Succession,” in The Splendors and Miseries of Ruling Alone: Encounters with 
Monarchy from Archaic Greece to the Hellenistic Mediterranean, ed. Nino Luraghi, StAM 1 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2013), 99–
127. Haake notes that “due to the main characteristics of Hellenistic kingship there were no fundamentally accepted rules of 
royal inheritance independent of the individuals involved” (107).
306. This element of royal ideology is completely absent from the philosophical justification of kingship in the 
Pythagorean piερι` βασιλει'ας treatises. If Hellenistic kingship has, at its core, the idealized memory of Alexander, then the 
failed attempts to continue his dynasty might explain the absence of the concept of hereditary kingship as part of the larger 
kingship topos. 
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presence of these topoi within the somewhat esoteric Pythagorean treatments of kingship illustrate just 
how stable the core of the kingship ideal was in the Hellenistic period and beyond.
Diotogenes captures the essence of the Pythagorean argument with regard to virtue: “for it is 
necessary that he excel all others in virtue and for this reason to be judged worthy to rule” (73.2–3). All 
three writers attribute to their ideal king multiple virtues. These are found throughout Hellenistic 
kingship texts and serve to prop up the doctrine that only the most excellent person is capable of 
monarchical rule.307 If a piερι` βασιλει'ας text is read as a Fürstenspiegel, these virtues become 
desiderata expressed by the king’s courtiers, rather than descriptions of that king.
A list of the royal virtues mentioned in the Pythagorean treatises would be tedious, both in 
production and consumption.308 In what follows, the various virtues have been grouped and discussed 
so as to allow key themes to emerge. 
Self-sufficiency (αυ τα' ρκεια) is the primary virtue for Ecphantus. He identifies self-sufficiency 
as the sovereign virtue (α ρχη' ) since, like a monarch, it leads all others but is itself not led by anything 
(84.1). This seems to be an argument through definition. It identifies the virtue that most closely 
corresponds to monarchical rule and elevates that virtue to the supreme place. The argument finds 
support in the divine realm, however. God’s self-sufficiency is seen in his lack of officials and 
attendants (82.17–18). Instead of issuing orders and insisting on obedience, divine rule is effected 
through instilling in humanity the desire to imitate God (82.20–21). This forms part of Ecphantus’ 
argument in favour of imitation as the only legitimate way of ruling over subjects (82.7–27; 82.28–
83.10). Self-sufficiency thus becomes central to Ecphantus’ conception of kingship. But Ecphantus 
also employs self-sufficiency in a more conventional way. 
Self-sufficiency engenders self-control (ε γκρα' τεια)309 and these two virtues guard against 
extravagance (piολυτε'λεια), incontinence (α κρασι'α/α κρα' τεια), and their result, violence (υ«βρις) (83.25–
84.3). The common concern that kings avoid luxury and greed lies implicitly behind this observation. 
The violence in view could refer to a general observation that greed often drives strife and contention, 
or it might refer more specifically to the way in which rulers extract wealth from their subjects.   
Diotogenes also uses the topos of self-rule when warning the king about wealth and its 
attendant vices. The king must not be conquered by pleasure (η  δονη' ), but must, instead, cultivate 
α νδραγαθι'α.310 In cultivating virtue in this way the king distinguishes himself from the masses (72.25–
29). The warning against greed (piλεονεξι'α) carries with it the recognition that wealth is necessary that 
a ruler might benefit his friends (φι'λως ευ εργετε`ν), support the poor (δεοµε'νως υ  πολαµβα' νεν), and 
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307. The reason for that excellence is not always clear. Is it because the king naturally excels in virtue (71.18–23)? Or 
because of something inherent which allows him to imitate the divine and in this way exhibit superior virtue (188.2–4)? Is he 
chosen by God who then produces virtue in him (81.10–13)?
308. A selection of virtues are mentioned here to illustrate their commonplace nature: Sthenidas: µεγαλο'φρων, η«µερος, 
and ο λιγοδεη' ς (188.3); η»πιος (188.6); Diotogenes: δι'καιος (71.18–23); νο' µιµος (71.18–23);  α νδραγαθι'α (72.25–28); 
Ecphantus: φιλι'α, κοινωνι'α (82.1); ευ»νοια (82.3); εγκρα' τεια (83.25).
309. “Socrates said that the better king is the one able to rule his own emotions (δυνα' µενον α»ρχειν τωñν piαθωñν)” (apud 
Stob. 4.7.26 = WH 4, 255), cf. Xenophon, Mem. 4.5.1. So, too, Isocrates Ad Nic. 29 (α»ρχε σαυτουñ ... κρατηñς τωñν επιθυµιωñν), 
Demon. 21 ( εγκρα' τειαν α»σκει piα' ντων ... α»ρχειν ταιñς δ η  δοναιñς). 
310. Here best translated as “manly virtue” rather than “courage.” Presumably the association of η  δονη'  with τρυφη'  
(luxury, softness, effeminacy) is in view at this point. 
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bring his enemies to justice311—all unavoidable aspects of kingship. A general exhortation concludes 
this section:
So whichever king is self-controlled (σω' φρων) with regard to pleasure, is given to sharing 
(κοινωνατικο`ς) with regard to possessions, and is prudent (φρο' νιµος) and powerful (δεινο' ς) 
with regard to his rule, such a person would truly be king (73.6–9; my translation). 
Behind this exhortation (albeit one hidden in an observation) lies the recognition that kingship is 
necessarily combined with wealth and power. Within a royal dynasty, these are passed from one 
generation to the next. Seen from a practical perspective, for those not born into this position, wealth 
and power are the means by which kingship is obtained and sustained. Giving a nod towards the 
Realpolitik of the Hellenistic period, Diotogenes recognizes this and urges the king to temper wealth 
and power with the relevant virtues, of which self-control/self-rule is the most important.312
Although self-control is important for Diotogenes, he suggests that there is a more significant 
paradigm within which the king would circumscribe his actions. In imitation of Zeus, the ruler of all 
(75.8–16), the ideal king should be majestic (σεµνο' ς), gracious (χρηστο' ς), and fearsome (δεινο' ς).313 
Diotogenes explains this exhortation as follows:
For majesty, a godlike thing, can make him admired and honoured by the multitude; 
graciousness will make him popular and beloved; while the ability to inspire fear will make 
him terrible and unconquerable in his dealings with enemies, but magnanimous and 
trustworthy towards his friends (73.28–74.4; trans. Goodenough).
In this section the emphasis seems to have shifted from the virtues themselves to the king’s display of 
these virtues. At 74.12–19 Diotogenes states that the king’s mind, physical appearance, and actions 
must supersede those around him to such a degree that those who gaze upon him are brought into order 
(τω`ς piοταυγασµε'νως αυ το`ν κατακοσµαθηñµεν; 72.15–16). Diotogenes’ explanation of the process that 
brings about this change sheds some light on Pythagorean thinking about the king’s control of his 
subjects: “For the appearance of the good king (<α > τωñ  α γαθωñ  βασιλε'ως piοταυ' γασις314) ought to direct 
the soul of those who gaze upon him no less than a flute or harmony” (74.17–19).315
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311. Diotogenes’ phrasing at this point—και` ε χθρω`ς δε` µετα` δι'κας α µυ' νασθαι (73.31)—suggests a defensive or 
retaliatory war rather than aggression on the part of the king.
312. At 73.9–14 Diotogenes seems to offer an alternative reason for the importance of self-rule. Since the political body 
(δηñµος) exhibits the same relationship between its various parts as the soul, the king who is able to rule his own soul would 
have the knowledge necessary to rule his subjects. Or so the argument would seem to run. A lacuna in 73.9 separates this 
paragraph from the previous one. For Diotogenes’ analysis of the soul, see e.g., Plato, Resp. 435c–445e. The parallels 
between the political and the individual is also found in this work. At Resp. 368e–369a, Socrates proposes to search for 
justice at the macro-level, that is, the polis, in order to understand justice in the individual.
313. Delatte (Traités, 264) identifies a similar triplet of virtues in Philo (Rewards 97), except that ευ εργεσι'α/το` 
ευ εργετικο' ν is substituted for χρηστο' της. Philo predicates these virtues of a leader-figure raised up by God in an 
eschatological battle. Delatte also finds a similar scheme in Cicero (Off. 2.1–10), which he traces back to Panaetius’ influence 
(Traités, 265–66). He suggests that Panaetius is also the source for these ideas in Diotogenes (which would support Delatte’s 
later dating of the Pythagorean texts), but no unambiguous evidence is presented which proves that the influence necessarily 
flowed in that direction.
314. The is the only occurrence of this noun in the TLG data set (accessed 14 April 2015). Diotogenes creates it by 
nominalising piροσαυγα' ζω (Doric piοταυγα' ζω).   
315. The text reads αυ λωñ  και` α  ρµονι'ας. Delatte (Traités, 270–71) argues that α  ρµονι'α must refer here to a stringed 
instrument like a lyre. But at 73.15 Diotogenes uses the image of the lyre to describe the way in which a king might control a 
city. He is thus able to refer to that instrument when necessary. Although the “flute and lyre” merism would be pleasing, 
Diotogenes seems concerned not to lose the emphasis on “harmony” at this point. 
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Diotogenes compares the affect of the king’s appearance on his subjects to the effect that 
music has on those listening to it. It is not the “numinous experience” and “mystical ecstasy” described 
by Blumenfeld—as Delatte observes, any sense of religious sentiment is entirely absent at this point.316 
The centrality of music and harmony in Pythagorean philosophy is well known. In addition to its 
significance in Pythagorean mathematical thought, the later biographical tradition attributes an 
ethical/therapeutic role to music.317 Just as music is able to correct a person’s character and life, by 
projecting the right image for his subjects, the king is able to order his subjects as they respond to the 
image being presented to them. In neither case is the mechanism of change described, it is simply 
assumed.
Diotogenes makes use of another musical analogy in the section expounding χρηστο' της, 
graciousness (74.19–75.8). Justice stands in the same relation to community (κοινωνι'α) as rhythm does 
to motion and harmony does to the voice (74.23–25). The excellence in each case consists in the 
rightly-ordered working of a complex entity. Motion can be chaotic or rhythmic, a voice can produce a 
cacophony or harmony, similarly, a community can produce injustice or justice, depending on how its 
various parts are brought together. Before he is able to bring about this harmony in the political body, 
though, the king must ensure that the various parts of his own soul are suitably harmonised (74.20–
23).318  It is not primarily justice applied by the king to the state that is in view at this point—justice is 
also what brings harmony to the relationship between the king and his subjects. In this statement we 
can glimpse coherent, even if not profound, political thought. If the king’s role is to bring the state into 
harmony with himself (73.15–16), and if this only happens through his bringing justice to bear on the 
community, then it is essential that the king is the most just person (71.18–19).319 As such, he is to act 
as judge and distributor of justice (72.9–15). The idea of divine imitation is never far in these treatises 
and Diotogenes considers it fitting that the king acts in his realm as God, the ruler (η  γεµω' ν) and leader 
(piροστα' της) of the cosmos, does in his (72.10–11). In his capacity as judge and distributor of justice, 
he must act in relation to the general public (ξυνο' ς) and the individual (ι»διος).320 As “embodied law,” 
the king is in a unique position, through imitation of the divine, to assure that potentially conflicting 
interests are brought into harmony. 
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316. Blumenfeld, Political Paul, 246; Delatte, Traités, 270.
317. “Through music Pythagoras produced very useful corrections to human character and life” (Iamblichus, VP 115, my 
translation; see 110–115 for examples). Similarly Cleinias of Tarentum is said to have played the lyre in order to calm 
himself (Riedweg, Pythagoras, 113). Although this ethical/therapeutic use of music was identified very strongly with 
Pythagoreans, it was also known outside of those circles, see Martin L. West, Ancient Greek Music (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1992), 31–33.
318. The idea, again, is Platonic and is seen most clearly in Book 4 of the Republic. In Resp. 4.443c–444a, for example, 
justice is that which harmonizes the three elements of the soul, allowing each its proper function and place. The just state 
functions analogously. But δικαιοσυ' νη is also a significant element in Aristotle’s philosophy (see esp. Eth. nic. Book 5 and 
Pol. 3.1280a8–1284b34). In a recent discussion of justice, Johan Thom notes that it is, for Aristotle, “the social virtue par 
excellence” (“Justice in the Sermon on the Mount: An Aristotelian Reading,” NovT 51 [2009]: 319–24, here 320).
319. Justice is the central virtue for the king in his judicial role (72.9–15), and there, too, it is described as bringing his 
subjects into harmony with himself and his rule.
320. The distinction between the king-made law (νο' µος κοινο' ς) and local tradition (ι»διος νο' µος) is what is in view here, 
according to Goodenough (“Hellenistic Kingship,” 67–68). Goodenough’s reading might be seen as an extension or 
refinement of the classical distinction between natural law and the law of the city, or universal and particular law (see e.g., 
Aristotle, Rhet. 1.1373b1–18). Delatte (Traités, 251), in contrast, sees Diotogenes focusing on the state as a whole and on the 
individual (see e.g., Aristotle, Rhet. 1.1373b19–24).
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The section concludes by describing the king as “doing well and benefiting” (εν τωñ,  piοιε`ν ευò  
και` ευ εργετε`ν) his subjects, without negating either justice or the law (72.14–15). The title ευ εργε'της is 
again one that was attached to a number of different Hellenistic kings.321 Diotogenes envisages the 
possibility that a system of benefaction might be open to abuse and thus he emphasises that the king as 
benefactor should also be marked by the judge’s concern for justice and law.
There is another passage in which the king’s exercise of justice and care for his subjects are 
joined. In 74.26–75.8, the just king is described as gentle (εpiιεικη' ς), and merciful (ευ γνω' µων). These 
virtues are portrayed as counsellors (piα' ρεδροι) of justice. They don’t “share the throne of justice” 
(Goodenough), as if gentleness and mercy are equally as important as justice, but rather, justice is best 
served by taking them into account. It is important to note that εpiιει'κεια at this point does not carry the 
juridical weight that it does elsewhere;322 “gentleness” is therefore a better translation than “clemency.” 
Although εpiιει'κεια and ευ γνωµοσυ' νη are brought together in the realm of legal δικαιοσυ' νη by Pseudo-
Aristotle (Magna Moralia 2.1198b–1199a3), the way in which Diotogenes’ king will show himself to 
be just at this point is not through carefully balancing strictness and leniency with regard to the law, but 
through caring for those in his kingdom who are least able to care for themselves.323 We see in this 
section an appeal to the king to treat the most vulnerable of his subjects well. Those in need will be 
assisted. Those petitioning the king will be given aid without regard for their ability to honour the king 
in return for his benefaction (75.1–8).324 The same instinct that led Sthenidas to urge the king to imitate 
God in being kind (η»piιος; 188.6) is at work here in Diotogenes. Without the power of exile or voting a 
leader out of office, subjects within an absolute monarchy are reliant on the king’s mercy and kindness 
to shield them from his power.
The element of kindness and gentleness is less conspicuous in Ecphantus’ treatise. Neverthe-
less, he does recognize that the political community must be marked by love (φιλι'α) between the king 
and his subjects, a relationship that is also expressed in terms of goodwill (ευ»νοια) shown by both 
parties (81.13–82.5). He compares this to the relationship between father and son, shepherd and 
sheep,325 law and those who use it (82.5–6). The “king-as-law” topos has already been discussed 
above. We must examine briefly the first two images together with other metaphors used of the king.
The king as shepherd is a common metaphor found throughout the Ancient Near East and the 
Mediterranean region.326 In Homer the phrase describes kings, often Agamemnon, but without any 
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321. E.g., Ptolemy III, Ptolemy VII, Antiochus VII, Mithridates V. 
322. For a discussion of the use of εpiιει'κεια during the early Roman Empire and a definition, see Walker, Paul’s Offer of 
Leniency, 38–52. Walker’s definition is summarized in Appendix 1 (Paul’s Offer of Leniency, 331–35). In view at this point 
in Diotogenes is “the easy, kind and generous treatment shown to subjects or inferiors” (definition 2g) rather than “a ruler’s 
mercy (or leniency or clemency)” (definition 2h) or “a technical term for a reasoned and humane application of laws and 
sanctions” (definition 3).
323. The sense in which Diotogenes uses the word here is closer in meaning to LSJ B.II.1.a: “meet and right, fitting” 
rather than “legally exact” (B.I.1.b) or “lawful, just” (B.I.2).
324.  One would expect fierceness (δεινο' της) to be addressed in the next section. Instead, the final paragraph discusses 
the three-fold set of virtues as they are exhibited by the gods. The third section must therefore have been lost at some stage in 
the manuscript’s transmission (Delatte, Traités, 264).
325. Ecphantus uses νοµευ' ς rather than piοιµη' ν. The former is a general term used to described a person in charge of a 
flock or herd (LSJ, s.v. νοµευ' ς;  cf. Plato, Theaet. 176d; Resp. 370d), however, the reference to a flock (piοι'µνη) makes it 
clear that a shepherd is in view at this point.
326. For discussion of this theme, see Brock, Political Imagery, 43–52. See also numerous references to primary and 
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explanation as to its significance.327 According to Xenophon’s Socrates, the comparison is used is 
because the king must act for the good of his subjects (Mem. 3.2; cf. Cyr. 1.6.8). Similarly, when 
disputing the nature of justice with Thrasymachus, Plato’s Socrates concludes that proper rule is like 
“the art of the shepherd” in that each “is concerned with nothing else than how to provide what is best 
for that over which [it] is set” (Resp. 345d).328 The image is used primarily to speak of the ruler’s care 
of and responsibility towards his subjects.329 Ecphantus’ statement assumes this relationship and takes 
the argument one step further by turning this relationship into the basis of a state of goodwill that exists 
between ruler and subject. For this desired state to exist, the ruler must be concerned for the well-being 
of his subjects. The shepherd is his first example, followed by the father, and the law. In each case, the 
respective figure should be concerned for the welfare of whatever is subordinate to it, thus producing 
the mutual goodwill necessary for the political community to thrive. The third element in this series, 
the law, is included on the assumption that proper law exists for the good of those who live under it and 
that they will willingly submit to it. If the use of “law” at this point is somewhat confusing, the image 
of the king as father is more easily understood.330
According to Sthenidas, God’s kindness (η»piιος) results from his being “father of gods, and 
father of men” (188.5–6). At 75.11–13 Diotogenes quotes the same Homeric phrase to which Sthenidas 
alludes331 and ties God’s fatherhood to his gentleness (χρηστο' ς) which, in turn, causes him to be 
beneficent (ευ εργετικο' ς) and generous (α γαθοδο' της) towards all. In both cases the king is encouraged 
to emulate God’s fatherhood and the related virtues. Both metaphors—the king is a father and a 
shepherd to his people—are used to portray the ideal king as one who is concerned for the well-being 
of his subjects.332 Additional functions that a good king should fulfil are described using other 
metaphors commonly found in Greek political texts.
At 72.6–9 Diotogenes describes the king’s role as leader using three common images—the 
pilot of a ship (κυβερνη' της),333 a charioteer (η  νι'οχος), and a physician (ιατρο' ς). Each of these is 
  
 158 
secondary literature collected by Aalders (Political Thought, 23–26) and the brief discussion in Martin L. West, The East 
Face of Helicon: West Asiatic Elements in Greek Poetry and Myth (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 226–27.
327. For Agamemnon, see, e.g., Il. 2.243; 4.4.13; 11.187; 24.654; Od. 3.156; 14.497; used of others: Il. 1.263; 4.296; 
5.144; Od. 4.24; 15.151. Brock (Political Imagery, 43) suggests that “directing and marshalling an unruly crowd” lies behind 
the Homeric use of this image. 
328. Plato seems to be ambivalent about the metaphor. From one perspective the metaphor is inaccurate and inadequate 
because the king is not solely responsible for caring for the human flock (Pol. 267b–268d). At other points, though, Plato 
finds the metaphor useful when examining matters of ruling (Resp. 341–347; 416a; 440d).
329. Brock, Political Imagery, 43 Brock notes that the image evolves from being “an invariant formula of mainly military 
significance to a carefully articulated paradigm of benign authority” (48). It is the latter use of the shepherd image that is 
clearly in view in Ecphantus.
330. For the metaphor of the state as a household, see Brock, Political Imagery, 25–42; on the king as father, see esp. pp. 
30–35.
331. Sthenidas has piατε'ρα µε`ν θεωñν, piατε'ρα δε` α νθρω' piων while Diotogenes has piατη`ρ α νδρωñν τε θεωñν τε. Diotogenes’ 
title epithet is found in Hesiod (Theog. 542, 643; Op.59) but Diotogenes’ “Ionic poet” (75.12) must be Homer who uses the 
phrase a handful of times, e.g., Il. 1.544, 4.68; Od. 1.28, 12.445. See also Aristotle, Pol. 1259b14; Dio Chrysostom, Hom.12.
332. Brock (Political Imagery, 31–32) notes two potentially negative roles that this metaphor might play. First, as father, 
a king might feel free to chastise his subjects, engendering a more authoritarian view of leadership. Second, the state may be 
viewed as the king’s property to be disposed of as he wishes. Neither of these are in view in the Pythagorean texts.  
333. For the “ship of state” metaphor, of which the king as pilot is part, see Brock, Political Imagery, 53–67. Brock notes 
that in Plato’s Republic the image is used to imply expertise in leadership which, as in Diotogenes, leads to the security of the 
people (58).
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credited with saving those over whom they “rule.”334 The σωτη' ρ-ideal is common in Hellenistic 
kingship ideology.335 Here it is predicated of the “king and general” (βασιλε'ως δε` και` τωñ  στραταγωñ ) 
who rescues those in danger during war. It is not surprising to find salvation tied to the king’s duty as 
general since it is often in battle that the king is seen to function as saviour of a people or a city. 
Ptolemy I Soter, for example, received this epithet from the Rhodians for rescuing them when they 
were besieged by Demetrius in 305–304 B.C.E.336 The final sentence in this section relates this salvific 
function to the fact that each of these—pilot, charioteer, physician, king/general—is the η  γεµω' ν, 
εpiιστα' της, and δηµιουργο' ς, respectively, of a system. In view at this point is the leader’s role of 
organising and arranging a specific system—the political/military system that the king/general forms to 
achieve the salvation of his subjects.337 The king-as-warrior is an important part of the topos of the 
ideal king. However, the concept is not found in either Ecphantus or Sthenidas, and here, in 
Diotogenes, it seems to have been softened by focusing on the king as leader and organiser, rather than 
on the king as triumphant conqueror of his foes. If pushed to account for this irenical trend in these 
texts, we might hypothesize that it is due to a certain weariness from living in a time of “ubiquitous 
war.”338    
As a result of his imitation of God, the king shares the divine virtues (81.9–10), but more than 
that, these virtues are understood to be the work of God in the king (81.12–13). 
Concluding Comments on Pythagorean Kingship
Almost fifty years ago, Oswald Murray considered the Pythagorean pseudepigrapha a product 
of a “motley band of vegetarians and wizards which thought itself from time to time to be the 
Pythagorean school.”339 Bruno Centrone’s recent survey340 points to increased scholarly appreciation  
for a group of texts which aim at a systematic description of a particular blend of Platonic and 
Aristotelian ideas, even if they lack the profundity of other philosophical writings. 
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334. Philo describes the king as a physician, general, and pilot, amongst others  (Spec. Laws 4.186). The point of 
comparison is that each has the power to make things better or worse for those under their authority.
335. We have already seen how Ecphantus envisages the king as religious-ethical saviour. At this point in Diotogenes’ 
treatise the more common idea of the king as military-political saviour is in view (see, e.g., Frank W. Walbank, “Monarchies 
and Monarchic Ideas,” in The Hellenistic World, 2nd ed., ed. Frank W. Walbank, et al., CAH 7.1 [Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984], 82; Francis Cairns, Virgil’s Augustan Epic [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989], 20–21; 
Blumenfeld, Political Paul, 238).  
336. Pausanias, Descr. 1.8.6. For the siege itself, see Pausanias, Descr. 1.6.6; Plutarch, Demetr. 21–22. The most detailed 
account of these events is provided by Diodorus Siculus (20.81–88, 91–100). Diodorus does not mention the epithet but he 
does describe the construction of a “Ptolemaeum” in order to honour Ptolemy as a god (20.100.4). In general, a king’s ability 
to offer protection and salvation was seen as a reason for honouring him in the same way as gods were honoured; see, e.g., 
Arthur Darby Nock, “Soter and Euergetes,” in The Joy of Study: Papers on New Testament and Related Subjects Presented 
to Honor Frederick Clifton Grant, ed. Sherman E. Johnson (New York: Macmillan, 1951), 127–48; Angelos Chaniotis, “The 
Divinity of Hellenistic Rulers,” in A Companion to the Hellenistic World, ed. Andrew Erskine, BCAW (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2003), 433, 440–43; Angelos Chaniotis, War in the Hellenistic World: A Social and Cultural History, Ancient World at War 
(Malden: Blackwell, 2005), 72–75. 
337. So Blumenfeld, Political Paul, 237, who translates the three terms as “leader,” “manager,” “initiator.”
338. Chaniotis, War, 2 Chaniotis observes further, “There is hardly any moment in which a geographical region was not 
directly involved, or indirectly affected, by a military conflict” (2). This assertion is illustrated in the remainder of the first 
chapter (1–17). See also John Serrati, “Warfare and the State,” in Greece, the Hellenistic World and the Rise of Rome ed. 
Philip Sabin, Hans van Wees, and Michael Whitby, vol. 1 of The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 461–97.
339. Murray, “Peri Basileias,” 246–47.
340. Centrone, “Pseudo-Pythagorean Writings.”
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Centrone describes the authors of the pseudepigrapha as “Pythagoreanizing Platonists, who 
considered themselves to be heirs to the Pythagorean tradition, with a firm belief in the continuity 
between Pythagoras, Plato and Aristotle.”341 The use of Platonic and Aristotelian language and thought 
in the Pythagorean kingship treatises accords with this description. The use of names connected with 
famous Pythagoreans and the clear attempts at connecting the ideas in these treatises with those of 
traditional Pythagoreanism suggests that they might rather think of themselves as “Platonizing 
Pythagoreans.” 
With regard to the lack of profundity exhibited in the Pythagorean pseudepigrapha, John 
Dillon observes:
All this Pythagorean activity, however, seems to have occurred on the non-philosophical, or at 
least sub-philosophical, level. The treatises are bald and didactic, stating their doctrine without 
attempt at proof and aimed at an audience which, it would seem, was prepared to substitute 
faith for reason. 342
This description is also true of the kingship treatises which present neither a carefully constructed 
political philosophy nor a justification of monarchy, even if they could contribute to both. There is 
another group which, while not necessarily intent on substituting faith for reason, might appreciate 
“bald and didactic” philosophical tracts: new initiates or lay people would benefit from a simple 
statement of the group’s position on monarchy or ethics or economics, which could form the basis for 
subsequent discussion.343 The absence of more complicated treatises might nullify this thesis in so far 
as there is no evidence of a Pythagorean school. But the absence of advanced texts might hint at the 
attempt by later Pythagoreans to mimic the tradition of Pythagorean secrecy and oral teaching 
associated with Pythagoras.344
At the heart of these constructions of ideal kingship in a Pythagorean mold was the idea of 
imitation. The king must imitate the divine and his subjects must imitate him. Continuing the trend 
observed in Isocrates and Xenophon, the Pythagoreans envisage a form of virtue kingship in which the 
king’s various virtues set him apart as the most superior man and thus the one worthy and able to rule. 
The other striking development in these treatises is the concept of the king as νο'µος ε»µψυχος.  
I argue above that the Pythagorean use of this phrase is an attempt to maintain the king’s authority and 
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341. “Pseudo-Pythagorean Writings,” 337 For the homogeneity of the doctrine in the pseudepigrapha, see also Thesleff, 
Introduction, 73.
342. Dillon, The Middle Platonists, 119.
343. According to Thesleff, the tracts might be “philosophical propaganda for laymen” and/or “textbooks in philosophy” 
(Introduction, 72) and, as such, might contribute to our understanding of “popular philosophy” in this period. See Johan C. 
Thom, “Popular Philosophy in the Hellenistic-Roman World,” EC 3.3 (2012): 279–95 for a discussion of popular philosophy 
and some texts that exemplify it. There are similarities between what Thom identifies as “popular philosophy,” William 
Desmond’s “low philosophy” (“Low Philosophy,” in The Oxford Handbook of Hellenic Studies, ed. George R Boys-Stone, 
Barbara Graziosi, and Phiroze Vasunia [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009], 518–29) and Elizabeth Asmis’ “personal 
philosophy” (“Galen’s De Indolentia and the Creation of a Personal Philosophy,” in Galen’s De Indolentia: Essays on a 
Newly Discovered Letter, ed. Clare K. Rothschild and Trevor W. Thompson, STAC 88 [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
2014], 127–42). 
344. Even if the ascription of secrecy and exclusively oral, esoteric teachings to Pythagoras and the early Pythagoreans 
has no basis in history (Zhmud, Pythagoras and the Early Pythagoreans, 150–62; contra Walter Burkert, Lore and Science 
in Ancient Pythagoreanism, trans. Edwin L. Minar Jr. [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972], 178–79, 192), it is well 
established later in the tradition (see, e.g., D.L. 8.6, 15, 42).
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independence while at the same time positing a standard external to the king against which his reign 
might be measured. The tracts do not provide us with enough evidence for how their writers envisaged 
this working itself out in terms of the king’s judicial and legislative activities. 
Hellenistic Kingship: Concluding Comments
In this chapter, I have examined the way in which the Cynic, Stoic, Epicurean, and 
Pythagorean schools constructed ideal kingship. It has become evident that the first three schools345 
agreed that it was acceptable, perhaps even desirable, for the sage to advise the king that he might 
progress towards this ideal. In the case of the Cynics and Stoics, this advice would be an 
encouragement for the king to pursue these ways of life in order to move towards becoming a sage 
himself.346 For the Epicureans, philosophical advice to the king aimed at making the Epicurean life 
possible for those who chose to follow it. Philodemus’ treatise on Homeric kingship addressed to Piso 
is an example of Epicurean advice, even if the philosophical approach is not typically Epicurean and 
the addressee not, strictly speaking, a king.
Foundational to this philosophical advice was the idea inherited from the classical period (see 
Chapter 2) that the king should be the best man, the most superior being. And as was the case in the 
classical period, what marked the king as superior was his exercise of the philosophical virtues. As 
Oswyn Murray notes:
Hellenistic views of kingship were based on ideas common since the fourth century, that the 
justication of monarchic rule lay essentially in the virtues of the monarch. This created an 
ideology, or (as I might have said a generation later) “a discourse,” a general set of attitudes, 
which could be and were used to justify the rule of particular kings. The result was not so 
much a political theory or even political thought as a literary genre or a collection of topoi and 
analogies.347 
Some virtues obviously belong in the collection of royal traits exalting the king—justice and courage, 
for example—while others, like clemency, can be construed as forming part of a dialogue between the 
king and his subjects.348 In each of the schools, however, ideal kingship was seen in terms of virtue 
monarchy.
In the Pythagorean texts, virtue monarchy was joined with the idea of cosmic monarchy, which 
included the idea that the king imitate the divine (see above, p. 140 ). These two models work together 
since through his imitation of the divine, the king receives certain divine virtues which enable him to 
rule and which are also imitated by his subjects. The centrality of the virtues in Hellenistic kingship 
ideals points beyond the political community to the individual and the ethical.
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345. If the authors of the Pythagorean piερι` βασιλει'ας treatises hoped they would be read by rulers, then they too would 
have considered it acceptable to serve in the royal courts in this way. The dating difficulties and absence of any historical 
context make it difficult to reach a definitive conclusion about the readers of these texts.
346. Behind this impulse stands Plato’s philosopher-king (Resp. 473c–e).
347. “Philosophy and Monarchy,” 21.
348. For the idea that the kingship texts were part of a dialogue between king, polis, and philosopher, see Matthias 
Haake, “Writing Down the King: The Communicative Function of Treatises On Kingship in the Hellenistic Period,” in The 
Splendors and Miseries of Ruling Alone: Encounters with Monarchy from Archaic Greece to the Hellenistic Mediterranean, 
ed. Nino Luraghi, StAM 1 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2013), 165–206.
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Cynic and Stoic thought in particular kingship is used as a model to think about the sage. As A. 
A. Long observes with regard to the Hellenistic period, “The concepts of authority, power, ruler and 
subject, stable government and insurrection have become ways of analyzing the self.”349 Not 
surprisingly, given the metaphor being employed, self-rule and self-control were considered 
foundational virtues.
Chapter 5 will return to these constructions of kingship to explore how they are used by 
Hellenistic Jewish authors. In order to tease out accurately the various strands of thought in these 
hybrid models, though, it is important to identify an additional model of kingship upon which these 
Jewish authors drew: ideal kingship as it is described in the Jewish Scriptures. 
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349. “Hellenistic Ethics and Philosophical Power,” 9.
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CHAPTER 4: IDEAL KINGSHIP IN ISRAEL’S SCRIPTURES
In this chapter I construct a model of ideal human kingship as it is found in parts of the Jewish 
Scriptures. Although my primary question in this dissertation is concerned with Paul’s possible 
appropriation of Hellenistic philosophical ideals of kingship, Paul’s familiarity with the Jewish texts 
means that their construction of kingship needs to be excluded if I am to isolate Hellenistic elements in 
his writings.
In order to limit the length of this part of the study, I will only look at selected passages from the 
Deuteronomistic History (Deuteronomy–Kings), the Psalms, and Isaiah. The limited scope is warranted 
for three reasons. First, this group of texts is representative of the three parts of the Jewish canon: the 
law (Deuteronomy), writings (Psalms), and prophets (former prophets: Samuel, Kings; latter prophets: 
Isaiah). Second, the three groups of texts being examined contain a number of the most significant 
passages in which concentrated discourse about kingship can be found.1 In attempting to mirror as 
closely as possible the approaches taken in the previous two chapters, I will examine passages in which 
the focus falls primarily on kingship or within which the ideals of kingship are explicitly expressed. 
Third, in his quotations of, and allusions to, the Jewish Scriptures, Paul draws most frequently from 
Deuteronomy, the Psalms, and Isaiah.2 If the frequency with which he quotes these texts provides an 
estimate of their influence on him, then our use of them to sketch a model of kingship with which he 
might have been familiar is warranted.
The kingship of Israel’s god, the Lord,3 is often considered to be the defining feature and/or 
organizing principle of not only the Hebrew Bible, but the entire body of literature that comprises the 
Christian Scriptures.4 The centrality of divine monarchy in the texts of the Hebrew Bible is matched by 
the presence and prominence of a human king who stands in relation to Israel’s god and Israel’s 
people.5 
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1. The following might be included in a more extensive study: Jer 23.1–8; Ezek 34; 37.15–28; Zech 9.9–13.  
2. Paul cites Isaiah 28 times, the Psalms 20 times, and Deuteronomy 15 times. Only Genesis (15 times) receives similar 
attention (Dietrich-Alex Koch, Die Schrift als Zeuge des Evangeliums: Untersuchungen zur Verwendung und zum 
Verständnis der Schrift bei Paulus, BHT 69 [Tübingen: Mohr, 1986], 33).
3. The Hebrew divine name served to distinguish Israel’s god from the gods of the surrounding nations. In the Greek 
Scriptures, the divine name is usually translated as κυ' ριος. I will refer to Israel’s god either as “the Lord” or “God.”
4. See John Bright, The Kingdom of God: The Biblical Concept and Its Meaning for the Church (Nashville: Abingdon, 
1953); John Gray, The Biblical Doctrine of the Reign of God (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1979); Thomas R. Schreiner, The King 
in His Beauty: A Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2013). These 
theological studies are complemented historical-critical studies that describe divine kingship as a development from, or 
reflection of, Israel’s human kingship (Marc Zvi Brettler, God is King: Understanding an Israelite Metaphor, JSOTSup 76 
[Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1989]) or in relation to the divine kingship of Israel’s neighbours (Shawn W. Flynn, YHWH is King: 
The Development of Divine Kingship in Ancient Israel, VTSup 159 [Leiden: Brill, 2014]). Anne Moore (Moving Beyond 
Symbol and Myth: Understanding the Kingship of God of the Hebrew Bible Through Metaphor, StBibLit 99 [New York: 
Lang, 2009]) and Beth Stovell (Beth M. Stovell, Mapping Metaphorical Discourse in the Fourth Gospel: John’s Eternal 
King, Linguistic Biblical Studies 5 [Leiden: Brill, 2012], 73–133) explore “God is King” as metaphorical language.
5. The period of the ancient Near East reflected in these texts is dominated by kingship (see, e.g., the essays in Nicole 
Brisch, ed., Religion and Power: Divine Kingship in the Ancient World and Beyond, University of Chicago Oriental Institute 
Seminars 4 [Chicago: Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago, 2008]), and substantial scholarship in the mid-twentieth 
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I will not pursue the development of Israel’s kingship or the historical nature of kingship ideology 
in this chapter. Rather, the object of study is the concept of kingship as it appears in the texts of the 
Jewish Scriptures. The image of the ideal king will be pursued through a synchronic analysis of the 
texts in the Septuagint, since this is most likely how Paul would have encountered and understood 
them.6 Since Deuteronomy functions to anchor the Deuteronomistic History,7 and, by happy 
coincidence, also contains the most concentrated discourse on kingship in the Jewish Scriptures, the so-
called “Law of the King” in Deuteronomy 17.14–20, I begin by examining this passage.
Moses’ Law of the King (Deuteronomy 17.14–20)
The narrative that extends from Deuteronomy to 2 Kings portrays the period from Israel’s 
imminent entrance of the promised land through to the Babylonian exile of Judah, the southern 
kingdom centred around Jerusalem. Leadership is a key theme in this narrative.8 Moses, Joshua, and 
the different “judges” take on roles of leadership which might be termed monarchical, but it is Saul 
who is recognized as Israel’s first king. Following Saul’s unsatisfactory reign, the reigns of David and  
Solomon are often perceived as the high point of Israelite monarchy, since the rest of the narrative tells 
of the dividing of the kingdom and the exile of Israel in the north and, later, Judah in the south.   
The stylistic, linguistic, thematic, and theological similarities in Deuteronomy and the books of the 
Former Prophets have led to the recognition of a certain coherence in this body of literature which has 
been explained in different ways. Martin Noth’s thesis of a “Deuteronomistic history” (DH) created by 
an exilic author-editor he called the Deuteronomist (Dtr) continues to serve as the paradigm which 
subsequent hypotheses have refined or modified.9 But while diachronic literary and tradition-historical 
approaches have led to advances in the scholarly understanding of this body of texts, they are not 
suitable for the purposes of this study.
Since the goal of this part of the dissertation is to examine constructions of ideal kingship in 
Jewish texts as they might have been read and understood by Paul, a synchronic, narrative approach to 
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century was concerned with the relationship between Israel’s kingship and that of the nation’s neighbours (see, e.g., Henri 
Frankfort, Kingship and the Gods: A Study of Ancient Near Eastern Religion as the Integration of Society and Nature, 
[1948; repr., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978]; Ivan Engnell, Studies in Divine Kingship in the Ancient Near 
East, 2 ed. [Oxford: Blackwell, 1967]).
6. For the argument that Paul follows narrative patterns within Scripture, albeit with a sense of freedom, see Steve 
Moyise, “How Does Paul Read Scripture?” in Early Christian Literature and Intertextuality: Volume 1: Thematic Studies, 
ed. Craig A. Evans and H. Daniel Zacharias, LNTS 391 (London: T&T Clark, 2009), 184–96. Different approaches to 
defining what those patterns might look like can be found in the contributions to Bruce W. Longenecker, ed., Narrative 
Dynamics in Paul: A Critical Assessment (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2002).
7. “The book of Deuteronomy, which is presented as Moses’ testimony, appears as the hermeneutical key and the 
ideological basis for reading and understanding the following history” (Thomas C. Römer, The So-Called Deuteronomistic 
History: A Sociological, Historical, and Literary Introduction [London: T&T Clark, 2005], 24).
8. Mark O’Brien, “The ‘Deuteronomistic History’ as a Story of Israel’s Leaders,” ABR 37 (1989): 14–34.
9. See Noth’s The Deuteronomistic History, trans. Jane Doull, John Barton, and Michael D. Rutter, JSOTSup 15 
(Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1981) and the essays in Steven L. McKenzie and M. Patrick Graham, eds., The History of Israel’s 
Traditions: The Heritage of Martin Noth, JSOTSup 182 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1994). But, as Gary Knoppers 
observes with regard to this pursuit, “there is a bewildering diversity of opinion on the questions of sources, authorship, date, 
provenance, and redaction” (“Introduction,” in Reconsidering Israel and Judah: Recent Studies on the Deuteronomistic 
History, ed. Gary N. Knoppers and J. Gordon McConville, SBTS 8 [Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 2000], 3).
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passages within DH is more appropriate. This involves treating Dtr not as a redactor who simply joined 
together pre-existing sources with linking passages, but as an author who, in addition to making 
judicious choices about which sources to use, where to use them, and how to link them, has also 
rewritten and edited these sources in order to produce a coherent text narrating an historical account.10 
Within this account, the “Law of the King” in Deuteronomy 17.14–20 contains the first concentrated 
discussion of human kingship.11  
The Law of the King in Context
Deuteronomy 16.18–18.22 contains instructions about various offices in Israel: judges and 
officials (16.18–20), the king (17.14–20), priests (18.1–8), and prophets (18.14–22), between which 
are interspersed related instructions regarding worship (16.21–17.7; 18.9–13) and legal proceedings 
(17.8–13). Dean McBride argues that the central section of Deuteronomy, chapters 12–26, form “a 
social charter of extraordinary literary coherence and political sophistication” which, following 
Josephus, he identifies as a type of “constitution” for Israel.12 Norbert Lohfink considers Deuteronomy 
16.18–18.22 to be “a comprehensive piece of legislation concerning the principal functions of power in 
Israel,”13 the primary goal of which was the distribution of power within the nation.14   
The Law of the King does not place kingship within a clear, detailed legal framework. Instead, 
“merely a shadowy existence is allowed here to kingship in Israel.”15 The passage does not provide 
Israel’s king with a set of rights and responsibilities but is meant, instead, “to inculcate a spirit of law-
keeping.”16 Careful attendance to the law is at the heart of Deuteronomy’s theological vision and, as 
this section will make clear, the Law of the King provides the reader with “an ideal charter for kingship 
that is consistent with the character and content of the Mosaic instruction in the rest of this book.”17  
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10. Paul R. Noble, “Synchronic and Diachronic Approaches to Biblical Interpretation,” JLT 7.2 (1993): 130–48. The 
scholarly discussion around the identity of those who produced DH is summarized by Thomas Römer (So-Called 
Deuteronomistic History, 45–49).
11. There are adumbrations and isolated mentions of Israel’s future human kings earlier in the narrative; see, for 
example, Gen 17.6, 16; 36.31; 49.10 (discussed in T. Desmond Alexander, “Messianic Ideology in the Book of Genesis,” in 
The Lord’s Anointed: Interpretation of Old Testament Messianic Texts, ed. Philip E. Satterthwaite, Richard S. Hess, and 
Gordon J. Wenham [Carlisle: Paternoster, 1995], 19–39); Num 24.17, 27.
12. “Polity of the Covenant People: The Book of Deuteronomy,” Int 41 (1987): 243; cf. J. Gordon McConville, God 
and Earthly Power: An Old Testament Political Theology, Genesis-Kings, LHBOTS 454 (London: T&T Clark, 2006), 85–
88.
13. “Distribution of the Functions of Power: The Laws Concerning Public Offices in Deuteronomy 16:18–18:22,” in A 
Song of Power and the Power of Song: Essays on the Book of Deuteronomy, ed. Duane L. Christensen, SBTS 3 (Winona 
Lake: Eisenbrauns, 1993), 345.
14. Lohfink places the final redaction of this legislation in the exilic period and argues that its current form is the result 
of interaction with the Israelite monarchy. As such, Deut 16–18 is a “utopian theory” rather than legislation that might have 
been implemented (“Distribution of the Functions of Power,” 346). So, too, Bernard Levinson: “Deuteronomy submits a 
utopian manifesto for a constitutional monarchy that sharply delimits the power oft he king” (“The Reconceptualization of 
Kingship in Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomistic History’s Transformation of Torah,” VT 51.4 [2001]: 511).
15. Gerhard von Rad, Deuteronomy: A Commentary, trans. Dorothea Barton, OTL (London: SCM, 1966), 120.
16. Gordon McConville suggests that this is the goal of Deuteronomy’s legal section (Law and Theology in 
Deuteronomy, JSOTSup 33 [Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1984], 154); see Jamie A. Grant, The King as Exemplar: The Function of 
Deuteronomy’s Kingship Law in the Shaping of the Book of Psalms, AcBib 17 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 
2004), 199.
17. Patrick D. Miller, Deuteronomy, Interpretation (Louisville: John Knox, 1990), 147.
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Choosing God’s King18
The opening verse of this section establishes the context for Israel’s monarchy. After conquering 
the land, Deuteronomy envisages a request from the nation for monarchical leadership: “I will set a 
ruler (α»ρχοντα) over me, like the rest of the nations that are around me” (Deut 17.14).19 There is no 
indication at this point in Deuteronomy that there is anything wrong with the desire for a king, although 
Israel’s desire to be like the nations is more problematic.20 Deuteronomy 7 commands the Israelites to 
destroy the nations they conquer, not to enter into any political agreements with them, and not to marry 
their sons and daughters, lest they lead the Israelites to follow after other Gods (cf. Deut 12.29–30; 
18.9–14). Israel’s distinctiveness as God’s people is axiomatic in the narrative of the nation’s history. 
Verbal parallels with the incident at 1 Samuel 8 where Israel demands a king (cf. 1 Sam 8.5), provide 
further support that kingship like the nations was seen as rebellion against God.21 It is the nature of 
Israel’s monarchy, rather than monarchy per se, that is potentially problematic.22 
The first part of Deuteronomy 17.15 confirms the acceptability of kingship. Moses instructs the 
people that when they desire a king, they are to appoint the king chosen by the Lord.23 The theme of 
God’s choosing is an important one in Deuteronomy. God chooses the nation (e.g. 4.37; 7.6–7; 10.15), 
the place where God or God’s name will dwell (12.5, 11, 14; 16.6, 11), and the Levitical priests who 
serve there (18.6; 21.5). God’s choice means he has determined that a specific state of affairs must 
exist and that this state has his blessing. Kingship is one of the things that the Lord has chosen and 
must be seen as falling within God’s purposes and rule.24 The fact that the Lord has chosen a king 
suggests that the main question is not “Should there be a king?” but “What should the king look 
like?”25  
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18. Grant, King as Exemplar, 193 identifies four key elements in Deuteronomy 17.14–20 that will serve to structure 
our discussion of the passage: (1) the king is chosen by the Lord (vv. 14–15); (2) the king is to be like his fellow Israelites 
(15, 20); (3) the limitation of royal power (vv. 16-17); and (4) the centrality of torah in the life of the king (vv. 18-19). 
Similarly, Miller (Deuteronomy, 148–49) draws three main conclusions from this passage: the limitation of royal power, the 
king’s allegiance to the Lord, and, joining Grant’s second and fourth points, that the king must be a model Israelite 
(especially with respect to torah).
19. The LXX translation, Καταστη' σω ε π ε µαυτο`ν α»ρχοντα..., is in keeping with the translator’s decision to use α»ρχων 
for ךלמ when Israel’s rulers are in view and to use βασιλευ' ς for the Lord or a foreign king (John William Wevers, Notes on 
the Greek Text of Deuteronomy, SCS 39 [Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1995], 286). This usage is most evident at Deut 33.5 where 
ךלמ is translated with α»ρχων since the translator has (mis)understood the passage to be speaking about Moses and not the 
Lord (Wevers, Deuteronomy, 541). The LXX translation also allows Deut 17 to refer to Israel’s rulers between Moses and 
Saul who were not called “king,” such as Joshua and the judges.
20. So Mark O’Brien, “Deuteronomy 16.18–18.22: Meeting the Challenge of Towns and Nations,” JSOT 33.2 
(2008): 155–72. Rachelle Gilmour, Representing the Past: A Literary Analysis of Narrative Historiography in the Book of 
Samuel, VTSup 143 (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 196 interprets the request in a neutral sense.
21. “To ask for a king like the nations is then a rejection of Yahweh and his ways” (Gerald Eddie Gerbrandt, Kingship 
According to the Deuteronomistic History, SBLDS 87 [Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986], 109, original emphasis).
22. In contrast to Gerhard von Rad’s conclusion that “kingship is conceived, almost reluctantly, as a concession to 
historical reality” (Deuteronomy, 119), Mark O’Brien reads Deut 17.14–15 as permissive, rather than concessive 
(“Deuteronomy 16.18–18.22,” 165).
23. It is difficult to discern how the people’s choice of king is related to the divine act (von Rad, Deuteronomy, 120). 
In the book of  Samuel it is the prophet who anoints the king on the Lord’s behalf (1 Sam 9), following the people’s request 
for a king (1 Sam 8). 
24. Gerbrandt, Kingship, 109–10.
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Like One of His Brothers
In addition to being chosen by God, the king must be appointed from among the Israelites: “One 
of your own brothers you shall appoint as ruler over you” (17.15). The appointment of a foreign king is 
forbidden. No explicit reason for this prohibition is provided, but it is consistent with Deuteronomy’s 
general warning against foreign influences (see above).26
The first part of verse 20 provides a further clue as to the type of kingship these instructions are 
attempting to create. The king is to keep God’s law “so that his heart may not be exalted above his 
brothers.” The emphasis here falls on the king’s humility. By following God’s law he will not think of 
himself as superior to the rest of the Israelites but will be the first among equals.27
The use of familial metaphors in Deuteronomy emphasizes the unity of the nation.28 Any 
distinction or tension between the tribes is only hinted at in Deuteronomy.29 The tribes must fight 
together to conquer the various enemies inhabiting the land, and none may rest until the Lord gives rest 
to their “brothers” (3.12–20). The appointment of a king from among his “brothers” contributes to this 
theme so that kingship may not disturb the essential unity of God’s people.30
Israel’s unity is seen above all in the covenant established by the Lord with the ancestors of the 
generation addressed by Moses in Deuteronomy (see, e.g., 7.12; 8.18) which, paradoxically, the Lord 
made with the generation addressed by Moses (5.2–3).31 Moses addresses his words to “all Israel” (1.1; 
5.1), the descendants of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob (1.8). Deuteronomy 4–5 and 29 set the entire book 
within the context of this covenant which looks back to the events described at Exodus 19–20 where 
the multitudinous descendants of the seventy who originally went in Egypt (Deut 10.22) are constituted 
as “a royal priesthood and a holy nation” (Exod 19.6). It is therefore necessary for Israel’s king to be a 
“brother” since only a “brother” falls under this covenant. The significance of this will be explored 
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25. Grant, King as Exemplar, 196–99; Gerbrandt, Kingship, 189.
26. It sounds absurd for a people to appoint a foreign king over themselves. David Daube suggests that Abimelech 
(Judg 8.29–9.57), whose father was Gideon, but whose mother was a Canaanite, is in view at this point (“One from Among 
Your Brethren Shall You Set King Over You,” JBL 90.4 [1971]: 480–81). The importance of the king being under the 
covenant (see vv. 18–20) which the Lord had established with the nation and individuals of Israel seems a more likely 
explanation for this decree (Gerbrandt, Kingship, 111).  
27. Given their jurisdiction in cultic (18.1–8; cf. 10.8–9) and judicial affairs (17.8–13; cf. 21.5), as well as their 
authority in matters of the law (31.9, 24–26; 33.10), the Levitical priests seem to have wielded an enormous amount of 
power, according to Deuteronomy. If the king was indeed “the judge” of 17.9 (McBride, “Polity,” 241), this might have been 
an attempt to balance the power of the Levites.
28. Paul A. Barker, “Contemporary Theological Interpretation of Deuteronomy,” in Interpreting Deuteronomy: Issues 
and Approaches, ed. David G. Firth and Philip S. Johnston (Nottingham: Apollos, 2012), 78.
29. McConville, God and Earthly Power, 92; cf. McConville, Law and Theology, 19.
30. Sociological analyses of kingship in Israel suggest similar motivations behind the law, except there the differences 
which these laws aim to ameliorate are expressed in terms of socio-economic class; see Robert B. Coote and Keith W. 
Whitelam, “The Emergence of Israel: Social Transformation and State Formation Following the Decline in Late Bronze Age 
Trade,” Semeia 37 (1986): 107–47; Patricia Dutcher-Walls, “The Circumscription of the King: Deuteronomy 17:16–17 in Its 
Ancient Social Context,” JBL 121.4 (2002): 601–16.
31. This verse dissolves the gap that exists between the past and the present in Deuteronomy. “The covenant is not an 
event, a claim, a relationship of the past; it is of the present” (Miller, Deuteronomy, 67). The covenant thus establishes an 
inter-generational unity in Israel.
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further when we look at Deuteronomy 17.18–20. Before then, however, it is necessary to look at verses 
16 and 17 which introduce three additional areas in which the laws limit Israelite kingship.  
Weapons, Women, Wealth
Deuteronomy 17.16–17 bars the king from acquiring many horses for himself, and from acquiring 
many wives, and from amassing great quantities of silver and gold. “Weapons, women, and wealth: 
why else be a king?” wonders Wright.32 These proscriptions limit the king’s power within the nation 
and restrict his ability to engage either diplomatically or militarily with the nations around Israel. 
Internally, the laws contribute to a more egalitarian type of kingship by making the king more like his 
“brothers” and less like the kings of the surrounding nations.33 Externally, these limitations force the 
king—and, by extension, Israel—to rely on the Lord for protection.34 
The prohibition against acquiring horses is usually understood in military terms, although 
commerce and wealth might also be in view.35 In contrast to other ancient Near Eastern societies, 
Israel’s king has been removed from providing military leadership, raising armies, and waging wars. In 
Deuteronomy, Israel would seem to have no standing army, but when the nation does go to war, an 
army will be assembled from the various tribes in the manner described in Deuteronomy 20.36 It is the 
Lord, and not the king, who fights on behalf of his people to give them victory (Deut 20.4; cf. 3.22).
The temptation to return the people to Egypt most probably has in view the sale of Israelite slaves 
in return for horses. Such actions would reverse the exodus by returning Israelites to the condition of 
slavery from which the Lord had redeemed them. Although the Lord retains this option as punishment 
for covenant disobedience (Deut 28.68), no king may place his fellow Israelite in this position.
The prohibition against multiplying wives (v. 17a) is put in place lest his heart be led astray by 
them (µεταστη' σεται αυτουñ η  καρδι'α). In Deuteronomy, being led astray or turning aside almost always 
happens with regard to the Lord, his ways, and his laws (e.g., 5.32; 7.4; 9.12, 16). This is also the case 
in the immediate context of the warning about many wives (17.11, 20). While élite marriages certainly 
had economic, social, and political implications,37 at Deuteronomy 17.17 a multitude of wives carries 
religious dangers. No mention is made of foreign wives at this point, but given the absence of 
restrictions on polygamy in ancient Israel and the prohibitions against marrying foreigners because of 
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32. Christopher J. H. Wright, Deuteronomy, NIBC 4 (Peabody: Hendrickson, 1996), 209.
33. O’Brien, “Deuteronomy 16.18–18.22,” 166.
34. Dutcher-Walls, “Circumscription of the King,” 603–4. Dutcher-Walls employs social-scientific tools to illuminate 
the internal and external implications of these restrictions. She assumes the law had been developed by élites in seventh-
century Judah to address the nation’s situation as a vassal of the Assyrian empire. In her reading, these laws deny the king the 
opportunity to assert military, political/diplomatic, and economic independence and “thus support a strategy of acquiescence 
to the domination of Assyria” (615), while simultaneously reducing the king’s power in relation to other élites (616). 
35. See Gary N. Knoppers, “Rethinking the Relationship Between Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomistic History: The 
Case of Kings,” CBQ 63 (2001): 401–2 for further discussion.
36. Lohfink (“Distribution of the Functions of Power,” 345) suggests that Deut 17.16 alludes to a mercenary force 
rather than a standing army. With regard to the officials of Deut 16–18, Lohfink argues that the “officers” appointed at 16.18 
are those who appoint “commanders” (20.9) in times of war.
37. Dutcher-Walls, “Circumscription of the King,” 608; see also Norbert Lohfink who argues that both the king’s 
harem and his wealth would have been intended as displays of magnificence and signs of the prosperity of the state 
(“Distribution of the Functions of Power,” 349).
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the religious dangers inherent in such relationships (Deut 7.3–4; cf. 1 Kgs 11.1–4),38 it is quite likely 
that foreign wives are meant. Since royal marriages were often used to seal international agreements, 
this law would restrict the king’s ability to engage in international diplomacy.39 This reading of the 
prohibition against multiplying wives stresses, once again, the king’s and nation’s dependence on the 
Lord for their safety.40 
Finally, the restriction on amassing silver and gold is not an absolute prohibition but a warning 
against excessive wealth.41 If we assume that the thread of the king being like his “brothers” runs 
through the Kingship Law, then the reason for this prohibition is clear. Power—especially monarchical 
power—always brings with it the potential to generate great wealth. Israel’s king is to resist the 
temptation to enrich himself at the expense of his “brothers.”42 Not only is power able to generate 
wealth, but wealth can establish and maintain political power, both internally and externally. The 
king’s avoidance of excessive wealth would mark him as odd in the ancient Near East where kingship 
and great wealth frequently accompanied one another. In his attitude towards silver and gold, the king 
is once again shown to be unlike the kings of the other nations.Like his “brothers,” the king is to 
depend on the Lord and not his wealth.43  
The limitations placed upon the king serve to make the king more like his “brothers” and thus, 
distinguish his kingship from that of the kings of the surrounding nations. “The legislation is not 
primarily about how the king is to rule his people but about how, once the option of having a king is 
taken up, he can effectively counter the desire to be like the nations.”44 Furthermore, once the usual 
devices of rule—military might, international diplomacy, wealth—have been removed, the king can 
only rely on the Lord as the source of a successful reign. The final section in the Kingship Law 
establishes the conditions for the Lord’s support of such a reign. 
The King and Torah
In Deuteronomy 17.18–20, provision is made for the king to study and follow God’s law so that 
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38. On the religious aspect of exogamic marriage in Deut 7, see Benedikt J. Conczorowski, “All the Same as Ezra? 
Conceptual Differences Between the Texts on Intermarriage in Genesis, Deuteronomy 7 and Ezra,” in Mixed Marriages: 
Intermarriage and Group Identity in the Second Temple Period, ed. Christian Frevel, LHBOTS 547 (New York: T&T Clark, 
2011), 89–108.
39. Grant, King as Exemplar, 203; cf. Gerbrandt, Kingship, 111.
40. If foreign wives are not in view, the passage prohibits the king from providing a royal harem for himself. In this 
case, the emphasis would be on the distinction between Israel’s king and those in surrounding nations for whom harems were 
a symbol of wealth and status (Gary N. Knoppers, “The Deuteronomist and the Deuteronomic Law of the King: A 
Reexamination of a Relationship,” ZAW 108 [1996]: 402). Assuming, too, that the average Israelite would not be in a 
position to maintain a harem, this part of the law would also ensure that the king’s family situation was similar to that of his 
fellow Israelites.
41. While the same construction is used here to warn against “multiplying” horses and wives (ου   πληθυνειñ εαυτωñ, ), the 
clause about wealth is modified by σφο' δρα, indicating that excessive wealth is the problem. 
42. Gerbrandt, Kingship, 112. If, as some have argued, vv. 18–19 were inserted at a later stage, this argument is 
strengthened with regard to the original prohibition, since v, 20a continues with “so that his heart may not be exalted above 
his brothers.” In Dutcher-Walls’ reading, this prohibition against excessive wealth represents an attempt by the élite to limit 
the king’s control of the economic surplus (“Circumscription of the King,” 609).
43. Grant, King as Exemplar, 203–4.
44. O’Brien, “Deuteronomy 16.18–18.22,” 159.
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he and his dynasty may enjoy a long reign over Israel. Upon his ascension to the throne, the king must 
“write for himself this second law in a book from the priests, the Leuites” (v. 18).45 In the opening 
paragraph of Deuteronomy we read, “Moyses spoke to all the sons of Israel according to all that the 
Lord had commanded him for them” (1.3) and Moses then expounds “this law” (1.5; cf. 4.1). Repeated 
references in the closing chapters of Deuteronomy to “law,” “this law,” and “the Book of the Law” 
(29.29; 30.10; 32.46; 33.10), combined with provisions for regular reading of the law (31.10–13) and 
its safe-keeping (31.24–26), suggest that Deuteronomy is indeed “this law” which the king is meant to 
copy, read, and follow. The link with the Levitical priests (17.18 and 31.25) corroborates this thesis.46 
The centrality of the law in the life of the king arises, in part, from the fact that in Deuteronomy νο'µος 
(הרות) has become more than instruction and even more than law—it has become the word of God.47 
The centrality of the law is seen in the king’s relation to it. The law must be with him and he must 
read it so that he might “keep all these commandments and these statutes to do them” (Deut 17.19). In 
contrast to other ancient kings who promulgate law, Israel’s king is subject to a law that he did not 
make.48 Furthermore, in Deuteronomy 16–18, provision is made for judges to execute justice 
throughout the land (16.18–20) and for difficult cases to be taken to the Levitical priests and “the 
judge” (κριτη' ς; 17.9, 12), both of whom reside in the place the Lord will choose (17.8–13).49 
Deuteronomy 17.20 links the purpose of this unusual limitation to the text’s “democratizing” 
tendency: the king must submit to the law “so that his heart may not be exalted above his brothers.” 
This levelling process occurs as the king submits to the same law as the people (e.g., Deut 5.1, 28–33; 
26.16–19), not turning from it to the right or the left. 
The conditional nature of God’s blessing implied in the clause “in order that he be long-lived in 
his rule, he and his sons among the sons of Israel” (Deut 17.20), is mirrored in the various warnings 
issued to Israel: “And you shall be watchful to perform all the words of this covenant in order that you 
may understand everything that you shall do” (29.9). In both cases, then, the king and the nation are to 
express careful obedience to God’s law in the knowledge that their future success or failure—blessing 
or curse—will depend on their adherence to the decrees and statutes of their god’s law.
Put shortly, by living under God’s law, the king is to be an exemplar of “torah piety” and 
covenant obedience. His adherence to the covenant the Lord made with Israel makes the king  a “model 
Israelite.”50 In the words of Patrick Miller, commenting on verse 19: 
The fundamental task of the leader of the people, therefore, is to exemplify and demonstrate 
true obedience to the Lord for the sake of the well-being of both the dynasty and the kingdom. 
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45. The Hebrew reads, “a copy of this law” (תאזה הרותה הנׁשמ־תא).
46. In Moses’ final song, it is “Levi” who teaches God’s ordinances and law (τα` δικαιω' µατα'  ... τον` νο' µον; Deut 33.10).
47. Jonathan Ben-Dov, “Writing as Oracle and as Law: New Contexts for the Book-Find of King Josiah,” JBL 127.2 
(2008): 226–28.
48. McBride, “Polity,” 241; Knoppers, “Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomistic History,” 402–3.
49. This separation of powers might seem commonplace to many modern interpreters,but would have struck the ancient 
reader as decidedly odd. Levinson suggests that this “Torah monarchy” might have been foundational for western 
constitutional thought in general (“Reconceptualization of Kingship,” 532).
50. Lohfink, “Distribution of the Functions of Power,” 349.
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King and subject share a common goal: to learn to fear the Lord.51
This observation is generally correct, but one should note, especially in light of the history recounted in 
the book of Kings, that the nation’s future is not explicitly linked to the obedience of the king at this 
point in Deuteronomy. His reign and the reign of his descendants depend upon his faithfulness. 
Nevertheless, to the extent that the king serves as a model for the nation, it would indeed seem to be the 
case, as this historical narrative progresses, that “as goes the king, so goes the kingdom.”
The final verses of the Law of the King thus serve two purposes. First, they establish the king as 
an example for the people to follow and a model to imitate. Second, they place the king in the same 
position as other Israelites in relation to the Lord.52 The focus in Deuteronomy is on the nation and the 
nation’s fortunes as it negotiates its new situation in the land of promise. Deuteronomy 17 does not 
create a direct link between the king’s obedience and the fate of the nation, but that connection 
becomes evident later in Israel’s history.   
The King in Samuel and Kings
The theme of kingship looms large in the books of Samuel and Kings,53 but in this section I 
highlight just three significant points in this account. First, the inauguration of Israelite monarchy is 
described in 1 Samuel 8–12. These chapters are important because they echo a number of themes 
already hinted at in Deuteronomy 17. Second, the figure of David will be examined by focusing on a 
significant passage, 2 Samuel 7, in which the Lord enters into a covenant with David and the Davidic 
dynasty. Finally, the book of Kings describes two good kings, Hezekiah and Josiah, who are set apart 
in the narrative because of their reforms.
The Inauguration of Monarchy: 1 Samuel 8–12
The book of Samuel serves, among other things, as a bridge between the period during which 
judges ruled the tribes of Israel and the monarchy.54 Samuel himself is a pivotal figure, acting first as a 
judge within Israel and then serving as the instrument of the Lord’s appointment of a king in the 
inauguration of Israelite monarchy described in 1 Samuel 8–12.55 The first and last chapters of this 
section contain the most concentrated ideas of monarchy and will receive attention in what follows,56 
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51. Miller, Deuteronomy, 149; see also Dennis J. McCarthy S. J., “Compact and Kingship: Stimuli for Hebrew 
Covenant Thinking,” in Studies in the Period of David and Solomon and Other Essays: Papers Read at the International 
Symposium for Biblical Studies, Tokyo, 5–7 December, 1979, ed. Tomoo Ishida (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 1982), 84–85.
52. Grant, King as Exemplar, 210.
53. The books of Samuel and Kings are identified in the LXX as Kingdoms. I shall use the English nomenclature when 
referring to these texts.
54. Samuel is part of Noth’s DH, but this thesis and its various presuppositions and corollaries have come under 
scrutiny; see, e.g., the essays in Cynthia Edenburg and Juha Pakkala, eds., Is Samuel Among the Deuteronomists? Current 
Views on the Place of Samuel in a Deuteronomistic History, AIL 16 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2013) .
55. For the literary delimitation of these chapters, see Dennis J. McCarthy S. J., “The Inauguration of Monarchy in 
Israel: A Form-Critical Study of I Samuel 8–12,” Int 27.4 (1973): 401–4; Lyle M. Eslinger, Kingship of God in Crisis: A 
Close Reading of 1 Samuel 1–12, BLS 10 (Sheffield: Almond Press, 1985), 43–53.
56. Saul’s various accessions to kingship in these chapters means that 1 Sam 8–12 has been a focal-point for source-
critical studies of the book, presenting scholars with “among the most vexed questions in biblical studies” (Tomoo Ishida, 
The Royal Dynasties in Ancient Israel: A Study on the Formation and Development of Royal-Dynastic Ideology, BZAW 142 
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but the preceding chapter is also significant for understanding the flow of the narrative.
In 1 Samuel 7, we find Samuel acting as judge (δικαστη' ς/δικα' ζω) in Israel (v. 6c; cf. vv. 15–17). 
However, Samuel’s involvement in rescuing Israel from the Philistines is limited to interceding for 
them (vv. 5, 8–9) and offering sacrifices to the Lord (vv. 9–10, 17). While the reader is given one 
example of the “men of Israel” pursuing and slaughtering the Philistines (v. 11), this only happens 
following the Lord’s intervention (v. 10). The emphasis in the narrative is thus on the Lord delivering 
Israel (v. 13; cf. v. 3), while Samuel’s role as leader is portrayed largely in terms of a mediatorial role. 
Samuel’s faithful performance of this role provides the context for the inauguration of Israel’s 
monarchy in the following chapter.
The people disapprove of Samuel’s appointment of his sons as judges (1 Sam 8.1–5), since his 
sons turned aside after gain, took bribes and perverted justice (v. 3). The elders of Israel ask, instead, 
that Samuel appoint a king to judge (δικα' ζειν) them, like all the other nations (v. 5).57 While Samuel’s 
displeasure at this request (v. 6) might result from personal reasons,58 the request is seen as a rejection 
of Israel’s god: the Lord says to Samuel, “they have not rejected you, but they have rejected me from 
being king over them” (v. 7).59 The full significance of this rejection is made clear towards the end of 
this passage where the request is repeated in an expanded form: “a king will be over us, and we too will 
be like all the nations, and our king will judge us and will go out before us and fight our battle.” (1 Sam 
8.19b–20). Samuel’s exemplary leadership in 1 Samuel 7 had shown the Israelites that it was the Lord 
who fought on their behalf. In 1 Samuel 8, their confidence in both Samuel and the Lord has shifted 
and they now look to a king to be their champion. Not only is the Lord rejected as the people of Israel 
trust a human king for their deliverance instead of the Lord, but implicit in this rejection is a 
problematic desire to be like the nations who have a king to lead them in battle (see above, p. 166).60
The Lord’s rehearsal in 1 Samuel 8.8 (cf. 10.17–19) of Israel’s unfaithfulness places the nation’s 
rejection in the context of the covenant established by the Lord with Israel. This connection is made 
even more explicit in 12.6–11 where the Lord shows faithfulness through the repeated rescue of Israel 
as he raises up those—including Samuel—who deliver the nation from Israel’s enemies. The Lord’s 
defeat of Israel’s enemies establishes his rule and is thus closely linked to the theme of the kingship of 
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[Berlin: De Gruyter, 1977], 26). On the other hand, literary/narrative approaches allow for coherent readings of these 
passages to emerge; see V. Philips Long, The Reign and Rejection of King Saul: A Case for Literary and Theological 
Coherence, SBLDS 118 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1989), 195–233; Eslinger, Kingship of God, 283–382.
57. For a recent, comprehensive survey of the various scholarly opinions regarding the nature of the elders’ rejection, 
see Jonathan H. Walton, “A King Like the Nations: 1 Samuel 8 in Its Cultural Context,” Bib 96.2 (2015): 179–91. Walton 
argues that the elders’ request is for the king to replace the ark. Gilmour’s narrative approach to this passage examines the 
various characters (the elders, Samuel, the Lord) involved in the request for a king before concluding that the narrator’s point 
of view is difficult to determine given the complexity of the various issues at stake in the request (Representing the 
Past, 168–98).
58. Keith Bodner, 1 Samuel: A Narrative Commentary, HBM 19 (Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2008), 71–72.
59. In v. 8, however, the Lord states that the people are indeed rejecting Samuel, just as they had rejected the Lord in 
the past. Eslinger (Kingship of God, 264–65) solves the puzzle by resorting to a textual emendation; but this emendation is 
not supported by any evidence .  
60. Gilmour, Representing the Past, 188–90.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
God.61 In contrast, the Israelites displays faithlessness by doubting the Lord’s ability or desire to rescue 
them. The Israelites’ doubt is displayed in their request for a king (12.12).     
It is somewhat surprising, in light of Israel’s disobedience and faithlessness, that the Lord agrees 
to give the people a king (8.9, 22; 12.13). Within the broader Deuteronomistic context, however, it is 
not unexpected, since Moses had already indicated that such a request would be granted (Deut 17.14-
15).62 
It remains to ask about the purpose of 1 Samuel 8.10–18 within this reading of chapters 8 and 12. 
In verse 9, Samuel is commanded by God to listen to the people, but to testify to them (διαµαρτυρε'ω) 
“and tell them the just claim of the king (το` δικαι'ωµα τουñ βασιλε'ως) who shall reign over them.” What 
Samuel describes is the servitude of the elders’ sons and daughters and the king’s demand for a tenth of 
all they produce. Ronald E. Clements argues that an anti-monarchical source lies behind this passage 
which “contains some of the sharpest and most incisive criticisms of the institution of kingship which 
are found in the Old Testament.”63 Against this view, Robert Polzin points out that these are “the 
monarchic rights and practices without which no king could effectively govern ... the normal baggage 
accompanying an ancient royal state.”64 Seen from this second perspective, the “rights of the king” are 
neutral, rather than negative, with regard to the question of monarchy in Israel.65
In contrast, the final warning in 1 Samuel 8.18—that the Lord will not answer on the day Israel 
cries out for relief from the king—is indeed negative, as is the fact that Israel refuses to listen to 
Samuel (v. 19a), even when he speaks the words of the Lord (v. 10). However, the nature of kingship is 
problematic, rather than monarchy itself, as verses 19b–20 confirm when the people once again ask for 
a king “like other nations.”   
From this survey of 1 Samuel 8 and 12 it becomes evident that the book of Samuel is neither anti- 
nor pro-monarchical.66 Dtr situates the origin of Israel’s monarchy in a time of social change and 
ongoing concern about the nation’s safety from its neighbours. Samuel’s success in leading the nation 
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61. Patrick D. Miller, The Divine Warrior in Early Israel (1973; repr., Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 
2006), 174.
62. Bodner argues that the Lord accedes to this demand like a parent giving in to a rebellious child (1 Samuel, 76), 
while Jerry Hwang considers God’s fulfillment of this request an act of judgment against Israel (“Yahweh’s Poetic Mishpat 
in Israel’s Kingship: A Reassessment of 1 Samuel 8–12,” WTJ 73 [2011]: 341–61); see Robert Polzin, Samuel and the 
Deuteronomist: 1 Samuel, A Literary Study of the Deuteronomic History 2 (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1989), 87; 
Gilmour, Representing the Past, 190–91. 
63. “Deuteronomistic Interpretation of the Founding of the Monarchy in 1 Sam 8,” VT 24.4 (1974): 399. Similarly, 
Jonathan Kaplan (“1 Samuel 8:11–18 as ‘a Mirror for Princes’,” JBL 131.4 [2012]: 625–42) argues that the discussion is 
meant to critique kingship and restrain monarchical power. Kaplan identifies 1 Sam 8 as a Fürstespiegel which provides a 
portrait of a bad ruler.
64. Polzin, Samuel, 85–86. Similarly, Baruch Halpern’s reading of this passage leads him to conclude that in this 
passage Samuel lays out the price of kingship for the elders to consider (The Constitution of the Monarchy in Israel, HSM 25 
[Chico: Scholars Press, 1981], 216–20).
65. Lyle M. Eslinger, “Viewpoint and Point of View in 1 Samuel 8–12,” JSOT 26 (1983): 68. While the Hebrew of this 
passage is ambiguous, the Greek translator seems to have understood the king’s demands positively, as demonstrated by their 
translation of the phrase as το` δικαι'ωµα τουñ βασιλε'ως.
66. So Eslinger: “The narrator ... maintains a steadfast neutrality towards the subject of kingship” (“Viewpoint,” 68). In 
Gilmour’s reading, the narrator refuses to judge between the points of view of the elders, Samuel, and the Lord on this 
complex matter, but is content to simply present each character’s position (Representing the Past, 197–98).
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is tempered by the looming threat of the appointment of his corrupt sons as leaders. The representatives 
(elders) of Israel demand that Samuel appoints a king like the nations to lead them against their 
enemies. This request is interpreted as a failure to trust the Lord for their deliverance and thus a 
rejection of the Lord’s covenant with Israel.67 Nevertheless, following the nation’s repentance, the Lord 
agrees to the appointment of a king within the context of the renewal of the covenant with Israel. Had 
the nation requested a ruler like Samuel (1 Sam 7) who trusted in the Lord and modelled faithful 
behaviour, the confrontation might have been avoided.
This account accords with the major themes of Deuteronomy 17.14–20: (1) the covenant is of 
primary significance not only for Israel, but also, and especially, for Israel’s king (cf. Deut 17.18–20); 
(2) Israel’s distinctive nature as the Lord’s chosen nation is illustrated by the fact that the king must not 
be like those of the nations, since this is seen as a rejection of the covenant; (3) the king and people 
must trust their god to fight their battles and deliver them from their enemies; (4) the description of the 
rights of the king circumscribe, albeit in a very limited way, the king’s future actions in a way similar to 
Deuteronomy 14.16–17; (5) we also note that the elders’ request for a king corresponds to the request 
for a king in Deuteronomy 17.14, while the Lord’s appointment of Saul through Samuel (1 Sam 9.17; 
10.1, 24; 11.15) corresponds to God’s choosing (Deut 17.15).
 The tension between Israel and the Lord in 1 Samuel 8 prepares the careful reader for Saul’s 
problematic reign. The Lord’s faithfulness to the nation is constant, though, and works itself out in the 
reign of Israel’s greatest king, David, son of Jesse.
Good King David
The story of David’s monarchy includes an extensive pre-history which tells how David replaces 
Saul as king (1 Sam 15–2 Sam 3)68 before securing his sovereignty over all Israel in the City of 
David/Zion/Jerusalem (2 Sam 4–9).69 The rest of the story of his reign (2 Sam 10–1 Kgs 2.12) 
describes war-time victories, murder, adultery, and palace intrigues that make him one of the more 
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67. Gerbrandt, Kingship, 145, 148–49.
68. For which, see J. Randall Short, The Surprising Election and Confirmation of King David, HTS 63 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2010).
69. A number of scholars are dubious of the existence of a unified monarchy under David; see, e.g., Israel Finkelstein, 
“A Great United Monarchy? Archaeological and Historical Perspectives,” in One God – One Cult – One Nation: 
Archaeological and Biblical Perspectives, ed. Reinhard G. Kratz and Hermann Spieckermann, BZAW 405 (Berlin: De 
Gruyter, 2010), 3–28. In the same volume, Amihai Mazar’s assessment of the evidence is more open to the possibility 
(“Archaeology and the Biblical Narrative: The Case of the United Monarchy,” 29–58).
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interesting characters of ancient literature.70 The sheer length of the Davidic narrative suggests his 
importance in DH, but also makes it difficult to survey Dtr’s portrait of Israel’s great king. And his 
story lacks a passage in which the nature of his kingship is explored in a concentrated fashion. 
Fortunately, the book of Kings contains a number of passages in which David’s monarchy is 
remembered and used as the criterion against which other kings are measured. Before turning to these 
we examine briefly one of the central passages in the story of David’s reign, 2 Samuel 7.
The significance of this passage for the rest of the Hebrew Bible can be gauged from William 
Schniedewind’s study of the reception history of 2 Samuel 7.71 The passage is important because of the 
central role David plays within the history of the Israelite monarchy narrated in Samuel–Kings and it 
also plays a pivotal role in DH.72 Dennis McCarthy, for example, has shown that the passage contains a 
number of key Deuteronomistic themes, serving both to sum up what has come before and anticipate 
what follows.73
The reference to “the day [the Lord] brought up the sons of Israel from Egypt” (2 Sam 7.6) 
establishes as a context for this prophecy Israel’s broader history and the covenant which establishes 
Israel as a people. The theme of “rest” (v. 11), now promised to David, echoes the promises made to 
Israel throughout DH (Deut 3.20; 12.10; Josh 21.44; Judg 3.11; 5.31; 8.28). Both David and the people 
enjoy this rest because the Lord has destroyed the king’s enemies and made David’s name great, thus 
providing a place74 in which Israel might be “planted” and where the nation will no longer experience 
trouble from enemies  (vv. 8–11). Given the history that precedes this passage, it might be surprising 
that David’s success as a military leader is not mentioned (cf. 1 Sam 8). But this serves to emphasize 
the Lord’s agency in these matters, another significant theme that runs through DH.75
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70. “David, in a word, is human, fully, four-dimensionally, recognizably human. He grows, he learns, he travails, he 
triumphs, and he suffers immeasurable tragedy and loss. He is the first human being in world literature” (Baruch Halpern, 
David’s Secret Demons: Messiah, Murderer, Traitor, King, The Bible in Its World [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001], 6). 
Halpern argues that the book of  Samuel presents the reader with pro-David propaganda in the form of a literary creation. 
Halpern’s portrait offers the reader “a glimpse of David as his enemies saw him. ... the anti-David or, by implication, the anti-
Messiah” (p. xv). Steven L. McKenzie’s King David: A Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) reaches similar 
conclusions about the historical David, reading the biblical narrative as apology. For a critical review of these two works, see 
Steven Weitzman, “King David’s Spin Doctors,” Prooftexts 23.3 (2003): 365–76. David M. Gunn (The Story of King David: 
Genre and Interpretation, JSOTSup 6 [Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1978], 21–26) provides an older survey of works that treat 2 
Sam 9–20 as political propaganda. Regardless of the motives that lie behind it, these readings are united in their recognition 
of the generally positive portrayal of David in the narrative of Samuel and Kings.
71. William M. Schniedewind, Society and the Promise to David: The Reception History of 2 Samuel 7:1–17 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1999); see Pss 2, 72, 89, 132; Isa 7.10–17; 9.2–7; 11.1–5; Jer 33.14–26; Ezek 34.23–24; 
37.24–28 (David G. Firth, 1 & 2 Samuel, ApOTC 8 [Nottingham: Apollos, 2009], 387). Schniedewind provides a brief 
survey of the research on 2 Sam 7 (Society, 30–33). Robert Gordon calls Nathan’s oracle “the matrix of biblical messianism” 
(I & II Samuel: A Commentary, Library of Biblical Interpretation [Grand Rapids: Regency Reference Library, 1986], 236).
72. See, e.g., Firth, 1 & 2 Samuel, 381 and the bibliography mentioned there.
73. Dennis J. McCarthy S. J., “II Samuel 7 and the Structure of the Deuteronomic History,” JBL 84.2 (1965): 134. The 
verbal parallels are more evident in the Hebrew than in translation. Robert Polzin (David and the Deuteronomist: 2 Samuel, 
A Literary Study of the Deuteronomic History 3 [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993], 71–84) reads 2 Sam 7.1–17 
largely against the book of  Judges, comparing Israel’s monarchy with the nation under the judges.
74. Schniedewind (Society, 36–37) notes a tension between the Deuteronomic understanding of “place” (םוקמ [το' πος; 
LXX]) as the temple where the Lord would dwell, and this passage’s use of “place” for the land. The tension is alleviated by 
the king’s relationship to both elements.
75. Gerbrandt, Kingship, 170.
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Although the term “covenant,” does not appear in 2 Sam 7.1–17, the covenantal language that 
occurs in the passage leads the reader to conclude that this is indeed a covenant established by the Lord 
with David and his “house.”76
“House” (οιòκος) proves to be something of a Leitwort in this passage. The initial scene is set in 
David’s οιòκος (“palace”?) (vv. 1, 2), the building of the οιòκος (“temple”) of the Lord is then in view 
(vv. 5, 6, 7; cf. v. 13), and in vv. 11–12, it is David’s οιòκος (“dynasty”) that will be built by the Lord 
(cf. v. 16). The passage is thus primarily concerned with the Lord’s temple and David’s dynasty.77
The Lord’s promise to build David’s house (2 Sam 7.11b) is already hinted at in the promise to 
make David’s name great (v. 9).78 The Lord’s activity—this time on behalf of David and his dynasty—
is once again at the centre of this passage as the Lord promises to establish the kingdom of David’s 
offspring (vv. 12–13). The close relationship between Israel’s god and Israel’s king is confirmed 
through the use of the adoption formula in verse 14a. The legitimacy of the Davidic line is thus firmly 
established through the divine sanction David’s sons receive.79 In the narrative that follows, it is this 
Davidic line, as opposed to the line of Jeroboam and the kings in the northern kingdom, that seems to 
carry forward the only hope for the Lord’s people.80 The narrative thus illustrates the unconditional 
nature of this eternal covenant (vv. 15–16) in which “the Davidic king may be disciplined, but ... not be 
set aside.”81   
Although not a central theme in the passage, 2 Samuel 7 raises another royal element: the king as 
shepherd.82 The Lord mentions those rulers who were commanded to shepherd his people (7.7; cf. 2 
Sam 5.2). This is followed by the observation that David had been a shepherd before he was designated 
as ruler of Israel (7.8; cf. 1 Sam 16.11; 17.15, 20). Nothing more is said about this metaphor at this 
point, but it occurs throughout the Jewish Scriptures as an important description of Israel’s ideal 
leader.83
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76. Firth, 1 & 2 Samuel, 380–88; see the reference to this event as the “eternal covenant” (διαθη' κη αι ω' νιος), in David’s 
prayer (2 Sam 23.5). Later texts also reflect on the passage in terms of “covenant” (e.g., Pss 89, 132; Isa 55.3). 
77. P. Kyle McCarter Jr., II Samuel: A New Translation with Introduction, Notes, and Commentary, AB 9 (New York: 
Doubleday, 1984), 217–20; Gordon, I & II Samuel, 235–42; Schniedewind, Society, 33–35.
78. In DH the focus is on the Name of the Lord (e.g., Deut 5.11; 12.11; 14.23; 1 Sam 12.22; 2 Sam 6.2, 18; 7.13, 23), 
but this promise from the Lord is reminiscent of that made to Abram (Gen 12.2), thus linking the Davidic covenant to the 
Abrahamic covenant and the larger biblical narrative.
79. Schniedewind, Society, 39.
80. As will be indicated below, even though the promises to the Davidic line are extended to Jeroboam and his “house” 
(1 Kgs 11.37–39), the history of the northern kingdom shows that line to be incorrigibly wicked. The Davidic line does not 
always fare much better, but the presence of a handful of kings who live up to David’s example are signs of hope in that 
dynasty.
81. Gordon, I & II Samuel, 240.
82. See Timothy S. Laniak, Shepherds After My Own Heart: Pastoral Traditions and Leadership in the Bible, NSBT 
20 (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2006).
83. The metaphor occurs again in 2 Sam 24.17; 1 Chron 21.17. David’s shepherding of Israel is celebrated in Ps 
78.70–72 and similar language is used of the future Davidic king (Ezek 34.23; 37.24). Moses had also been a shepherd 
(Exod 3.1; see Num 27.17) and Israel’s god was understood as a shepherd (Gen 48.15; 49.24; Ps 23.1; 80.1). For the place of 
this metaphor within the metaphor of God as king, see Brettler, God is King, 36–37 
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David is held up as the standard against which the Israelite monarchy is subsequently measured.84  
Solomon’s reign seems to start well and he is compared favourably to David (1 Kgs 3.3, 6–7, 14). 
Solomon asks that the Davidic promises be extended to him (8.25) and the Lord agrees to this, 
providing Solomon follows David’s example (9.4).85 In these passages David is described as faithful to 
the Lord, righteous, upright in heart, as one who walked in the ways of the Lord, obeying the Lord’s 
statutes and commands. These traits are linked to the promises of 2 Samuel 7. Later, however, the 
nation is split and ten tribes removed from Solomon’s realm because he did not keep the Lord’s decrees 
and laws as David did (1 Kgs 11.33 LXX).
As the kingdom starts to tear apart, Jeroboam, presumptive ruler of the northern tribes, is given the 
opportunity to follow David’s example. At 1 Kgs 11.37–39 Jeroboam is told that he must do what the 
Lord commands, walk in the Lord’s ways, do what is right in the Lord’s eyes by keeping the Lord’s 
statutes and commands, just as David did, thus ensuring the Lord’s presence with the king and the 
longevity of his dynasty. But Jeroboam fails to live up to this standard (14.8–9). From that point on, the 
kings of Israel, the northern kingdom, who follow Jeroboam are described as wicked (1 Kgs 15.26, 34; 
16.19, 25–26, 30; 22.52; 2 Kgs 3.2–3; 13.2, 11; 14.24; 15.9, 18, 24, 28; 17.2) and they are measured 
against their forebears (often Jeroboam), but never against David.
The theme of David-as-example can be observed in the regnal formulae for the Judahite kings that 
drive the narrative of 1–2 Kings.86 Amongst the kings of Judah, some are described simply as doing 
evil (2 Kgs 21.2), while others are compared to the kings of Israel (2 Kgs 8.18, 27) or to their wicked 
fathers (2 Kgs 21.20; 23.32, 37; 24.9, 19). Two kings, Abijah (1 Kgs 15.3) and Ahaz (2 Kgs 1.62), are 
explicitly contrasted with David.
Abijah’s example is instructive because Dtr notes that the king’s dynasty is maintained and 
Jerusalem kept strong “for David’s sake” (1 Kgs 15.4): “because David did what was right in the sight 
of the Lord, and did not turn aside from anything that he commanded him all the days of his life, except 
in the matter of Uriah the Hittite” (15.5). The Lord’s promises to the Davidic dynasty are reaffirmed on 
the basis of David’s faithfulness to God’s torah, not on the basis of the performance of individual 
kings.87 But Dtr is not content to whitewash David’s past. The book of Samuel notes a number of 
disturbing elements in David’s reign and here in the book of Kings, the reader is reminded of the 
distasteful way in which David dealt with Uriah (see 2 Sam 11). This is surprising, given David’s 
exemplary status in the rest of 1–2 Kings, but perhaps it is included to explain why the Davidic dynasty 
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84. So McKenzie, King David, 188–89, arguing that success of the Davidic apologetic/propaganda in the book of  
Samuel led to David occupying this significant role in Israel’s history. On the David-theme, see Iain W. Provan, Hezekiah 
and the Books of Kings: A Contribution to the Debate About the Composition of the Deuteronomistic History, BZAW 172 
(Berlin: De Gruyter, 1988), chap. 4, in which Provan teases out both the “comparative” and “promissory” elements of the 
David-theme.
85. Not only do these passages establish David as an exemplary figure, they also establish a close link between 
Solomon’s rule and the covenant of 2 Sam 7 (McCarthy, “II Samuel 7,” 134).
86. For a discussion of the characterization of kings achieved through the various judgments describing them, see 
Robert L. Cohn, “Characterization in Kings,” in The Books of Kings: Sources, Composition, Historiography and Reception, 
ed. Baruch Halpern and André Lemaire, VTSup 129 (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 91–93.
87. The pattern is established during Solomon’s reign; cf. 1 Kgs 11.11–13, 34–36.
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experiences such trials despite the Lord’s covenantal promises.88 Regardless of the shortcomings of 
Judah’s kings, the Lord’s covenant with David will be honoured and upheld by the Lord. However, the 
promises of the covenant cannot be used to sanction wickedness.89
Finally, a good king of Judah can be described simply as one who “did what was right in the sight 
of the Lord” (2 Kgs 12.3 LXX) or can be compared positively to his father (1 Kgs 22.43; 2 Kgs 15.3, 
34). Amaziah does right in the eyes of the Lord, yet “not like Dauid his father” (2 Kgs 14.3). None of 
these kings effect the removal of the “high places” (1 Kgs 22.43; 2 Kgs 12.3; 14.4; 15.4, 35) and 
cannot therefore be compared to David. There are, however, three kings who are compared favourably 
to David. The first is Asa who“did what was right before the Lord like his father Dauid” (1 Kgs 15.11). 
Asa banished idolatrous practices (15.12) and deposed his mother, Ana,90 cutting down and burning 
the image she had made for the worship of Asherah (15.13). But despite his evident zeal for religious 
reform, Asa is unable to remove the “high places” (15.14). Nonetheless, since “the heart of Asa was 
perfect with the Lord all his days” (15.14), his reign is measured positively against the example set by 
David. Asa’s attempts at religious reform commend him to Dtr who lauds him for it. Unlike the other 
two kings who are  compared to David (see below), the account of Asa’s reign is quite brief (1 Kgs 
15.9–24) and does not draw the same sort of attention as their stories do.
The promises in 2 Samuel 7 are remembered as being at the heart of the Lord’s relationship with 
David and the Davidic line; the ideal king is described primarily in terms of his relationship with 
Israel’s god. The single most important trait characterizing a good king is “doing right in the eyes of 
the Lord,” something in which the kings of the northern kingdom fail, as do most of the kings in the 
southern kingdom, although there are a handful that are described in more positive language, albeit 
briefly. There are, however, two striking exceptions to this trend. 
These two examples of kings of Judah who are compared favourably with David occur in 
extended passages towards the end of the Kings narrative. They serve to confirm the exemplary nature 
of David within DH and also highlight the centrality of the covenant in understanding Israel’s ideal 
monarchy. Before turning to these two kings, one unusual element of David’s kingship needs to be 
noted.
David is unusual (but not unique) amongst Israel’s kings in being described as physically superior 
to their subjects.91 When Saul is introduced into the narrative following Israel’s request for a king, he is 
described as follows: “tall (ευ  µεγε'θης), a good man (α  γαθο' ς), and there was not among the sons of 
Israel better than he; above the shoulder and upward he was taller than all the land” (1 Sam 9.2). Saul 
is superior to others in the land and his physical appearance confirms this. Saul’s failure suggests that 
this is an unreliable indicator of ideal kingship. 
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88. Compare Nathan’s warning/curse in 2 Sam 12.10–11: “Now therefore the sword shall never depart from your 
house, for you have despised me ... I will raise up trouble against you from within your own house.”
89. Provan, Hezekiah, 94–98, 100–113.
90. The MT has him deposing his grandmother, Maacah.
91. Meir Sternberg, The Poetics of Biblical Narrative: Ideological Literature and the Drama of Reading, ISBL 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), 354–64, discusses the narrative role of good looks in the case of Saul, David, 
and Absalom. 
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After Saul’s failure, Samuel is sent to anoint one of Jesse’s sons to be king over Israel (1 Sam 16). 
When Saul sees Eliab, presumably the eldest son, he assumes this is the one who is to be anointed. But 
God responds: “Do not look on his appearance or on the posture of his size, because I have rejected 
him, for God will not look as a mortal will see, for a mortal will see into a face, but God will see into a 
heart” (1 Sam 16.7).92 In contrast to his brother—but, more importantly, in contrast to Saul—the 
youngest son, David, is described as “the smallest” (ο  µικρο`ς; v. 11).93 Yet, when he arrives on the 
scene, the narrator observes: “this one was ruddy with beauty of eyes and was good in appearance to 
the Lord (πυρρα' κης µετα` κα' λλους ο φθαλµωñν και` α  γαθο`ς ο ρα' σει κυρι'ω, ). And the Lord said to Samouel 
[sic], “Rise, and anoint Dauid; for this one is good (ουðτος α  γαθο' ς ε στιν)” (v. 12).94 Similarly, when 
David is first described to Saul, Saul’s attendant says of David: “he knows how to play music, and the 
man is intelligent (συνετο' ς), and the man is a warrior (πολεµιστη' ς) and prudent with words (σοφο`ς 
λο' γω, ), and a man good in appearance (α  νη`ρ α  γαθο`ς τωñ,  ει»δει), and the Lord is with him” (v. 18). 
David’s description as an ideal king in these verses95 is marked by an emphasis on his physical beauty. 
As was the case with the ideal Hellenistic king, David’s physical appearance is superior to those of his 
subjects. 
The final (potential) king to be described in this way is Absalom (2 Sam 14.25–27). This 
description comes not when the reader is first introduced to Absalom, but at his return from exile, 
following Absalom’s murder of his brother in 2 Samuel 13. The description might lead the reader to 
expect a change of heart in Absalom, perhaps he is to be David’s successor. The seditious events in 2 
Samule 15, however, put paid to these ideas. 
The portraits of Saul, David, and Absalom are unusual amongst the Jewish kings that would 
follow. In keeping with the general nature of characterization in the Jewish Scriptures,96 no other 
king’s appearance receives the same attention that theirs does. But rather than define ideal kingship in 
these books, superior physical appearance is indeterminate. While David fulfills the ideal, both Saul 
and Absalom prove to be failures. The statement in 1 Samuel 16.7 is vindicated: “a mortal will see into 
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92. This could be a platitude not to judge a person by what is external but by what is internal, although in context, it 
seems to be a rebuke of the prophet for assuming to know the Lord’s anointed without a word from the Lord (cf. 1 Sam 
16.3); so Peter D. Miscall, 1 Samuel: A Literary Reading, ISBL (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 116–17. But 
these two readings are not opposed to one another, as illustrated by the comments in Bodner, 1 Samuel, 169–70.
93. This could be speaking of David’s age, but it is most likely an allusion to his height, which stands in contrast to that 
of Saul (1 Sam 9.2; cf. 17.38–39); see McKenzie, King David, 64–65, who finds other allusions to David’s short stature 
elsewhere in Samuel–Kings.
94. Bodner (1 Samuel, 171) observes the “inscrutability of the divine ways” at this point in the narrative: Samuel has 
been told not to judge by outward appearances, and yet here is one whose outward appearance is described in glowing terms.
95. McKenzie (King David, 51–67) shows how these attributes summarize aspects of David’s kingship from his 
anointing (1 Sam 16) until his death (2 Kgs 2).
96. Robert Alter notes about characterization in the Jewish Scriptures that, in general, “we are given only the barest 
hints about the physical appearance ... of the characters” (The Art of Biblical Narrative [New York: Basic Books, 
1981], 114). On characterization, see Alter, Biblical Narrative, 114–30; Adele Berlin, Poetics and Interpretation of Biblical 
Narrative, Bible and Literature Series 9 (Sheffield: Almond Press, 1983), 23–42; Sternberg, Poetics of Biblical 
Narrative, 321–41.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
a face, but God will see into a heart.”97 There are, however, other exemplary aspects of kingship which 
does attract the attention of the narrator.   
The Good King as Religious Reformer
 Both Hezekiah (2 Kgs 18.1–20.21) and Josiah (2 Kgs 22.1–23.30) are held up as “models of 
godliness”98 and ideal kings. They are not the only kings who are praised by Dtr, but their reigns are 
portrayed as exemplary.99  While Joash (2 Kgs 12.2) is praised for doing right in the eyes of the Lord, 
and other kings of Judah are praised for doing right like their fathers did (e.g., Jehoshaphat [1 Kgs 
22.43], Azariah [2 Kgs 15.3]), only Asa (1 Kgs 15.11), Hezekiah (2 Kgs 18.3), and Josiah (2 Kgs 22.2) 
are praised for following the example of their “father” David. Given the exemplary nature of David 
(see above), these commendations draw the reader’s attention to the special place Hezekiah and Josiah 
occupy in the book of  Kings. They serve as examples of kings who manage to do what David did.
Hezekiah’s praise is linked to the removal of the “high places,”100 the groves, and Neesthan, 
Moses’ bronze snake (2 Kgs 18.4; cf. v. 22).101 When Asa had attempted to reform Judah’s cult, he had 
failed to remove the high places. Similarly, none of Hezekiah’s predecessors had attempted to remove 
the bronze snake.102 Hezekiah has clearly distinguished himself by going beyond the cultic reforms of 
all those who had come before him. Special attention is drawn to the fact that he “hoped (η»λπισεν) in 
the Lord God of Israel” (18.5) and displays this by following the Lord and keeping the commandments 
given to Moses (18.6).103
However, the character of Hezekiah is not perfect. In 2 Kings 18.9–16 he strips the temple of its 
treasure in order to pay tribute to the king of Assyria. This flaw is remedied in the following narrative 
(18.17–19.37) in which Hezekiah turns to the Lord and is shown to trust him for Jerusalem’s 
deliverance.104 As David Janzen argues, “the incomparability of Hezekiah’s eventual trust rewrites his 
history so that, in his evaluation, it appears as if he had never sinned at all.”105 This theme is meant to 
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97. As Sternberg puts it, “the relations between surface and depth in character still resist univocal (unitypal, 
unimetonymic) fixture” (Poetics of Biblical Narrative, 362).
98. Cohn, “Characterization,” 102.
99. David Janzen, “The Sins of Josiah and Hezekiah: A Synchronic Reading of the Final Chapters of Kings,” 
JSOT 37.3 (2013): 349–70 argues that 2 Kgs 18–25 presents Hezekiah and Josiah as examples for Jehoiachin to imitate. This 
idealized view is argued for by Noth, for whom Josiah’s reign is characterized “as an episode which does no more than show 
how things should have been done all along ... what should have been the case but was not” (Deuteronomistic History, 73–
74, 80); see also Phil J. Botha, “‘No King Like Him..’ Royal Etiquette According to the Deuteronomistic Historian,” in Past, 
Present, Future: The Deuteronomistic History and the Prophets, ed. Johannes C. de Moor and Harry F. van Rooy, OtSt 44 
(Leiden: Brill, 2000), 36–49, who reaches the same conclusion using a social-scientific approach. 
100. See Provan, Hezekiah, 57–90.
101. The extended descriptions of Hezekiah’s reforms at 2 Chron 29–31 stand in contrast to the rather brief mention in 
2 Kings 18.4.
102. Although arguments from silence are tenuous, Dtr’s observation that “until those days the sons of Israel had been 
making incense offerings to it” (2 Kgs 18.4) seems to emphasize Hezekiah’s unique action with regard to the idol.
103. See Janzen, “Josiah and Hezekiah,” 357–59. The summary descriptions of Hezekiah (2 Kgs 18.5–7) and Josiah (2 
Kgs 23.25) might be compared to the description of Saul as the “anti-king” in 1 Sam 13.13–14.
104. See, e.g., the conclusion of Hezekiah’s prayer (2 Kgs 19.19) which is answered positively by the Lord through 
Isaiah (19.20–34). The promise-to-David theme occurs at the conclusion of this prophecy (19.34).
105. Janzen, “Josiah and Hezekiah,” 359.
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encourage Jehoiachin with regard to the potential deliverance of Judah. It should also instruct 
Jehoiachin (and others who read it) about the trust that a good king should exhibit.
A similar situation pertains to Josiah who is implicitly critiqued through the writer’s recollection 
of the fact that Josiah reigned for seventeen years before he undertook his reforms (2 Kgs 22.3).106 
Nevertheless, Josiah’s repentance and the reforms he institutes lead to the erasure of all that had come 
before. the Lord’s forgiveness is demonstrated by the prophetess’ pronouncement that Josiah will be 
buried in peace and that he will not witness the disaster that will befall Jerusalem (22.20).
The reforms that lead to this blessing are occasioned by the discovery in the temple of the book of  
the Law (βιβλι'ον τουñ νο' µου) by Hilkiah the high priest (22.3–10). Josiah acts as a result of this book 
being read to him. He gathers the nation’s leadership and its people and “he read in their hearing all the 
words of the book of the covenant (τουñ βιβλι'ου τηñς διαθη' κης) that had been found in the Lord’s house” 
(23.2), following which the king and the people renew the covenant with the Lord (23.3). The sincerity 
of this covenant renewal is shown in the cultic reforms that follow (22.4–24). The writer concludes by 
once again praising Josiah:
Before him there was no king like him, who turned to the Lord with his whole heart and with 
his whole soul and with his whole strength, according to all the law of Moyses, and after him 
none arose like him. (2 Kgs 23.25)
The two main themes in the account of Josiah are the king’s allegiance to the covenant that exists 
between the Lord and his people, and the centrality of the book/law of Moses that describes the nature 
and terms of that covenant.107
It is possible to conclude on the basis of the accounts of these two kings that the ideal king is 
characterized by trust in the Lord and obedience to his covenant and its stipulations as described in the 
book of  the Law. These two kings are thus portrayed in a manner meant to exemplify the central 
criteria of Deuteronomy 17.14–20.108   
Psalms
From the opening promises of the Lord to his anointed king (Ps 2), to the repeated refrain of “The 
Lord became king (ο  κυ' ριος ε  βασι'λευσεν)” in Psalm 92.1; 95.10; 96.1; 98.1 LXX109 and the 
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106. Janzen, “Josiah and Hezekiah,” 355–57. The Chronicler (2 Chron 35.20–22) identifies Josiah’s sin as not listening 
to the word of God which comes to Judah’s king from the Egyptian king, Neco.
107. The possibility of restoration following exile is held out in Solomon’s prayer (1 Kgs 8.46–51) as it is in 
Deuteronomy 30 (J. Gordon McConville, “Narrative and Meaning in the Books of Kings,” Bib 70.1 [1989]: 47–48). The 
question of whether Kings ends with hope or despair remains a crux interpretum within DH scholarship.
108. Botha, “‘No King Like Him..’,” 48–49. For Marvin A. Sweeney (King Josiah of Judah: The Lost Messiah of 
Israel [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001], 168–69, 176–77), only Josiah meets the requirements of Deut 17.14–20. 
There are elements of Josiah’s actions that do not adhere to the stipulations found in the broader context of Deuteronomy 16–
18 (see, e.g., Ronald E. Clements, “A Dialogue with Gordon McConville on Deuteronomy: I. The Origins of Deuteronomy: 
What Are the Clues?” SJT 56.4 [2003]: 515–16). However, the most significant elements of Deuteronomy’s “Law of the 
King” are mirrored in the narratives at the end of Kings.
109. When quoting from the LXX, or when the LXX diverges significantly from the MT, I use the LXX versification 
so that this passage might be consulted in the LXX. When referring to a psalm, as in the first part of this sentence, I use the 
versification found in English translations.
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celebration of the Lord’s kingship in the concluding psalms of praise (see, e.g., Ps 145.1; 146.10; 
149.2), kingship is a significant theme in the book of Psalms.110
In his survey of Psalms scholarship, David Clines observes that, “of Psalm study in general since 
1955 it may fairly be said that the work of Gunkel and the early Mowinckel has to a very large extent 
provided its framework and presuppositions.”111 Gunkel identified a group of psalms that focused on 
Israel’s king. These he identified as “royal psalms” on the basis of their content rather than their 
form.112 Mowinckel accepted this group (with one or two adjustments) and argued that these psalms 
represented real Israelite and Judahite kings who were understood as representatives of their 
community.113 Nowhere was this representation more important than in the nation’s annual religious 
festivals, including an annual enthronement ceremony.114
The Gunkel-Mowinckel approach to the Psalms has been given further nuance by more recent 
scholars. John Eaton argues that Gunkel has not gone far enough in identifying royal psalms and adds a 
further fifty-four psalms to Gunkel’s collection by attributing a number of the “anonymous-I” psalms to 
a royal figure.115 Eaton’s collection of kingship psalms might be a bit too large; Stephen Croft, while 
still in general agreement with Eaton, suggests that the speakers of these anonymous psalms might 
include cultic ministers and private individuals.116 In these more recent studies, nevertheless, the king 
remains a central figure, as he did in the work of Gunkel and Mowinckel.
Since the mid-1980s there has been a growing appreciation for, and study of, the book of  Psalms 
as a unity.117 Gerald H. Wilson is a significant voice amongst those advocating this approach to 
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110. Jamie Grant writes, “The Davidic king ... subtly dominates the book of Psalms” (“The Psalms and the King,” in 
Interpreting the Psalms: Issues and Approaches, ed. Philip S. Johnston and David G. Firth [Leicester: Apollos, 2005], 102). 
According to James L, Mays, in the Psalter, the kingship of the Lord “is the comprehensive theological metaphor” (Psalms, 
Interpretation [Louisville: John Knox, 1994], 48).
111. David J. A. Clines, “Psalm Research Since 1955: I. The Psalms and the Cult,” TynBul 18 (1967): 104. Clines also 
surveys scholarship regarding the psalms’ Gattungen in “Psalm Research Since 1955: II. The Literary Genres,” TynBul 20 
(1969): 105–25. For more recent surveys of Psalms scholarship, see David M. Howard Jr, “Recent Trends in Psalms Study,” 
in The Face of Old Testament Studies: A Survey of Contemporary Approaches, ed. David W. Baker and Bill T. Arnold 
(Grand Rapids: Baker, 1999), 329–68; David M. Howard Jr, “The Psalms and Current Study,” in Interpreting the Psalms: 
Issues and Approaches, ed. Philip S. Johnston and David G. Firth (Leicester: Apollos, 2005), 36–39.
112. Hermann Gunkel and Joachim Begrich, Introduction to Psalms: The Genres of the Religious Lyric of Israel, 4th 
ed., trans. James D. Nogalski, Mercer Library of Biblical Studies (Macon: Mercer University Press, 1998), 99–120.
113. Sigmund Mowinckel, The Psalms in Israel’s Worship, trans. D. R. Ap-Thomas, with a foreword by James L. 
Crenshaw, The Biblical Resource Series (Grand Rapids; Cambridge; Dearborn: Eerdmans; Dove, 2004), 42–80.
114. This ceremony provided Mowinckel with a context in which to interpret individual psalms. For a recent survey of 
the ongoing influence of Mowinckel’s thesis, see J. J. M. Roberts, “Mowinckel’s Enthronement Festival: A Review,” in The 
Book of Psalms: Composition and Reception, ed. Peter W. Flint and Patric D. Miller, Peter W. Flint, and Patrick D. Miller; 
assisted by Aaron Brunell and Ryan Roberts, VTSup 99 (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 97–115. 
115. John H. Eaton, Kingship and the Psalms, SBT 2/32 (London: SCM, 1976); see Grant, “Psalms,” 104–6.
116. Steven J. L. Croft, The Identity of the Individual in the Psalms, JSOTSup 44 (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1987).
117. Summarized by Howard, “Current Study,” 24–29; see also Gerald Henry Wilson, “The Structure of the Psalter,” 
in Interpreting the Psalms: Issues and Approaches, ed. Philip S. Johnston and David G. Firth (Leicester: Apollos, 
2005), 229–46 and the essays in J. Clinton McCann Jr., ed., The Shape and Shaping of the Psalter, JSOTSup 159 (Sheffield: 
JSOT Press, 1993).
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studying the Psalter.118 Wilson argues that the first three books of the collection (Pss 1–89) explain the 
story of the rise and fall of Davidic kingship, while Books 4 and 5 (Pss 90–150) point to the future in 
which the Lord will exercise his divine kingship. Wilson’s book concludes as follows: “YHWH is 
eternal king, only he is ultimately worthy of trust. Human ‘princes’ will wither and fade like the grass, 
but the steadfast love of YHWH endures for ever.”119 Wilson’s thesis that Davidic kingship diminishes 
into insignificance towards the end of the collection and that there are consequently no messianic 
elements in Books 4 and 5 has been challenged.120 Regardless of whether one follows Wilson at this 
point, the centrality of the theme of kingship when the book of Psalms is viewed as a unity is evident.  
Which Psalms To Study?
In this section I will analyze the following “royal psalms” in order to determine the portrait of 
kingship that emerges from them: 2, 18, 20, 21, 45, 72, 89, 101, 110, 132, 144. This group represents 
Gunkel’s “royal psalms”121 which have been adopted as such by a number of other scholars.122  They 
suit the methodological criterion of texts that focus largely, even if not exclusively, on kings and 
kingship.123 Gunkel himself had identified this group on the basis of “the fact that they are concerned 
entirely with kingship.”124  But does the portrait that emerges represent ideal kingship?
While it might seem strange to speak of “ideal kingship” in the context of a larger collection of 
texts in which the king is at times shown in a negative light, the inclusion of these elements serve either 
to highlight the nature of the king’s relationship with the Lord (dependence, repentance) or reflect 
historical incidents. Eaton thus speaks of the Psalms’ portrait of the king as “an ideal, though 
  
 183 
———————————
118. Wilson’s dissertation was published as The Editing of the Hebrew Psalter, SBLDS 76 (Chico: Scholars Press, 
1985). The impact and significance of Wilson’s work is discussed in a number of the essays in Nancy L. deClaissé-Walford, 
ed., The Shape and Shaping of the Book of Psalms: The Current State of Scholarship, AIL 20 (Atlanta: SBL Press, 2014).
119. Wilson, Editing, 228.
120. See, e.g., David C. Mitchell, “Lord, Remember David: G. H. Wilson and the Message of the Psalter,” VT 56.4 
(2006): 526–48; Michael K. Snearly, The Return of the King: Messianic Expectation in Book V of the Psalter, LHBOTS 624 
(New York: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2015). Wilson has responded to this type of critique and argues that his original thesis 
does not preclude a messianic element, even if that element is not as prominent in the Psalms as others suppose (“King, 
Messiah, and the Reign of God: Revisiting the Royal Psalms and the Shape of the Psalter,” in The Book of Psalms: 
Composition and Reception, ed. Peter W. Flint and Patric D. Miller, Peter W. Flint, and Patrick D. Miller; assisted by Aaron 
Brunell and Ryan Roberts, VTSup 99 [Leiden: Brill, 2005], 400–405).
121. Gunkel and Begrich, Introduction, 99–120. Gunkel included only parts of Pss 89 (vv. 46–51) and 144 (vv. 1–11), 
but I shall view the whole psalm as a royal psalm (see Eaton, Kingship, 56–57). 
122. For a survey of the scholarship on the royal psalms, see Scott R. A. Starbuck, Court Oracles in the Psalms: The 
So-Called Royal Psalms in Their Ancient Near Eastern Context, SBLDS 172 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 
1999), 19–66. Starbuck note that the psalm’s in Gunkel’s group “are treated as royal by almost every modern commentator” 
(p. 66 n. 202). Divergences from this group are usually minor; for example, Mowinckel excludes Ps 144 but adds Pss 28, 61, 
63 (Psalms, 47). Rowe’s study includes Ps 118 as well as 2 Sam 23.1–7 (God’s Kingdom and God’s Son: The Background in 
Mark’s Christology from Concepts of Kingship in the Psalms, AGJU 50 [Leiden: Brill, 2002], 31–59).  Gottwald ignores Pss 
101, 132 but includes Ps 146 (“Kingship in the Book of Psalms,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Psalms; William P. Brown 
[Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014], 437–44).
123. The significance of these royal psalms is elevated since they also serve as strategic markers when the editorial 
activity within the Psalter is considered; see Gerald Henry Wilson, “The Use of Royal Psalms at the ‘Seams’ of the Hebrew 
Psalter,” JSOT 35 (1986): 85–94 and Jinkyu Kim, “The Strategic Arrangement of Royal Psalms in Books IV–V,” WTJ 70 
(2008): 143–57.
124. Gunkel and Begrich, Introduction, 99, original emphasis; see Mowinckel, Psalms, 47; Gottwald, “Kingship,” 437.
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intersecting with actual experience.”125 But even the historical incidents found in the psalms have been 
chosen and recounted in such a way as to contribute to the portrait of the ideal king.
Following a study in which the royal psalms are compared to royal psalms, hymns, and prayers 
from the ancient Near East, Scott Starbuck concludes that the absence of specific royal names in the 
Israelite psalms indicates that they have been recontextualized to speak of kingship more generally.126
The [royal psalms] are psalms whose concern is the institution of Israelite kingship. Their 
protagonist is an unspecified king; hence he is a typological representative of the “office” of 
the institution.127
It is this “typological representative” that we consider to be the ideal king of the final redaction of the 
Psalms.
In the remainder of this section I will present a synchronic view of the royal psalms in which the 
most significant elements of kingship are gathered together within the following heuristic categories: 
the king as he stands in relation to (1) the Lord; (2) the people of Israel; and (3) the nations.128 To limit 
the length of this section, detailed exegesis of each passage is not described.129 
Israel’s God and Israel’s King 
Anointed. If we allow that Psalm 2 combines with Psalm 1 in a programmatic way,130 then the first 
figure the reader encounters in the Psalter is Israel’s ruler,131 described here as the Lord’s “anointed” 
(χριστο' ς), (2.2 LXX).132 “The anointed one” makes a further six appearances in the royal psalms 
(18.50; 20.6; 89.38, 51; 132.10, 17) and is found on two occasions elsewhere in the Psalter (28.8; 
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125. Kingship, 200. Arguing against the idea that the Psalms suggest divine, sacral, charismatic, or sacerdotal kingship, 
David Clines proposes that they be read as presenting “a religious understanding” of an “essentially secular institution” (“The 
Psalms and the King,” in On the Way to the Postmodern: Old Testament Essays, 1967–1998. Volume II, JSOTSup 293 
[Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998], 690–700, here 700).  
126. Starbuck, Court Oracles.
127. Starbuck, Court Oracles, 102, 104, 204, 206.
128. Eaton, Kingship, 135–97 presents 27 categories in his description of the ideal king. While the precision of these 
categories is helpful, the presentation is perhaps too diffuse for our purposes. Rowe, God’s Kingdom, 50–57 summarizes his 
own analysis of Davidic kingship under the headings of the king’s relation to the Lord, the people, and the cult. Gottwald, 
“Kingship” employs three different categories: the king as military leader, the king as securing peace and justice in Israel, and 
the bond between the Lord and the king.  
129. In addition to the standard commentaries, the following provide focused discussion of the royal psalms: Eaton, 
Kingship, 111–29; Starbuck, Court Oracles, 113–19, 123–68; Rowe, God’s Kingdom, 37–50; see also Hans-Joachim Kraus, 
Theology of the Psalms, trans. Keith Crim (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1986), 107–23.
130. Patrick D. Miller, “The Beginning of the Psalter,” in The Shape and Shaping of the Psalter, ed. J. Clinton 
McCann Jr., JSOTSup 267 (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1993), 83–92; Grant, King as Exemplar, 41–65. For the reception history 
of this idea, see Susan E. Gillingham, A Journey of Two Psalms: The Reception of Psalms 1 and 2 in Jewish and Christian 
Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
131. The figure in Ps 1 is described as “blessed, happy” because of their concern for God’s law. This concern for the 
king’s faithfulness to the law is seen especially in relationship to the Davidic covenant (Ps 89.30; cf. 2 Sam 7), but also more 
generally (Ps 18.20–22). Grant has argued that within its canonical context, the combination of Pss 1 and 2 expresses a 
Deuteronomic theory of kingship (King as Exemplar, 65–70).
132. I will refer throughout to the English psalm and verse numbering system, which differs slightly from that found in 
the Hebrew Bible and the Septuagint. These incongruities arise, in part, because English translations do not assign a verse 
number to the superscriptions. For the significance of these titles in the interpretation of the Psalter, see Brevard S. Childs, 
“Psalm Titles and Midrashic Exegesis,” JSS 16.2 (1971): 137–50; Elieser Slomovic, “Toward an Understanding of the 
Formation of Historical Titles in the Book of Psalms,” ZAW 91 (1979): 350–80.
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84.9). In one instance (105.15) the plural is used to refer to the prophets (cf. 1 Chron. 16.22; 1 Kgs. 
19.16; Sir. 48.8), but in all the other cases reference is made to a single figure who is associated with 
Israel’s god—he is consistently referred to as “the Lord’s anointed one” or, when the Lord is being 
addressed, “your anointed one.” A number of instances make it clear that the anointed one is a king 
(2.2, cf. 2.6; 20.6, cf. 20.9) and, more specifically, a Davidic king (132.10, 17).133 
The anointing of the king was a sign that he has been chosen by the Lord.134 In Psalm 2 the king 
exclaims, “I was established king by him, on Sion, his holy mountain” (2.6).135 The theme of choice is 
made explicit in Psalm 89.3 where “Dauid my slave” stands parallel to “my chosen ones” (τοιñς 
ε κλεκτοιñς µου; 88.4 LXX; cf. 78.70). The fact that the king is the Lord’s chosen ruler, anointed by him 
for the task, places him in a special relationship which is characterized in filial terms in Psalm 2.136
Son. In Psalm 2.7 the king repeats a decree (προ'σταγµα) of the Lord: “My son you are; today I have 
begotten (γεγε'ννηκα) you.” While some identify traces of divine kingship in this decree,137 it seems 
more likely that the language refers to the Lord’s acceptance of this particular Davidic king as the 
Lord’s chosen ruler. Although Egyptian court ideology might provide the form and language at this 
point,138 the content of this imagery should probably be understood in terms of Israel’s adoption as the 
Lord’s first-born child (Exod 4.22–23; cf. Ps 89.27).139 Just as the covenant promises and obligations 
brought the relationship between the Lord and Israel into being, so the covenant with David and those 
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133. In addition to kings, priests and prophets were also anointed; see Mark J. Boda, “Figuring the Future: The 
Prophets and Messiah,” in The Messiah in the Old and New Testaments, ed. Stanley E. Porter (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
2007), 38–39 and references there. Lisbeth S. Fried distinguishes other anointed figures from “the Lord’s anointed one,” who 
is always a royal figure around whom a royal theology is constructed, influenced not least of all, by Psalm 2 (“Cyrus the 
Messiah? The Historical Background to Isaiah 45:1,” Harvard Theological Review 95.4 [2002]: 379–83). For the argument 
that only kings were anointed before the exile and that it was only following the demise of the monarchy that others were 
anointed, see Roland de Vaux O.P., Ancient Israel: Its Life and Institutions, 2nd ed., trans. John McHugh (London: Darton, 
Longman & Todd, 1973), 104–6. John Day reconstructs the place of anointing within the coronation ritual (“Some Aspects 
of the Monarchy in Ancient Israel,” in New Perspectives on Old Testament Prophecy and History: Essays in Honour of Hans 
M. Barstad, ed. Rannfrid I. Thelle, Terje Stordalen, and Mervyn E. J. Richardson, VTSup 168 [Leiden: Brill, 2015], 161–
63).
134. The centrality of the Lord’s choice has already been discussed in relation to Deuteronomy 17.14–20 where it was 
noted that the people’s request for and/or choice of a king did not necessarily negate or diminish the Lord’s choice (cf. 1 Sam 
10.1, 24; 12.13 [Saul]; 16.12–13; 2 Sam 6.21; 7.8 [David]). The machinations behind Solomon’s accession to the throne do 
not stop Adonijah from recognizing that Solomon received his sovereignty from the Lord (1 Kgs 2.15). 
135. In the MT it is God who announces his establishment of the anointed one.
136. So Mays, Psalms, 47: “The basic assertion [of Psalm 2] is that the king’s installation is a divine act.” Roland de 
Vaux observes that this aspect of royal ideology is universal in the ancient Near East (Ancient Israel, 100–101).
137. For a recent examination of the divinity of the Israelite king, see Adela Yarbro Collins and John Joseph Collins, 
King and Messiah as Son of God: Divine, Human, and Angelic Messianic Figures in Biblical and Related Literature (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), 1–24. Egyptian parallels are often adduced (see, e.g., Grad Granerød, “A Forgotten Reference to 
Divine Procreation? Psalm 2:6 in Light of Egyptian Royal Ideology,” VT 60 [2010]: 323–36), while Mowinckel, Psalms, 62 
points to parallels between the king’s recitation of the Lord’s decree (Ps 2.7) and the reading of the god’s decree in the 
Egyptian enthronement ritual. But Grant, King as Exemplar, 63, suggests this act in Ps 2.7 might refer to the reading of 
Deuteronomy or a pre-canonical version of the work as required by the Law of the King in Deut 17. For a brief survey of the 
primary objections to the presence of divine kingship in the Psalms, see Clines, “Psalms and the King,” 690–93; Rowe, 
God’s Kingdom, 52.
138. Ansgar Moenikes, “Psalm 2,7b und die Göttlichkeit des israelitischen Königs,” ZAW 111 (1999): 619–21.
139. Gerald Cooke, “The Israelite King as Son of God,” ZAW 32 (1961): 202–25.
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who would follow in his dynasty (2 Sam 7) establishes a close relationship between the Lord and this 
royal line. Similar sonship language is thus used in the covenant (2 Sam 7.14) and in texts related to it 
(Pss 2, 89) to express this close relationship which arises out of the Lord’s choice of the king.  
It should also be noted that in its immediate context, this filial language stresses the exalted nature 
of Israel’s king and his relationship with the Lord in contrast to the kings of the surrounding nations 
who, presumably, cannot call themselves “sons of the Lord.”140 
Neither “son of the Lord” nor “son of God” appears in Psalm 110, but the language of the 
psalm—especially Psalm 110.3—is considered by some scholars to contribute to the theme of divine 
sonship.141 However, this passage’s meaning is by no means clear. The Septuagint translator struggled 
with the meaning of the verse and introduced the “Morning Star.”142 More recently, the NRSV 
translates Ps 110.3b as follows: “From the womb of the morning, / like dew, your youth will come to 
you,” and includes an alternative reading of the second colon: “the dew of your youth will come to 
you.” In contrast, Yarbro Collins and Collins offer the following translation by re-pointing the 
Masoretic text: “In sacred splendor, from the womb, from dawn, / you have the dew wherewith I have 
begotten you.”143 For Dahood, this colon speaks of the Lord’s youth given to the Lord’s followers.144 
Starbuck’s exasperation in attempting to understand this passage is tangible: “as v. 3e [sic] presently 
stands in the MT it is nonsensical,” and he resorts to arguing that the text is corrupt.145 The “dew” 
language—the crux interpretum with regard to the nature of kingship in this passage—is thus 
notoriously difficult to interpret. Based on this and other puzzles in Psalm 110, it seems unwise to 
conclude that it provides decisive evidence for divine kingship in ancient Israel.
Even though it does not contain “son of god” language, Psalm 45 is sometimes adduced for divine 
kingship. At first glance, Psalm 45.6 seems to address the king as “god,” but the psalm is a wedding 
song that necessarily indulges in exaggeration. Verse 2, for example, asserts that the king is “the most 
handsome of men” and verse 16 predicts that the king shall have many sons who will be “princes in all 
the earth.” According to Hans-Joachim Kraus, the Hebrew term  םיהלא is therefore “not a reliable 
indication of apotheosis, but a bold stroke of the court style in praise of the ‘divine.’”146 It is also 
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140. Starbuck, Court Oracles, 165.
141. See, e.g., Yarbro Collins and Collins, King and Messiah, 15–19, and Eaton, Kingship, 147, who also attempts to 
link the imagery to the king’s anointing and/or baptism (p. 124). On the dating of Psalm 110, see the summary by Day, 
“Aspects of Monarchy,” 163–64.
142. The last part of Ps 110.3 is translated: ε κ γαστρο`ς προ` εωσφο' ρου ε ξεγε'ννησα'  σε. For further discussion, see 
Evangelia G. Dafni, “Psalm 109(110):1–3 in the Septuagint: Its Translation-Critical, Tradition-Historical, and Theological 
Setting,” in Psalms and Hebrews: Studies in Reception, ed. Dirk J. Human and Gert J. Steyn, LHBOTS 527 (New York: 
T&T Clark, 2010), 246–47.
143. Yarbro Collins and Collins, King and Messiah, 17, following Aubrey R. Johnson, Sacral Kingship in Ancient 
Israel (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1955), 121–22.
144. Mitchell Dahood S. J., Psalms III: 101–150: Introduction, Translation, and Notes, AB 17A (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1970), 116; cf. Eccl 11.10; Isa 40.27–31.
145. Starbuck, Court Oracles, 149.
146. Kraus, Theology, 110.
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possible to read verse 6 as referring to the king’s god,147 in which case we are certainly not dealing 
with any sense of divine kingship.
Despite the suggestive language of Psalms 2, 45, and 110, there is no unequivocal evidence that 
the king in the royal psalms is considered divine. It is likely that Israel’s tradition at this point has been 
influenced by the language found in its neighbours’ courts,  but this language has been 
“demythologized” and incorporated into the theology of divine choice.148 The king’s exalted status as 
the supreme individual within Israel results from his being chose as the Lord’s son, a decision indicated 
through anointing, but which nevertheless does not exalt him to super-human status. The king’s feet of 
clay, his all-too-human weaknesses are evident in Psalm 89 in relation to the covenant which 
inaugurated Davidic kingship.
Covenant. References to the Davidic covenant (2 Sam 7) are explicit in Psalm 89 (see vv. 3–4, 28–
37).149 Knut Heim identifies Psalm 89.19–37 as “a poetic expansion of Nathan’s oracle.”150 The theme 
of the king’s sonship (vv. 26–27) appears right before mention of the covenant in v. 28, thus further 
confirming the link between these ideas (cf. 2 Sam 7.14). As the king cries out to the Lord, “My Father 
you are my God and supporter of my deliverance!” (Ps 89.26 = 88.27 LXX), the Lord identifies the 
king as “firstborn (πρωτο' τοκος), high among the kings of the earth” (88.28 LXX). The covenant 
between the Lord and David establishes a special bond between Israel’s god and those chosen by the 
Lord who would follow after David as Israel’s rulers. This bond is described in terms of the 
relationship between father and son.
This bond makes the latter half of the psalm (89.38–51) all the more shocking. The psalmist 
laments the fact that the Lord has renounced the covenant with the Lord’s servant (v. 39), a covenant 
that was meant to be inviolate and permanent (vv. 33–37). Most shocking of all, it is the Lord who is 
portrayed as fighting against the king (v. 40), it is the Lord who permits the king’s enemies to prosper 
(vv. 41–42), and it is the Lord who removes the sceptre from the king’s hand and destroys his throne 
(v. 44).151 The nadir of the lament is reached in the final stanza: “Lord, where are your mercies (τα` 
ε λε'η) of long ago, which you swore to Dauid by your truth?” (v. 49 = 88.50 LXX; cf. 18.50; 21.7).
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147. See, for example, Mitchell Dahood S. J., Psalms I: 1–50: Introduction, Translation, and Notes, AB 16 (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), 269: “The eternal and everlasting God has enthroned you!” or the NRSV’s alternative 
translation: “Your throne is a throne of God, it endures for ever and ever.” Dahood offers a grammatical argument for this 
translation on pp. 272-73. See also Day, “Aspects of Monarchy,” 166–67.
148. Kraus, Theology, 110; see also Martin Noth, “God, King, and Nation in the Old Testament,” in The Laws in the 
Pentateuch and Other Studies, trans. D. R. Ap-Thomas (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1966), 145–78.
149. It is striking, as Kraus notes (Theology, 109–10), that one way or another, what is said of the king in the Psalms 
always involves the name of David.
150. Knut M. Heim, “The (God-)Forsaken King of Psalm 89: A Historical and Intertextual Enquiry,” in King and 
Messiah in Israel and the Ancient Near East: Proceedings of the Oxford Old Testament Seminar, ed. John Day, LHBOTS 
270 (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 297. Heim notes that in its canonical context the vision of v. 19 must refer to the words of 
God spoken to Nathan the night before the promises were given to David (cf. 2 Sam 7.4). 
151. For a different reading of the Hebrew at this point, see Mitchell Dahood S. J., Psalms II: 51–100: Introduction, 
Translation, and Notes, AB 17 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 310, 319. The main point remains, however: the 
Lord has turned against the king in battle and now fights on behalf of the king’s foes.
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The Lord’s covenant and promise are also on view in Psalm 132 where the tension between its 
unconditional and contingent nature becomes evident. On the one hand, “the Lord swore to Dauid the 
truth, and he will never annul it” (131.11 LXX), but the Lord states that David’s sons will only be 
given David’s throne if they keep the Lord’s covenant and decrees (v. 12). The concluding promise, 
that the Lord will establish a Davidic ruler within the temple/Zion (v. 17), confirms the unconditional 
nature of the covenant without indicating any sanctions for disobedience. The possibility that the Lord 
would discipline his “son” is in view in 2 Samuel 7.14–15, but with the reassurance that such discipline 
would only be temporary. Although this disciplining element is not explicit in Psalm 89, there are hints 
that the Lord’s renunciation of the covenant is not final.   
Knut Heim argues that the tension between the Lord’s eternal promises and the dire situation 
accounted by the psalmist gives Psalm 89 an “open-ended” feeling: there is “the defiant hope that the 
divine promise as expressed in Nathan’s oracle is still valid.”152 The postscript—“Blessed be the Lord 
forever. May it be; may it be.” (88.53 LXX)—makes this hope clear and, in the context of the psalm, 
looks to the Lord to raise up a Davidic king in order to display his love and faithfulness. The bond 
between the Lord and the king, expressed in Psalm 89 in terms of the Davidic covenant, is the basis of 
this hope.
Psalm 89 concludes the third book of the Psalter. The opening of the collection starts off well (Ps 
2), but ends badly (Ps 89), suggesting a trajectory through Books I–III that traces the decline of Davidic 
kingship.153 The final verse was most likely appended to the psalm not only as a conclusion to Book 
III,154 but to Books I–III. The verse asserts hope not only that the Lord will answer the prayer to 
“remember” (89.47),155 but also that the trajectory of Books I–III would be reversed.156  
Servant. The royal person in Psalm 89 combines the figure of the Lord’s servant with that of David and 
the anointed one: “I found Dauid my slave (το`ν δουñλον); with my holy oil I anointed him” (Ps 88.21 
LXX). “Servant” is clearly a relational rather than functional description, expressing intimacy, trust, 
and authority.157 The designation for David comes from 2 Samuel 7 where it occurs throughout. As in 
that passage, the Lord’s covenant is made with the Lord’s servant, David (Ps 89.3). In the 
superscription to Psalm 18 (παιñς) and at Psalm 144.10 (δουñλος), the designation is used of David to 
speak of the Lord’s rescue of the king. It is, however, also the servant (δουñλος) who is taunted (Ps 
89.50)158 and with whom the covenant is broken (Ps 89.39). The servant is thus both “humble and 
highly privileged.”159
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152. Heim, “Psalm 89,” 303.
153. J. Clinton McCann Jr., “Books I–III and the Editorial Purpose of the Hebrew Psalter,” in The Shape and Shaping 
of the Psalter, ed. J. Clinton McCann Jr., JSOTSup 159 (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1993), 93–107; Mays, Psalms, 287–88; 
Gottwald, “Kingship,” 439–41.
154. Dahood, Psalms II, 320.
155. Heim, “Psalm 89,” 304–5.
156. Wilson, “Seams” argues that the placement of Ps 89 at the end of Books I–III points to Israel’s hope in the Lord 
as king, expressed in Books IV–V; the covenant with David, however, has failed (p. 90).
157. Eaton, Kingship, 149; cf. Moses in Exod 14.31; Num 12.7–8.
158. In Ps 89.50, ךידבע is understood as a “plural of majesty” (Dahood, Psalms II, 320). The plural has been translated 
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The King as Vice-Regent. God’s kingship forms a significant theme within the Psalter and the presence 
of Israel’s king in the royal psalms does not diminish this is any way. A hymn embedded within Psalm 
89 (vv. 5–18) praises the Lord’s kingship. In the final verse, Israel’s defence/support (α  ντι'ληµψις) is 
“the Lord and the Holy One of Israel, our king” (my translation). The king plays an instrumental role in 
the Lord’s support of his people. When the king fulfils a function that the Lord fulfils, this does not 
diminish the Lord’s rule in any way. The Lord thus appoints Israel’s king as a vice-regent (2.6; 110.1, 
5) to rule the Lord’s people and to fight against the Lord’s enemies. In the words of James Mays, the 
kingship of David “actualizes in the world what is reality in heaven. David’s kingship is the agency 
through which the LORD’s rule is extended from heaven to earth, and his dominion over cosmic chaos 
expanded over historical confusion.”160
One of the corollaries of this appointment is that there is a correspondence between the dominion 
of the Lord as king in heaven and the earthly reign of the Lord’s anointed king. The Lord sits in the 
heavens (Ps 2.4) while he has enthroned the king on Zion (2.6). This correspondence is understood not 
as identical or equal, but as reflective. In Psalm 89, for example, the characteristics of the Lord found 
in vv. 1–18 are echoed in the description of the Davidic king in vv. 19–37.161 Both are portrayed as 
powerful, David will rule over the sea and rivers (v. 25) as the Lord rules over the chaotic waters (v. 9). 
The Lord’s righteousness and justice (89.14) elsewhere characterize the king (101.1). And while the 
king is the most high of the earthly kings (υψηλο`ν piαρα` τοιñς βασιλευñσιν τηñς γηñς; 88.28 LXX), the Lord 
is the Most High (υ«ψιστε; 9.3 LXX; ο  υ«ψιστος; 17.14 LXX). Not only does the glory (δο' ξα) and 
majesty (µεγαλοπρε'πεια) in which the king participates comes from God (20.6 LXX), it is more 
properly ascribed to God (µεγαλοπρε'πεια: 95.6 LXX; 110.3 LXX; δο' ξα: 23.10 LXX; 28.1–2 LXX).162 
We noted in Chapter 3 that the appearance of Hellenistic kings played an important role in their 
kingship. There were hints of this idea in the portrait of David (see p. 178), but the Psalms are 
generally silent about the visage of the king. Psalm 45.2–3 is the one exception. Not surprisingly, given 
that this is a wedding song, the king is portrayed as “youthful in beauty ... beyond the sons of men” 
(ω ραιñος κα' λλει παρα` του`ς υιου`ς τωñν α  νθρω' πων) and as one who is “powerful ... in [his] bloom and 
beauty” (δυνατε' , τηñ,  ω ραιο' τητι' σου και` τωñ,  κα' λλει σου; 44.3–4 LXX).163 The king is frequently 
described in terms of his character (righteous, blameless, law-keeping) and his relationship with God, 
but his physical appearance is unimportant to the psalmist. 
In conclusion, James Mays argues that the royal psalms are primarily about the relationship 
between God and Israel’s king: “[They are] confessional, formulaic, poetic, and ideal ... [transcending] 
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as such in the Greek Psalms.
159. Eaton, Kingship, 150; cf. Kraus, Theology, 122–23. In this the servant is similar to the servant of Deutero-Isaiah.
160. Mays, Psalms, 286; cf. Kraus, Theology, 120–23.
161. Heim, “Psalm 89,” 314–15.
162. Eaton, Kingship, 142–46 considers a number of additional ways in which the king is drawn into the Lord’s aura. 
163. Theodotion describes the king of Psalm 45 in terms of his ευ  πρε'πεια, “beauty” or “majesty” and uses the same 
word to speak of “the beauty of the holy one” (Ps 109.3); see William Horbury, Jewish Messianism and the Cult of Christ 
(London: SCM, 1998), 97, who also notes that this language is used in Pss. Sol. 17 and 18.
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human existence and human history.”164 In the Psalms, the reader encounters the one who stands in the 
line of David as God’s son, servant, and vice-regent. The king receives these designations on the basis 
of the eternal covenant established between the Lord and the Davidic line. The promises of the Lord 
form the basis of this close bond between God and king.
Israel’s People and Their King
Psalm 101, according to Martin Luther, represents “David’s mirror of a monarch.”165 In this 
psalm, the king sings of the Lord’s “mercy” (ε»λεος) and “justice” (κρι'σις) (Ps 100.1 LXX), while 
claiming to be blameless before the Lord (vv. 2–3, 6 LXX) and confessing that “a crooked heart did not 
cling to me” (v. 4 LXX). These traits are displayed in the way he rewards the righteous and punishes 
the wicked in his kingdom (vv. 5–8). Elsewhere the psalmist prays for the king to be characterized by 
righteousness and justice (Ps 72.2), and that he would benefit the poor, needy, and oppressed (72.4, 
12–14). The psalmist’s concern is that the king ensures that the weak and marginalized within society 
are treated equitably. Just rule is thus seen as an essential characteristic of the Lord’s chosen king.166
Ultimately, though, the psalmist recognizes that it is the Lord whose throne is established on 
righteousness and justice (89.14) and that the Lord provides for the poor and needy (132.15). Psalm 82 
portrays the Lord condemning other gods for their injustice which they display by favouring the wicked 
instead of the weak.167 Protection of the weak is thus recognized as the will of the Lord,168 and in so far 
as the king exhibits these qualities, he is imitating the Lord and embodying the Lord’s reign. It is the 
Lord’s justice and righteousness that empower the king to be just and righteous (72.1). 
The righteous king who imitates the Lord in this way can expect to live a long life (72.5; 21.4), a 
gift from the Lord which is closely linked to the prosperity of the people (72.3, 6, 15–16). The 
blessings of the righteous king and his people thus coincide (144.12–15). The king’s life, based upon 
his righteousness within the covenant (18.20–30) is seen to bring life to the people.169 
“The king is ipso facto a saviour,” according to Roland de Vaux.170 While the king often plays 
this role in a military context, the king’s actions on behalf of the needy and the prosperity that result 
from his righteous reign justly make him the saviour of Israel in Psalm 72.3–4, 12–14.171 Outside of 
Psalm 72, the psalmist avoids using this language with reference to the king, suggesting that the 
emphasis must fall on the Lord as saviour. It is God who saves both the king (18.3; 20.9) and God’s 
people (28.9; 80.3, 7). 
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164. Mays, Psalms, 46.
165. Cited by Mays, Psalms, 321; cf. Franz Delitzsch, Biblical Commentary on the Psalms, vol. 3, trans. David Eaton 
(London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1889), 74 who says Luther entitled the psalm “David’s mirror for rulers.”
166. For a summary of these concerns in the Hebrew prophets and in the ANE more broadly, see Frank Charles 
Fensham, “Widow, Orphan, and the Poor in Ancient Near Eastern Legal and Wisdom Literature,” JNES 21.2 (1962): 129–
39; Richard G. Smith, The Fate of Justice and Righteousness During David’s Reign: Rereading the Court History and Its 
Ethics According to 2 Samuel 8:15b–20:26, LHBOTS 508 (New York: T&T Clark, 2009), 49–52.
167. Mays, Psalms, 268–71.
168. See Fensham, “Widow, Orphan, and the Poor,” 137–38.
169. Eaton, Kingship, 165–68.
170. de Vaux, Ancient Israel, 110.
171. So Rowe, God’s Kingdom, 55.
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What cultic roles do the Psalms ascribe to the king? We have seen there is a sense in which the 
king is the Lord’s representative leader of Israel, but is there any indication that the king represented 
the people before the Lord? We have noted that the Deuteronomistic History seem ambivalent at this 
point. While Deuteronomy 16–18 separates the priestly from the royal functions (cf. 1 Sam 13.8–15), 2 
Samuel 6.16–19 has David offering priestly sacrifices and blessings.172 This last incident, the ark’s 
arrival in Jerusalem, is recalled in Psalm 132. If the psalms are read as derived from the king’s 
enthronement ceremony and other rituals, then it follows that the king occupies an important place in 
the life of the nation’s cult. Psalm 132, for example, would suggest a regular ceremony re-enacting the 
events of 2 Samuel 6 in which the king plays a central role.173 
Psalm 110 is perhaps the most striking psalm with regards to the king’s cultic role. In this psalm, 
the Lord appoints the king as “priest for ever according to the order of Melchisedek” (109.4 LXX). The 
murky figure of Melchizedek is mentioned explicitly in the Jewish Scriptures only here and in Genesis 
14.18–20. The difficulties in this verse have led some to remove Melchizedek altogether.174 Joseph 
Fitzmyer’s conclusion that the so-called “Melchizedek scroll” found at Qumran (11QMelch=11Q13) 
was not influenced by Psalm 110 would seem to support this conclusion.175 This conclusion is 
contested by  David Mitchell who does find the influence of Psalm 110 in the Melchizedek scroll.176 
Further supporting Melchizedek’s presence is that fact that at least one other early interpreter of the 
psalm, the Septuagint translator, understood the psalm to be talking about Melchizedek.177 
The psalmist’s use of Melchizedek seems to be inspired by the fact that Melchizedek is at once 
both “king of Salem”178 and “priest of God Most High” (Gen 14.18). Melchizedek would therefore 
seem to be an ideal typological candidate if the psalmist was attempting to unite the offices of priest 
and king in one person.
When combined with Psalm 20.3 in which the king is seen offering sacrifices,179 Psalm 110 offers 
the strongest evidence that the Lord’s chosen king also functioned as a priest. However, Hans-Joachim 
Kraus’ cautious conclusion regarding the king’s priestly role in Israel’s history should be heeded. He 
writes, “Hypotheses concerning the role of the king in worship are to be kept within bounds, the 
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172. In contrast, the Chronicler records Uzziah’s punishment for entering the Lord’s temple to make an offering (2 
Chron 26.16–21). 
173. Eaton, Kingship, 125–27 Eaton’s discussion of the king’s cultic role can be found on pp. 172–77. It is interesting 
to note that most of discussion draws on the larger group of kingship psalms that he has defined; Gunkel’s smaller group of 
royal psalms does not seem to offer much evidence for the king’s cultic role.
174. See, e.g., Dahood, Psalms III, 112 or the NRSV’s alternative translation: “You are a priest for ever, a rightful king 
by my edict.”
175. Joseph A. Fitzmyer, “Further Light on Melchizedek from Qumran Cave 11,” JBL 68.1 (1967): 31–32.
176. David C. Mitchell, The Message of the Psalter: An Eschatological Programme in the Book of Psalms, JSOTSup 
252 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997), 259–60.
177. Ps 109.4 LXX: Συ` ειò ιερευ`ς ει ς το`ν αι ωñνα κατα` τη`ν τα' ξιν Μελχισεδεκ. This connection between Melchizedek and 
Ps 110 was also an important element for at least one early Christian writer who drew on LXX Psalms (see Hebrews 7.3, 17, 
21).
178. If the psalmist understood “Salem” to be Jerusalem, as later interpreters did, then the link is strengthened because 
of the mention of Zion (Ps 110.2). 
179. Peter C. Craigie argues that these were sacrifices offered by the king before he went off to war (Peter C. Craigie, 
Psalms 1–50, WBC 19 [Waco: Word Books, 1983], 185–86); cf. 1 Sam 7.7–11; 13.8–15.
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bounds drawn by each of the texts and by the form in which they have been preserved.”180 Psalm 110 is 
undoubtedly a martial psalm and beyond the appellation, the king’s priestly duties are not mentioned.
Within the royal psalms we also observe the king at prayer. The king’s prayers are described by 
others (20.1; 21.2) or asked for by the Lord (2.8). Assuming that the king prays, the psalmist is 
confident that the Lord “will hearken to him [the anointed one] from his holy heaven” (19.7 LXX). In 
another parallel between God and the king, the king answers the needy when they call upon him 
(72.12), just as God responds to the king when, in his distress, he calls upon God.
The king bears witness to the Lord’s love, faithfulness (89.1), and to the Lord’s great deeds on the 
king’s and Israel’s behalf as seen throughout the Psalms (e.g., 89.5–18; 18.7–19). Psalm 144.9–11 
suggests that both petition and praise formed part of the king’s singing before the Lord. 
 Finally, the close relationship between the king and the temple in Psalm 132 has already been 
observed. Lest the king be allowed to dominate the site of Israel’s cult, the presence of the priests at 
132.9, 16 should also be noted. In general, though, the cultic actors in the Psalms are either the king or 
the congregation.181 With the exception of the singers/musicians,182 priests are almost entirely 
absent.183
The royal psalms envisage the king’s participation in Israel’s cult. The nature of the king’s 
activities are not always clearly spelled out, but it would seem that the king prayed for himself and the 
nation, and that, at times, he offered sacrifices. A more confident conclusion regarding the king’s cultic 
role is probably not attainable on the basis of the data available to us in the Psalms.  
The King of Israel and the Nations
A triangular relationship that exists between the Lord, the Davidic king, and Israel. In the royal 
psalms this relationship often becomes linear, with the king mediating in various ways between the 
Lord and the nation. In this final section we consider briefly an element that falls outside of these 
relationships: Israel’s neighbours.
Enemies. The negative perspective on “the nations” starts in Psalm 2.1 and continues throughout the 
royal psalms. The presence of enemies in all of the royal psalms ensures the impression that 
“engagement in warfare” should be considered “the principal activity of kings.”184 This state of affairs 
arises because the nations set themselves up against the Lord and his anointed (Ps 2.1–2).
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180. Kraus, Theology, 117.
181. Kraus, Theology, 67–71.
182. The superscriptions of a number of psalms link them to the Levites: eleven psalms are attributed to the “Sons of 
Korah” (42, 44–49, 84, 85, 87, 88) and a dozen more to “Asaph” (50, 73–83); for the Levitical links between these groups 
and their connection to the Davidic court, see, e.g., 1 Chron 9.19; 15.4–5, 17; 16.4–5, 37. For further discussion, see Martin 
J. Buss, “The Psalms of Asaph and Korah,” JBL 82.4 (1963): 382–92.
183. Whether this reflects the historical marginalization of the priesthood or is the result of a scholarly myopia, unable 
to see beyond Mowinckel’s enthronement ritual, remains an open question; see the discussion and warnings in Kraus, 
Theology, 84–85.
184. Gottwald, “Kingship,” 438. For “enemies of the nation,” see Kraus, Theology, 126–29.
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In the previous paragraph, it is assumed that the nations and the enemies are identical,185 and this 
is certainly the case in most of the royal psalms. The one exception can be found in Psalm 101.8: 
“Morning by morning I would kill all the sinners in the land in order to destroy from the Lord’s city all 
who practice lawlessness” (Ps 100.8 LXX). In this psalm, the king exhibits a general antipathy towards 
the wicked within the nation.
If Psalms 1 and 2 are read together as an introduction to the Psalter (see n. 130, above), then the 
wicked who plague the way of the righteous individual in Psalm 1 are identified in some way with the 
nations of Psalm 2 who rage against Israel’s god and king. Patrick Miller suggests that Psalm 1 serves 
to highlight the theme of the Lord’s dealings with the righteous and wicked, respectively, and the 
conflict between the two.186 This conflict might occur at the individual level or, more commonly in the 
royal psalms as Psalm 2 makes clear, at the corporate level between nations, but with Israel’s king as 
representative.
At certain points the battle is portrayed as being fought on a cosmic scale. The unnamed enemies 
of Psalm 18.3 are identified in verses 4–5 as Death and Hades. The Lord’s response to the king’s cry 
for help is to leave the divine temple (v. 6) and to demonstrate the Lord’s salvation in a theophany (vv. 
7–15). By the end of the psalm, however, mythic-poetic language has given way to the more historical 
discourse of “enemies” and “nations” (vv. 46–50) over whom Israel’s king triumphs.187
An important theme found throughout the royal psalms is that it is the Lord who saves the king 
from his enemies (e.g., 18.3, 17, 40, 47; 20.6; 110.1; 144.10–11).188 The Lord’s defeat of the king’s 
enemies is tied to the covenant (89.22–23), and so one of the purposes of this rescue of the Davidic 
king is that his dynasty might continue (132.17–18). The covenant that exists between the Lord and the 
king also means that the Lord’s enemies are the king’s enemies (18.50–51). The way in which the 
kings and rulers of the earth are to show their service and fear of the Lord is to be loyal and subservient 
to the Lord’s anointed (2.11–12).189
At times the psalmist describes the Lord as fighting and destroying enemies (20.6; 21.8–12), while 
elsewhere it is the king who defeats enemies (2.9). Both of these elements are combined in Psalm 18, 
for example, where the Lord strengthens the king (v. 32) and prepares him for war (v. 34), while the 
king pursues and strikes down his enemies (vv. 37–38), which he is able to do since the Lord subdues 
and defeats them (v. 39–40). In one shocking passage, it is the Lord who empowers the king’s enemies 
to defeat the king as part of the Lord’s judgment upon the king for his rebellion against the covenant 
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185. Derek Wittman provides a recent survey of scholarship on the identity of the enemies in Psalms (“The Kingship of 
Yahweh and the Politics of Poverty and Oppression in the Hebrew Psalter” [Ph.D. diss., Baylor University, 2010], 85–92).
186. Patrick D. Miller, “The Ruler in Zion and the Hope of the Poor: Psalms 9–10 in the Context of the Psalter,” in 
David and Zion: Biblical Studies in Honor of J.J.M. Roberts, ed. Bernard F. Batto and Kathryn L. Roberts (Winona Lake: 
Eisenbrauns, 2004), 188.
187. There are a number of other psalms that employ this mythic-poetic language; see, e.g., 74.13–15; 89.9–10, 25; 
116.3. The assessment of Kraus regarding these mythical powers seems sound: he argues that mythical language has been 
used to describe Israel’s experience of its enemies in transcendent terms (Theology, 134).
188. For this theme, see Kraus, Theology, 120.
189. So Starbuck, Court Oracles, 166–67. For an alternative interpretation which considers the last verses of Psalm 2 
to refer to the Lord, see Dahood, Psalms I, 6, 13–14. 
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(89.38–45). The overall impression created by the royal psalms, however, is that it is the Lord who is 
sovereign over the king’s enemies and that it is the Lord who subdues them and subjects them to divine 
wrath through the human agency of the Davidic king.190  
The Future.  It remains to ask whether the royal psalms hint at a future and/or eschatological 
king/Messiah, and it is with regard to the king’s enemies that this question might be most easily 
pursued.
When assessing the eschatological and messianic elements in the royal psalms, Sigmund 
Mowinckel states that these psalms originally spoke only of historical, not future, kings. The psalms’ 
messianic language is explained by the fact that the king was idealized using the same imagery and 
concepts used by the prophets to speak of the Messiah, but without speaking of a future/eschatological 
king.191 Roland de Vaux, on the contrary, argues that a number of psalms, “had a twofold meaning 
from the moment of their composition: every king of the Davidic line is a figure and a shadow of the 
ideal king of the future.”192 Similarly, John Eaton considers the future hope expressed in the royal 
psalms “to be as old as kingship itself.”193 Even if Mowinckel is followed at this point, it is still 
possible to agree with those who argue that the inclusion of the royal psalms in the Psalter shows that 
they were interpreted along messianic lines at a relatively early stage, even if they were not originally 
messianic. Jamie Grant, for example, argues that the cultic celebration of Davidic kingship introduced 
eschatological overtones into psalms that originally spoke only of historical/reigning kings.194 The 
significance of eschatological elements increased as the psalms were read in the light of the exile and 
subsequent historical developments within Israel.195
There are certainly points in the royal psalms at which the nations should be understood in an 
historical and local sense. Psalm 18 praises the Lord for a victory that has already been won (vv. 16–
19, 31–42), following which the king is made “head of the nations” (v. 43). The superscription 
envisages David speaking this psalm about his personal enemies within Israel and the surrounding 
nations. Psalm 101 carries a similar local tone (see, esp. v. 8). There are other psalms, however, that 
would seem to carry eschatological overtones. 
The royal psalms envisage a time when the enemies of God/Israel/the king will be subdued and 
when the king will rule over the nations and their kings (72.8–11; 89.27). The Lord promises the king 
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190. Wittman, “Kingship of Yahweh” observes that in the kingship-of-God psalms, the emphasis falls on the Lord as 
the one who subdues the nations on behalf of the people of Israel who are portrayed as poor and oppressed.
191. Mowinckel, Psalms, 48–49. For a recent argument against seeing messianism in the Psalms, see Susan E. 
Gillingham, “The Messiah in the Psalms: A Question of Reception History and the Psalter,” in King and Messiah in Israel 
and the Ancient Near East: Proceedings of the Oxford Old Testament Seminar, ed. John Day, LHBOTS 270 (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2013), 209–37.
192. de Vaux, Ancient Israel, 100.
193. Eaton, Kingship, 200.
194. Grant, “Psalms.”
195. Clines, “Psalm Research II,” 120; Grant, “Psalms,” 109–12. Amongst those pursuing canonical readings of the 
Psalms, arguments for a messianic programme can be found in Mitchell, Message of the Psalter; Mitchell, “Lord, Remember 
David”; Snearly, Return of the King.  The most prominent scholar arguing against a strong messianic thread is Wilson, 
Editing, although his earlier position has been modified slightly (see Wilson, “King, Messiah”).
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(2.8) that the Lord will make the nations his inheritance. “Inheritance” has special resonance, coming, 
as it does, after the declaration of divine sonship (2.7). In Psalm 135.10–12 the psalmist recalls how in 
the past the Canaanite kingdoms were given as an inheritance to Israel. In Psalm 2, however, the 
second colon of verse 8 makes clear that the promise includes “the ends of the earth” (cf. 72.8; 89.25) 
thus expanding the geographical horizon upon which this promise will develop and necessarily pushing 
it into the future, although the psalm contains no unambiguous eschatological elements. This raises the 
question whether there is any sense in which the royal psalms might be read eschatologically.
If Psalm 110 is approached as a collection of short oracles, the individual elements can all be 
explained through parallels with ancient Near Eastern royal ideology in which the images form part of 
an exalted court style.196 However, David Mitchell has argued that when read as a unity, the psalm 
takes on an eschatological shape.197 The king’s enthronement at the right hand of the Lord (Ps 110.1) is 
not simply part of an annual ceremony in which he is “enthroned at the right hand of the invisible but 
nonetheless present Lord,”198 rather, the words suggest “that the king is being offered a place in 
Yhwh’s heavenly throne room or divine council,” which is how a number of early interpreters 
understood the psalm.199 The fact that the subjection of the king’s enemies (vv. 1–2) happens through 
an earthly battle (vv. 5–7) in which the king leads his people (v. 3) does not negate this reading, rather, 
it points to the continuity between the Lord’s heavenly rule and the Lord’s earthly sovereignty 
exercised through his chosen king.  
At least four of the royal psalms, Pss 2, 72, 89, 110, seem to transcend their historical and 
geographical context in order to portray the king in exalted terms. David’s empire has become a world 
empire, with the king at the centre of the cosmos. This lofty language might simply reflect 
exaggerations of the type found in various examples of royal ideology or, as Hans-Joachim Kraus 
argues, statements in these psalms about the universal dominion of Israel’s king “are the reflection of a 
comprehensive mandate which Yahweh, as creator and Lord of the world, has entrusted to his chosen 
king.”200  This mandate involves bringing the nations under subjection, not ultimately for the sake of 
punishment but for blessing (72.17), as the king brings fertility and prosperity to his subjects (72.16; cf. 
144.12–15). This mandate thus extends into the future and beyond the geographical borders of Israel. 
The elements discussed briefly in this section illustrate how the Psalms came to be read as speaking of 
Israel’s future rescue under a divinely appointed king. 
This study of the so-called royal psalms has allowed us to develop a rough sketch of Israel’s ideal 
king as he is presented in the Psalter. The portrait that has emerged has much in common with the one 
found in the Deuteronomistic History. This is not surprising: many of the psalms draw explicitly from 
this tradition, especially in the way they focus on Davidic kingship. The king is chosen by God and 
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196. So Starbuck, Court Oracles, 142–61.
197. Mitchell, Message of the Psalter, 258–67.
198. Dahood, Psalms III, 114; see also Kraus, Theology, 115–16.
199. Mitchell, Message of the Psalter, 259–60. For further discussion of how the New Testament uses Psalm 110, see 
Kraus, Theology, 185–88; David M. Hay, Glory at the Right Hand: Psalm 110 in Early Christianity, SBLMS 18 (Nashville: 
Abingdon, 1973).
200. Kraus, Theology, 122.
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must walk in the ways of the Lord. Another way of conceptualizing this relationship is in terms of the 
Davidic covenant (2 Sam 7). The king must be like God in promoting righteousness in the nation. He 
achieves this through caring for the poor and marginalized, ensuring that justice is done, and in 
defending God’s people from their enemies. In summary, the king’s reign on earth is an image of the 
Lord’s reign in heaven.   
Isaiah
The book of Isaiah does not contain a concentrated discourse on kingship and, were it not for the 
significance accorded Isaiah by Paul,201 might not have been included in our investigation of kingship 
texts according to the methodology outlined in the first chapter of this study. Nevertheless, the theme of 
kingship is present in Isaiah and its shape in the book will be explored in this section.
 There is a distinctive development of the theme of kingship202 within the three major parts of 
Isaiah (1–39, 40–55, 56–66).203 In Isaiah 1–39, the focus falls on a human king from either the present 
or the future. The most significant passages in this regard are found in chapters 7, 9, 11, 16, and 32; 
these texts will be investigated more carefully in what follows.204 Israel’s human king is absent from 
Isaiah 40–55 (with the exception of the mention of David at Isa 55.3), but there are numerous 
references to the Lord’s kingship. Two significant figures also appear in this section: Cyrus—“the 
Lord’s anointed one” (45.1)—and the servant of chapters 42, 49, 50, and 53, whose potential as a royal 
figure I shall investigate below. 
Israel’s god, the Lord, stands above all the royal figures in Isaiah. The final chapter of Isaiah 
begins with a vision of the Lord’s reign: “Heaven is my throne, and the earth is the footstool of my 
feet” (66.1). Spoken in the context of the temple (vv. 1–6), these words are reminiscent of Isaiah’s 
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201. See above, p. 163 . J. Ross Wagner (Heralds of the Good News: Isaiah and Paul “in Concert” in the Letter to the 
Romans, NovTSup 101 [Leiden: Brill, 2002]) describes Paul as writing Romans “in concert” with Isaiah.
202. The following summary of the development of this theme relies on H. G. M. Williamson, Variations on a Theme: 
King, Messiah and Servant in the Book of Isaiah, The Didsbury Lectures (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1998), 1–29.
203. For much of the twentieth century, scholars followed Bernhard Duhm (Das Buch Jesaia, 2nd ed., HKAT 3 
[Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1902]) in arguing that these three sections of the book, commonly identified as 
“Proto-Isaiah,” “Deutero-Isaiah,” and “Trito-Isaiah,” are the result of three distinct authors (see Roy F. Melugin, “Form 
Criticism, Rhetorical Criticism, and Beyond in Isaiah,” in “As Those Who Are Taught”: The Interpretation of Isaiah from 
the LXX to the SBL, ed. Claire Mathews McGinnis and Patricia K. Tull, SBLSS 27 [Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 
2006], 263–78).Without necessarily asserting single authorship, scholars are increasingly recognizing Isaiah as a unity, albeit 
a “complex unity” (J. Clinton McCann Jr., “The Book of Isaiah—Theses and Hypotheses,” BTB 33.3 [2003]: 88–94). For a 
fuller discussion of this approach and its basis, see Ronald E. Clements, “The Unity of the Book of Isaiah,” Int 36 
(1982): 117–29; H. G. M. Williamson, The Book Called Isaiah: Deutero-Isaiah’s Role in Composition and Redaction 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 1–18; H. G. M. Williamson, “Recent Issues in the Study of Isaiah,” in Interpreting Isaiah: 
Issues and Approaches, ed. David G. Firth and H. G. M. Williamson (Nottingham: Apollos, 2009), 23–30. A survey of this 
approach that encompasses work up to the late-1980s can be found in Paul D. Wegner, An Examination of Kingship and 
Messianic Expectation in Isaiah 1–35 (Lewiston: Mellen Biblical Press, 1992), 13–62. For surveys of Isaiah in recent 
research, see Marvin A. Sweeney, “The Book of Isaiah in Recent Research,” in Recent Research on the Major Prophets; 
Alan J. Hauser (Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2008), 78–92; Christopher B. Hays, “The Book of Isaiah in 
Contemporary Research,” Religion Compass 5.10 (2011): 549–66. Both surveys identify the trend to read Isaiah as a unity as 
the most significant development in Isaiah studies.
204. Williamson entitles the chapter in which he discusses these texts, “The ideal king” (Variations, 30–72). The same 
group of texts are dealt with at greater length by Wegner, Kingship and Messianic Expectation.
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vision in chapter 6 in which the prophet sees his lord seated upon the heavenly throne and his glory 
filling the temple (6.1). The focus of Isaiah’s vision (6.5) is “the King, the Lord Sabaoth.” It is this 
vision of the Lord as king that ties together the various parts of the book of Isaiah.205  
Israel’s King of Justice and Righteousness206
The human kings mentioned in Isaiah are usually part of the historical narrative within which the 
prophecy unfolds. Isaiah receives his vision “in the reign of Ozias and Ioatham and Achaz and 
Hezekias, who reigned over Judea” (1.1), and the vision that constitutes his call (6.1–13) occurs “in the 
year that King Ozias died” (6.1). Judah’s king shares the stage with the kings of Aram and Israel (7.1), 
Assyria  (7.7, 17; 8.4, 7; 20.1; 36.1), Egypt (36.6), Babylon (14.4; 39.1), and the kings of the nations 
(14.9, 18; 60.10–11; 62.2). These references do not provide us with any insight into Isaiah’s under-
standing of ideal kingship, but there are a handful of passages that do suggest the outlines of this 
portrait.
It is difficult to overestimate the significance of Isaiah 7, especially the “virgin birth” of verse 14, 
in Christian interpretations of the book.207 However, with regard to the question of Isaiah’s 
understanding of ideal kingship, the passage does not yield much. This conclusion is supported by 
Rodrigo de Sousa’s study of the Greek translator’s messianism. He summarizes his findings on Isaiah 7 
as follows: “the rendering of LXX Isa 7:14–16 does not give sufficiently strong evidence of a 
conscious, systematic messianic reading of the passage.”208 At most, we can conclude with H. G. M. 
Williamson that the passage teaches “that Isaiah was deeply committed to the fact of a divinely 
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205. Williamson, Book Called Isaiah, 37–56; see also Brevard S. Childs, Isaiah, OTL (Louisville: Westminster John 
Knox, 2001), 539. Thomas Wagner (Gottes Herrschaft: Eine Analyses der Denkschrift [Jes 6,1–9,6], VTSup 108 [Leiden: 
Brill, 2006]) provides a detailed analysis of Isa 6.1–9.7, the Isaiah “memoir” (Denkschrift), using the kingship of God as a 
Leitmotiv. Wagner also provides a recent survey of scholarship on the kingship of the Lord (pp. 2–12). 
206. In this section “Israel” is used in both its narrow sense, that is, to refer to the northern kingdom, and more broadly, 
as in this heading, to refer to the Lord’s chosen nation. In doing so I follow the precedent set in the book of Isaiah in which 
both are used and distinguished by the context in which they occur. For the former, see, e.g., 7.1; 8.14; examples of the latter 
are found at  9.8; 41.3, frequently in parallel with Jacob (e.g., 14.1; 46.3; 49.5).
207. In the index of John F. A. Sawyer, The Fifth Gospel: Isaiah in the History of Christianity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), for example, there are slightly more references to Isa 53, but Isa 7.14 is by far the most frequently 
cited single verse. Christian interest in the passage is driven by its use in Matthew’s birth narrative (Matt 1.23). 
208. Rodrigo F. de Sousa, Eschatology and Messianism in LXX Isaiah 1–12, LHBOTS 516 (New York: T&T Clark, 
2010), 70–102, here, 101.
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appointed leader of the people within the framework of God’s broader purposes for Zion.”209  Other 
passages say slightly more about this leader.
Isaiah 9.5–6 LXX210 contains a striking description of a Davidic ruler, but one which has been 
transformed dramatically in translation.211 The salvation of the Lord, described in verses 1–4, reaches a 
climax in verse 5 with the gift of a child (παιδι'ον), a son (υιο' ς). The reading of Isaiah 9.5 MT reflected 
in most English translations identified the child by four names, each of which describe the ruler in 
exalted terms and  provide insight into the portrait of the ideal ruler in Isaiah.212 The Greek translator 
has understood the Hebrew quite differently. The son is called “Messenger [or Angel] of Great Counsel 
(µεγα' λης βουληñς α»γγελος; 9.5 LXX), leading some to suggest that he is a priestly figure, while others 
read α»γγελος more literally and argue that he is an angelic being.213 Whether one understands this 
figure in priestly or angelic terms, his kingship cannot be denied. We read that “sovereignty (α  ρχη' ) was 
upon his shoulder” (v. 5) and that it will know no boundary (v. 6). Foreign dominion has been replaced 
by the rule of this god-given child. Mention of the “throne of David and his kingdom” (v. 6) allow the 
identification of this figure as a king in the Davidic dynasty. 
Within the literary context of Isaiah, the poem speaks not simply of a coming king who will 
improve on the reign of Ahaz (see 7.1), but it takes on eschatological overtones which turn the exalted 
kingship language into language that speaks to the book’s messianism.214 These eschatological 
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209. H. G. M. Williamson, “The Messianic Texts in Isaiah 1–39,” in King and Messiah in Israel and the Ancient Near 
East: Proceedings of the Oxford Old Testament Seminar, ed. John Day, LHBOTS 270 (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 244–
54, here 254. Wegner’s study of Isa 7.10–17 (Kingship and Messianic Expectation, 63–137) leads him to conclude that while 
the passage was originally not meant to be understood as messianic, “the redactional shaping of the passage appears to have 
been intended to engender these ideas” (p. 136). Ronald E. Clements defends the view that the child of Isa 7.14 is a son of 
the prophet and that a later redactor turned him into a prince through the addition of 9.1–6 (“The Immanuel Prophecy of 
Isaiah 7:10–17 and Its Messianic Interpretation,” in Old Testament Prophecy: From Oracle to Canon [Louisville: 
Westminster John Knox, 1996], 65–77). M. J. de Jong argues that the earliest form of Isaiah 7 contained an encouragement 
to Ahaz (e.g., 7.7–9), whose subsequent disobedience is in view in a later addition which was critical of the Davidic dynasty 
(see, e.g., 7.17) (“From Legitimate King to Protected City: The Development of Isaiah 7:1–17,” in ‘Enlarge the Site of Your 
Tent’: The City as Unifying Theme in Isaiah: The Isaiah Workshop – De Jesaja Werkplaats, ed. Archibald L. H. M. van 
Wieringen and Annemarieke van der Woude [Leiden: Brill, 2011], 21–48). Despite their views on the original intention of 
Isaiah 7, these scholars all agree that in its canonical form the text is meant to be understood along messianic lines.  
210. In the discussion of this passage, I am following the versification in Alfred Rahlfs and Robert Hahnhart, eds., 
Septuaginta: Id est Vetus Testamentum graece iuxta LXX interpretes, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 
2006), 577–78. In English translations of the MT, as well as in NETS, this is vv. 6–7. 
211. Rodrigo de Sousa (Eschatology and Messianism, 103–37) discusses these verses in detail.
212. Read in the historical context in which the poem was first written, these names “express important aspects of an 
ideal polity and government, which was certainly never realized in ancient Israel and, at the same time, intimate a certain 
transcendental aura attaching to royalty in the ancient Near East” (Joseph Blenkinsopp, Isaiah 1–39: A New Translation with 
Introduction and Commentary, AB 19 [New York: Doubleday, 2000], 250 ).
213. Priest: Arie van der Kooij, “The Septuagint of Isaiah and the Mode of Reading Prophecies in Early Judaism: 
Some Comments on LXX Isaiah 8–9,” in Die Septuaginta—Texte, Kontexte, Lebenswelten, ed. Martin Karrer and Wolfgang 
Kraus; assisted by Martin Meiser, WUNT 219 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 597–611. Angelic messiah: Horbury, Jewish 
Messianism, 86–92. Despite his careful investigation, de Sousa is unable to decide between these two options (de Sousa, 
Eschatology and Messianism, 136–37).  
214. So Childs, Isaiah, 80–81. Wegner argues that the passage speaks of a future ruler/deliverer, even if it does not 
speak of the Messiah (Kingship and Messianic Expectation, 199–201; “What’s New in Isaiah 9:1–7?” in Interpreting Isaiah: 
Issues and Approaches, ed. David G. Firth and H. G. M. Williamson [Nottingham: Apollos, 2009], 246–47). For the contrary 
view, i.e., that the passage speaks of “an actual historical ruler rather than a projection of hopes for the future,” see 
Blenkinsopp, Isaiah 1–39, 248.
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overtones grow louder when we read of the peace without boundaries that results from the king’s reign 
(v. 6). Peace is more than the cessation of hostilities, “peace is what happens when a righteous order 
prevails.”215 The order that the king will establish and uphold is marked by righteousness (δικαιοσυ' νη) 
and judgment (κρι'µα) “from this time onward and for evermore” (v. 6). In acting as the Lord’s agent to 
bring about righteousness and justice, the king establishes the properly ordered society of which Isaiah 
speaks throughout his prophecy.
Three qual i t ies summarize the nature  of  th is  society:  r ighteousness ,  justice ,  and 
truth/faithfulness.216 Not only do they characterize the Lord (5.16; 28.17; 32.16), but they describe the 
society that the Lord desires and acts to restore (1.21, 26; 28.17; 32.16–17; 33.5). Although the king is 
not a central figure in all of the passages that speak of this future society, as we saw above with regard 
to chapter 9, when he does appear he is the focus of the hope of righteousness and justice and truth.217 
The book of Isaiah looks forward to a time when 
a throne shall be restored with mercy (ε λε'ους), and he shall sit on it with truth (α  ληθει'ας) in the 
tent of Dauid, judging and seeking judgment (κρι'νων και` ε κζητωñν κρι'µα) and quickly 
procuring righteousness (δικαιοσυ' νην). (16.5 LXX)
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215. Blenkinsopp, Isaiah 1–39, 250–51.
216. See, e.g., J. J. M. Roberts, “The Divine King and the Human Community in Isaiah’s Vision of the Future,” in The 
Quest for the Kingdom of God: Studies in Honor of George E. Mendenhall, ed. Herbert B. Huffmon, Frank A. Spina, and 
Alberto R. W. Green (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 1983), 127–36.
217. Daniel Schibler, “Messianism and Messianic Prophecy in Isaiah 1–12 and 28–33,” in The Lord’s Anointed: 
Interpretation of Old Testament Messianic Texts, ed. Philip E. Satterthwaite, Richard S. Hess, and Gordon J. Wenham 
(Carlisle: Paternoster, 1995), 89–93; see also Williamson, Variations, 243–44.
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Using language that seems to be proverbial rather than referring to a specific king, Isaiah 32.1 speaks 
of a king exercising dominion with righteousness and justice.218 These same qualities are on view in 
the portrait of the Davidic “shoot” of Isaiah 11.1–9:219  
He shall be girded with righteousness (δικαιοσυ' νη, ) around the waist and bound with truth 
(α  ληθει'α, ) around the sides. (11.5 LXX)
Verses 11.3b–4a have a decidedly judicial ring to them, but the language of seeing eyes and hearing 
ears alludes to 6.10 and serves to distinguish this figure from the sinful nation to which Isaiah is sent to 
preach.220 Isaiah 32.3 looks forward to a time when eyes will see and ears will hear and adds that minds 
will make good judgments and tongues speak well (32.4). This is not a description of the king but of 
the period in which the king reigns, a time in which the curse of 6.10 is reversed and the ideal society 
marked by righteousness and justice is established.221
Martial elements are not absent from Isaiah’s portrait of the king, even if they are somewhat 
muted.222 Isaiah 11.4b points to the deliverance that this Davidic ruler will bring through his defeat of 
the wicked. Related to this is the shelter and refuge he will provide (32.3). The goal of the ruler’s 
warring is the previously-mentioned peace, now achieved at the international as well as the national 
level. At a number of points, most famously at 2.4, the book looks forward to “the eschatological 
horizon of the abolition of war.”223 The utopia described in 11.6–9 should be read as the result of this 
ruler’s work which now encompasses not only Israel and the nations, but the whole created order.224
One striking element in Isaiah 11 still needs to be mentioned. The following is said about the rod 
that comes out of Jesse’s root:
And the spirit of God shall rest on him, 
the spirit of wisdom and understanding (σοφι'ας και` συνε'σεως), 
the spirit of counsel and might (βουληñς και` ι σχυ' ος),
the spirit of knowledge and godliness (γνω' σεως και` ευ  σεβει'ας).
The spirit of the fear of God will fill him. (11.2–3a LXX)
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218.   Williamson, “Messianic Texts,” 266.
219. Verses 6–9 describe the period inaugurated by this figure. Williamson excludes it from his discussion (“Messianic 
Texts,” 264–68), but vv. 1–9 should probably be read as a single poem; so Blenkinsopp, Isaiah 1–39, 262–65; Childs, 
Isaiah, 97–106. 
220. Williamson, Book Called Isaiah, 259–60.
221. Roberts, “Divine King”.
222. Tryggve N. D. Mettinger suggests that “the martial charisma of Saul and the judicial one of Solomon have merged 
in the image of the ruler in Jes [sic] ch. 11” (King and Messiah: The Civil and Sacral Legitimation of the Israelite Kings, 
ConBOT 8 [Lund: CWK Gleerup, 1976], 248–49). 
223. Blenkinsopp, Isaiah 1–39, 250 
224. Childs, Isaiah, 104.
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If it is accepted that Isaiah 11 is about the king of the Lord’s people, other texts about God’s spirit and 
kingship should inform our understanding of these verses.225  In 1 Samuel 10, Saul is anointed and give 
the spirit of the Lord, proof of which is seen in Saul’s ability to prophesy and, in 1 Samuel 11, 
following a further endowment of the spirit (11.6), in Saul’s military victory.226 In 1 Samuel 16.13–14, 
famously, the spirit of the Lord falls227 upon David after his anointing and departs from Saul, signalling 
his demise. In the following chapter, David’s defeat of the Philistine Goliath is proof that the Lord 
empowers David and gives him victory (1 Sam 17.45–47). When the Lord elects a king, this is 
demonstrated by anointing and reception of the spirit which empower the king that he might rule the 
Lord’s people.228
In Isaiah 11.2–3, the “resting” of the Lord’s spirit upon the king endows him with seven qualities: 
wisdom, understanding, counsel, might, knowledge, godliness, and fear of the Lord. This is an example 
of the spirit providing “an abundant reservoir of skill and knowledge” for the service of God,229 as 
illustrated in Exodus 31.3, for example, where the spirit of God fills Bezalel with σοφι'ας και` συνε'σεως 
και` ε πιστη' µης in all his work. In this case, the filling of the spirit is for the construction of cultic 
elements; in Isaiah 11 the wisdom and understanding have to do with the art of ruling.
According to Hilary Marlow, the combination of the king’s counsel and might “suggests both the 
ability to devise a plan or strategy and the heroic power to carry it out.”230 Given the assertion in 11.4c, 
that the king will slay the wicked, Marlow is perhaps a bit too hasty in seeking to soften the martial 
implications of the “might” of the king through which his stratagems are achieved.231 The peaceful 
  
 201 
———————————
225. The relationship between Israel’s god-chosen leadership and the spirit of the Lord is discussed by Wilf 
Hildebrandt, An Old Testament Theology of the Spirit of God (Peabody: Hendrickson, 1994), 104–50; David G. Firth, “The 
Spirit and Leadership: Testimony, Empowerment and Purpose,” in Presence, Power and Promise: The Role of the Spirit of 
God in the Old Testament, ed. David G. Firth and Paul D. Wegner (Nottingham: Apollos, 2011), 259–80. For a broader 
discussion of Jewish and Christian texts about the spirit, see John R. Levison, Filled with the Spirit (Grand Rapids; 
Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2009).
226. The pattern of the spirit’s empowering presence in this account is very similar to that found in the book of Judges; 
see Firth, “Spirit and Leadership,” 270–77. But the relationship between the spirit of the Lord and Israel’s leadership goes 
back even earlier in Israel’s history. In the account found at Numbers 11.16–30 this relationship is clearly in view as some of 
Moses’ leadership responsibilities devolve from him to the seventy elders.
227. For the use of חלצ in this context, cf. Judg 14.6, 19; 1 Sam 10.6, 10, although not too much should be made of the 
specific verb used to describe the action of the spirit (Levison, Filled with the Spirit, 55–56); see, e.g., Num 11.29; 24.2; 
Judg 3.10; 6.43; 1 Kgs 19.7.
228. See Hildebrandt, Spirit of God, 124, 127. In contrast, W. Creighton Marlowe, “The Spirit Chiasm in Isaiah 11,2a–
3a,” SJOT 28.1 (2014): 44–57 gives more weight to the immediate lexical elements and poetic form of Isa 11.2–3 and reads 
הוהי חור in an attributive sense—“a YHWH-like spirit.” This reading tends to minimise the parallels found elsewhere in the 
Hebrew Bible. 
229. Levison, Filled with the Spirit, 54. Levison cites, as an example, Exod 28.1–3: “You [Moses] must declare to all 
the wise of heart whom I have filled with the spirit of wisdom (המכח חור) that they must make garments for Aaron...” (28.3; 
my translation). The NRSV’s translation of Exod 28.3 obscures the role of the spirit: “And you shall speak to all who have 
ability, whom I have endowed with skill ...”
230. Hilary Marlow, “The Spirit of Yahweh in Isaiah 11:1–9,” in Presence, Power and Promise: The Role of the Spirit 
of God in the Old Testament, ed. David G. Firth and Paul D. Wegner (Nottingham: Apollos, 2011), 226 In the MT, both 
words also occur in the description of the child in Isaiah 9.6, suggesting that they are important for Isaiah’s understanding of 
the ideal ruler.
231. Marlow, “Spirit of Yahweh,” 227.
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vision of 11.6–8 must nevertheless be understood as the ultimate goal of the king’s application of his 
strategy and power.
Finally, “fear of the Lord” is a foundational element of Israel’s kingship. It is used to describe the 
king of Deuteronomy 17.19, and David speaks of “ruling in the fear of God” (2 Sam 23.2). The 
knowledge, godliness and fear of the Lord of Isaiah 11.2–3a should be understood against the 
background of Israel’s wisdom tradition (see, e.g., Prov 1.7; 2.5) and speaks of the king’s moral 
character as it relates to the Lord. 
Marlow summarizes well Isaiah 11’s contribution to the book’s portrait of an ideal king:
In Isaiah 11, the prophet’s description of the coming king brings together wisdom traditions 
and those connected to royal ideology to present the picture of someone with the skill and 
wisdom to govern well and protect his land and his people, and with the attitude of humility 
and reverence towards Yahweh that will ensure God’s continuing presence and protection.232
 Although the picture is quite feint through most of Isaiah 1–39, it is possible to discern Isaiah’s 
portrait of an ideal ruler of God’s people. A synthesis of the various traits delivers a traditional picture 
of Israelite kingship: the king is chosen by the Lord and is in close relationship with the Lord. The king 
is one who is wise and judges fairly, and who defeats the enemies of Israel and the Lord in order to 
bring about peace. This peace is not simply the cessation of hostility between Israel and the nations, but 
refers to an ideal society marked out by righteousness, justice, and truth. In the later parts of Isaiah 
(chaps. 40–66), the responsibility for the attainment of this goal is shifted to the servant of the Lord .
The Servant of the Lord
In Isaiah 1–39, both Isaiah (20.3) and David (37.35) are called “servant” (παιñς) of God. The  term 
is used far more frequently in the latter parts of the book to refer to a specific figure or group.233 This 
distinctive usage led Bernhard Duhm to identify four “Servant Song” (Ebed-Jahve-Lieder)—42:1–4;234 
49:1–6; 50:4–11; 52:13–53:12—which, he argued, were post-exilic texts composed after the rest of 
Deutero-Isaiah and inserted into this work without much thought.235 Duhm’s hypothesis very quickly 
became a “generally accepted axiom” amongst Isaiah scholars (albeit in a modified form), but it has not 
been without its opponents.236 Recent scholarship tends to interpret the Servant Songs in the context of 
Deutero-Isaiah237 and this is the approach that will be followed in the subsequent paragraphs.
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232. Marlow, “Spirit of Yahweh,” 227.
233. In the Hebrew, Isaiah 40–55 contains the singular 17 times (41.8, 9; 42.1, 19 bis; 43.10; 44.1, 2, 21; 45.4; 48.20; 
49.3, 6, 7; 50.10; 52.13; 53.11) and the plural twice (44.26; 54.17) while there are 9 occurrences of the plural in Isaiah 56–
66 (56.6; 63.17; 65.8, 9, 13 bis, 14, 15; 66.14).
234. A number of scholars now include 42.5–9 as part of the first song; see, e.g., Joseph Blenkinsopp, Isaiah 40–55: A 
New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, AB 19A (New York: Doubleday, 2002), 207–12; Klaus Baltzer, 
Deutero-Isaiah: A Commentary of Isaiah 40–55, Hermeneia (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 2001), 124–37.
235. Duhm, Jesaia, xiii. For Duhm’s earlier views on these passages, as well as a full summary of his argument, see 
Kristin Joachimsen, Identities in Transition: The Pursuit of Isa. 52:13–53:12, VTSup 142 (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 15–26.
236. See, e.g., Tryggve N. D. Mettinger, A Farewell to the Servant Songs: A Critical Examination of an Exegetical 
Axiom, Scripta Minora Regiae Societatis Humaniorum Litterarum Lundensis 3. (Lund: CWK Gleerup, 1983), here, 45.
237. See, e.g., Peter Wilcox and David Paton-Williams, “The Servant Songs in Deutero-Isaiah,” JSOT 42 (1988): 79–
102; Williamson, Variations, 113–66; Hans-Jürgen Hermisson, “The Fourth Servant Song in the Context of Second Isaiah,” 
in The Suffering Servant: Isaiah 53 in Jewish and Christian Sources, trans. Daniel P. Bailey; ed. Bernd Janowski and Peter 
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Regardless of the way in which scholars reconstruct the history of the Servant Songs, much 
research continues to focus on the identity of the Servant.238 Tryggye Mettinger lists 
an entire catalogue of historical individuals who have figured in the discussions of the Servant: 
the prophet himself, Duhm’s unknown teacher of the Law, Isaiah, Uzziah, Hezekiah, Josiah, 
Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Job, Moses, Jehoiachin, Cyrus, Sheshbazzar, Zerubbabel, Meshukkam, 
Nehemiah, and Eleazar.239
Fortunately, our study of Isaiah’s portrait of kingship does not require of us to uncover the identity of 
the Servant, but simply to identify how the figure contributes to the book’s conception of the ideal 
king.
Several scholars accept that the Servant does indeed exhibit some royal characteristics.240 Since 
the Servant is not explicitly identified as “king” or “ruler,” it would be methodologically incorrect to 
include all of the Servant’s characteristics within our portrait of Isaiah’s ideal king. What I will attempt 
in this section is to produce a summary sketch of those elements that are generally recognized as 
contributing to the identification of the Servant as royal. The studies by Antti Laato and H. G. M. 
Williamson will provide the starting point for my discussion of the Servant as a king-like figure.241 
Laato collects a number of parallels between extra-biblical material (especially Akkadian royal 
inscriptions) and the Servant Songs and Cyrus material in Isaiah 40–55 to show how these passages in 
Isaiah draw on royalty traditions.242 Williamson presents five elements that demonstrate the Servant in 
Isaiah 42.1–4 is royal in some or other way.243  
(1) The opening words, “Here is my servant” describe the designation or commissioning of a 
significant figure.244 The parallels with 1 Samuel 9.17 and 12.13 illustrate a similar formula which is 
used in designating a king. 
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Stuhlmacher (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 16–47. For a stylistic comparison of the Servant Songs and Isa 40–55, see 
Antti Laato, The Servant of YHWH and Cyrus: A Reinterpretation of the Exilic Messianic Programme in Isaiah 40–55, 
ConBOT 35 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1992), 29–46.
238. See, e.g., Roy F. Melugin, “Isaiah 40–66 in Recent Research: The ‘Unity’ Movement,” in Recent Research on the 
Major Prophets; Alan J. Hauser (Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2008), 142–94 who surveys recent research on Deutero- 
and Trito-Isaiah. I follow the convention of capitalizing “Servant” since Isaiah 40–55 seems to speak of a specific figure 
rather than a generic “servant.”
239. Mettinger, Farewell to the Servant Songs, 45.
240. In addition to Laato, Servant of YHWH, chaps. 2–6 and Williamson, Variations, 130–43, see, for example, Ivan 
Engnell, “The  Ebed Yahweh Songs and the Suffering Messiah in ‘Deutero-Isaiah’,” BJRL 31 (1948): 54–93; Richard L. 
Schultz, “The King in the Book of Isaiah,” in The Lord’s Anointed: Interpretation of Old Testament Messianic Texts, ed. 
Philip E. Satterthwaite, Richard S. Hess, and Gordon J. Wenham (Carlisle: Paternoster, 1995), 177–79; Ronald E. Clements, 
“Isaiah 53 and the Restoration of Israel,” in Jerusalem and the Nations: Studies in the Book of Isaiah, HBM 16 (Sheffield: 
Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2011), 173–87. For the argument that the Servant is a prophet and/or “Moses,” see, e.g., Robert G. 
Boling, “Kings and Prophets: Cyrus and the Servant: Reading Isaiah 40–55,” in Ki Baruch Hu: Ancient Near Eastern, 
Biblical, and Judaic Studiesin Honor of Baruch A. Levine, ed. Robert Chazan, William W. Hallo, and Lawrence H. 
Schiffman (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 1999), 177–78.
241. Laato, Servant of YHWH; Williamson, Variations.
242. Laato, Servant of YHWH, 47–68. For the sake of brevity, I will not repeat Laato’s parallels but simply note them 
and refer to the relevant pages in his study. Both authors make these arguments with regard to the Hebrew text, but they hold 
with regard to the Greek too.
243. Williamson, Variations, 132–37.
244. Blenkinsopp, Isaiah 40–55, 209.
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(2) “Servant” is used to speak of those chosen by the Lord for a specific task, including, but not 
limited to, the king; see, e.g., 2 Samuel 3.18; 7.5; Psalm 89.3, 20, 39, 50; 132.10.245 
(3) “Whom I uphold (ךמת)” (Isa 42.1) contains a relatively rare verb that is used of the king in 
Psalm 63.8 and indicates God’s support and protection of the king.246 Although a clear verbal parallel 
to the Lord’s pleasure shown towards the king (“in whom my soul delights”) does not occur in the 
Hebrew Bible, the concept—that of divine love and favour towards the king247—is evident, for 
example, at 2 Samuel 7.15; 22.51; Psalm 18.50; 21.7.
(4) The concept of divine election248 presented in the phrase “my chosen one (יריחב/ο  ε κλεκτο' ς 
µου)” (Isa 42.1) is important in Israel’s kingship ideology; see, e.g., Deut 17.15; 1 Sam 10.24; 16.1–13; 
1 Kgs 8.16; 11.34. A striking parallel is found at Psalm 89.3 where “chosen one” and “servant” 
combine to speak of the Davidic king. 
(5) The reception of the Lord’s spirit (Isa 42.1; cf. 48.16) is often associated with kingship, as 
discussed above with regard to Isaiah 11.2. 
While none of these elements serve as indisputable proof, their cumulative weight suggests that 
the Servant in Isaiah 42.1–4 is royal. This thesis is strengthened by the presence in chapter 42 of the 
justice (vv. 1, 3, 4), faithfulness (v. 3), and righteousness (v. 6)—themes closely linked to the king in 
Isaiah 1–39, as demonstrated above. Furthermore, 42.6–7 point to the Servant’s role in bringing 
salvation not only to God’s people (Israel), but also to the nations.249
While Isaiah 42 has a single royal figure in view, the image of the Servant is more complicated in 
other passages. At a number of points the Servant is spoken of in corporate terms, usually in terms of 
Israel and/or Jacob (e.g., 41.8; 44.1–2; 45.4 ). Like the Servant in Isaiah 42, this Servant is also chosen 
(41.8–9; 43.10; 49.7) and receives the Lord’s spirit (44.3; 59.21). Other royal characteristics include 
the Lord’s foreknowledge of the Servant. Although Isaiah 49.1—“From my mother’s womb he [the 
Lord] called my name” (cf. v. 5)— sounds very similar to the prophet’s self-description in Jeremiah 
1.5, the Lord’s foreknowledge of those he would elect as king is on view at 1 Kings 8.19 (Solomon) 
and 13.2 (Josiah).250 The following verse, “He made my mouth like a sharp dagger” (Isa 49.2), might 
be understood as referring to a prophetic task, but could also be speaking of the king’s judicial function 
or, more generally, of the power that the word of the king has (cf. 11.4).251 Like the Servant of Isaiah 
42, the corporate Servant’s task includes the salvation not only of Israel, but also the nations (49.6).252  
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245. So Blenkinsopp, Isaiah 40–55, 299. For the Akkadian parallels, see Laato, Servant of YHWH, 54–55. In Jeremiah, 
the Lord can also speak of Nebuchadnezzar as “my servant” (25.9; 27.6; 43.10). 
246. Laato, Servant of YHWH, 58 In both places, the Greek translators gloss this verb with α  ντιλαµβα' νω.
247. Laato, Servant of YHWH, 51–53.
248. Laato, Servant of YHWH, 53–54.
249. The programmatic statement in Isaiah 6.9–10 makes clear the link between light/sight and salvation; see Ronald E. 
Clements, “A Light to the Nations: A Central Theme in the Book of Isaiah,” in Jerusalem and the Nations: Studies in the 
Book of Isaiah, HBM 16 (Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2011), 187–97.  
250. For the concept in extra-biblical texts, see Laato, Servant of YHWH, 56–57.
251. Engnell, “ Ebed Yahweh Songs,” 69; Laato, Servant of YHWH, 112–13.
252. Richard L. Schultz argues that Israel’s election and salvation leads to the offer of universal salvation 
(“Nationalism and Universalism in Isaiah,” in Interpreting Isaiah: Issues and Approaches, ed. David G. Firth and H. G. M. 
Williamson [Nottingham: Apollos, 2009], 122–44). Israel’s salvation is cast in terms of a new exodus (49.8–12; see Laato, 
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Finally, the Servant is described in exalted terms (υψωθη' σεται και` δοξασθη' σεται σφο' δρα; 52.13)253 
that are elsewhere used for the Lord, the divine king (e.g., 6.1; 5.16; 57.15).
Isaiah 55.3 proves to be a key verse in understanding the Servant’s royal corporate identity. The 
covenant once made with David is now shifted to Israel, suggesting that the community comes to take 
on the role of the king.254 This is confirmed when the Lord makes an eternal covenant with “them” 
(διαθη' κην αι ω' νιον διαθη' σοµαι αυ  τοιñς; 61.8), presumably the same group who will be involved in the 
restoration of Zion (61.4), the same role that Cyrus, another important royal figure, plays in the earlier 
part of Isaiah (see below). If the corporate nature of the Servant in Isaiah 40–55 is uncertain, the 
repeated use of the plural, “servants,” in Isaiah 56–60 suggests that this is indeed the direction in which 
the theme develops.255
One final passage should be mentioned. The figure of Isaiah 61.1–3, even though he is not 
explicitly identified as a/the “servant,”256 exhibits a number of the same royal characteristics already 
observed: the spirit of the Lord is upon him, he is anointed, and he is an agent of rescue and salvation 
(v. 1). Other aspects of this figure’s activity find echoes in Isaiah 40–55, such as his proclamation (v. 2; 
cf. 40.2–6) and bringing comfort (v. 2; cf. 49.13; 51.3, 12, 19; 52.9; 54.11), leading Williamson to 
conclude that this figure represents a “composite character, a bringing together into one of all those 
whom God had earlier said he would use for the salvation of his people.”257  
Although the Servant of Isaiah 40–55 is never identified as “king” or “messiah,” this brief 
discussion indicates that the Servant bears certain royal traits and characteristics, some of which are 
shared with the figure of the ideal king that one encounters in Isaiah 1–39.258 
Thus the “Servant” of Isaiah 40 ff. can be understood as a complementary portrait of Yahweh's 
agent, which corresponds to the King of Isaiah 1-39. The similarities suggest this 
correspondence, while the differences reflect the emphases of their respective sections within 
the chronological and thematic development of the book of Isaiah as a whole.259
One of the most significant differences in Isaiah 40–55 is the “democratization” of kingship suggested 
by the corporate Servant. But this is not the only indication that kingship has been removed—whether 
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Servant of YHWH, 121–22) a theme first announced at Isaiah 40.1–11.
253. The question of whether the Servant is individual or corporate in Isaiah 52.13–53.12 is particularly complicated 
(see, e.g., Laato, Servant of YHWH, 156–65) and I will not attempt a solution at this point.
254. So Williamson, Variations, 113–29; see also Edgar W. Conrad, “The Community as King in Second Isaiah,” in 
Understanding the Word: Essays in Honor of Bernhard W. Anderson, ed. James T. Butler, Edgar W. Conrad, and Ben C. 
Ollenburger, JSOTSup 37 (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1985), 99–111, who argues that the five “fear not” oracles (Isa 41.8–13; 
41.14–16; 43.1b–4; 43.5–7; 44.2b–5) are “war oracles” that are usually addressed to kings but, in Isaiah 40–55, are 
addressed to the community.
255. Williamson, Variations, 192.
256. For a brief discussion of the history of this question, see Childs, Isaiah, 502–3.
257. Williamson, Variations, 174–88, here, 188; see also Childs, Isaiah, 504 who recognises that the figure in Isa 
61.1–3 describes himself “in the garb of the figure of the servant of Second Isaiah.” 
258. Recognising the royal elements in Isaiah’s description of the Servant does not preclude the possibility that he is 
also described as a second Moses and/or a prophet-like figure (see, e.g, Gordon P. Hugenberger, “The Servant of the Lord in 
the ‘Servant Songs’ of Isaiah,” in The Lord’s Anointed: Interpretation of Old Testament Messianic Texts, ed. Philip E. 
Satterthwaite, Richard S. Hess, and Gordon J. Wenham [Carlisle: Paternoster, 1995], 105–40).
259. Schultz, “King in Isaiah,” 159.
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temporarily or permanently—from the Davidic line: there is one more significant royal figure in Isaiah 
40–55 that has not yet been mentioned and Isaiah’s surprising characterization of Cyrus must be 
investigated before concluding this section.
Cyrus
Xenophon’s version of Cyrus has already been encountered in Chapter 2. The Judahite exiles in 
Babylon do not make an appearance in this narrative, but, like Xenophon, the biblical tradition 
remembers and interprets Cyrus’ career in a positive light.260 In Isaiah, Cyrus’ name is only mentioned 
at 44.28 and 45.1, but a number of passages speak of this king and his role within the Lord’s plan for 
the nation.261 He is referred to as “righteousness from the east” (41.2), “the one who is from the rising 
of the sun” (41.25), “a bird  from the east” (46.11).262 He will tread down rulers like a potter treading 
clay (41.25).263 More specifically, Cyrus will defeat Babylon (43.14; cf. 47.1; 48.14, 20) in order to set 
free those the Lord had sent into exile (45.13) and, most startling, he will rebuild the Lord’s temple and 
city (44.28; 45.13). Cyrus thus fulfills the role that the Lord’s king is expected to fulfill. He is the 
Lord’s messiah/anointed (χριστο' ς; 45.1);264 apart from the Lord, “the real king in Second Isaiah is a 
Persian!”265
Klaus Baltzer argues that Isaiah 45.1–4 represents the installation of Cyrus as the Lord’s king.266 
This would have been shocking to many who heard or read Isaiah:267 Israel’s God is now working 
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260. See, e.g., 2 Chron 36.33–23; Ezra 1.2–4; 6.2–5; Dan  1.21; 6.28; 10.1. As seen in Chapter 2, the Greek tradition 
also portrays Cyrus positively. Amélie Kuhrt (“Cyrus the Great of Persia: Images and Realities,” in Representations of 
Political Power : Case Histories from Times of Change and Dissolving Order in the Ancient Near East, ed. Marlies Heinz 
and Marian H. Feldman [Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 2007], 169–91) provides a thorough reading of all the evidence and 
suggests a less idealistic portrait of the Achaemenid emperor: “Instead of a young idealistic liberator with a new vision for 
ruling the world, we can begin to define a king, heir to an already fairly significant realm, who deployed both brutal and 
placatory gestures in a calculated and effective manner” (p. 180). The same points are made in Amélie Kuhrt, “Ancient Near 
Eastern History: The Case of Cyrus the Great of Persia,” in Understanding the History of Ancient Israel, ed. H. G. M. 
Williamson, PBA 143 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 107–27. The Cyrus cylinder is partly responsible for the 
positive and uncritical view of the emperor; for Kuhrt’s deconstruction of this reading of the cylinder, see “The Cyrus 
Cylinder and Achaemenid Imperial Policy,” JSOT 25 (1983): 83–97. 
261. For a recent argument that the conquering king in Isa 45.5–7, 45.11–13, and 48.12–15 is Darius and not Cyrus, 
see Rainer Albertz, “Darius in Place of Cyrus: The First Edition of Deutero-Isaiah (Isaiah 40.1–52.12) in 521 BCE,” 
JSOT 27.3 (2003): 371–83. The similarities between these Cyrus/Darius passages (see Laato, Servant of YHWH, 36–38) 
indicate that they deal with the same concept of kingship and they can thus be treated together, regardless of whether or not 
Albertz’ thesis can be sustained.
262. Michael Jay Chan, “Cyrus, Yhwh’s Bird of Prey (Isa. 46.11): Echoes of an Ancient Near Eastern Metaphor,” 
JSOT 35.1 (2010): 113–27 demonstrates that the metaphor is common in ancient Near Eastern kingship discourse, especially 
that related to the king’s military activities. Early Jewish readers associated this anonymous conqueror from the east with 
Abraham (Joseph Blenkinsopp, “Abraham and Cyrus in Isaiah 40–48,” in New Perspectives on Old Testament Prophecy and 
History: Essays in Honour of Hans M. Barstad, ed. Rannfrid I. Thelle, Terje Stordalen, and Mervyn E. J. Richardson, VTSup 
168 [Leiden: Brill, 2015], 33–34).
263. At Isa 45.9–10 the metaphor is adjusted: the Lord is the potter and Cyrus is a tool in the Lord’s hand.
264. The Lord calls Cyrus “my shepherd” at Isa 44.28, but this metaphor is missing in the Greek translation.
265. Richard J. Clifford, “The Unity of the Book of Isaiah and Its Cosmogonic Language,” CBQ 55.1 (1993): 14–16, 
here, 15.
266. Deutero-Isaiah, 221–26 See also Fried, “Cyrus the Messiah?”.
267. Liesbeth S. Fried (“Cyrus the Messiah?” 392) suggests that the rebuke in Isa 45.9–13 is aimed at those who 
cannot accept Cyrus as the Lord’s anointed one. It is more likely, however, that this warning is addressed to the nations and 
not the people of Israel (Childs, Isaiah, 354); the latter are mentioned in the third person (Isa 45.11). 
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through the Achaemenid line and no longer through the Davidic line. On the face of it, this seems 
correct. Cyrus, not David or David’s son (2 Sam 7), will (re)build the Lord’s temple and city (44.24–
28). If David provided the “prototype” of “the Lord’s anointed” (e.g., 1 Sam 12.3; 16.1–13),268 this title 
now belongs to Cyrus (Isa 45.1). Liesbeth Fried points out that even though prophets and priests were 
also anointed, the title “the Lord’s anointed” or “his anointed” refers exclusively to the legitimate ruler 
of the Lord’s people. And, more than a title, “it connotes a theology.”269 Cyrus has come to inherit not 
only the title, but also the entire complex of ideas and expectations tied up with the title.
Given Cyrus’ disappearance after Isaiah 48, though, it becomes evident that his role is only 
temporary in the book of Isaiah. Cyrus’ anointing should indeed be understood against the background 
of the anointing not only of kings, but also of prophets and priests: he is “set aside for a divine 
commission,” but there is no indication that either he or his descendants enjoy this privileged status 
before Israel’s God once his commission has been completed.270 The contours of that mission can be 
discerned in Isaiah 45. Cyrus acts for the sake of Israel (v. 4) and the reputation of the Lord (vv. 5–7), 
but ultimately, it is all of creation that will benefit (v. 8).271 This rough outline bears some similarity 
with the Servant’s role as he brings salvation to Israel and the nations for the sake of the Lord’s glory 
(see above).
There are additional verbal and conceptual parallels between Cyrus and the Servant,272 but the 
differences should not be overlooked. Cyrus defeats the Lord’s enemies and establishes the conditions 
for the new exodus and the rebuilding of Jerusalem and the temple, while the Servant will lead the 
people back through the desert, bringing salvation to the nations even as he rescues Israel.273 In both 
cases, though, the description of these two figures draw on royal tradition as found in the Hebrew Bible 
and royal ideology from Israel’s neighbours.274  
Concluding Comments
In this chapter I have attempted to sketch various portraits of kingship that are found in a select 
group of texts from the Jewish Scriptures. The texts from Deuteronomy, Samuel and Kings, the Psalms, 
and Isaiah were chosen because these are the books from which the apostle Paul drew most frequently. 
While it is important to remain open to the possibility that Paul’s understanding of kingship was based 
partly on other scriptural texts, the survey in the present chapter should at least provide an outline, a 
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268. See Baltzer, Deutero-Isaiah, 225 and references provided there.
269. Fried, “Cyrus the Messiah?” 379–80, here, 380.
270. Childs, Isaiah, 352–54, here, 353; cf. Williamson, Variations, 5–6. Similarly, the Assyrian king is merely an agent 
through whom the purposes of the Lord are accomplished (Isa 10.5–11) who is, in turn, punished once he has fulfilled his 
purpose (v. 12). 
271. David J. Reimer, “Isaiah and Politics,” in Interpreting Isaiah: Issues and Approaches, ed. David G. Firth and H. 
G. M. Williamson (Nottingham: Apollos, 2009), 100–101.
272. Laato, Servant of YHWH, 29–46; see also Blenkinsopp, “Abraha,m and Cyrus,” 39–40.
273. Laato, Servant of YHWH, 282–83.
274. So Laato, Servant of YHWH; see, for the extra-biblical parallels, pp. 47–68; the Servant, pp. 69–155; Cyrus,  pp. 
166–95.
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rough model, of the kingship ideal found in the Jewish Scriptures upon which Paul might have based 
some of his thinking.
 In Deuteronomy 17.14–20, the “Law of the King” defines the nature of Israelite kingship in three 
significant ways (see pp. 164–171 ). (1) The king is chosen by the Lord. This proves to be defining 
characteristic in all the texts studied in this chapter. (2) The king is not to be like the kings that rule 
Israel’s neighbours. The usual trappings of royalty—weapons, women, wealth— while not denied him, 
are restricted. This curtailment forces the king to rely on the Lord instead of some of the usual sources 
of power. (3) The corollary of the previous point is that the king should be like his fellow Israelites. 
Not only should he be chosen from among them, but he must also follow God’s law. In this, he acts as 
an exemplar of Israelite piety. This passage serves as a yardstick against which kingship in the 
following books can be measured.275
The nature of kingship in Samuel and Kings (pp. 171–181) is more variegated—a result, most 
likely, of the combination of the disastrous reigns of Saul, Solomon, and others, with the lofty promises 
attached to the reign of David. In the books of Samuel and Kings the narrative seeks to address the 
nature of Israelite kingship rather than the question of whether monarchy is a good or bad development. 
More specifically, since the narrative arc begins with great promise (the inheritance of the promised 
land) and ends with disappointment (the exile in Babylon), it invites questions about the contribution of 
Israel’s leadership to that situation. The most significant aspect of Israelite kingship is faithfulness 
towards the Lord, his covenant and the covenant stipulations. David’s kingship and the covenant 
established with him and his dynasty are central in this regard (see pp. 174–180). David’s faithfulness 
is highlighted throughout the narrative of his reign and in those texts which compare other kings to 
him. The kings that are portrayed positively are those who act to ensure that the cultic elements of the 
nation’s life are ordered according to the covenant. This is especially the case with Hezekiah and Josiah 
(pp. 180–181).
The king’s participation in and contribution to the cultic life of the nation has been at the centre of 
much twentieth-century research on the Psalms. In the second major section of this chapter, I have 
focused on the portrait of the king that emerges from those Psalms (pp. 181–196 ). Some important 
themes emerge from this investigation. Israel’s kingship is portrayed in Davidic terms and the Davidic 
covenant between the Lord and David reflected in 2 Samuel 7 is considered foundational. The king’s 
faithfulness to this covenant is seen as determinative in his relationship with the Lord. Through this 
covenant the king is chosen by the Lord and becomes the Lord’s anointed. This close relationship is 
also described using filial language. However, while the king, as “son of God,” is not divine, he is the 
most exalted person within Israel. And because of Israel’s exalted status amongst the nations, the king 
is necessarily the most exalted person in the cosmos. This exalted status is not diminished through use 
of the term “servant” to describe the king and this designation is also indicative of the king’s status as 
the Lord’s vice-regent who is given dominion over Israel and the nations that mirrors, albeit at a lesser 
scale, the Lord’s dominion over the cosmos. As vice-regent, the king imitates the Lord’s justice and 
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righteousness, especially with regard to the poor, oppressed, and marginalized within Israel. The 
corollary of this position is that the king must oppose the wicked both within and outside Israel. The 
latter group are often identified as “enemies” against whom the Lord wages war through the agency of 
the king. Echoes of the psalms’ poetic portrait of the ideal king can also be found in Israel’s prophetic 
tradition.
Kingship in the book of Isaiah is marked by a number of the same characteristics already noted in 
DH and the Psalms: the king is chosen by the Lord, anointed and given the Lord’s spirit. Isaiah’s vision 
is overwhelmingly corporate, even as it makes space for an individual ruler. The ideal society, marked 
by righteousness and justice, is achieved as various rulers fulfill their mandates as the Lord’s agents: 
the king in the earlier part of the book, the Servant and Cyrus in the latter parts. The surprising 
announcement of Cyrus as the Lord’s “anointed” reminds the reader that the Davidic dynasty becomes 
less and less significant throughout the book, presumably in response to the effective end of that 
dynasty in the exilic period. Nevertheless, the Davidic covenant is not forgotten (see, e.g., Isa 9.7; 
11.1), even as it is transferred to the nation in the latter part of the book (55.3; 61.8).
One of the most striking differences between the ideal king in some of the Greek writings already  
investigated and that of the Hebrew Bible is that the latter is almost never described in terms of his 
“virtues.” Rather, the king’s relationship to the Lord and fidelity to the covenant is paramount. The 
king acts as  warrior/saviour, in both the present and the future. The king is expected to act righteously 
and ensure a just society, yet he is not consistently described as “righteous” or “just.” The closest we 
get to a description of the king’s virtues is in Isaiah 11 where he is associated with wisdom, 
understanding, the ability to strategize and act accordingly,276 and piety through the spirit of God. But 
even at this point, if this statement is associated with the king’s anointing, these traits are linked to the 
king’s coronation and the Lord’s provision, rather than virtues inherent in the king’s person. This 
correlates well with Williamson’s conclusion that in Isaiah (and, I would argue, elsewhere in the 
Jewish Scriptures) the emphasis falls on the king’s role rather than on his person.277 In Isaiah, the most 
significant role this ruler plays (whether the Davidic king of chapters 1–39 or the Servant or Cyrus) is 
concerned with the rescue of the Lord’s people in order to establish an ideal society marked by justice 
and righteousness. In Isaiah, this future rescue also comes to include the nations who turn to serve the 
Lord. As in the Psalms, the realm of Israel’s king is expanded beyond the geographical boundaries 
established under David and Solomon. While the hope for a ruler that will accomplish this salvation is 
sometimes focused on a sitting ruler, more often than not the book of Isaiah looks to a future ruler who 
will inaugurate this state, thus contributing to the development of messianism in the post-exilic period 
and beyond.278
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276. This is not a new development within the narrative of Judahite kingship. Solomon was known as the wise king par 
excellence (e.g., 1 Kgs 3.1–28; 4.26–34; 10.23–24).
277. Williamson, Variations, 28–29, 204–5; “Messianic Texts,” 270.
278. Even if Isaiah’s original prophecy did not contain this future orientation, later redactional activity shifted the hope 
of the prophecy further into the future (Williamson, “Messianic Texts,” 269–70). Matthew Novenson provides a survey of 
scholarship on messianic thought in ancient Judaism from a socio-linguistic perspective (Christ Among the Messiahs: Christ 
Language in Paul and Messiah Language in Ancient Judaism [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012], 34–63).
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The messianic ideal plays an increasingly important role in the Persian, Hellenistic, and Graeco-
Roman periods of Israel’s history. In the next chapter, however, I attempt to identify Jewish texts from 
these periods that draw not on this developing messianic ideal, but on the various constructions of ideal 
kingship presented in the preceding chapters.  
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CHAPTER 5. HELLENISTIC JEWISH KINGSHIP
In Chapter 3, we observed some of the continuities and changes in philosophical thought 
concerning ideal kingship that occurred in the Hellenistic period in the wake of Alexander’s conquests 
and the transformation of the political landscape of the eastern Mediterranean following his death. In 
this chapter, three Jewish texts from the Hellenistic period are examined in order to survey the way in 
which Jewish authors of this period might have been influenced by the same Zeitgeist.1 Of particular 
interest is the way in which Hellenistic kingship ideals interacted with those found in the Jewish 
Scriptures.
The first text that will be examined, the Letter of Aristeas, is part of a larger cultural project  
identified by Erich Gruen as “the production of stories that gave Jewish matters a place in the high 
policy of Hellenistic kings.”2 Within this project, the Letter of Aristeas is significant because it contains 
an extended section which draws on the topos of the ideal king and perhaps even directly from 
Hellenistic piερι` βασιλει'ας treatises.3 The next text examined in this section, the Wisdom of Solomon, 
does not contain a similarly concentrated discourse on kingship, but scholars have noted its 
indebtedness to Hellenistic kingship ideals.4 Finally, selected passages from Philo’s On the Life of 
Moses will be examined. Philo explicitly identifies Moses as the model philosopher-king and also 
shows evidence of familiarity with ideas common to the ideal kingship topos, thus making his 
biography of the Jewish leader a suitable candidate for investigation in this chapter.5
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1. In terms of chronology, Wisdom of Solomon and Philo’s writings should be described as Graeco-Roman texts, if we 
decide that the Hellenistic period ended in 30 BCE with the death of Cleopatra VII. As Glenn Bugh observes, this is “a 
choice of convenience and custom” (“Introduction,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Hellenistic World, ed. Glenn R. 
Bugh [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006], 2). Because of the continuing cultural and intellectual influence of 
the Hellenistic period on these writers, we are justified in identifying them as “Hellenistic.” For Wisdom of Solomon, see 
James Miller Reese, Hellenistic Influence on the Book of Wisdom and Its Consequences, AnBib 41 (Rome: Biblical Institute 
Press, 1970); for Philo, see Gregory E. Sterling, “‘The Jewish Philosophy’: Reading Moses Via Hellenistic Philosophy 
According to Philo,” in Reading Philo: A Handbook to Philo of Alexandria, ed. Torrey Seland (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
2014), 129–54.
Sylvie Honigman, The Septuagint and Homeric Scholarship in Alexandria: A Study in the Narrative of the Letter of 
Aristeas (London: Routledge, 2003), argues that Hellenistic Jewish literature should be considered part of the larger body of 
Hellenistic literature rather than as a distinct category. While I agree with a number of Honigman’s arguments, for the 
purposes of my study, the distinction is necessary. The manner and extent to which the Jewish Scriptures influenced and were 
used by the authors in this chapter allows us to distinguish them from the Hellenistic authors considered in Chapter 4.
2. Heritage and Hellenism: The Reinvention of Jewish Tradition, HCS 30 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1998), 189.
3. Günther Zuntz, “Aristeas Studies I: ‘The Seven Banquets’,” JSS 4.1 (1959): 21–36, modified by Oswyn Murray, 
“Aristeas and Ptolemaic Kingship,” JTS 18 (1967): 337–71; “Aristeas and His Sources,” in Studia Patristica, Vol. XII: 
Papers Presented to the Sixth International Conference on Patristic Studies, Held in Oxford, 1971, ed. Elizabeth A. 
Livingstone, TUGAL 115 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1975), 123–28.
4. Reese, Hellenistic Influences, 71–87; Matthew Edwards, Pneuma and Realized Eschatology in the Book of Wisdom, 
FRLANT 242 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2012), 201–23.
5. According to Louis Feldman, “Philo’s Moses is the Jewish equivalent to Plato’s philosopher-king” (Philo’s Portrayal 
of Moses in the Context of Ancient Judaism, Christianity and Judaism in Antiquity 15 [Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 2007], 375); see also Sarah Pearce, “King Moses: Notes on Philo’s Portrait of Moses as an Ideal Leader in the 
Life of Moses,” Mélanges de l’Université Saint-Joseph 57 (2004): 37–74.
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John Barclay argues that Jewish Hellenization can be plotted along three axes: assimilation, which 
looks at social integration; acculturation, concerned with language and education; and accommodation, 
the use of acculturation.6 In this chapter I am concerned primarily with the second category. To what 
extent do these texts display an awareness of Hellenistic models of kingship? In what way were these 
models adapted? How did these three authors use kingship ideals from the Jewish Scriptures within 
their construction of ideal kingship? The way in which other Hellenistic Jews write about kingship will 
inform the penultimate chapter of this dissertation in which Paul’s writings about Jesus’ kingship are 
studied.
Just as Athenian authors dominated the chapter on classical Greek writings and, to a lesser extent, 
the Hellenistic writings, Alexandrian Jewish authors dominate this chapter. This phenomenon 
illustrates the shift during the Hellenistic period in the scholarly centre of gravity from Athens to 
Alexandria of which these texts are both product and witness. 
The Philosphers’ King in The Letter of Aristeas
The Letter of Aristeas7 is neither a letter8 nor was it written by Aristeas. Humphrey Hody’s Contra 
historiam Aristeæ de LXX interpretibus dissertatio (1684) is one of the earliest works to argue against 
the text’s authenticity and historicity.9 The Letter is universally recognized amongst modern scholars as 
pseudepigraphical and its historical value questioned. Nonetheless, there is a growing appreciation for 
its value in understanding second-century Alexandrian Judaism.10
The Letter11 is framed by the translation into Greek of the “divine Law” written “in Hebrew 
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6. Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora: From Alexander to Trajan (323 BCE - 117 CE), HCS 33 (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1996), 92–98. Stewart Alden Moore, Jewish Ethnic Identity and Relations in Hellenistic Egypt: With 
Walls of Iron? JSJSup 171 (Leiden: Brill, 2015) is somewhat critical of Barclay’s approach and studies Judaean ethnic 
identity in Egypt using the concept of “boundary markers,” developed by the anthropologist Frederick Barth.
7. Thorough essays addressing introductory questions are provided by Moses Hadas, Aristeas to Philocrates: Letter of 
Aristeas (New York: Harper, 1951), 1–90; Oswyn Murray, “The Letter of Aristeas,” in Studi ellenistici, vol. 2, ed. Biagio 
Virgilio, Biblioteca di studi antichi 54 (Pisa: Giardini, 1987), 15–29; Benjamin G. Wright III, The Letter of Aristeas: 
“Aristeas to Philocrates” or “On the Translation of the Law of the Jews”, CEJL (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015), 3–74. In the 
discussion that follows I will use André Pelletier’s Greek text (Lettre d’Aristée à Philocrate: introduction, texte critique, 
traduction et notes, index complet des mots grecs, SC 89 [Paris: Cerf, 1962]) and, unless otherwise noted, the English 
translation provided by R. J. H. Shutt, trans., “Letter of Aristeas,” in The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha, vol. 2, ed. James 
H. Charlesworth (New York: Doubleday, 1983), 7–34.
8. While this is the majority position, L. Michael White, “Epistolarity, Exhortation, and Apologetics in the Epistle of 
Aristeas,” EC 6 (2015): 179–219 argues that the text’s presentation of itself as a letter needs to be taken more seriously by 
scholars.
9. Although Ludovicus de Vives and Joseph Scaliger had raised doubts even earlier than Hody (Hadas, Aristeas, 5–9, 
84–86); see also Wright, Aristeas, 6–11. 
10. See, e.g., Erich S. Gruen, “The Letter of Aristeas and the Cultural Context of the Septuagint,” in Die Septuaginta—
Texte, Kontexte, Lebenswelten, ed. Martin Karrer and Wolfgang Kraus; assisted by Martin Meiser, WUNT 219 (Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 134–56; Tessa Rajak, Translation and Survival: The Greek Bible and the Ancient Jewish Diaspora 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
11. Discussions of the text’s genre notwithstanding, the work is traditionally identified as the “Letter of Aristeas”; see 
the titles of the two major English commentaries: Hadas, Aristeas and Wright, Aristeas. I will follow Oswyn Murray and 
refer to both the author and character as Aristeas and not Pseudo-Aristeas, “since he was inventing himself, not 
impersonating another” (“Aristeas and Ptolemaic Kingship,” 343 n. 7); pace Honigman, Septuagint and Homeric 
Scholarship, 2; Wright, Aristeas, 20.
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characters” (Let. Aris. 3). The translation is requested by Demetrius of Phalerum, the keeper of King 
Ptolemy II Philadelphus’ library (9–11), and the translation is eventually executed (301–307) by 72 
Jewish sages sent to Alexandria by Eleazar, the high priest in Jerusalem. This basic narrative occupies 
a surprisingly small part of the Letter but is fleshed out with a number of excursuses which are not 
digressions but which contribute to the author’s larger purpose.12 One of these excursuses  (187–300) 
deals with a seven-day symposium during which the king asks each of the Jewish sages a question 
about kingship. This excursus needs to be seen within the broader purposes of the letter.  
Purpose of the Letter of Aristeas
 Because it is the earliest independent witness to the Septuagint,13 the purpose of the Letter of 
Aristeas has often been understood in terms of this translation. Moses Hadas, for example, following 
Paul Kahle’s thesis, argues that the purpose of the Letter is to give authority to a Greek translation 
produced around the time the Letter was written.14 The problem with this approach to the Letter’s 
purpose is that it fails to account for the various excursuses and the fact that the translation is so 
infrequently mentioned in the narrative.
Seeing broader societal concerns reflected in the Letter, an earlier generation of scholarship 
considered the Letter to exemplify Jewish apologetic literature addressed to a Gentile audience.15 
Victor Tcherikover’s mid-twentieth-century study of the Letter of Aristeas points in the opposite 
direction. He argues that this text “was composed not for propaganda among the Greeks, but for the 
needs of the Jewish reader.”16 Tcherikover’s position constitutes the majority opinion with regard to the 
audience of the Letter.17
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12. Sylvia Honigman notes that digressions of this nature are not unusual in Hellenistic prose compositions (Septuagint 
and Homeric Scholarship, 17–25, 37).
13. “Septuagint” (LXX) is used here to refer to the Greek translation of the first five books of the Hebrew Bible and not 
the larger body of the Greek Jewish scriptures (=“Septuagint/Old Greek”).
14. Aristeas, 66–73; cf. Paul Eric Kahle, The Cairo Geniza, 2nd ed. (New York: Praeger, 1959), 209–15. Without 
limiting the Letter’s purpose to matters related to the translation, Benjamin Wright argues that it is not a new translation, but 
the new use of the translation independently of the original Hebrew text that gives rise to the Letter (Aristeas, 11–15).
15. Henry Thackeray, for example, writes: “[The author’s] main object is to commend and magnify the Jewish nation, 
with its laws and institutions, in the eyes of the Greek public for which he writes, by narrating the honour bestowed upon it 
by a Greek monarch and the praise accorded to Jewish wisdom by heathen philosophers” (The Letter of Aristeas: Translated 
with an Appendix of Ancient Evidence on the Origin of the Septuagint, Translation of Early Documents. Series II. 
Hellenistic-Jewish Texts [London: SPCK, 1917], x); cf. Henry Meecham who subtitled his volume on Aristeas, “a study in 
early apologetic” (The Oldest Version of the Bible: ‘Aristeas’ on Its Traditional Origin. A Study in Early Apologetic with 
Translation and Appendices. [London: Holborn, 1932].)
16. “The Ideology of the Letter of Aristeas,” HTR 51.2 (April 1958): 62–63. He makes the same argument with regard 
to this and other Alexandrian Jewish texts, including Wisdom of Solomon and Philo’s writings in Victor Tcherikover, 
“Jewish Apologetic Literature Reconsidered,” Eos 48 (1956): 169–93.  
17. For a summary of this discussion, see Barclay, Jews in the Diaspora, 148–50. Barclay, however, argues that there is 
no need that the question of audience be posed in either/or terms, and that Aristeas addresses Gentiles and Jews; cf. Hadas, 
Aristeas, 60 who writes of “strengthening the self-esteem of the Jews themselves and perhaps heightening their esteem in the 
eyes of the dominant environment” and also Shutt, “Aristeas,” 10: “its underlying motive and purpose are mixed.” Abraham 
Wasserstein and David Wasserstein are among the few modern scholars who still hold to the older thesis when they write 
about “the clearly apologetic and propagandistic purpose of the Jewish author who endeavours to show the pagan reader how 
well regarded the Jews were at the Ptolemaic court” (The Legend of the Septuagint: From Classical Antiquity to Today [New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2006], 25).
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Although scholars differ on points of detail—Benjamin Wright identifies “a dizzying array of 
purposes” proposed for the Letter—there seems to be broad agreement that the Letter of Aristeas was 
written primarily for a Jewish audience as a means of justifying and strengthening a particular Jewish 
identity within the Alexandrian Jewish community. This identity was constructed, partly, through the 
production of a charter myth which had at its centre the Alexandrian translation of the Jewish scriptures 
from Hebrew into Greek.18 This myth necessarily looked even further back to Israel’s own “charter 
myth”—the events of Israel’s escape from Egypt as they are recorded in Exodus.19 While the biblical 
aspect of the myth would have distanced the Jews of Alexandria from their neighbours, the author 
sought to decrease this distance through the use of the elements of Hellenistic intellectual culture. The 
theme of Alexandrian textual scholarship combined with Hellenistic philosophical topoi and language 
placed within a Hellenistic literary composition would have assured the readers of their place at the 
table of Hellenistic culture. In the remainder of the section I will explore the author’s efforts more 
closely by examining the seven-day symposium hosted by Ptolemy II Philadelphus.  
The Symposium
In an extended excursus (187–300), Aristeas describes how, over a period of seven days, Ptolemy 
entertains the Jewish sages who arrive from Jerusalem in order to produce the translation for his library.  
The Sages. From their first appearance on the narrative scene, it becomes obvious that the Letter seeks 
to portray these Jewish scholars as Hellenistic sages. In Eleazar’s response to Ptolemy request for 
“elders of exemplary lives, with experience of the Law and ability to translate it” (39), Eleazar states 
that 72 elders, α»νδρας καλου`ς και` α  γαθου' ς,20 were chosen in the presence of all (46). Each is then 
named in 47–50. The names reflect the elders’ Jewish heritage but provide evidence for the Hellenism 
which both influences the author and to which he aspires.21 In the reader’s next encounter with this 
group they are described as “men of the highest merit and of excellent education” (του`ς α  ρι'στους 
α»νδρας και` piαιδει'α,  διαφε'ροντας), the result of their noble birth (121). These are men whom one would 
expect to be at home in the upper echelons of Hellenistic society in Alexandria.22
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18. So Wright, Aristeas, 62–74; cf. Gruen, “Aristeas and the Septuagint”; Rajak, Translation and Survival, 24–63.
19. For the significance of the exodus in the Letter, see Honigman, Septuagint and Homeric Scholarship; Noah 
Hacham, “The Letter of Aristeas: A New Exodus Story?” JSJ 36 (2005): 1–20; Arkady Kovelman, Between Alexandria and 
Jerusalem: The Dynamic of Jewish and Hellenistic Culture, BRLA 21 (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 101–34; Paul R. McKechnie, 
“Ptolemy Philadelphus: A New Moses,” in Ptolemy II Philadelphus and His World, ed. Paul R. McKechnie and Philippe 
Guillaume, MNS 300 (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 233–46.
20. This is as close as one can get to describing someone in terms of καλοκα  γαθι'α without actually using the word. 
Kovelman, Between Alexandria and Jerusalem, 122 notes a similarity between Let. Aris. 122 and Exod 18.21 LXX (quite 
different from the MT), where those to be appointed as officers (χιλι'αρχοι) are described as “capable, god-fearing men, 
righteous men, who hate arrogance” (α»νδρας δυνατου`ς θεοσεβειñς, α» νδρας δικαι'ους µισουñντας υ piερηφανι'αν). But 
Kovelman’s assumption that the “officers” represent the same group as the 70 elders (piρεσβυ' τεροι) of Exodus 24 is 
unwarranted.
21. Naomi G. Cohen, “Jewish Names as Cultural Indicators in Antiquity,” JSJ 7 (1976): 97–128; “The Names of the 
Translators in the Letter of Aristeas: A Study in the Dynamics of Cultural Transition,” JSJ 15 (1984): 32–64.
22. So Rajak, Translation and Survival, 62: “As we have seen, he represents the Jewish sages as quintessential Greeks, 
on top of their other attributes, and he thus asserts Jewish participation in the great Alexandrian work of revitalizing and 
reconfiguring Athenian culture.”
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As befits gentleman of this class, they are highly educated. They are described as being  
knowledgeable, not only of Jewish literature, but also that of the Greeks (121). They rise above 
“conceit and contempt” and engage “in discourse and listening to and answering each and every one, as 
is meet and right” (122). This trait is clearly essential in their discourse with the king that will follow. 
In good Aristotelian fashion, they take “the middle way as their commendable ideal,” avoiding any 
“uncouth and uncultured attitude of mind” (το` τραχυ` και` βα' ρβαρον τηñς διανοι'ας; 122). When the 
Alexandrian philosophers express admiration for these Jewish scholars (200–201, 296)—who 
“surpassed them in attitude and eloquence” (235)—their identification as Hellenistic sages is 
complete.23 
The presence of these men at a series of banquets hosted by Ptolemy (187–300) ensures that the 
reader is presented with an ideal Hellenistic royal symposium24 at which the king is entertained and 
educated by a group of philosophers.  
The Royal Symposium. The Hellenistic royal symposium is, according to Oswyn Murray, modelled on 
the tyrannical symposia of archaic Greece, the Macedonian royal feasts, and the banquets of the Persian 
king.25 Murray argues for the importance of the performative aspect of the royal symposium wherein 
the king displays certain aspects of his person for public consumption.26 But the symposium is also 
known to us as a literary form, of which the symposia of Plato, Xenophon, and later, Plutarch and 
Athenaues are the best known.27 
In the Letter of Aristeas we are provided with a literary symposium that purports to provide an 
accurate account of a royal symposium (297–300).28 These two elements—the historical and the 
literary—combine to present us with, on the one hand, a performance of the king’s virtues and, on the 
other, philosophical instructions on ideal kingship.29 In the Letter, however, the king’s virtues are seen 
primarily in the type of questions he asks and his response to the answers given.  
“On Kingship” in Aristeas. Both Günther Zuntz and Oswyn Murray argue that the author of the Letter 
of Aristeas drew on the tradition of piερι` βασιλει'ας writings in his narration of the royal symposium.30 
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23. So, e.g., Naomi Janowitz, “The Rhetoric of Translation: Three Early Perspectives on Translating Torah,” HTR 84.2 
(1991): 135: “Aristeas constructs a philosophical portrayal of Judaism not by shaping Moses in the image of a philosopher 
but by making the Jewish text experts into philosophers.”
24. Oswyn Murray, “Hellenistic Royal Symposia,” in Aspects of Hellenistic Kingship, ed. Per Bilde, et al., SHC 7 
(Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1996), 22. From the perspective of the Exodus theme, the connection between 72 elders 
and the Jewish law might recall the events of Exodus 24 at which the elders eat and drink with the Lord (Kovelman, Between 
Alexandria and Jerusalem, 125–29).
25. “Hellenistic Royal Symposia,” 15–20. The development of the symposium is also discussed briefly by Peter 
Garnsey, Food and Society in Classical Antiquity, KTAH (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 128–31.
26. “Hellenistic Royal Symposia,” 23–26.
27. These texts are literary representations, not of the royal symposium, but of the more general symposium (for which, 
see Jason König, Saints and Symposiasts: The Literature of Food and the Symposium in Greco-Roman and Early Christian 
Culture, Greek Culture in the Roman World [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012], 6–17).
28. Aristeas’ idealized version is nonetheless marked by “ignorance and confusion ... about the actual practices of early 
Hellenistic symposia.” (Murray, “Hellenistic Royal Symposia,” 22–23).
29. Wright, Aristeas, 327–31.
30. Zuntz, “Aristeas Studies I”; Murray, “Aristeas and Ptolemaic Kingship”; see also Wright, Aristeas, 331–35.
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In Zuntz’s view, the Letter’s ideas about kingship go back to a single piερι` βασιλει'ας source, which has 
been combined with other sources that reflect Greek popular philosophy. Zuntz feels confident about 
reconstructing Aristeas’ piερι` βασιλει'ας Vorlage from the questions and answers that pertain directly to 
kingship. Murray observes that the discussion around the banquet is also influenced by the author’s 
Jewish thought. He disagrees with Zuntz on the nature of Aristeas’ kingship source. Murray argues that 
multiple sources inform the writing of the author, “who had doubtless read widely in kingship 
literature.”31 Furthermore, Murray’s observation that Aristeas uses his sources quite freely—not only 
here, but throughout the Letter32—makes it impossible to reconstruct them with any degree of certainty.
I have discussed the Letter’s particular view of kingship expressed in the symposium and 
elsewhere in the context of a “charter myth” for the Alexandrian Jewish community.33 In that essay I 
attempt to distinguish between three different “types” of kingship portrayed in the various parts of the 
Letter: Hellenistic, Egyptian, and Jewish. In what remains of this section, I shall focus on the kingship 
elements in the symposium, using Murray’s observation that the narrative contains elements from 
Hellenistic kingship writings, Hellenistic moral philosophy, and Jewish thought.34 While I am in 
general agreement with Wright’s observation that there is not much to be gained from teasing out the 
various sources and the traditions to which they belong,35 these three categories are heuristically useful 
for dealing with an otherwise unwieldy text, even if absolute certainty regarding the tradition-history of 
the Letter remains elusive.  
Hellenistic Kingship
A number of questions situate the symposium within Hellenistic thinking about kingship. The first 
two questions ask how one might maintain one’s kingdom/kingship (βασιλει'α) (Let. Aris. 187; cf. 271) 
and how a king should act (189), while another inquires about “the most needful characteristic of 
kingship” (209), and yet another about “the definition of kingship (211).36 Moreover, at the conclusion 
of the symposium, the king expresses gratitude to the sages for providing him with the doctrines of 
royal rule (294). Through these questions and answers, one is able to catch a glimpse of the kingship 
writings that inform the Letter of Aristeas.
Oswyn Murray37 notes that Aristeas’ kingship doctrine is defined in three primary ways: the king 
must ensure the well-being of his subjects, he must exercise justice, and he must be characterized by 
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31. Murray, “Aristeas and Ptolemaic Kingship,” 352; see also Peter M. Fraser, Ptolemaic Alexandria, 3 volumes 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 1.702, 2.982 n. 169.
32. Murray, “Aristeas and Ptolemaic Kingship,” 343, 353.
33. Jonathan More, “Kingship Ideology: A Neglected Element in Aristeas’ Charter Myth for Alexandrian Judaism,” in 
Septuagint and Reception, ed. Johann Cook, VTSup 127 (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 299–319.
34. The reconstruction/outline offered by Zuntz, “Aristeas Studies I,” 28–29 consists of 8 headings: fundamental virtues 
(188–90), ethical qualities (206–33), largesse (225–27), just administration (239–53), the bond of eunoia (262–73), the 
exercise of power (279–281), the king’s daily life (283–287), and essentials of kingship (288–92). While there are indeed 
smaller clusters of related material, such as the one discussing the king’s life (283–287), the Procrustean outline offered by 
Zuntz has failed to convince subsequent scholars (see, e.g., Wright, Aristeas, 339). 
35. Wright, Aristeas, 359–60, cf. 334–35.
36. See also 265, 267, 271, 283–87, 291. 
37. “Aristeas and Ptolemaic Kingship,” 353–60.
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certain royal traits and virtues. Space constraints make the enumeration and discussion of all the 
elements that contribute to these themes impossible.38 In what follows, I will highlight a handful of 
examples in order to demonstrate the presence of these aspects of ideal kingship.  
Subjects’ well-being. The king must be marked by clemency and love of humanity (ε piιεικει'α,  και` 
φιλανθρωpiι'α, ; 290). According to Murray, φιλανθρωpiι'α is the central royal virtue from which all others 
flow.39 The king will exercise φιλανθρωpiι'α by remembering the pain that humanity faces and not 
inflicting further pain (208). The king’s love of humanity will ensure that he treats his subjects well 
and that they respond with love (265).40 This bond of good will between ruler and subject was 
emphasized in a number of the texts studied in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 and is the defining element of 
the subject-ruler relationship in the Hellenistic kingship ideal.
Other concepts contribute to this idea of the king’s φιλανθρωpiι'α. The king shows concern for his 
subjects be exercising careful foresight (piρο' νοια) and benefitting (ευ  εργετε'ω) them like God does 
(190; cf. 201). “Doing good to all” (ευ  εργετωñν ουòν α«piαντας; 249) is another way of talking about the 
king’s relationship to his subjects, whose well-being should be at the centre of his thinking (245) and 
should even inform his choice of officials (271).41 By benefitting his subjects, the king ensures their 
good will towards him; it is from this pool of subjects that the king should choose his officials and 
advisors (264; 270). 
The king’s care of his subjects might be seen as an end in and of itself. But a slightly more 
utilitarian tone is sounded in 204–205, where the sage answers that the king might remain rich if, 
amongst other things, he ensures the good will (ευ» νοια) of his subjects through benefaction 
(ευ  εργεσι'α). The longevity of the king’s reign is best guaranteed by treating his subjects well (188; 
271) and his security is guaranteed by ευ»νοια since this is the strongest weapon (230). Aristeas joins 
Isocrates and Xenophon in pointing out that the king’s interests are best served when his concern is for 
his subjects’ interests.
The Letter of Aristeas holds the subjects’ well-being and prosperity as central. The most essential 
possession for a king is spoken of in terms of the reciprocal relationship of love and good-will that 
exists between the good king and his subjects (265) and “the greatest thing in kingship” (trans. Wright) 
is described in terms of the subjects’ well-being: to establish them in peace and to guarantee justice 
(291). It is to the latter that we now turn. 
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38. For detailed exegesis of the symposium passages, see Wright, Aristeas, 335–424. Still useful are the notes provided 
by Hadas, Aristeas, 172–215.
39. “Philosophy and Monarchy in the Hellenistic World,” in Jewish Perspectives on Hellenistic Rulers, ed. Tessa Rajak, 
et al., HCS 50 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 24. Given Aristeas’ greater purpose, it is not surprising that 
Ptolemy II is described in this way, even if these words are placed on his own lips (Let. Aris. 36).
40. The genitive in the phrase τωñν υ piοτεταγµε'νων φιλανθρωpiι'α και` α  γα' piησις at 265 has been understood in both a 
subjective and objective sense. I follow Wright, Aristeas, 403–4 and Murray, “Aristeas and Ptolemaic Kingship,” 353–54 in 
seeing both suggested: the king shows φιλανθρωpiι'α  towards his subjects and they respond with love.  
41. Klaus Bringmann, “The King as Benefactor: Some Remarks on Ideal Kingship in the Age of Hellenism,” in Images 
and Ideologies: Self-Definition in the Hellenistic World, ed. Anthony Bulloch, et al., HCS 12 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1993), 7–24 discusses this important topos. 
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Justice. Justice is an important element within Aristeas’ construction of ideal kingship. The concluding 
answer proclaims that justice, along with ensuring peace, is the greatest achievement of kingship (291; 
cf. 209). Justice must govern the king’s general dealings with others (189; 212; 232; 267) because of 
the temptation to use power to his own advantage in such a way as to pervert justice (215).
The king’s more specific judicial function is on view at 191 when he is urged to show equality 
(ι»σος γε'νοιο) in his “dealings and judgments” (cf. 263). In this way, he will be seen to have behaved 
correctly even by those who have not succeeded in their cases or petitions before him. 
Furthermore, the good king’s judgements are tempered by clemency, ε piιει'κεια. Wrongdoers are to 
be punished less severely than they deserve in order that they might turn from evil (188; cf. 207). 
Surprisingly, clemency is urged in the paragraph immediately after the one holding up equality as the 
way to establish justice (191–192). The author of the Letter seems not to feel the tension highlighted by 
the Stoics between urging the king to act with both justice and leniency.42 Perhaps the Aristotelian 
attempts to make ε piιει'κεια part of δικαιοσυ' νη is on view at this point.43 As seen by its pairing at 290 
with love of humanity, ε piιει'κεια should perhaps be seen in its broader sense of kindness and mercy, 
rather than in its more legal sense of clemency or leniency.44 The question of the role of law naturally 
follows on from this discussion.
While the narrative frame of the letter speaks of the divine law (3), which is also the law of the 
Jews (30) and for which the high priest provides an extended apology (128–171),45 the discussion of 
kingship has little to say about law from the perspective of political theory. Aristeas assumes that the 
king should follow the law since the legislators have been appointed by God for the good of 
humankind (240). By following the laws the king will be following the commandment of God and will 
thus be acting justly (279). The Hellenistic discussion of the king’s relationship to the law in the light 
of his irreproachable rule has vanished and we are left simply with a king who is required to follow the 
established law. The king must follow “the laws” (plural) rather than the singular “law,” suggesting to 
Benjamin Wright that the Letter is referring to some law code rather than to an ideal law.46 The 
“commandment” (piρο' σταγµα) of God which the king follows in this way might have in view an 
abstract ideal law or, more likely, refers to a divine prescription that the king should follow the 
established laws. This would serve to curb the king’s power and, together with the argument for 
kindness/ε piιει'κεια, guard against oppressive rule. 
The Letter also appeals to the king to follow the laws for the sake of his posthumous reputation 
(279; cf. 230–31; 278) and to follow justice for the sake of his conscience (215). Furthermore, the 
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42. Wright, Aristeas, 43–44.
43. See Johan C. Thom, “Justice in the Sermon on the Mount: An Aristotelian Reading,” NovT 51 (2009): 322–24.
44. For a full definition of ε piιει'κεια, see Donald Dale Walker, Paul’s Offer of Leniency (2 Cor 10:1): Populist Ideology 
and Rhetoric in a Pauline Letter Fragment, WUNT 2/152 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002), 331–35. I am suggesting that 
Aristeas’ use is closest to Walker’s definition 2(c), “a friendly or democratic bearing towards one’s lessers,” or 2(g),  “the 
easy, kind and generous treatment shown to subjects of inferiors.”
45. See Wright, Aristeas, 246–313. 
46. Aristeas, 416–17.
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king’s officials (280) and generals (281) should also be concerned with justice and the king should 
make appointments accordingly.   
Alongside φιλανθρωpiι'α, justice (το` δι'καιον/δικαιοσυ' νη) is a foundational characteristic of ideal 
kingship in the Letter of Aristeas. The author shows concerns that are similar to other Hellenistic 
writers. Both justice and clemency are necessary traits, but the author is either unaware of or 
unconcerned with the tension created when both traits are encouraged. With regard to the question of 
the king and the law, the author requires the king to submit to the laws. They thus limit the power and 
authority characteristic of Hellenistic kingship.   
Virtues. In the penultimate question (288–90) the king asks whether a commoner or someone of royal 
descent is the best king. Perhaps the king was setting up his interlocutor with something of a dilemma: 
Ptolemy II belonged in the latter category, but his illustrious father, who started the Ptolemaic dynasty, 
might be considered to fall into the first category.47 The Jewish sage avoids the false dichotomy with an 
answer that accords with the one seen in earlier chapters: the one who is by nature superior (το`ν 
α»ριστον τηñ,  φυ' σει) should reign (288).48 Such a person is described in terms of a noble character and 
education (ηò θος χρηστο`ν και` piαιδει'ας; 290), the type of person the banquet discourse has been 
describing all along.
We have already noted the foundational nature of the virtues of justice and love of humanity, but 
other traditional royal traits are added to these. When the king asks about the goal of courage (α  νδρει'α), 
the answer—accomplishing that which one intended—is given in Stoic terms.49 The martial view of 
courage is on view at 281, albeit in a slightly modified form that focuses on appointing leaders who 
will protect the lives of soldiers. Moderation (σωφροσυ' νη) is seen as making the greatest contribution 
to the king’s health (237).50 Most people need to exercise moderation (µετριο' της) in terms of eating 
and drinking, but kings need to be wary of the desire to expand their territory (221–223).51 Moderation 
here is spoken of in the context of self-control (see below). The king’s entertainment should also be 
marked by decorum and restraint (284), and it is this restraint which is a mark of his love of wisdom 
(285). Furthermore, wisdom (σοφι'α) teaches the king to be merciful (207) and brings about a clear 
conscience (260). There is a marked absence of talk of the science of ruling or royal wisdom. This 
might be because the author intends the entire banquet discourse to be understood in these terms. In the 
only explicit question dealing with φρο' νησις, the king asks whether to act with this sort of royal 
wisdom (το` φρονειñν) is something that can be taught (236). The sage informs him that it is a 
disposition of the soul which comes from God.
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47. Ptolemy I came from a noble Macedonian family with some connection to the royal family through his mother, but 
cannot be thought of as royal (Günther Hölbl, A History of Ptolemaic Egypt, trans. Tina Saavedra [London: Routledge, 
2001], 14); see pp. 21–22 of Hölbl’s work for Ptolemy’s assumption of the title βασιλευ' ς.
48. Hadas’s attribution of this view to a Cynic-Stoic conception of kingship (Aristeas, 212) is too narrow; this is the 
foundational assumption of all Hellenistic kingship (Wright, Aristeas, 421).
49. Hadas, Aristeas, 178; Wright, Aristeas, 347.
50. Wright, Aristeas, 381 notes the same connection between health and moderation made by Plato (Charm. 157a).
51. Gruen cites this as an example of Aristeas’ subversive humour (“Aristeas and the Septuagint,” 147).
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A number of answers teach that virtue comes from God (216; 236–239; 243), but the author also 
draws on another theme that we have regularly encountered in other texts: it is through the imitation of 
God that the king will be blameless (210) and benefit his subjects (190; 281). The Letter identifies the 
Jewish god with Ζευ' ς and ∆ι'ς (16), the supreme Greek god, and also speaks of his uniqueness (µο' νος ο  
θεο' ς) and dominion (δυναστει'α) (132). The fact that the human king should imitate this god suggests 
that kingship is an appropriate metaphor to apply to this god. Yet nowhere is the Jewish god explicitly 
called king, although there are two passages that speak of God’s rule over the cosmos (θεο`ς το`ν piα' ντα 
κο' σµον διοικειñ; 254; cf. 195). Given the prominence of the metaphor in other writings being examined 
in this chapter, it is surprising that the Letter only refers to God’s kingship in very muted tones. To this 
observation should be added the fact that the king is not presented as God’s representative or image—
the mystical type of kingship on view in the Pythagorean writings is absent.52 Perhaps the fact that the 
only kings on view in the Letter are non-Jewish has caused the author to temper his view of kingship at 
this point.
Also missing is any indication of how the king might improve his subjects. In the Pythagorean 
treatises, for example, we saw that subjects were to imitate the king as the king imitated the divine. In 
this way humanity reflected something of the divine virtues. At 218, the king is urged to act in a 
manner worthy of the office since his subjects will be watching him, but this is said for the sake of his 
reputation, not their improvement. There is a question about bringing the “heterogeneous multitudes” 
(piαµµιγωñ ν ο»χλων) of the kingdom into harmony (267) that potentially allows the sage to apply 
Pythagorean political theory along the lines seen in the kingship treatises. However, the response 
simply points the king once again to the importance of justice. The framework of the Letter points to 
the fact that the divine law is now available in language that Jew and Greek alike can understand. 
While the author stops short of exhorting non-Jews to follow this law, the law’s excellence in teaching 
justice/righteouness (noted especially in the apology, 128–172) suggests its suitability for guiding the 
life of citizens in place of the example of the king.53 
The Letter is also conscious of the need to warn the king against certain traits and we note the 
presence of a number of vices: arrogance (262–263), envy (224), and anger (253-254) are all 
mentioned as potentially destructive of kingship. The king is warned about idleness and pleasure (245), 
and is told later in the discourse that he should spend time reading literature beneficial to his rule (283) 
and speaking at banquets with learned men (οι φιλοµαθειñς) (286–287) since these activities would 
benefit his subjects. When he does indulge in entertainment, he should do so with decency and 
moderation (284–285).
As in so many of the kingship texts already examined, the Letter of Aristeas defines kingship in 
terms of the rule of a superior person. The king’s superiority is described in terms of a characteristic 
matrix of royal virtues. Whether these were originally meant to flatter or exhort the royal reader, they 
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52. Zuntz, “Aristeas Studies I,” 30. 
53. Philo’s writing (see below) shows an attempt to do both through linking the king’s example to the law by means of 
the idea of “embodied law” or νο' µος ε»µψυχος.
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have found their way into the topos of ideal kingship from which the author of the Letter has drawn. 
The Letter therefore serves as a prime example of the what the Hellenistic piερι` βασιλει'ας treatises 
might have contained.54
However, the reader who perseveres through the king’s questions and the sages’ answers is struck 
by the extent to which kingship is absent in a large proportion of the discourse.55 The advice is 
applicable to a broader audience and bears more than a passing resemblance to the moral advice found 
in Hellenistic philosophical writings. 
Hellenistic Moral Philosophy
The king asks a question (195) that would not have been out of place in any of the classical or 
Hellenistic philosophical schools: Τι' κα' λλιστον αυ  τωñ,  piρο`ς το` ζηñν αν ει»η; The author’s Jewish roots do 
not allow him to speculate further along philosophical lines and the sage’s answer is given in terms of 
the sovereignty of God.56 On other topics, however, the author allows the sages to display their mastery 
of Hellenistic philosophy.
We have already noted the sages’ discussion of the virtues that play such an important role in 
Hellenistic philosophy. To these we might add the question about getting a good night’s sleep which 
leads to a discussion of dreams and generates one of the longer answers in the discourse (213–216).57 
The discussion at 197 of how one might navigate life with “equanimity” (µετρι'ως) might seem to 
derive from Peripatetic concerns, but the sage’s answer is given in terms of adopting a certain 
“preconception” or “mental scheme” (piρο' ληψις). The use of this term suggests that Stoic α  piα' θεια 
rather than Aristotelian equanimity is in view at this point.58 The author’s use of the technical 
vocabulary for moral progress (α»piταιστος, διευθυ' νω) at 188 demonstrates an easy familiarity with at 
least parts of this tradition.59 More examples can be pointed out,60 but these should suffice to 
demonstrate that, in addition to drawing from Hellenistic writings about kingship, the author has used 
one or more sources that provide him with vocabulary and concepts from Hellenistic moral philosophy.
There also seems to be an attempt to give the banquet digression a philosophical form. Michael 
White notes that the sages’ answers bear a certain resemblance to gnomic sayings, indicating “a 
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54. Murray, “Aristeas and Ptolemaic Kingship”; Wright, Aristeas, 424–25.
55. Zuntz is of the opinion that about half of the questions and answers do not address kingship (“Aristeas Studies 
I,” 30). According to Murray (“Aristeas and Ptolemaic Kingship,” 349), only 18 questions reflect Hellenistic popular 
philosophy. I suspect Zuntz counts every question that contains any element of Hellenistic philosophy while Murray is only 
counting questions which bear no connection to thought on kingship. Neither scholar provides a list of the passages to which 
he is referring.
56. Eleazar considers the main objective of life to be concerned with (contemplating?) the sovereignty of God (141; cf. 
132).
57. The author of the Letter already signalled an interest in dreams at 160. The Peripatetics, in particular, seem to have 
been concerned with questions of sleep and dreams. Aristotle’s On Sleep and On Dreams no doubt inspired others like 
Theophrastus (D.L. 5.45) and Strato (D.L. 5.59). Diogenes Laertius mentions that Chrysippus wrote about  sleep in his work 
On the Soul (7.50) and notes part of the Stoic discussion (D.L. 7.158). 
58. Wright, Aristeas, 346–47.
59. White, “Epistolarity,” 207–9.
60. Murray (“Aristeas and Ptolemaic Kingship,” 349) cites the discussion of envy (224), sorrow (232), of philosophy, 
impulses, and the passions (256), and living as a stranger (257) as further examples; see also Wright, Aristeas, 425.
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conscious effort to ‘translate’ elements of the Jewish moral tradition into recognizable and normative 
Greek equivalents.”61
Two passages are of special interest for our discussion of kingship. In the first, the king asks for a 
definition of kingship (Τι'ς ο«ρος τουñ βασιλευ' ειν ε στι'ν; 211), while in the second, the king asks about 
the greatest form of rule (Τι'ς ε στιν α  ρχη` κρατι'στη; 221). However, instead of an answer given in terms 
of political theory or ideal kingship, both questions receive answers that focus on self-rule. Yet another 
passage teaches that those who cultivate the virtues (like the king?) will find themselves respecting 
self-control and righteousness instead of the rule of pleasure (278).We have already noted that the 
Socratic theme of self-control/self-mastery (ε  γκρα' τεια) was central in classical thought and that this 
idea was extended in the Hellenistic period as part of a general pattern in which political concepts were 
used to engage in moral analysis, especially of the self.62 The author of the Letter has drawn from the 
same pool of thought.63  
Jewish Kingship
We turn finally to ask how the author’s reading of the Jewish scriptures have influenced his 
conception of kingship.64 There are only a handful of instances where the Letter quotes the Septuagint, 
but he feels no need to rewrite the Jewish scriptures as part of his narrative. Rather, at certain points he 
has drawn on Jewish thought, broadly conceived, as part of his discussion of kingship.
The most obvious element is the direct reference to God as part of every answer—either as a 
model to follow or to petition for God’s help.65 At 200–201 and 235 the king and the philosophers 
acknowledge this as the reason for the sages’ excellence.66 It is not so much the appeal to the divine or 
the recommendation of piety (210) that is exceptional, but the emphasis that the author places on the 
role of God in the life of the king. If, according to the Jewish high priest, everything in life is concerned 
with the sovereign power (δυναστει'α) of God (141), then this should certainly be true of royal rule.
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61. White, “Epistolarity,” 209–11, here 211. In a short article published in 1966, J. J. Lewis demonstrated a number of 
similarities between the Letter of Aristeas and the Sentences of Pseudo-Phocylides (“The Table-Talk Section in the Letter of 
Aristeas,” NTS 13.1 [1966]: 53–56). It is unlikely that the Letter drew on Ps-Phocylides’ γνωñµαι, given that the latter was 
written in the period 100 BCE – 100 CE (Walter T. Wilson, The Sentences of Pseudo-Phocylides, CEJL [Berlin: De Gruyter, 
2005], 7). The general nature of the parallels also make it difficult to prove literary dependence (Wright, Aristeas, 59–60). 
The similarities between the texts are probably to be ascribed to a shared intellectual and cultural milieu. If Pseudo-
Phocylides did indeed write in Alexandria (Wilson, Sentences of Ps-Phocylides, 10, 12–13), the thesis of a shared intellectual 
heritage is strengthened.
62. A. A. Long, “Hellenistic Ethics and Philosophical Power,” in From Epicurus to Epictetus: Studies in Hellenistic and 
Roman Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), 9; see also the discussions of Cynic and Stoic kingship in Chapter 3.
63. Passages outside of the symposium also display some knowledge of philosophy. Katell Berthelot, “L’interprétation 
symbolique des lois alimentaires dans la ‘Lettre d’Aristée’: une influence pythagoricienne,” JJS 52.2 (2001): 253–68 argues 
that Eleazar’s apology for the law employs a Pythagorean method of interpretation to defend the Jewish laws. Sylvia 
Honigman argues that when Eleazar decries incest in the same passage (152), he has in mind a (misguided) critique of Cynics 
and/or Stoics, not Egyptians or Ptolemies (Septuagint and Homeric Scholarship, 22). I remain unconvinced by Honigman’s 
argument at this point (see More, “Kingship Ideology,” 316–17).
64. See More, “Kingship Ideology,” 312–15.
65. Zuntz, “Aristeas Studies I,” 22.
66. The comment that the Jewish sages surpassed the Greek philosophers might suggest that the author is attempting to 
argue for Jewish superiority. Given the context of a symposium, however, these comments should be read in the light of the 
friendly debate between Jews and Greeks that one might expect at such a gathering (Wright, Aristeas, 376–77).
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Most scholars agree that 193 represents a Jewish understanding of war: when asked about how a 
king might remain undefeated, the sage answers in terms of confidence in God instead of military 
might. Similarly, 194 asserts that military forces are useless apart from the fear of God. Hellenistic 
thought did allow for divine intervention in battle,67 but here the Letter seems to deny traditional 
military exploits in favour of a policy reminiscent of Psalm 19.7–10 LXX and 1 Maccabees 3.19 in 
which victory is determined solely by God.68 The advice to be moderate in one’s desire for territorial 
conquest (Let. Aris. 223), furthermore, would also have seemed odd to those accustomed to defining 
their kingship in terms of military victory and “spear-won land.”69
A number of important aspects of Jewish kingship are, however, missing in Aristeas’ banquet 
discussion. The idea that the king was specially chosen by God was a central tenet of the Jewish 
kingship texts examined in Chapter 4. While an implication of God’s sovereignty is the assertion that 
the king rules at God’s pleasure (199; 219; 224), there is no text that speaks of his special appointment 
by God to this role.70 Perhaps the fact that the Letter deals primarily with Graeco-Egyptian kingship 
prevents the author from pursuing this idea any further than this. Also missing is the sense of a future 
ideal king, as seen in some of the Isaiah passages. If Aristeas’ focus is on the Pentateuch, however, this 
is not surprising. What is surprising is the absence of exhortations regarding the law. While the king is 
certainly told to follow the law given by the legislators (240), the plural suggests that traditional Greek 
lawmakers are in view and not Moses.71 The appeal forms part of the Greek discourse on the king’s 
relationship to law, rather than the Jewish discourse on the king’s faithfulness to the Mosaic 
ordinances. The Mosaic law is unlikely to be in view at 279 (see the discussion above, p. 218 ). It is 
true that in the narrative, Ptolemy demonstrates deep reverence for the books containing the Jewish law 
(177; 312; 317), but this confirms that they are worthy to be included in his library (10); there is no 
indication that Aristeas expected the Egyptian king to be found “diligently observing all the words of 
this law and these statutes” (Deut 17.19).
 There is no appeal to the Jewish scriptures for a model of kingship and the kingship discourse at 
the banquet contains only a handful of Jewish elements that might be considered peculiar within a 
Hellenistic milieu. In the realm of political thought, then, there is very little in the Letter of Aristeas 
that is particularly Jewish.
Aristeas: Concluding Comments
Erich Gruen writes that the Letter of Aristeas “testifies most eloquently to the appropriation of 
Hellenistic culture to express the preeminence of Jewish values” while showing “self-assurance and a 
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67. Hadas, Aristeas, 76.
68. Zuntz, “Aristeas Studies I,” 23; Murray, “Aristeas and Ptolemaic Kingship,” 354; Wright, Aristeas, 344.
69. See, e.g., Frank W. Walbank, “Monarchies and Monarchic Ideas,” in The Hellenistic World, 2nd ed., ed. Frank W. 
Walbank, et al., CAH 7.1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 66; Angelos Chaniotis, War in the Hellenistic 
World: A Social and Cultural History, Ancient World at War (Malden: Blackwell, 2005), 57–77.
70. Contra Wright, Aristeas, 371, 426.
71. Compare this statement to 312 where the king marvels at the genius of the lawgiver (singular)—a clear reference to 
Moses, whose name is mentioned only once in the Letter (see 144).
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sense of comfort and belonging in the realm of Ptolemaic intellectual society.”72 This self-assurance is 
clearly on view in the Letter of Aristeas in the discussion between the Ptolemaic king and the Jewish 
translator-sages. However, in contrast to Gruen, I would argue that it is not their sly irony or subversive 
speech that indicates the author’s self-assurance, but the sages’ ability to engage in political discourse 
with a Hellenistic king in his own terms.73 
In an excursus modelled on symposium literature in which the author has also borrowed from the 
gnomic tradition, the monarch and the sages discuss kingship in terms familiar from other Hellenistic 
writings, suggesting that one or more piερι` βασιλει'ας treatises provided content for the author of the 
Letter. The sages also draw effortlessly from Hellenistic moral philosophy and couch their answers in 
Jewish piety. While Jewish particularism is on view at other points in the Letter, here the sages show 
themselves to be masters of a “universal” philosophy which is perfected through their appeal to the 
divine.
The ideal reign constructed in the banquet discourse displays all the markers of virtue kingship. 
The king’s virtues are directed towards his subjects and God. Their well-being is to be his primary 
concern. And he can best work towards their well-being by recognizing that every element of his 
kingship is directed by and dependent upon God. 
While it is certainly the case that this lengthy section serves to enhance the prestige of the Jewish 
sages74 and thus the status of the translation which they produce,75 unlike other contemporaneous 
Jewish writers, the author’s appeal to Jewish superiority is “restrained” and understated.76 The goal of 
this part of the narrative is not to argue for the superiority of the Jewish sages (although they are clearly 
superior), but to show that their philosophical advice is suitable for a Hellenistic king. As valued 
advisors in the royal court, the translators are welcomed on their own terms. In this way the author 
shows that Jews belong in Alexandrian society alongside Greeks.    
Philosophy and the King in the Wisdom of Solomon
The Wisdom of Solomon consists of three main parts, 1.1–6.21, 6.22–9.18, 10.1–19.22, which, 
following John Collins, we might identify as the “book of eschatology,” the “book of wisdom” and the 
“book of history.”77 The “book of eschatology” addresses the “rulers of the earth,” urging them to 
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72. “Aristeas and the Septuagint,” 143.
73. This slippage between the author and the characters of the text assumes the conclusion of Janovitz: that the author 
presents himself and his philosophical/theological positions in the persons of the sages and the high priest (“Rhetoric of 
Translation,” 134–38).
74. Pelletier, Lettre d’Aristée, 47–48.
75. Wright, Aristeas, 427.
76. Wright, Aristeas, 426, cf. 68.
77. John Joseph Collins, Between Athens and Jerusalem: Jewish Identity in the Hellenistic Diaspora, 2nd ed. (Grand 
Rapids; Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2000), 196; see also David Winston, The Wisdom of Solomon: A New Translation with 
Introduction and Commentary, AB 43 (New York: Doubleday, 1979), 9–12. With minor modifications, this is roughly the 
same structure proposed by James Miller Reese, “Plan and Structure in the Book of Wisdom,” CBQ 27 (1965): 391–99, who 
suggests the following: 1.1–6.11 + 6.17–21; 6.12–16 + 6.22–10.21; 11.1–19.22. Robert Pfeiffer summarizes fourteen 
different positions regarding Wisdom’s structure (History of New Testament Times with an Introduction to the Apocrypha 
[London: Black, 1949], 321–26), but the major differences between scholars concern the transitional sections in chapters 6 
and 10.
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“love righteousness” (1.1). The author proceeds to contrast the ungodly/unrighteous with the 
godly/righteous and the section reaches its climax with a picture of the eschatological vindication of the 
righteous (5.1-23). The conclusion of the section is once again addressed to “kings” and “judges of the 
earth,” (6.1) urging them to “honour wisdom, so that [they] may reign forever” (6.21).78 This address to 
kings suggests that the book be included in our discussion. This suggestion is further strengthened by 
the fact that in the second part of the Wisdom of Solomon, 6.22–9.18, the author reveals himself 
indirectly as “Solomon,” King David’s great successor. Finally, the “book of history” is a “vivid ode to 
divine Wisdom, explaining her saving work in history”79 by means of seven antitheses or comparisons 
in which God’s salvation of the Israelites is compared to his judgment of the Egyptians. This section 
also contains extended digressions on God’s mercy (11.16–12.27) and on idolatry (13.1–15.19). 
Kingship ideas recede in this section, but are still present in the author’s vision of the divine monarchy.
There is no clear evidence indicating the book’s date of composition. The text’s literary 
dependence on the LXX suggests 100 BCE as the terminus post quem. This might be lowered to 30 
BCE on linguistic grounds,80 although the lack of comparative literary evidence from this period gives 
reason for caution.81 Allusions to the book in the New Testament82 suggest the middle of the first 
century CE for the terminus ante quem. The social location of the persecuted  “righteous” best fits the 
period of Jewish persecution under Caligula’s reign (37–41 CE)83 but it could just as easily have been 
written in the late Ptolemaic or early imperial periods.84 The text can thus safely be dated to somewhere 
between the beginning of the first century BCE and the middle of the first century CE. The theological 
and philosophical traditions reflected in the Wisdom of Solomon would therefore have been available 
for Paul’s use.85
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78. The personification of wisdom in 6.12–16 suggests that it belongs with the following section. Put differently, 6.17–
21 can be seen as an appendix inserted by the author to smooth the transition between the two sections (Reese, “Plan and 
Structure,” 392).
79. Reese, “Plan and Structure,” 392.
80. Winston, Wisdom of Solomon, 22–23, followed by Michael Kolarcik S.J., “The Book of Wisdom: Introduction, 
Commentary, and Reflections,” in The New Interpreter’s Bible: A Commentary in Twelve Volumes: Volume 5, ed. Leander E. 
Keck, et al. (Nashville: Abingdon, 1997), 439. Maurice Gilbert perceives an allusion to the pax romana in 14.22 which 
would also make 30 B.C.E. the terminus post quem (“Wisdom Literature,” in Jewish Writings of the Second Temple Period: 
Apocrypha, Pseudepigrapha, Qumran Sectarian Writings, Philo, Josephus, ed. Michael E. Stone, CRINT 2.2 [Assen: Van 
Gorcum, 1984], 312).
81. Emil Schürer, The History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ (175 BC–AD 135), 3 volumes, ed. Geza 
Vermes, Fergus Millar, and Martin Goodman (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1986), 3.572–73.
82. David A. deSilva, Introducing the Apocrypha: Message, Context, and Significance (Grand Rapids: Baker, 
2002), 132, who notes Gilbert’s caution that the similarities between Wisdom and the New Testament do not necessarily 
indicate dependence (“Wisdom Literature,” 312–13). 
83. Winston, Wisdom of Solomon, 23–24. John Joseph Collins, Between Athens and Jerusalem: Jewish Identity in the 
Hellenistic Diaspora, 2 ed. (Grand Rapids; Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2000), 195 finds Winston’s dating the most convincing.
84. Barclay, Jews in the Diaspora, 451–52.
85. A number of studies have engaged in a comparison between Wisdom of Solomon and Paul; see, recently, Joseph R. 
Dodson, The ‘Powers’ of Personification: Rhetorical Purpose in the Book of Wisdom and the Letter to the Romans, BZNW 
161 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2008); Jonathan A. Linebaugh, God, Grace, and Righteousness in Wisdom of Solomon and Paul’s 
Letter to the Romans: Texts in Conversation, NovTSup 152 (Leiden: Brill, 2013).
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The author of Wisdom, Pseudo-Solomon, was a pious Jew who shows a knowledge of the Jewish 
biblical tradition as well as the Hellenistic literary tradition.86 His Greek is excellent87 and he is familiar 
with Hellenistic philosophy, suggesting that he was the recipient of a Greek education. Despite the 
author’s adoption of “the imagery, vocabulary and theories of contemporary Stoicism,” Maurice Gilbert 
argues that “he shows no mastery of these philosophies. His knowledge, indirect, seems to derive only 
from his general education.”88
The Egyptian provenance of the work is accepted by the majority of commentators. The 
recollection of God’s judgment against the Egyptians and the author’s antagonism towards them as 
evinced in the third part of the book leaves little doubt as to the identity of the “ungodly,” although it is 
possible that apostate/assimilated Jews are also in view in the opening chapters of the work.89 The 
author was clearly writing from within an Egyptian context and was most likely a member of the 
Jewish community in Alexandria.90  
God as King
As was the case in a number of the biblical texts studied in Chapter 4, for Pseudo-Solomon, God 
is king.91 God is never called βασιλευ' ς, but God will reign (βασιλευ' σει) over the righteous who, in 
turn, judge nations and rule over peoples (Wis 3.8). God manages (διε'piω)92 all things rightly (12.15a) 
and has “sovereignty (δεσpiο' ζω) over all” (12.16b). God is sovereign (δεσpiο' ζω), yet judges with mercy 
(ε piιει'κεια) and governs (διοικε'ω) with forbearance (φειδω' ) (12.18). God is kind and true and long-
suffering, ordering all things with mercy (15.1). God’s providence is mentioned throughout (14.3; 17.2; 
6.7). God acts as a “pilot” in the universe (14.3). God is also portrayed as benefactor of the righteous 
(ευ  εργετε'ω Wis 3.5; 11.5, 13; 16.2; ευ  εργεσι'α occurs in 16.11, 24).93 Like a good king, God punishes 
the wicked and rewards the righteous as part of God’s governing the cosmos.94
Given the close relationship between personified Wisdom and God (7.26), “she” is similarly  
described in royal terms: Wisdom is ευ  εργετικο' ς (7.22), φιλα' νθροpiος (1.6), concerned with justice 
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86. David Gill (“The Greek Sources of Wisdom XII 3–7,” VT 15 [1965]: 383–86) has argued that some of Pseudo-
Solomon’s vocabulary draws on Greek tragedy. 
87. Winston, Wisdom of Solomon, 14–18.
88. “Wisdom Literature,” 312.
89. Winston, Wisdom of Solomon, 14.
90. Winston, Wisdom of Solomon, 25. In “On Kingship in Philo and the Wisdom of Solomon,” in Text-Critical and 
Hermeneutical Studies in the Septuagint, ed. Johann Cook and Hermann-Josef Stipp, VTSup 154 (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 423–
40, I have explored some of the similarities and differences between ideas of kingship in three Alexandrian texts: Wisdom of 
Solomon, Philo’s Life of Moses, and the Pythagorean kingship treatises.  
91. See More, “On Kingship,” 412–14.
92. Ecphantus uses the same verb to refer to God (80.23; 81.1; 81.16); see Reese, Hellenistic Influences, 10.
93. See Reese, Hellenistic Influences, 78 n. 204. This language is found only infrequently in the LXX: Ps 12.6; 56.2; 
114.7; 2 Macc 10.38 (ευ  εργετε'ω); Ps 77.11 (ευ  εργεσι'α) and in these cases speaks of God.
94. This conviction forms the heart of the narrative in chapters 1-5. Luca Mazzinghi (“The Antithetical Pair ‘to Punish’ 
and ‘to Benefit’ [κολα' ζω] and ευ  εργετε'ω] in the Book of Wisdom,” in Wisdom for Life: Essays Offered to Honor Prof. 
Maurice Gilbert, SJ on the Occasion of His Eightieth Birthday; Nuria Calduch-Benages, BZAW 445 [Berlin: De Gruyter, 
2014]) studies the pair “to punish” (κολα' ζω) and “to benefit” (ευ  εργετε' ω) as part of Wisdom’s theology and kingship 
ideology. 
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(1.1–15), and orders all things well (διοικειñ τα` piα' ντα χρηστωñ ς; 8.1). Wisdom stands behind those who 
rule this world, allowing and enabling them to rule (6.20–21; 8.10–11).95
In his portrayal of God, Pseudo-Solomon draws on the same pool of vocabulary and imagery as 
the Pythagorean kingship treatises.96 However, some of the characteristics and attributes used in 
constructing human kingship in the Pythagorean texts are here used to speak of the divine king. Is there 
polemical intent on the part of Pseudo-Solomon, as Luca Mazzinghi suggests?97 While others speak of 
kings as benefactors and governors, the author of Wisdom suggests that these characteristics belong 
properly to God. In light of the critique of ruler cult (see below), it seems likely that Pseudo-Solomon 
seeks to draw this absolute distinction between God’s kingship and the types of exalted kingship 
expressed in the Pythagorean texts and elsewhere.
The Ideal King 
The most obvious human king in the Wisdom of Solomon is the character of Solomon. Although 
Solomon is not mentioned by name, the traditional title of the book recognizes the allusions to David’s 
son, especially in the prayer of chapter 9 (see 1 Kgs 3.6–15; 8.23–61) and the emphasis on wisdom 
(see, e.g., 1 Kgs 3.28; 4.29–34). This emphasis on wisdom led to the person of Solomon being 
associated with a number of writings in the Jewish wisdom tradition (Prov 1.1; 10.1; 25.1; Song 1.1; cf. 
Sir 47.12–22). Even though the words of this book have been placed on the lips of Solomon, the 
Davidic dynasty is alluded to only once (Wis 9.12) and it is not the covenant with David and his house 
that is of significance, but those covenants made with the people of Israel (Wis 12.21; 18.22). As will 
be seen in what follows, this shift from individual Davidic monarchy to a more “democratic” sense of 
kingship is a key element in the book.98 But individual monarchy is not absent, and so we turn first to 
the ideal king of the Wisdom of Solomon. 
In the Pythagorean treatises, divine kingship provides a model for human kingship to imitate.99 In 
the Wisdom of Solomon, both God and Wisdom are described in language that is also used of the king, 
leaving the reader in no doubt as to the similarity between the earthly and heavenly rulers, but there is 
no indication that the earthly king’s sovereignty comes through imitation of the divine king. Instead, 
sovereign rule comes through relationship with Wisdom (Wis 6.21; 8.10-18),100 which, in turn, is a gift 
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95. For a recent treatment of Wisdom in Proverbs 1–9, Sirach, and Wisdom of Solomon, see Gerlinde Baumann, 
“Personified Wisdom: Contexts, Meaning, Theology,” in The Writings and Later Wisdom Books, ed. Christl M. Maier and 
Nuria Calduch-Benages (Atlanta: SBL, 2014), 57–75. Wisdom of Solomon is dealt with on pp. 70–4.
96. Reese, Hellenistic Influences, 6–7, 10–11, 71–79; More, “On Kingship,” 412–14; Mazzinghi, “To Punish and to 
Benefit,” 241–43.
97. Mazzinghi, “To Punish and to Benefit,” 247.
98. A similar process of “democratization” was seen in Deuteronomy and Isaiah. 
99. More, “On Kingship,” 414–15.
100. David Winston sees a similarity between Timaeus 90A and the kinship with Wisdom expressed at Wis 8.17 
(Wisdom of Solomon, 197–98; “Wisdom in the Wisdom of Solomon,” in In Search of Wisdom: Essays in Memory of John G. 
Gammie, ed. Leo G. Perdue, Bernard Brandon Scott, and William Johnston Wiseman [Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 
1993], 154–55). But the emphasis in this passage is on relationship and not being. This becomes clear in the second half of 
the verse when the idea is developed in terms of friendship with Wisdom.
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from God (Wis 7.7; 8.21; 9.10, 17). The absence of imitation language is striking,101 especially when 
the allusion to Genesis 1 in Wisdom 9.1-3 would have allowed the author to discuss this topos in terms 
of humanity’s creation in the image of God.102
The nature of the king provides another contrast between the Wisdom of Solomon and the 
Pythagorean texts. In the latter, the king takes on semi-divine qualities (see ch. 3). In Wisdom 7.1–6, 
Pseudo-Solomon speaks of his common humanity: he is “a descendant of the first-formed individual 
born on earth” (v. 1), and his mortality: “for no king has had a different beginning of existence, but 
there is for all one entrance into life and the same way out” (vv. 5–6). Behind this assertion lies a 
critique of the ruler cult, the etiology of which is describe in Wisdom 14.15–21.103 The divinity of the 
ruler is not attacked directly, but implicit in this broader critique of idolatry is the denial of any divinity 
to that which is not God (Wis 14.20b).
While Pseudo-Solomon’s king is not divine, he is related to the divine through the figure of 
Wisdom.104 Divine Wisdom, portrayed as a desirable, beautiful bride (Wis 8.2), dwells in/with the king 
as a gift from God, bringing with her great honour (8.10-12), political success and military victory 
(8.14-15; 9.10-12). In addition to making the king suitable for war,105 Wisdom imparts the cardinal 
virtues: σωφροσυ' νη, φρο' νησις, δικαιοσυ' νη, and α  νδρει'α (8.7).106
At the heart of the prayer in the Wisdom of Solomon is the request for Wisdom: “Send her 
[Wisdom] out from the holy heavens, and from your glorious throne send her, that, being present with 
me, she may labour with me, and that I may learn what is well-pleasing before you” (9.10). The 
extended prayer in chapter 9 is essential, since Wisdom is only obtained through prayer (8.17–21). 
Personified Wisdom is linked with the spirit of God at a number of points in the Wisdom of 
Solomon. The royal author reflects on his prayer and observes that God answered with a gift of 
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101. Moyna McGlynn (“Solomon, Wisdom and the Philosopher-Kings,” in Studies in the Book of Wisdom, ed. Géza G. 
Xeravits and József Zsengellér, JSJSup 142 [Leiden: Brill, 2010], 72–77) describes a number of conceptual parallels between 
Plato’s Republic and Wisdom, arguing that the former “was a formative book” for the latter (72). This relationship makes the 
absence of the imitation topos all the more conspicuous.
102. Wis 2.23 states that God created humanity for immortality “and made them the image of his own nature.” It does 
not seem that this is considered a particularly royal trait in the Wisdom of Solomon and this idea cannot be considered to 
contribute to the kingly imitation-of-God topos. 
103. Winston, Wisdom of Solomon, 270–71.
104. The biblical narrative associates Solomon closely with wisdom: “God gave Solomon very great wisdom ... 
Solomon’s wisdom surpassed the wisdom of all the people of the east, and all the wisdom of Egypt. He was wiser than 
anyone else” (1 Kgs 4.29–31); see, e.g., Walter A. Brueggemann, “The Social Significance of Solomon as a Patron of 
Wisdom,” in The Sage in Israel and the Ancient Near East, ed. John G. Gammie and Leo G. Perdue (Winona Lake: 
Eisenbrauns, 1990), 117–32. For other ways in which the Solomon tradition developed, see Pablo A. Torijano, Solomon the 
Esoteric King: From King to Magus, Development of a Tradition, JSJSup 73 (Leiden: Brill, 2002) and the essays collected in 
Joseph Verheyden, ed., The Figure of Solomon in Jewish, Christian, and Islamic Tradition: King, Sage, and Architect, TBN 
16 (Leiden: Brill, 2013).
105. God is portrayed as the Isaianic divine warrior (Isa 59.17–19) at Wis 5.15–23, but in the latter chapters (11–19) it 
is the cosmos itself that plays a decisive role in bringing judgment upon God’s enemies (Michael Kolarcik S.J., “Sapiential 
Values and Apocalyptic Imagery in the Wisdom of Solomon,” in Studies in the Book of Wisdom, ed. Géza G. Xeravits and 
József Zsengellér, JSJSup 142 [Leiden: Brill, 2010], 31–35). The idea of Wisdom as saviour through moral and didactic 
means (9.18), is brought to bear on Israel’s history in the chapters that follow.  
106. In Chapter 2, we noted how Isocrates used a set of virtues to structure To Nicocles. For references to other 
instances of the virtues, see Winston, Wisdom of Solomon, 194.
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understanding (φρο' νησις) and a spirit of wisdom (piνευñµα σοφι'ας) (7.7). In 1 Kings 3.12, one of the 
passages being echoed here,107 Solomon is given “a prudent and wise heart” (καρδι'αν φρονι'µην και` 
σοφη' ν; 3 Kgdms 3.12 LXX). The nature of God’s gift has been intensified as it was in Isaiah where, 
for example, “the (divine) spirit of wisdom and understanding” (piνευñµα σοφι'ας και` συνε'σεως; Isa 
11.2) rests upon the king.108 The association between Wisdom and spirit of the Lord/God occurs 
elsewhere in the Book of Wisdom (1.6–7; 9.17). Not only are Wisdom and spirit spoken of in similar 
ways, but Wisdom and God’s spirit fulfill similar roles within the book’s cosmology. At 7.24, for 
example, it is Wisdom that “pervades and penetrates all things,” while at 12.1, God’s “incorruptible 
spirit is in all things.” Although Pseudo-Solomon never draws the link explicitly, Wisdom is closely 
associated with the divine spirit. 
The foundational trait for the Wisdom of Solomon’s ideal king is thus personified, God-given 
Wisdom. Not only do the king’s virtues flow from Wisdom, but his martial ability and success, his 
ability to judge rightly, his position amongst his subjects and the rulers of other nations, and his 
reputation—all these and more depend on Wisdom dwelling with the king. The traits of the ideal king, 
especially his close relationship with Wisdom, serve, furthermore, to indicate the transformation of 
Solomon into a Hellenistic sage.109 Pseudo-Solomon’s use of this idea enables an interesting 
development within his kingship ideology that extends kingship in what might be called a “democratic” 
manner. 
Democratic Kingship
We note, first, that spirit is not limited to the person of the king. Pseudo-Solomon also uses 
“spirit” to speak of that which, together with “body” and “soul,” constitutes general human existence 
(Wis 1.4–5). Behind Pseudo-Solomon’s anthropology lies Stoic cosmology and the biblical creation 
account.110 The strong Stoic influence on Pseudo-Solomon’s understanding of spirit is evident when 
spirit is described as that which “fills the world” and “holds all things together” (1.7; cf. 7.24; 8.1).111  
In the biblical passage, Genesis 2.7, the Lord blows “a breath of life” (piνοη`ν ζωηñς) into the man’s face 
that he might become “a living being” (ψυχη`ν ζωñσαν). This passage is paraphrased at Wisdom 15.11 
when God inspires within the person an “active soul” (ψυχη`ν ε  νεργουñσαν) and a “life-giving spirit” 
(piνευñµα ζωτικο' ν). This is the same spirit that returns to God upon a person’s death (15.16).
Since all people experience the spirit—and therefore also Wisdom, given the close relationship 
between the two (see above)—and since Wisdom is central in the book’s description of kingship, we 
might expect kingship to extend to the rest of humanity in some or other way. This idea is worked out 
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107. See 1 Kings 3.6–15 and 8.12–53 (Winston, Wisdom of Solomon, 168).
108. For further discussion of the spirit and wisdom in relation to remarkable figures in Jewish literature, see John R. 
Levison, The Spirit in First-Century Judaism (Boston; Leiden: Brill, 2002), 181–83.
109. Nathalie LaCoste, “Solomon the Exemplary Sage: The Convergence of Hellenistic and Jewish Traditions in the 
Wisdom of Solomon,” The University of Toronto Journal for Jewish Thought 1 (2010).
110. John R. Levison, Filled with the Spirit (Grand Rapids; Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2009), 142–45.
111. Collins, Between Athens and Jerusalem, 196. For Stoic physics, see Michael J. White, “Stoic Natural Philosophy 
(Physics and Cosmology),” in The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics, ed. Brad Inwood (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), 124–52; John Sellars, Stoicism, APh (Durham: Acumen, 2006), 91–106.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
by Pseudo-Solomon through another reference to the biblical creation account. Wisdom 10.1–2 notes 
that Wisdom protected the unnamed Adam and “gave him the strength to rule all things (κρατηñσαι 
α piα' ντων).” Similarly, in the previous chapter we overhear a prayer from the author in which he 
recognizes that God created all things by God’s word (Wis 9.1) and through divine wisdom, “formed 
human beings to rule (δεσpiο' ζω) over the creatures” and to “manage (διε'piω) the world” (vv. 2–3). In 
Genesis 1.26–28, at the climax of the word-wrought creation, God creates humankind in the divine 
image, commanding humanity to exercise dominion (κατακυριευ' ω) over the earth and rule (α»ρχω) over 
its animals. According to Judith Newman’s reading of Wisdom 9, Pseudo-Solomon uses this biblical 
creation tradition as part of a project that involves “the democratization of kingship.”112 The apparent 
failure of the Davidic dynasty in the post-exilic period has led Pseudo-Solomon to envisage all of 
humanity as potential rulers by virtue of their creaturehood. The antithesis between the righteous 
Israelites and the wicked Egyptians in chapters 10–19 suggests that it is only the former that might 
enjoy God’s blessing, including this rule. The eschatological vision of Wisdom 5.15–16 in which only 
the righteous receive immortality along with the symbols of sovereignty confirms that only those who 
show themselves to be righteous, those who are children of God (2.13, 18), will rule in this way. They 
are those who “will judge (κρι'νω) nations and rule (κρατε'ω) over peoples” as vice-regents under the 
Lord who will be king (βασιλευ' ω) over them (3.8).
Pseudo-Solomon envisages an eschatological “democratic monarchy” which exists in this text 
alongside Israel’s traditional Davidic monarchy. Both types of monarchy are characterized and 
empowered by God’s spirit and Wisdom. For those who love righteousness (δικαιοσυ' νη), an important 
qualifier mentioned above, Wisdom’s labours (piο' νοι) produce the cardinal virtues (8.7). Although the 
immediate context of this verse suggests that the Davidic king is in view, Pseudo-Solomon concludes 
the verse by stating that these are most profitable in the lives of humans, not only the king.   
The Kings of the Earth
The final instance of kingship in the Wisdom of Solomon relates to those addressed in the first 
part of the book: “Love righteousness, you who judge the earth (οι κρι'νοντες τη`ν γηñν); think about the 
Lord in goodness and seek him with sincerity of heart” (Wis 1.1). The chapter that concludes this 
section contains an exhortation to the same group to attend to Pseudo-Solomon’s words: “Hear 
therefore, you kings (βασιλειñς), and understand; learn, you judges (δικασται') of the ends of the earth” 
(6.1). This group is also addressed as τυ' ραννοι (“princes” [NETS] or “monarchs” [NRSV]; 6.9, 21).113
In the biblical tradition, Solomon’s wisdom becomes internationally known and attracts the 
attention of the surrounding rulers: 
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112. Judith H. Newman, “The Democratization of Kingship in Wisdom of Solomon,” in The Idea of Biblical 
Interpretation: Essays in Honor of James L. Kugel, ed. Hindy Najman and Judith H. Newman, JSJSup 83 (Leiden: Brill, 
2004), 309–28.
113. Pseudo-Solomon uses τυ' ραννος in a neutral sense here (cf. 12.14; 14.17). At Wis 8.15 the noun is modified in 
order to give it a negative meaning (τυ' ραννοι φρικτοι', “dread monarchs” [NRSV], “dread princes” [NETS]). 
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And all the people used to come to hear the wisdom of Salomon, and he would receive gifts 
from all the kings of the earth who were hearing of his wisdom. (3 Kgdms 5.14 LXX = 1 Kgs 
4.34)
And Salomon was greater than all the kings of the earth in riches and in discernment. And all 
the kings of the earth were seeking the face of Salomon to hear his discernment, which the 
Lord gave into his heart.(3 Kgdms 10.23–24 LXX = 1 Kgs 10.23–24)
Taken at face value, the Wisdom of Solomon addresses this group of foreign rulers:114 those who “rule 
over multitudes, and boast of many nations” (Wis 6.2), those who “delight in thrones and scepters” 
(6.21). Wisdom of Solomon then stands as an exhortation from Israel’s wisest king for these rulers to 
seek out Wisdom from Israel’s god in the same way that he, Solomon, did, in order that they might 
enjoy the same success, because “desire for wisdom leads to a kingdom [or kingship]” (6.20). There is 
another way in which this address to rulers might be understood.
In Chapter 3 it was noted that Hellenistic political ideas and language—in particular, conceptions 
of kingship—were used as a way of engaging in ethical thought. The Stoic claim that only the sage is 
truly king says more about what it means to be a Stoic sage than it does about what it means to be a 
king. James Reese observes that texts putatively addressed to kings “became the ordinary vehicle for 
tracing the moral ideal of Hellenism.”115 He argues that, in the same way, Pseudo-Solomon uses 
language and ideas about kingship to talk about the ideal sage.116 Solomon is held up as the ideal king 
in Israel’s history because of his traditional link with wisdom. The Wisdom of Solomon is not 
addressed to the rulers of the nations who might become kings through imitating Solomon, but to the 
“democratic kings” identified in the previous section who, through imitating Solomon (or Pseudo-
Solomon) become wise.
One important item related to kingship remains to be discussed: the place and nature of the law. 
The “kings” are urged to listen to Pseudo-Solomon and adopt wisdom (6.1–11) because, as servants of 
God’s βασιλει'α, they have not kept the divine laws or walked according to the divine purposes (6.4) 
and are therefore under the threat of God’s judgment. The sorites or “chain-syllogism” of 6.17–20 
points out that the desire for Wisdom will lead to faithfulness with regard to her laws and that this, in 
turn leads to incorruption. The fact that being brought near to God in incorruption/purity is linked to 
kingship (6.19–20) provides further proof of the ethical nature of kingship in this text. “The desire for 
wisdom has been shown to make one near to God,” writes David Winston, “and it is this divine 
intimacy which is the source of all sovereignty, both spiritual and earthly.”117
It is difficult to define precisely the nature of the law in the Wisdom of Solomon. On the one hand 
it is clearly God’s divine law (6.4; 16.6; 18.9), “the imperishable light” mediated to the world through 
God’s people (18.4). These references would seem to be to the Mosaic law as found in the Jewish 
scriptures. On the other hand, natural law is sufficient to explain that which the author has encouraged 
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115. Hellenistic Influences, 72.
116. Reese, Hellenistic Influences, 76–87.
117. Winston, Wisdom of Solomon, 156. It is on the basis of the law that the righteous reproach the wicked (2.12) who, 
in turn, are described as “lawless” (1.9; 4.20).
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or critiqued.118 Societies and cultures without the Decalogue forbid murder, adultery, theft, and deceit 
(see, e.g., 14.22–29). And the condemnation of idolatry (see Wis 13–15) is based not on the 
commandment found at Exodus 20.4–6 or Deuteronomy 5.8–10, but on the observation that such 
behaviour is ignorant and foolish.119 Despite mention of the law, it is the concept of “justice” that 
provides Pseudo-Solomon with a universal category against which the deeds of the righteous or wicked 
can be measured.120 
Pseudo-Solomon’s understanding of law mirrors the tension that exists between Greek and Jewish 
thought on the matter. While he has been able to meld the two traditions in the case of Wisdom/spirit 
(see p. 228), he has not been as successful in dealing with the question of law. With regard to kingship, 
however, it is clear that the law, whether natural or revealed, is something external to the king/sage and 
provides a standard against which his life might be ordered and measured. 
In the conclusion to his study of the addressees of the Wisdom of Solomon, James Reese states, 
“The Book of Wisdom was not written for a popular audience but for the religious education of a group 
of Jewish students who were preparing for life in the Hellenistic metropolis [Alexandria].”121 Having 
established the kingship of God, Pseudo-Solomon uses the figure of Solomon as an ideal king to teach 
his students about being wise. King Solomon shares traits with the biblical figure as well as with the 
ideal sage-king of the Hellenistic philosophers.122 Kingship is recast along “democratic” lines on the 
basis of the biblical creation tradition and the personified figure of Wisdom provides a goal to which all 
human beings can aspire. In constructing kingship in this way, Pseudo-Solomon provides the students 
of his school with a hybrid model comprised of Jewish and Greek elements. In the following section 
the thinking of the most influential, if not most exceptional, student of such an Alexandrian school is 
studied.  
The Philosopher-King in Philo of Alexandria
Philo of Alexandria was a prolific Jewish scholar who produced numerous religious, 
philosophical, and historical texts in the first half of the common era.123 His enthusiastic reception into 
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119. On the tension between natural and revealed theology in Wisdom of Solomon, see John Joseph Collins, “Natural 
Theology and Biblical Tradition: The Case of Hellenistic Judaism,” CBQ 60 (1998): 1–15. In response to John Barclay’s 
claim (Jews in the Diaspora, 190) that Pseudo-Solomon’s critique places the text in a position of “cultural antagonism,” 
Collins points to similar pagan critiques, arguing that Pseudo-Solomon’s critiques “represent a strategy of making common 
cause with enlightened Greeks who despised popular superstition” (p. 9).     
120. Michael Kolarcik S.J., “Universalism and Justice in the Wisdom of Solomon,” in Treasures of Wisdom: Studies in 
Ben Sira and the Book of Wisdom: Festschrift M. Gilbert, ed. Nuria Calduch-Benages and Jacques Vermeylen, BETL 143 
(Leuven: Leuven University Press; Peeters, 1999), 289–301.
121. Reese, Hellenistic Influences, 151.
122. For the transformation of Solomon into a Hellenistic king in other Jewish texts of this period, see Torijano, 
Esoteric King, 26–40.
123. For an introduction to Philo and his writings, see Erwin R. Goodenough, An Introduction to Philo Judaeus, 2nd 
ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962); Samuel Sandmel, Philo of Alexandria: An Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1979); Samuel Sandmel, “Philo Judaeus: An Introduction to the Man, His Writings, and His Significance,” ANRW 21.1: 3–
46; Peder Borgen, “Philo of Alexandria,” in Jewish Writings of the Second Temple Period: Apocrypha, Pseudepigrapha, 
Qumran Sectarian Writings, Philo, Josephus, ed. Michael E. Stone, CRINT 2.2 (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1984), 233–82; Jenny 
Morris, “The Jewish Philosopher Philo,” in The History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ (175 BC–AD 135), 3 
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the Christian tradition124 ensured the survival of his writings which, in turn, secured his reputation as 
“the most obviously outstanding of those who sought to marry Jewish faith with Hellenic culture, to 
retail Greek culture to the Jews and Jewish knowledge to the Greeks.”125 His writings thus provide us 
with another example of one who might be expected to combine Hellenistic philosophical ideas with a 
Jewish view of the world.
Philo was deeply influenced by his Greek education which most likely culminated with the study 
of the Greek philosophical tradition. His debt to Platonism, Stoicism and Neopythagoreanism can be 
clearly seen in his writings.126 It therefore comes as no surprise that Jerome calls him a “Platonist” and 
Clement of Alexandria identifies him as a “Pythagorean.”127 But Philo is, above all, an exegete of the 
Jewish scriptures. The bulk of his work comprises commentaries on the Greek translation of the 
Pentateuch arranged in three series: the “Questions and Answers on Genesis and Exodus”, the 
“Allegorical Commentaries,” and the “Exposition of the Law.”128 These two aspects of Philo’s 
intellectual world—the Jewish and the Greek—have been described as two foci in an ellipse.129 As we 
move through Philo’s writings we sometimes find them exerting equal influence, sometimes the Jewish 
elements prevail, and at other times Greek concepts dominate, but he is never able to escape the pull of 
either tradition.
Philo’s political thought owes much to Greek political philosophy.130 In seeking to describe the 
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influence of Hellenistic kingship ideals in his writings, I will focus on the two books that comprise his 
Life of Moses. While other treatises could also be examined to investigate Philo’s thought on 
leadership,131 Philo writes that the first book on Moses tells “the story of Moses’ actions in his capacity 
of king” (Moses 1.334), while the second book begins with the claim that Moses exemplified the 
Platonic philosopher-king (2.2). 
Philo’s claim that Moses is the ideal king might seem surprising since the Bible, Philo’s primary 
source, nowhere identifies Moses as “king.” However, Philo is not the only ancient writer to see Moses 
as Israel’s first king.132 Parts of the rabbinic tradition understand Moses to be the “king in Jeshurun” 
(Deut 33.5; NRSV),133 and Jewish texts written in Greek also view Moses as king (e.g., Sib. Or. 11.35–
40; Ezekiel the Tragedian 68–89).134 Even if it is not unique, the Alexandrian exegete’s extensive 
treatise about Moses’ kingship affords us a significant glimpse of the construction of ideal kingship at 
the point at which Jewish and Greek ideas of ideal kingship intersect. 
Philo’s Life of Moses
The two books that make up Philo’s Life of Moses are quite different. The first is a chronological 
account of Moses’ life that follows the biblical text from Exodus 2 to Numbers 32, while the second is 
structured around Moses’ roles as legislator, priest, and prophet. In the opening lines, Philo identifies 
his text as a “life” (βι'ος; 1.1) through which he hopes to rectify the neglect Moses has received at the 
hands of “Greek men of letters” (1.2). As Louis Feldman argues, this statement suggests that Philo’s 
intended audience consists of non-Jews who are unfamiliar with Moses but deserve to know something 
about him.135 As further evidence for this position, Feldman points to Philo’s account of the translation 
of the Pentateuch (Moses 2.25–44). According to Philo, this Greek translation was made for the sake of 
the nations, not Greek-speaking Jews (2.27, 43–44), in the hope that the nations would adopt God’s 
laws as their own, effectively becoming proselytes.136 Taking as his starting point Philo’s portrayal of 
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Moses as king, Finn Damgaard argues that the Life of Moses is “a political response to the situation of 
the Alexandrian Diaspora Jews.”137 As such, it serves to demonstrate to both Jewish and non-Jewish 
readers that the “founder” of the Jewish people embodied Greek as well as Jewish virtues. By doing 
this, the biography seeks to carve out a place for the Jewish tradition within Alexandria and to justify 
the Jewish presence there.138
If we adopt Arnaldo Momigliano’s common-sense definition of  biography, “an account of the life 
of a man from birth to death,”139 the Life of Moses certainly fits this description. We might go further, 
however, and note that the text also fits within the genre of “rewritten Bible.”140 While much of the 
first book of the Life of Moses retells the story of Moses as Philo finds it in his Bible, significant insight 
into Philo’s thought is gained by paying attention to where his retelling departs from or adds to the 
biblical tradition. In his definition of “rewritten Bible,” Philip Alexander’s ninth characteristic of the 
genre is: 
Rewritten Bible texts make use of non-biblical tradition and draw on non-biblical sources.... 
they seek to draw out the sense of Scripture and to solve its problems, and at the same time to 
read non-biblical material into Scripture, thereby validating it and preventing the fragmentation 
of the tradition.141
The Jewish extra-biblical tradition is on view when Philo states that his sources comprise “the sacred 
books” as well as what he has learned “from some of the elders of the nation” (Moses 1.4).142 Even 
more striking, however, is Philo’s use of the philosophical tradition to explain the biblical tradition. 
Philo’s fusion of Greek philosophy into the biblical text is not so much to prevent fragmentation of an 
existing tradition as it is to harmonize two traditions. In attempting to understand Philo’s use of the 
Hellenistic kingship topos I will give attention to the significant points at which Philo departs from the 
biblical tradition. We turn now to investigate Philo’s portrait of Moses as king.  
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Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Moses’ Early Years
The biblical account of Moses’ birth in Exodus 2.1–10 reflects the stark, straightforward manner 
used in much Hebrew narrative. In contrast, Philo adds numerous details and explanations to his 
account in order to show how Moses was prepared for the kingship to which he would later be 
appointed. In particular, Philo emphasizes Moses’ genealogy, his exceptional nature, and his education.
Genealogy. Philo begins by noting that Moses was a “Chaldean” (Moses 1.6). Moses is identified as a 
“Hebrew” at 1.15, but “Chaldean” here serves to heighten the antiquity of Moses’ people.143 Philo then 
proceeds to describe Moses’ parents as “the best of their contemporaries,” from the same tribe 
(according to Exod 2.1 they are both Levites) and exhibiting a strong affection for each other (Moses 
1.7). Although the point is not made explicit in the biography, as the progeny of two Levites, Moses 
enjoys “a double link with truth” (Prelim. Studies 131–132) according to Philo.144 The importance of 
the genealogy in royal biographies has already been discussed in relation to Xenophon’s Cyrus (see 
above, ch. 2). Philo stands in the same Greek biographical tradition.145 
Person. A number of elements in Philo’s description of the person of Moses point to Moses’ royal 
nature from a very early age. Moses’ superior appearance was apparent from birth. Exodus 2.2 LXX 
explains that his parents disobeyed the Pharaoh’s orders to murder male offspring and instead hid him 
because they saw he was beautiful (ι δο' ντες δε` αυ  το` α  στειñον). Philo recalls this tradition (Moses 1.9)146 
but also has the king’s daughter take note of the baby’s “beauty and fine condition” (ευ  µορφι'αν και` 
ευ  εχι'αν; 1.15). Once weaned, he was still “noble and good to look upon” (ευ  γενηñ  και` α  τειñον ο  φθηñναι; 
1.18). When he first encountered Moses, Jethro, Moses’ future father-in-law, was struck by his 
appearance (ο»ψις) and then his intention (βου' ληµα) since “great natures are transparent and need no 
length of time to be recognized” (1.59). Like the Greek writers examined earlier in this study, Philo 
sees the importance of the king’s superior appearance. Philo has expanded the biblical tradition of 
Moses’ beautiful appearance but stops short of the exalted treatment given this subject in later rabbinic 
texts.147
In addition to his physical appearance, Moses’ character marked him out as exceptional. As an 
infant he did not “delight in fun and laughter and sport,” but was characterized by a bearing of modesty 
(αι δω' ς) and seriousness (σεµνο' της) (1.20). In his adolescence, Moses grew in “good sense” (φρο' νησις) 
and was thus able to control his passions with the “reins” of moderation (σωφροσυ' νη) and patient 
endurance (καρτερι'α) (Moses 1.25).148 Philo compares the impulses of the soul to a restless horse. 
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These impulses are the cause of both good, when led by reason, and bad, when they turn to anarchy 
(1.26). Moses’ ability to control himself through the application of reason was noticed by those around 
him: 
His associates and everyone else, struck with amazement at what they felt was a novel  
spectacle, considered earnestly what the mind which dwelt in his body like an image in its 
shrine could be, whether it was human or divine or a mixture of both, so utterly unlike was it to 
the majority, soaring above them and exalted to a grander height. (1.27)
This self-control was seen in the curbing of his prandial and sexual appetites (1.28), his frugality and 
spurning of luxury (1.29), and the fact that his philosophy was matched by his life (1.29). Moses’ 
virtues form an important part of his royal nature; Philo returns to this theme later in his biography (see 
below).
No doubt with an eye on some of his kinsmen in Alexandria, Philo notes Moses’ continued loyalty 
to Judaism. Despite his good fortune in being adopted into the Egyptian king’s family, Moses refused 
to act like those who “subvert the ancestral customs ... by adopting different modes of life” (1.31). 
Instead, he “was zealous for the discipline and culture of his kinsmen and ancestors” (1.32).
Education. There is no mention of Moses’ education in Exodus. The writer of Jubilees thought it 
necessary for Moses’ father to teach him how to write (Jub. 47.9), but also passes over this period of 
time with exceptional brevity. Philo, in contrast, includes an extended discussion of Moses and his 
education. As a young child Moses applied himself to hearing and seeing that which would benefit his 
soul (Moses 1.20) and, in addition to those from Egypt and Greece, enjoyed a selection of international 
teachers, beyond whom he soon progressed (1.21). Moses’ education seemed to be a case of 
“recollection (α  να' µνησις) rather than learning (µα' θησις)” (1.21) and, like Abraham, Moses was self-
taught: 
the gifted soul takes the lead in meeting the lessons given by itself rather than the teacher and 
is profited thereby, and as soon as it has a grasp of some of the first principles of knowledge 
presses forward like the horse to the meadow. (1.22)  
Jaap Mansfeld suggests that at this point Philo “improvises an explanation for Moses’ development 
toward his outstanding role as the prophet of God.”149  Philo could not allow the Greeks to teach 
Moses, since Greek philosophy comes from Moses. It would not have been possible for Jewish teachers 
to partake in the education of an Egyptian prince, and the Jewish Scriptures are chronologically 
impossible as a source of education. Philo’s only recourse is thus “to a Platonizing suggestion: in going 
beyond his teachers, i.e., toward philosophy, Moses seems to remember what his soul would have 
known before entering his body.”150
  
 237 
———————————
149. Jaap Mansfeld, “Philosophy in the Service of Scripture: Philo’s Exegetical Strategies,” in The Question of 
‘Eclecticism’: Studies in Later Greek Philosophy, ed. John M. Dillon and Anthony A. Long (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1988), 95.
150. Mansfeld, “Philo’s Exegetical Strategies,” 95.
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Moses’ curriculum included the encyclical subjects and was most likely modelled on Philo’s own 
education,151 thus indicating the importance that this education held for Philo, “for he cannot imagine 
the development of his greatest hero in any other terms.”152 There are also a number of similarities 
between Moses’ education and the course proposed by Plato for the education of the upper-class in his 
city.153 Moses was thus educated in the tradition of the Platonic philosopher-king,154 but he only 
received his initial education in Egypt. Moses’ philosophical credentials were not yet sufficiently 
established; to do this, Philo transports him to Arabia where Moses studied philosophy, which must 
follow the encyclical subjects.155  
Moses of Arabia
Following the discovery of his murder of an Egyptian slave-driver (Exod 2.11–15a), Moses fled to 
Midian where he married Zipporah, the daughter of Jethro/Reuel, the Midianite priest, and fathered a 
child (Exod 2.15b–22). In Moses 1.47, Philo’s Moses withdrew to the more generically-titled Arabia 
where two important elements were added to his development as king. 
First, his philosophical education was completed. With his own reason as trainer (see above), 
Moses exercised virtue in preparation for the theoretical and practical life through studying the 
philosophical doctrines (1.48). The goal of these studies was that he might distinguish truth from 
appearance. Although he had been trained by his Egyptian teachers in “philosophy conveyed in 
symbols” (1.23), the philosophical training he received in Arabia concluded his education.156
The second important aspect of his Arabian retreat was the training in leadership (η γεµονι'α) he 
received when put in charge of his father-in-law’s flock:
For the shepherd’s business is a training-ground and a preliminary exercise in kingship (µελε'τη 
και` piρογυµνασι'α βασιλει'ας) for one who is destined to command the herd of mankind, the 
most civilized of herds, just as also hunting  is for warlike natures, since those who are trained 
to generalship practise themselves first in the chase. (1.60)
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151. Feldman, Philo’s Moses, 51–52; Erkki Koskenniemi, “Moses – a Well-Educated Man: A Look at the Educational 
Idea in Early Judaism,” JSP 17.4 (2008): 281–96. Philo mentions elsewhere that he studied grammar, geometry and music as 
a precursor to philosophy (Prelim. Studies 74–76; cf. 11; Dreams 1.205); see Peder Borgen, “Philo of Alexandria. A Critical 
and Synthetical Survey of Research Since World War II,” ANRW 21.1: 115–17 for a survey of research on this topic.
152. Mansfeld, “Philo’s Exegetical Strategies,” 98. Peder Borgen is slightly less optimistic: “Philo thus places 
encyclical education on the borderline between Judaism and paganism, as an adiaphoron which in itself is neither good nor 
bad” (Borgen, “Survey of Research,” 117). See Gregory E. Sterling, “‘The School of Sacred Laws’: The Social Setting of 
Philo’s Treatises,” VC 53.2 (1999): 148–64 for the suggestion that some of Philo’s treatises are best situated within an 
environment modelled on Graeco-Roman philosophical schools.
153. Plato discusses how philosopher-kings might be produced: in their earlier education as “athletes of war” (521d), 
the young men were to be trained in gymnastics and music and the arts (521e–522b; cf. 376e). This elementary training was 
followed by arithmetic (522c–526c), geometry (526c–527c), solid geometry (527d– 528d), astronomy (528e–530c) and 
harmony (530d– 531c). The “coping-stone” (534e) over all these subjects was “dialectics” (διαλεκτικη' ) (531d–535a).
154. Carl R. Holladay, Theios Aner in Hellenistic-Judaism: A Critique of the Use of This Category in New Testament 
Christology, SBLDS 40 (Missoula: Scholars Press, 1977); Louis H. Feldman, “Philo’s View of Moses’ Birth and 
Upbringing,” CBQ 64 (2002): 258–81.
155. Mansfeld, “Philo’s Exegetical Strategies,” 97–98.
156. Feldman, Philo’s Moses, 74.
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This is not a defence of the fact that Moses served as a shepherd,157 but represents a theme already 
encountered in Xenophon’s Cyrus (see Chapter 2). Philo finds Moses caring for his father-in-law’s 
sheep at Exodus 3.1 (cf. 2.17, 19)158 and this enables him to link Moses’ career to the topos of the 
king-as-shepherd.159 “Shepherd” is, for Philo, the highest title that a king can receive because it 
signifies his care and protection of his subjects, his φιλανθρωpiι'α. It is only the “perfect king” 
(βασιλευ`ς τε'λειος) who can accurately be described in this way (Moses 1.61–62). This image of the 
gentle king, so at odds with the picture Philo has painted of the Pharaoh (1.36–39), is an important part 
of Philo’s construction of ideal kingship in the person of Moses and one which we will encounter 
again.
Moses’ Appointment as Leader
Philo recounts Moses’ encounter with the divine at the non-burning bush, Moses’ return to Egypt, 
the ten plagues, and the nation’s escape (Moses 1.63–146). While careful study of these passages will 
illuminate more of Philo’s exegetical strategy, for our purposes, Moses’ role as leader comes to the fore 
again at Moses 1.146–162,160 another section that contains substantial extra-biblical material161 in what 
David Runia identifies as “an excursus [on Moses’ kingship] with a somewhat more theoretical 
character.”162   
Appointed by God. As seen in Chapter 4 of this study, the ideal king in the Hebrew Bible is chosen and 
appointed by God. So, too, Philo’s Moses, who received his kingship from God as a reward (γε'ρας) for 
his virtue (1.148). The king’s divine appointment is contrasted with “those who thrust themselves into 
positions of power by means of arms and engines of war and strength of infantry, cavalry and navy” 
(1.148; cf. Rewards 54). This “pacifist” model of kingship stands in contrast to the martial ideal on 
view in, for example, Diotogenes (72.6–9), while at the same time suggesting a critique of Roman 
imperial rule.163 It should also be observed that Philo does not find Moses as a warlike figure in his 
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157. Feldman, Philo’s Moses, 73 suggests that Philo, like Josephus (Ant. 2.263), felt the need to mount a defence of 
Moses’ status in light of Gen 46.43: “all shepherds are abhorrent to the Egyptians.” For an allegorical defence of Moses’ 
position as shepherd, see Sacr. 50–51, where what is abhorrent to the Egyptians is explained in the light of Exod 8.26 as 
being the virtues which every fool—that is, Egyptian—detests. Other passages in which shepherding is seen as an important 
aspect of rule are discussed briefly by Barraclough, “Philo’s Politics,” 519.
158. At a number of points in the Hebrew Bible, the Israelites are spoken of as sheep without a shepherd in the context 
of absent or inadequate leadership (e.g., Num 27.16–17; 1 Kgs 22.17; Isa 13.14; Ezek 34.5–6; Jdt 11.19).
159. For further discussion of this topos in Greek political thought, see Roger Brock, Greek Political Imagery from 
Homer to Aristotle (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 43–52.
160. According to John Martens, this passages is “Philo’s greatest example of the Hellenistic kingship ideal” (One God, 
One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, SPhAMA 2 [Leiden: Brill, 2003], 92); cf. Holladay, 
Theios Aner, 109 who states that Moses 1.148–162 is “a compact piερι` βασιλει'ας tractate tailored to fit his portrayal of Moses 
as the ideal king.”
161. That this is indeed an interruption of the biblical text can be seen from the fact that the discussion of the multitude 
that left Egypt (Moses 1.147) comes from Exodus 12.37; the “six hundred thousand” only occurs here and at Exod 38.26. 
The discussion of the route of the exodus in Moses 1.163–166 comes from Exodus 13.17–22. The biblical material between 
these passages contains further directions for celebrating the Passover and is ignored by Philo, as was the Passover material 
in the beginning of Exodus 12.
162. David T. Runia, “God and Man in Philo of Alexandria,” JTS NS 39.1 (1988): 53.
163. Émile Bréhier, Les idées philosophiques et religieuses de Philon d’Alexandrie (Paris: Alphonse Picard, 1908), 21 
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biblical sources. Rather, as noted in our discussion of Israelite kingship, it is Israel’s god who fights on 
behalf of the nation (cf. Moses 1.142, 176–180, 214–219) and on behalf of God’s appointed king.
Philo is also aware of the people’s role in choosing a king. Commenting on Deuteronomy 17.15, 
Philo dismisses the appointment of rulers by lot but recognizes the validity of an elected ruler, while at 
the same time managing to argue that this choice, “made by the whole people with the same mind,” is 
ratified by God (Spec. Laws 4.157). In Rewards and Punishments Philo reconciles these two ideas by 
observing that Moses did not become king through military means, rather, 
It was God who appointed him by the free judgement of his subjects, God who created in them 
the willingness to choose him [Moses] as their sovereign. (Rewards 54)
Philo thus has no difficulty in reconciling the divine appointment of a king with the free choice of the 
people.164 At the conclusion of the episode under investigation (Moses 1.147–162), Philo writes that 
Moses “received the authority which they [the people] willingly gave him, with the sanction and assent 
of God” (1.163).
The superior nature of Moses’ person has already been demonstrated in the narratives of his birth 
and upbringing and here, Moses’ character forms the basis of God’s choice of Moses as the king of 
God’s people. The biblical narrative does not allow Philo to raise the question of dynastic rule at this 
point, a very important question, given the prominence of the Davidic dynasty in the Hebrew Bible.165 
Nonetheless, Philo includes a comment about the fact that Moses allowed reason to trump his natural 
affection for his children and thus refused to promote them to positions of power in the present or as 
successors for the future (Moses 1.150). The same distaste for hereditary rule is on view in Philo’s  
discussion of Moses’ establishment of the priesthood (2.141–158).   
Following the construction of the tabernacle, the next step was to choose the most suitable people 
(του`ς ε piιτηδειοτα' τους αιρεθηñναι') to serve as priests (Moses 2.141). Philo stresses that Moses chose his 
brother as high priest “out of the whole  number” (ε ξ α piα' ντων) of suitable candidates, and he did so 
“on his [Aaron’s] merits” (α  ριστι'νδην) (2.142). Similarly, Moses appointed Aaron’s sons as priests 
because of their piety (ευ  σε'βεια) and holiness (ο σιο' της), the most important traits for those who would 
be priests. Moses ignored his own sons because he did not consider them “worthy of this distinction” 
(2.142). As in the case of the king, appointment of the priests is also considered to have been made 
with “the consent of the whole nation” (2.143). Philo thus guards the memory of Moses against charges 
of nepotism (φιλοι'κειος; 2.142), such as those raised at 2.278 (cf. Num 16), by pointing out that 
Moses’ choice was made on the basis of the candidate’s character and with the consent of the people. 
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n. 1. Goodenough identifies this and other practices against which Philo writes as reflecting “the spirit of Roman imperial 
elections” (Politics, 93).
164. Wolfson argues that Philo is uniting two biblical traditions which focus, respectively, on God’s appointment of the 
king and the people’s choice of a ruler (Philo, 2.226–331); see also Goodenough, Politics, 92–93.
165. Philo is aware of David and Solomon, but mentions them as psalmist and writer of proverbs; the Davidic dynasty is 
never brought up in Philo’s extant treatises (Wolfson, Philo, 2.333–34). Since Philo’s writings are focused on the 
Pentateuch, they do not require him to say anything about the Davidic dynasty.
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Furthermore—although the point is not made explicitly at Moses 2.142—in contrast to the claims made 
by those leading the rebellion against Moses, the appointments made by Moses were the result of 
divine direction (2.278).166 
Philo’s discussion of Moses’ refusal to advance his sons in either the political or cultic sphere  
hints at a negative view of dynastic rule. Philo stresses the appointments of priests were made on the 
basis of merit, seen especially in terms of priestly virtue. The appointments were made with the consent 
of the people, behind which lay divine choice. The same elements can be seen in the account of the 
appointment of Moses as king, where God’s choice and the decision of the people are both made on the 
basis of the king’s virtue.  
Moses’ Virtues. Moses’ virtue/excellence is identified as an important element within his appointment 
as king. It was “on account of his goodness and his nobility of conduct and the universal benevolence 
(α  ρετηñς ε«νεκα και` καλοκα  γαθι'ας και` τηñς piρο`ς α«piαντας ευ  νοι'ας) which he never failed to shew” that he 
was made king (1.148). While Moses is clearly an example of virtue kingship,167 the last of these three 
traits, his “benevolence” or goodwill shown to all, seen often in his concern for his subjects, is raised as 
perhaps the most significant reason for his suitability as king.168 
Moses renounced his rule in Egypt because his nobility of soul and magnanimity of spirit and 
natural hatred of evil (ψυχηñς ευ  γε'νειαν και` φρονη' µατος µε'γεθος και` το` µισοpiο' νηρον φυ' σει) would not 
allow him to see his fellow Hebrews mistreated (1.149). His virtues were directed towards those who 
would be his subjects. The implication is that he already felt a responsibility towards this people which 
included but went beyond the position he occupied in Egypt. He thus gave up that position to lead the 
Hebrews away from Egypt. Since he rejected the wealth of the Egyptians,169 God  rewarded him with 
“the greatest and most perfect wealth”: the earth, sea, rivers and all the elements therein. He was a 
partner with God in God’s possessions, given to Moses “as a portion well fitted for [God’s] heir.” As a 
“friend of God”170 he shares in God’s possessions, since “what belongs to friends is common” (κοινα` 
τα` φι'λων) (1.155–156). In addition to exalting the figure of Moses, in these verses Philo seeks to 
explain Moses’ miracles: the elements obeyed him as their master. Inspired by this observation, Philo 
manages to wed the biblical text to some Hellenistic philosophy: God possesses everything but needs 
nothing. The “good man” (ο  σpiουδαιñος)—in this case, Moses—possesses nothing but partakes in the 
things of God since he is a world citizen and thus receives the whole world as his portion (1.157).
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166. In Exod 28.1–5, Aaron and his sons are identified by God. 
167. Similarly, when reflecting on Gen 23.6, “you [Abraham] are a king (βασιλευ' ς) from a god among us,” Philo argues 
that Abraham gained faith (Gen 15.6) and therefore possessed all the other virtues. He was thus considered king by those 
around him “because of his greatness of soul” (Virtues 216).
168. Moses’ desire to benefit his subjects stands in stark contrast to Philo’s villainous rulers: Gaius, Flaccus, Sejanus 
(Barraclough, “Philo’s Politics,” 490).
169. Despite rejecting all that the Egyptian court had to offer him, Moses still showed “gratitude for the kind treatment” 
he received, thus exhibiting the appropriate response to that situation (Moses 1.32–33).
170. Cf. Exod 33.11.
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In addition to this example, we have already observed how Moses’ rejection of his sons as leaders 
(see above) was for the benefit his subjects and to further their interests rather than his own and those 
of his immediate family  (1.150–151).
Moses’ attitude to wealth provides Philo with a thread to which he might add another bead that 
turns the discussion back to Moses’ royal virtues. Moses’ attitude to wealth was quite different from 
that of other rulers.171 Even though he possessed “nothing” and lived a life of moderation in regard to 
food and dress, he was liberal in those treasures that a ruler should have in abundance (1.153): 
ε γκρα' τειαι, καρτερι'αι, σωφροσυ' ναι, α  γχι'νοιαι, συνε'σεις, ε piιστηñµαι, piο' νοι, κακοpiα' θειαι, 
η δονωñν υ piεροψι'αι, δικαιοσυ' ναι, piροτροpiαι` piρο`ς τα` βε'λτιστα, ψο' γοι και` κολα' σεις 
α µαρτανο' ντων νο' µιµοι, ε»piαινοι και` τιµαι` κατορθου' ντων piα' λιν συ`ν νο' µω, . 
self-restraint, continence, temperance, shrewdness, good sense, knowledge, endurance of toil 
and hardships, contempt of pleasure, justice, advocacy of excellence, censure and chastisement 
according to law for wrongdoers, praise and honour for well-doers, again as the law directs. 
(1.154)
Louis Feldman examines Moses’ virtues in great detail, noting that he “presents a paradigm of beauty 
and godliness, a speculum principis.”172 The patriarchs Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob were themselves 
models of virtue and Moses stands at the end of this exalted line (Moses 1.76; cf. Abraham 52; Good 
Person 62). Philo agrees with the Stoics that to have one virtue is to have them all (Moses 2.7; cf. D.L. 
7.125), and he is aware of the Platonic cardinal virtues (Moses 2.185; Creation 73; Alleg. Interp. 1.63–
64; Good Person 159)173 which he uses, like Isocrates (see ch. 2), to structure his writing (Spec. Laws 
4.135; Virtues).174 But here, when writing of Moses as king, he provides a list of virtues that speak of 
ideal kingship: the emphasis on self-rule, willingness to endure toil, and the rejection of pleasure have 
been seen repeatedly in the texts examined in earlier chapters of this study. The inclusion of “advocacy 
of excellence” is unusual, but not out of place if it speaks of the king’s exhortation of his subjects. 
Finally,  justice, the sine qua non of the royal ideal, is here joined to the punishment for evil and 
reward for good according to the law (cf. 2.4). Similarly, in the second book of the biography, Moses 
the legislator is presented as possessing the following four virtues: love of humanity (το` φιλα' νθρωpiον), 
love of justice (το` φιλοδι'καιον ), love of goodness (το` φιλα' γαθον), and hatred of evil (το` µισοpiο' νηρον) 
(Moses 2.9). It is significant for Philo’s understanding of Moses’ rule that love of humanity occurs first 
in the list and should be considered the premier virtue under which justice and the other virtues 
function. 
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171. See Feldman, Philo’s Moses, 57–59.
172. Philo’s Moses, 235–357. The centrality of virtue in Philo’s portrayal of Moses as a philosopher-sage is highlighted 
in Hywel Clifford, “Moses as Philosopher-Sage in Philo,” in Moses in Biblical and Extra-Biblical Traditions, ed. Axel 
Graupner and Michael Wolter, BZAW 372 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2007), 151–67.
173. There are also variations on the Platonic scheme. At Worse 73, ευ  σε'βεια replaces α  νδρει'α while δικαιοσυ' νη is 
dropped at Worse 114. In the Jewish “schools” the cardinal virtues are taught and practised, together with ευ  σε'βεια, ο σιο' της, 
and all the other virtues (Moses 2.216).
174. Philo’s use of the virtues to structure his thought is discussed by Walter T. Wilson, Philo of Alexandria, On 
Virtues: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, PACS 3 (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 1–7.
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Philo’s Moses has been shown to be superior to the rest of humanity in a number of different ways 
in the course of the biography. This allows Philo to recognize that God appointed Moses as king on the 
basis of Moses’ virtues. Philo is thus familiar with the Greek idea of virtue kingship and the excellent 
ruler, but Philo’s list of Moses’ virtues show a bias in favour of those virtues which are beneficial to 
the king’s subjects (cf. Abraham 261). Philo is aware of the traditional cardinal virtues, but when he 
chooses to catalogue Moses’ virtues, he includes those virtues which highlight Moses’ desire to benefit 
his subjects, thus reinforcing the idea that the king’s concern for his subjects is of primary 
importance.175   
Moses’ Ascent. Moses’ excellence not only ensures that he is appointed king, but it also allowed him to 
ascend to the divine. At Exodus 20.21, following the people’s request that he stand as mediator 
between them and God, Moses entered the darkness where God was (Μωυσηñς δε` ει σηñλθεν ει ς το`ν 
γνο' φον, ουð ηòν ο  θεο' ς).176 In Exodus, this “darkness” refers to the dark cloud and smoke enveloping the 
mountain,177 but Philo interprets this event as Moses’ entrance into “the unseen, invisible, incorporeal 
and archetypal essence of all existing things” (ει ς τη`ν α  ειδηñ  και` α  ο' ρατον και` α  σω' µατον τωñν ο»ντων 
piαραδειγµατικη`ν ου  σι'αν) (Moses 1.158). This entry into darkness is the fulfillment of Moses’ yearning 
to behold the divine,178 as Philo sees it expressed in Exodus 33.13 (Posterity 13–17; cf. Names 7–
10).179
Adela Yarbo Collins’ six-fold “typology of ascents” is a useful heuristic tool with which to 
analyze this passage.180 Moses’ ascent in Philo may be placed into Collins’ Type 2 and Type 4. The 
immediate context suggests the suitability of Type 2, “Ascents of the king” (pp. 142–143). Although 
Moses’ deification is not in view (see below), certainly Moses’ role as mediator is at the centre of 
Philo’s thought at this point. Type 4 deals with “Ascents of Cultural Heroes” (pp. 145–158) and in this 
case the ascent certainly contributed to Moses’ legitimacy (Type 4a), since, following his ascent, he 
was seen to have “the sanction and assent of God” (Moses 1.163). But the ascent also seems to be for 
the purpose of revelation (Type 4b), since in the darkness, Moses “beheld what is hidden from the sight 
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175. Cf. Moses 1.328.
176. The influence of the text upon which Philo draws should not be underestimated. With regard to Philo’s 
understanding of the vision of God, Scott Mackie comments: “Though Platonic philosophical contemplation and the practice 
of virtue are occasionally implicated, in most cases exegetical text work appears to be its underlying basis” (“Seeing God in 
Philo of Alexandria: Means, Methods, and Mysticism,” JSJ 43 [2012]: 148).
177. Cf. Exod 19.16, 18; 20.18; see John William Wevers, Notes on the Greek Text of Exodus, SCS 30 (Atlanta: 
Scholars Press, 1990), 316–17.
178. Mackie notes that not all ascents in Philo lead to the divine vision and not all visions of the divine are the result of 
an ascent, nevertheless, the two are usually linked (“Means, Methods, Mysticism,” 148).
179. The imagery and language used of Moses’ ascent is strikingly similar to that of his “translation” (Moses 2.288–
291)  (Meeks, Prophet-King, 124–25; M. David Litwa, “The Deification of Moses in Philo of Alexandria,” SPhiloA 26 
[2014]: 20–22).
180. Adela Yarbro Collins, “Ascents to Heaven in Antiquity: Toward a Typology,” in A Teacher for All Generations: 
Essays in Honor of James C. VanderKam, ed. Eric F. Mason, et al., JSJSup 153 (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 553–72; see also Alan 
F. Segal, “Heavenly Ascent in Hellenistic Judaism, Early Christianity and Their Environment,” ANRW 23.2: 1333–94.
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of mortal nature” (Moses 1.159).181 Before examining how Philo uses Moses’ ascent to describe him as 
receiving divine revelation and legitimizing his authority as king, the possibility that Type 5 is in view 
needs to be considered. 
Type 5 deals with ascents that are related to initiation in the mystery cults (pp. 158–159). Erwin 
Goodenough famously understood Moses’ ascent—indeed, all of Philo—against the background of 
Graeco-Roman mystery religions.182 Goodenough’s understanding of this aspect of Philo has generally 
not been accepted.183 Without denying something of a mystical element in Philo’s thought,184 most 
scholars understand the Alexandrian to exist somewhere between the two poles of “Philo the 
philosopher” and “Philo the exegete”—in the words of David Runia, a “philosophically orientated 
exegete.”185 The biblical texts engaging Philo’s attention as exegete is not difficult to establish; at this 
point, neither is his philosophical inspiration.
In Plato’s allegory of the cave (Resp. 514a–517a), the ascent of the potential ruler from the dark 
cave towards the light of the sun is explained to Glaucon as  “the soul’s ascension to the intelligible 
region (το`ν νοητο`ν το' piον)” where it can behold the form of the good which itself brings into the visible 
world all that is right and beautiful (Resp. 517b–c; LCL).186 That this Platonic scheme is indeed what 
lies behind Philo’s understanding of Moses’ ascent is suggested by his use of similar ideas elsewhere. 
In Philo’s explanation of Exodus 25.9 he describes how Moses received instructions regarding the 
construction of the tabernacle: 
He saw with the soul the immaterial forms (α  σωµα' τους ι δε'ας) of the material objects (τωñν ... 
σωµα' των) about to be made, and these forms had to be reproduced in copies perceived by the 
senses (αι σθητα` µιµη' µατα), taken from the original draught (α  ρχετυ' piου γραφηñς), so to speak, 
and from patterns conceived in the mind (νοητωñν piαραδειγµα' των). (Moses 2.74; LCL 
modified)
 Philo’s adoption of this element of Plato’s thought is also on view elsewhere (Spec. Laws 1.45–48; cf. 
Exod 33.18; and Creation 24–25; cf. Gen 1.27).187 Philo recognizes Plato’s philosopher-king in Moses 
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181. Type 6a, “Visit to Heaven as an Educational Experience” (pp. 159–161), seems to focus on revelation/education 
for the individual, while the revelation given in (4b) is for those who would listen to the one who has ascended. 
182. Erwin R. Goodenough, By Light, Light: The Mystic Gospel of Hellenistic Judaism (1935; repr., Amsterdam: Philo 
Press, 1969); for Moses, see pp. 180–234.
183. For an early critique of Goodenough’s thesis, see Arthur Darby Nock, review of By light, light: the mystic gospel of 
Hellenistic Judaism, by Erwin R. Goodenough, Gn 13.3 (1937): 156–65. Torey Seland suggests that Goodenough’s view of 
mysticism as the essence of religion drove his understanding of Philo to a certain degree (“Philo as a Citizen: Homo 
Politicus,” in Reading Philo: A Handbook to Philo of Alexandria, ed. Torrey Seland [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2014], 73).
184. See David Winston, “Philo’s Mysticism,” SPhiloA 8 (1996): 74–82. For a cautious approach to Jewish mysticism, 
see Collins, Between Athens and Jerusalem, 210–60 who discusses Jewish mysticism in terms of “higher revelation of a 
transcendent world” (p. 210).
185. Runia, “Middle Platonist,” 121, 123. Runia’s analogy of the ellipse (see above, p. 233) can also be applied here.  
Just as he is always Greek and Jewish, Philo is always exegete and philosopher; he cannot escape the pull of either task.
186. Similarly, in the Ship of State simile (487e–489c), the navigator guides the ship by looking at the stars, which 
represent the forms to which the philosopher-ruler must look (David N. Sedley, “Philosophy, the Forms, and the Art of 
Ruling,” in The Cambridge Companion to Plato’s Republic, ed. G. R. F. Ferrari [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007], 261).  
187. See, further, Wolfson, Philo, 1.181.
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(cf. Moses 2.2) and understands Moses’ ascent into the darkness at Sinai in terms of the climax of the 
philosophical education of Plato’s ruler.188
Philo’s autobiographical comments at Special Laws 3.1–6 (cf. 2.85), where he describes his own 
philosophical experiences in similar Platonic terms, further serves to confirm that Moses’ ascent is 
meant to be understood within his philosophical endeavours. “For Philo,” as Alan Segal observes, “the 
activity of the mind, under the guidance of scripture, leads to ascent to the divine.”189
As suggested by Collin’s Type 2 and Type 4a, Moses’ ascent legitimates his appointment as king 
(Moses 1.163).190 The fact that he beheld the “immaterial forms” (drawing on the language of 2.74)—
that which is “hidden from ... mortal nature” (1.158)—suggests some form of education or revelation 
(Type 4b)191 which turned Moses into a model for his subjects to imitate.  
Imitation and the Living Law. Upon completion of the ascent, Plato’s philosopher-king is expected to 
descend and to take up rule over the city (Resp. 519d–e). Plato describes the way in which the 
philosopher-king will benefit his subjects as follows:
At the age of fifty, those who have successfully negotiated their way through the preliminary 
exercises must turn their gaze to the good and then use it as a pattern (piαρα' δειγµα) for ordering 
the city correctly, an activity which includes the continuing study of philosophy, holding office 
and educating future generations (Resp. 540a–c). 
Moses’ presentation of himself as a model for the Israelites to copy implies his descent for this same 
purpose. In Philo’s retelling of the Sinai event, Moses returned as a “well-wrought picture, a piece of 
work beautiful and godlike, a model (piαρα' δειγµα ) for those who are willing to copy it” (Moses 1.158). 
Philo concludes, “Happy are they who imprint, or strive to imprint, that image in their souls” (Moses 
1.159; cf. Moses 2.74–76). Like that of the Platonic philosopher, Moses’ ascent has as its goal the 
improvement of the people over whom he exercises authority. 
The people’s improvement comes about through imitation. As Philo notes in Moses 1.160–161, it 
is a commonplace that “meaner men emulate men of distinction.” Rulers, who by definition are the 
superior ones who provide the model for imitation, should use this in their governing office. Elsewhere 
Philo observes that, like Moses in his role as king, the sage (ο  σοφο' ς) and the person of worth (ο  
σpiουδαιñος) exists, in part, not for his own glory but for the benefit of those around him: 
For to gaze continuously upon noble models (καλωñν piαραδειγµα' των) imprints their likeness in 
souls which are not entirely hardened and stony. ... And therefore those who would imitate 
these examples of good living so marvelous in their loveliness, are bidden not to despair of 
changing for the better. (Rewards 112–115)
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188. As important as Moses’ role as prophet and priest is to Philo, these are not on view in Philo’s discussion of Moses’ 
ascent at Moses 1.158 (contra Litwa, “Deification of Moses,” 13–14). Philo is aware of the other ascents described in 
Exodus. In particular, his discussion of Moses’ priesthood (Moses 2.66–108) refers to that of Exodus 24 in which Moses 
received instructions regarding the construction of the tabernacle.
189. “Heavenly Ascent,” 1356; cf. Mackie, “Means, Methods, Mysticism,” 158–60.
190. So, too, Runia, “God and Man,” 54: “The entry into darkness is not meant to indicate a divinizing initiation rite, 
but enhances Moses’ qualifications for kingship.”
191. On Plato’s cave allegory and education, see Sedley, “Art of Ruling,” 262–71.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
[Moses] used to incite and train all his subjects to fellowship, setting before them the 
monument of his own life like (στηλιτευ' σας το`ν ι»διον βι'ον) an original design (γραφη`ν 
α  ρχε'τυpiον) to be their beautiful model (piαρα' δειγµα καλο`ν). (Virtues 51)192 
When discussing the Patriarchs, Philo stresses that it is the sage’s life that should be heeded and not 
merely his words, although these should be in harmony (Prelim. Studies 69–70).193 Imitation of the 
sage is a controlling theme in Philonic ethics as it is in Stoic ethics. This is especially true for future 
kings who would find a guide by looking to Moses as their archetype (α  ρχε' τυpiον) and model 
(piαρα' δειγµα) (Virtues 70–71). There is another reason, in addition to his ascent, why Moses is worthy 
of imitation. 
At the conclusion to this section, Moses is described as “living and reasonable law” (νο' µος 
ε»µψυχο' ς τε και` λογικο`ς; Moses 1.162; my translation). God made him like this, knowing that Moses 
would one day be appointed as legislator. As legislator, a king must command what is right and forbid 
what is wrong, and since this is also what the law does, Philo states the “the king is a living law, and 
the law a just king” (το`ν µε`ν βασιλε'α νο' µον ε»µψυχον, το`ν δε` νο' µον βασιλε'α δι'καιον; 2.4). We have 
already had occasion to investigate this phrase (νο' µος ε»µψυχος) as it was  used by Diotogenes (ch. 3), 
noting that each occurrence of the phrase needs to be investigated in context, without assuming any 
continuity between the way in which various authors used it. In terms of Moses 2.4, then, we observe 
that Philo uses sees Moses’ role as νο' µος ε»µψυχος in a general legislative sense: the king, when doing 
what the law does, can be referred to an νο' µος ε»µψυχος. 
At its most basic, then, Philo’s statement at Moses 2.4 simply draws an analogy between the 
function of a king and that of law, and since the two are so similar, they might be spoken of in terms of 
one another. But the fact that at 1.158–162 Philo links this concept to that of imitation and Moses’ 
ascent suggests the possibility that something else lies beneath Philo's use of νο' µος ε»µψυχος. 
We begin by noting that the Patriarchs—Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob—are also described as 
ε»µψυχοι και` λογικοι` νο' µοι (Abraham 5). Philo identifies these figures as the general (unwritten) laws 
which are archetypes upon which the particular (written) laws are based (Abraham 3).194 The Patriarchs 
embody the law and follow the law because they live according to the law of nature (Abraham 61; 
275–276; Good Person 62). In so far as they follow perfectly the law of nature, the Patriarchs are sages 
(σοφοι',) in the Stoic mould.195 Philo takes the law of nature one step further, though, and argues that 
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192. Just as Moses presented his own βι'ος to his subjects for imitation, Philo presents Moses’ βι'ος for his readers 
(Moses 1.1). Although he stops short of calling the reader to imitate Moses, his pressing desire that Moses by known by more 
readers (1.1–4) does raise the question as to why this should be the case. 
193. See, further, David Winston, “Sage and Super-Sage in Philo of Alexandria,” in Pomegranates and Golden Bells: 
Studies in Biblical, Jewish, and Near Eastern Ritual, Law, and Literature in Honor of Jacob Milgrom, ed. David P. Wright, 
David Noel Freedman, and Avi Hurvitz (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 1995), 818.
194. There are echoes here of Aristotle, who writes of particular and universal laws (νο' µον το`ν µε`ν ι»διον, το`ν δε` 
κοινο' ν): particular laws are established by each people with reference to themselves, while “universal law is the law of 
nature” (κοινο`ν δε` το`ν κατα` φυ' σιν)  (Rhet. 1.13.1373b1–9; cf. Eth. nic. 1134b18–35a5); see David Winston, “Philo’s Ethical 
Theory,” ANRW 21.1: 372–416. Hindy Najman, “The Law of Nature and the Authority of Mosaic Law,” SPhiloA 11 
(1999): 55–73 argues that Philo’s thinking about law is an attempt to harmonize the universal and the particular in order to 
“authorize” the Mosaic law.
195. See Winston, “Sage and Super-Sage” for the argument that Philo’s sage is essentially the Stoic sage, but that 
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the divine law revealed to and by Moses mirrors the law of nature (Creation 1–3; Moses 2.11, 51–
52).196 Since the Patriarchs lived before Moses produced this written law, they could not have followed 
the Mosaic law, but by following the law of nature,197 they embodied the universal, unwritten, and 
divine law in themselves and in their lives. The Patriarchs are thus described as “unwritten law” and 
“embodied law.”198 
At Moses 1.160–162, Philo joins in the person of Moses the two functions of the νο' µος ε»µψυχος. 
He is both the legislator, but his is also, like the Patriarchs, one of those whose lives function as perfect 
examples for imitation. By joining these two functions in Moses, Philo avoids the tension that exists 
between the unwritten law—of which Moses is the embodiment—and the written law Moses 
produced.199  
Using language which he might have found in Pythagorean kingship treatises, Philo speaks of 
Moses, the ideal king, as embodied law. When doing so he combines a legal idea—the king functions 
in the same way as the law—with the somewhat more mystical, mimetic concept. In the case of the 
latter, the person of the king serves as a model for imitation because, as the perfect sage, he embodies 
what it means to live according to nature and follow the unwritten law. We should note, further, that 
Moses also serves as the archetype and model for all of Israel’s future leaders (Virtues 70). This exalted 
status of Moses in this passage raises one final question related to his nature. 
Moses’ Divinity. After noting Moses’ superlative virtue and his fellowship with God, Philo states, with 
regard to Moses’ ascent to the divine, that Moses “was named god and king of the whole nation” 
(Moses 1.158). The question of Philo’s understanding of Moses’ divinity has occasioned voluminous 
discussion without any apparent consensus.200 The problem is one of Philo’s own causing. As 
Goodenough notes, “On the question of the divinity of Moses Philo falls back into one of his frequent 
vacillations between points of view which cannot be reconciled.”201 On the one hand, Moses is called 
“(a) god” in a number of passages,202 frequently in relation to Exodus 7.1, where the Lord made Moses 
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Moses is portrayed as a “super-sage.” For “life according to nature” as the goal of the Stoic sage, see Rene Brouwer, The 
Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, CCS (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 25–
29. 
196. Martens (One God, 103–30) demonstrates that these forms of “higher law” form a unity in Philo’s thought.
197. For the law of nature in Philo, see Winston, “Ethical Theory,” 381–88. Wolfson describes three very specific “laws 
of nature” (Philo, 1.332–47) but the concept is broader than this in Philo’s writings and needs to be considered as part of 
what it means to live “according to nature” (see Philo, 2.165–200).
198. Martens (One God, 88–89) observes that Philo is unique in identifying an individual with unwritten law. 
199. The identification of the law of nature with the written law of God would have generated for many of Philo’s 
contemporaries an “unthinkable paradox”; the law of nature is necessary unwritten because it must be universal (Hindy 
Najman, “A Written Copy of the Law of Nature: An Unthinkable Paradox?” SPhiloA 15 [2003]: 55–56).
200. The most recent survey of the problem can be found at Litwa, “Deification of Moses,” 1–4; see also Holladay, 
Theios Aner, 103–98; Runia, “God and Man”; Wendy E. Helleman, “Philo of Alexandria on Deification and Assimilation to 
God,” SPhiloA 2 (1990): 51–71; Feldman, Philo’s Moses, 331–57.
201. Goodenough, Light, 223. Roberto Radice identifies a number of “vacillations” in Philo’s doctrine of God (“Philo’s 
Theology and Theory of Creation,” in The Cambridge Companion to Philo, ed. Adam Kamesar [Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009], 124–45).
202. In addition to Moses 1.158, see Alleg. Interp. 1.40; Worse 161–162; Names 19, 125–159; Sacrifices 8–10.
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god to Pharaoh: ’Ιδου` δε'δωκα'  σε θεο`ν Φαραω. On the other hand, Philo seems determined to uphold a 
strict monotheism203 in passages like On the Embassy to Gaius 118, where deification (θεοpiλαστηñσαι) 
is called “the most grievous impiety, since sooner could God change into a man than a man into God.” 
“That God is one” is one of the five most important lessons that Genesis teaches, according to Philo 
(Creation 171; cf. Alleg. Interp. 3.82; Virtues 214). This, according to Roberto Radice, “is for Philo a 
dogma of faith and tradition.”204  Moses, while exemplifying the perfection of the human race, remains 
firmly entrenched on this side of the human-divine chasm.
Commenting on Embassy 118, Mary Smallwood reminds us that among the Greeks 
the line of demarcation [between god and humanity] was frequently blurred, and their idea that 
a man’s virtues or his services to his fellows might carry him over the border and make him a 
god spread to the Roman world.205 
The possibility that this aspect of Greek thought has played a significant role in Philo’s theology cannot 
be ignored on the basis of an a priori appeal to the monotheism of Philo’s Jewish background. 
Furthermore, for many Jews of this period God’s metaphysical status was not unique, except in so far 
as God occupied “the top of a pyramid ... of divine beings.”206 Any study of this topic must therefore 
take heed of David Litwa’s caution against “disjunctive thinking about the divine” in which “an 
impermeable barrier” is established between the divine and the created world.207 
In Philo’s thought, the divine world is not limited to the supreme deity, the Existent (ο  ω» ν/το` ο»ν), 
but includes the Logos, the creative and ruling powers which bear the titles “God” and “Lord” 
(Abraham 121–122; QG 2.15), the stars, which are at times spoken of as “manifest and visible gods” 
(Creation 27),208 and angels, exemplars of “purity and excellence” who do the bidding of the Existent 
(Dreams 1.139–143; cf. Abraham 107–113).209 Despite his Stoic affinities at a number of other points, 
however, Philo does not usually identify the cosmos itself with the divine.210 Nevertheless, there are 
elements within the cosmos which are not to be identified with the Existent but are still identified as 
“god” or “divine” by Philo.
Certain passages seem to indicate unequivocally that Philo thought of Moses in this category.211 
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203. The meaning of “monotheism” within the period under consideration is itself disputed; see Litwa, “Deification of 
Moses,” 6, n. 25 and the literature cited there.   
204. “Philo’s Theology,” 129.
205. Philonis Alexandrini: Legatio ad Gaium, 2nd ed. (Leiden: Brill, 1970), 213.
206. Adela Yarbro Collins, “The Worship of Jesus and the Imperial Cult,” in The Jewish Roots of Christological 
Monotheism: Papers from the St. Andrews Conference on the Historical Origins of the Worship of Jesus, ed. Carey C. 
Newman, James R. Davila, and Gladys S. Lewis, JSJSup 63 (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 236.
207. “Deification of Moses,” 5. Litwa attributes this to later Christian theology. But it should also be noted that the early 
Christian tradition does sometimes speak of salvation as “deification” (Helleman, “Philo on Deification,” 51), a doctrine that 
is traced back to 2 Peter 1.4: “so that through [God’s promises] you may escape from the corruption that is in the world 
because of lust, and may become participants in the divine nature (θει'ας κοινωνοι` φυ' σεως).” 
208. For Philo’s view of the divinity of heavenly bodies, see Runia, Philo and the Timaeus, 250–51.
209. For a brief discussion of these elements, see Radice, “Philo’s Theology,” 135–44.
210. Runia, Philo and the Timaeus, 189–90.
211. Goodenough argues that Moses, and possibly other sages, constituted for Philo a “third race,” similar to the 
Hellenistic “divine man” (θειñος α»νθρωpiος) (Light, 223–29).
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At Sacrifices 8–9, for example, Moses is stationed at the side of the divine (according to Deut 5.31). 
Moses’ translation upon his death (Deut 34.5) provides Philo with further evidence of Moses’ 
extraordinary nature and is the grounds for Philo’s description of Moses as “a loan to the earthly 
sphere”212 and one whose virtue exceeds the ordinary virtue of kings and rulers and who is thus 
appointed as god (as per Exod 7.1). In response to a question about Exodus 24.2, Philo asserts that only 
Moses was able to approach God because of his prophetic mind which, since it was “divinely inspired 
and filled with God,” became like the monad.213 Thus, “[Moses] is changed into the divine, so that 
such men become kin to God and truly divine” (QE 2.29).214 
The emphasis on Moses’ mind reminds us that, in keeping with much of Greek philosophy, it is 
his rational soul/mind that is divine. In Philo’s particular case, however, this divinity is derived from 
the Logos which plays a mediating role between the world and the Existent.215 While this solution 
eases the tension created by the question of how a transcendent God might be at work in the world, 
from another perspective it simply pushes the question one step further down the line. In regard to the 
divinity of the human being understood in relation to the Logos and to the Existent, David Runia 
observes
It is clear that Philo would not wish to abrogate the divide that separates God and man. But it is 
not easy for him to give a clear indication of where God’s true divinity ends and man’s derived 
divinity starts.216
  Alongside the examples noted above, we also need to take note of the instances where Moses 
as “god” is interpreted metaphorically or allegorically. At On the Change of Names 125, “god” is one 
of the names of the many-named (piολυω' νυµος) Moses. This title is explained in two ways. First, he is 
god because he is wise, and thus the ruler of the foolish (Names 128). Kingship is described 
analogically in terms of being “god”; the sage stands in relation to the foolish as the Existent, the 
universal king, stands in relation to the world. Second, Moses is “god” to Pharaoh because, like the 
Father, he is merciful and benevolent in the punishment he metes out to Pharaoh (Names 129). These 
texts suggest that Moses’ divinity should be understood in terms of imitation of the divine rather than 
participation in the divine.217 Philo’s language in these examples is more philosophical than theological 
(if it is ever possibly to tease these apart in Philo’s thought). Thus, Philo can write of Moses as “having 
passed from a man into a god, though, indeed, a god to men, not to the different parts of nature” (Good 
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212. At Tongues 77–82 sages in general are described in a similar way.
213. Similarly, the angels, who are “all mind through and through, pure intelligences” are also described as “in the 
likeness of the monad” (Spec. Laws 1.66).
214. Feldman correctly sees Philo’s desire to keep Moses separate from the monad in QE 2.29, but he concludes, 
incorrectly, that because Moses is said to be “kin to God,” Philo cannot really mean what he writes: “That [Moses] is truly 
divine indicates that he is not actually divine, since he is only akin to G-d” (Philo’s Moses, 344, original emphasis).
215. Runia, “God and Man,” 64–73.
216. Runia, “God and Man,” 73–74; cf. the discussion at Dreams 2.228–236 where the sage’s mind is something 
superior to men but less than God (229), and where the perfect person is described as existing “on the border-line between 
the uncreated and perishing form of being” (234). 
217. So Helleman, “Philo on Deification” who bases her argument on the Platonic assimilation to the divine.
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Person 43).218 The context of this statement, coming as it does in one of the more philosophical 
treatises, provides further guidance as to how it should be understood. Moses is Philo’s perfect sage—
the only person who is truly free, virtuous, and royal.
In the discussion of Moses’ appointment as king, Philo is drawing on the idea that kingship 
describes the sage. We have already remarked on Philo’s portrayal of Moses as sage,219 and although 
Moses is not identified as σοφο' ς in Moses 1.147–162, there are a number of indicators that Philo’s 
discussion of Moses at this point draws from the sage-king ideal of Stoic-Cynic and Platonic thought. 
The cornucopia of virtues (1.154) identified Moses as a sage. The “good man,” ο  σpiουδαιñος (1.157), is 
in view, a term Philo uses interchangeably with α  στειñος and σοφο' ς, as becomes clear in the treatise 
That Every Good Person is Free. We also see at this point in Moses one of the Stoic paradoxes that are 
on view in Good Person: even though he possessed nothing, Moses partook in the wealth of God 
(Moses 1.155–157). Like other Stoic-Cynic sages, Moses was a “world citizen,” κοσµοpiολι'της  
(1.157).220 As already discussed, his ascension in this passage is modelled on that of Plato’s 
philosopher-king rather than on that of the mystagogue.221  Similarly, his fellowship with God was 
based on God’s gift of authority over the elements, rather than on the noetic participation in the divine 
examined earlier in this section. Moses kingship in this passage is spoken of in philosophical terms and 
must therefore be understood in terms of the Stoic paradox that only the sage is king (D.L. 7.122).
When Philo notes that Moses was “named god and king of the whole nation” (Moses 1.158), the 
second title informs the first.222 Moses became god of the nation to the extent that he exercised the 
godly function of rule. He is not transformed into a heavenly figure but is recognized as the supreme 
example of the earthly sage.223 This is not to deny that elsewhere Philo is capable of speaking of Moses 
as a divine figure. In his construction of Moses’ kingship at this point, however, Philo chooses to 
employ a model that draws heavily on the Platonic and Stoic-Cynic model of the philosopher-king. 
Moses as Legislator, Priest, and Prophet
The second book of Philo’s treatise On the Life of Moses treats Moses’ work as legislator, priest, 
and prophet, functions which are joined, in the person of Moses, to the kingly and the philosophical 
(Moses 2.2; cf. Moses 1.334; Rewards 52–56). A careful exegesis of these functions as portrayed in 
this book would require much more space than that available to me in this chapter. In the following 
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218. A similar qualification is found at Worse 161, where Philo states that Moses was not appointed a god to Pharaoh in 
reality but only in appearance (µη` piρο`ς α  λη' θειαν ... δε` δο' ςη, ).
219. See, further, Feldman, Philo’s Moses, 237–42.
220. Philo identifies the “cosmopolitan” as one who lives according to the will of nature, which he identifies as the Law 
that is in harmony with the world (Creation 3). In other words, the “cosmopolitan” is another word for the sage who lives 
according to nature.
221. Wayne Meeks (“Moses as God and King,” in Religions in Antiquity: Essays in Memory of Erwin Ramsdell 
Goodenough, ed. Jacob Neusner, SHR 14 [Leiden: Brill, 1970], 354–71) finds a tradition of Moses’ ascent and enthronement 
in Samaritan writings which suggests to him that Philo also understood this event to signal that Moses shared in God’s 
kingship. Feldman, in contrast, denies Moses any divinity and argues that Philo is, instead, portraying Moses in a way that is 
meant to contrast and oppose the Samaritan tradition (Philo’s Moses, 348, 357).
222. Runia, “God and Man,” 55.
223. Holladay, Theios Aner, 128–29.
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paragraphs I shall simply draw out some of the key features that contribute to Philo’s portrait of Moses 
as ideal king.  
Legislator (2.8–65). Philo uses “legislator” (νοµοθε'της) more than any other title to describe Moses.224 
The word is rare in Philo’s biblical source, where it refers exclusively to God,225 but Philo joins other 
Jewish writers who frequently identify this aspect of Moses as integral to their portraits of the Jewish 
leader.226 
We have already noted Philo’s identification of the king and law as those elements within a polity 
which command and prohibit right and wrong, what should and should not be done, respectively, 
which makes the king a “living law” and the law a “just king” (Moses 2.4; cf QE 2.68). Without 
providing any further argument, Philo concludes from this that it is fitting that the office of legislator be 
combined with that of king in the person of Moses.
Like the sage, the legislator should possess all the virtues, but some are more important than 
others in the legislative task: love of humanity (το` φιλα' νθρωpiον) ensures that the law-giver will serve 
the common good; because of his love of justice (το` φιλοδι'καιον) he will honour equality; his love of 
what is good (το` φιλα' γαθον) will ensure that he approves and attempts to supply that which is good for 
others; and through his hatred of evil (το` µισοpiο' νηρον) he will reject the “dishonourers of virtue” (2.9). 
All of these virtues are brought together in the person of Moses and displayed in his law.
Philo argues that Moses was “the best of all lawgivers in all countries” (2.12) and provides a 
number of proofs. The laws have remained unchanged despite the often difficult circumstances that the 
Jews have faced (2.14–16). What’s more, the Jewish laws have been noticed and drawn upon when 
other nations have instituted their own laws (2.17–24), as shown by the presence of a weekly day of 
rest and an annual “holy month” observed by “the Greeks.”227  The clearest indication of the universal 
significance of Moses’ laws for Philo is its translation under the Ptolemies from “the Chaldean tongue” 
(2.26) into Greek (2.25–44).228
Philo’s ambivalence regarding the source of the Mosaic law—human or divine—is on view in the 
opening sentence of the treatise on Moses.229 Philo observes that some describe Moses as “legislator of 
the Jews” while others see him as “the interpreter of the Holy Laws” (Moses 1.1). The latter would 
seem to be in view when Philo emphasizes God’s role in revealing the law. Philo asserts that the 
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224. Feldman, Philo’s Moses, 258–80, here, 268; see also Lierman, New Testament Moses, 132–36.
225. νοµοθε'της: Ps 9.21; 83.7 LXX; νοµοθετε'ω: Exod 24.1; Deut 17.10; Ps 24.8, 12; 26.11; 83.7; 118.33, 102, 104 
LXX.
226. For which, see Feldman, Philo’s Moses, 258–80; Lierman, New Testament Moses, 124–74.
227. This is a condensed version of the argument that all Greek philosophy comes from Moses (e.g., QG 4.152; Heir 
214; Good Person 57). Elsewhere Philo takes a more nuanced view on the relationship between Jewish and Greek 
philosophy (see Wolfson, Philo, 1.141–42). 
228. For Philo’s understanding of the translation, see Hindy Najman and Benjamin G. Wright III, “Perfecting 
Translation: The Greek Scriptures in Philo of Alexandria,” in Sibyls, Scriptures, and Scrolls: John Collins at Seventy2 vols., 
ed. Joel Baden, Hindy Najman, and Eibert J Tigchelaar, JSJSup 175 (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 897–915. Other accounts of this 
translation are found in Aristobulus, the Letter of Aristeas, and Josephus. For a discussion of Philo in the broader context of 
this developing tradition, see Wasserstein and Wasserstein, Septuagint, 35–50. 
229. Lierman (New Testament Moses, 124–28) traces this ambivalence back to the Old Testament.
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primary reason for the supremacy of Moses’ law was that the one who was Father and Maker of the 
world was also the Lawgiver who gave the law in accordance with the divine ordering of the universe 
so that whoever followed the law would also live according to nature (2.48). Other passages support 
the former point of view when they praise Moses for his role in producing the laws (2.45–47). Both 
positions are in view at Hypothetica 6.9:  
So whether what [Moses] told them came from his own reasoning powers or was learnt from 
some supernatural source they held it all to come from God. 
As with the question of Moses’ divinity, Philo does not seem concerned to resolve .230  
Priest (2.66–186). The priestly follows the legislative as the second office which Philo joins to 
kingship. With the exception of Psalm 98.6 LXX, which states that Moses and Aaron are among the 
Lord’s priests, Philo would find no explicit statement in his biblical source about Moses’ priesthood. 
However, the Pentateuch depicts Moses functioning in a priestly role,231 and it is from this tradition 
that Philo feels confident in identifying Moses as a priest.232 The political developments in Rome 
provided Philo with another instance of the combination of priesthood and kingship,233 and he would 
also have found the king acting as priest in some of his Hellenistic sources.234 At Virtues 54, however, 
Philo is critical of those following Moses who would serve as both king and priest. This comment 
should probably be read in the light of the Hasmonean reign, but it perhaps also serves to highlight the 
unique nature of Moses.
In a very condensed statement of the king’s duties as priest, Philo highlights the service of God 
(τηñς τουñ θεουñ θεραpiει'ας) and prayer on behalf of his people (Moses 2.5; cf. Rewards 56). Behind this 
statement stands the conviction that no people can thrive without God’s blessing. If the priest is to be 
successful in his office, piety (ευ  σε'βεια) is the chief virtue he must possess (Moses 2.66). Moses’ 
natural gifts provided the basis upon which this pious life might be built, but it was brought to 
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230. So Najman and Wright, “Perfecting Translation,” 903–4. Feldman (Philo’s Moses, 268–71) recognizes both 
positions in Philo but argues that he consistently portrays Moses as more than a “mere transmitter of the laws” (p. 270) or a 
“mere agent of G-d” (p. 271). 
231. See, e.g., Exod 24.6; cf. Lev 8.24–9.30. Lierman (New Testament Moses, 66) observes that Moses experienced the 
presence of God in the tabernacle in a way that exceeded that of the priests (Exod 25.22; cf. Lev 16.2). Lierman concludes, 
“in the first century all these pieces of Moses lore would have implied that Moses had functioned for his people as priest” (p. 
67).
232. Philo finds Moses in charge of the Levites at Exod 32.25–29 (Sacrifices 130). With Moses clearly in mind, Philo 
observes that the true priest is also a prophet who serves the Existent according to virtue rather than birth (Spec. Laws 4.192); 
see Lierman, New Testament Moses, 67–68. This is perhaps why Philo highlights the excellence of Moses’ parents and 
mentions that they are from the same tribe (Moses 1.7), but fails to identify them as Levites (Exod 2.1) even though he is 
aware of this aspect of Moses’ genealogy (Prelim. Studies 132).
233. For developments in republican Rome, see John A. North, “Religion in Republican Rome,” in The Rise of Rome to 
220 BC, 2nd ed., ed. Frank W. Walbank, et al., CAH 7.2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 610–15; for 
Augustan innovations, see Simon R. F. Price, “The Place of Religion: Rome in the Early Empire,” in The Augustan Empire, 
43 BC–AD 69, 2nd ed., ed. Alan K. Bowman, Edward Champlin, and Andrew Lintott, CAH 10 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 824–30.
234. See, e.g., Diotogenes 72.15–23. There are also some similarities between Philo’s concept of the king’s priestly 
duties and Xenophon’s emphasis on the king’s piety. Philo writes elsewhere that “the early kings were at the same time high 
priests” (QE 2.105), but fails to identify these early kings.  
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perfection through an ascent to the divine (2.66–70). This ascent to “an inaccessible and pathless 
mountain, the highest and most sacred in the region” (2.70) lasted for forty days and nights, and was 
accompanied by fasting. Philo understands this ascent in terms of a priestly purification process during 
which time Moses was fed by “the better food of contemplation (θεωρι'α)” (2.69). Moses descended 
more beautiful than he ascended, and his person was marked by “dazzling brightness that flashed from 
him like the rays of the sun”(2.70; cf. Exod 34.28–35). Just as the ascent described at Moses 1.158 
served to legitimate Moses’ kingship,235 this ascent legitimates his priestly role by emphasizing the 
purification process which perfected his piety. 
This priestly piety is not in view in the bulk of the remaining section on Moses’ priestly office, 
which is given over to a discussion of his preparation of the tabernacle (Moses 2.71–108) and the other 
priests (2.109–158). But piety was shown by both Moses and the Levites in the incident of the Golden 
Calf (Moses 2.159–173; cf. Exod 32) and is the cause for the elevation of the Levites to the priesthood 
(cf. Spec. Laws 1.79).
The priestly office is defined by piety. Because it directs the human being towards the divine, 
piety is the source of all other virtues (Decalogue 52), the “queen” of the virtues (Decalogue 119; 
Spec. Laws 4.135, 147), and “that most godlike of qualities” (Dreams 2.186).236 As has already been 
seen, Moses, possessed of all the virtues perfectly, including piety, was thus uniquely situated to fulfill 
the role of priest. As the priest-king, Moses was able to worship the Existent correctly, and offer 
prayers and supplications that his subjects might be rescued from evil and be blessed with what is 
good.237 This mediatorial role in which Moses represents the people before God is balanced by the next 
in which he speaks to the people from God.   
Prophet (2.187–287). The Pentateuch portrays Moses as a unique prophet. Other prophets receive 
revelation in the form of visions and dreams, but the Lord spoke with Moses face to face (Num 12.6–8; 
Deut 34.10). Philo is aware of this tradition and writes of Moses: “Is he not everywhere celebrated as a 
prophet?” (Heir 262). Moses is the chief prophet (α  ρχιpiροφη' της; Names 103, 125; Dreams 2.189) and 
“the most perfect of the prophets” (Decalogue 175).238
 Philo knows of prophecy as (1) interpretation of divine utterances; (2) answers revealed to 
particular questions; and (3) ecstatic utterances given under divine possession (Moses 2.188–191).239 In 
the discussion of Moses as prophet, Philo passes over the first type of prophecy (2.191), but 
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235. The relationship between this ascent and that of Moses 1.158 is not explicitly described by Philo. The ascent in 
Exod 20.21 which lies behind 1.158 makes no mention of a forty-day ascent or the accompanying fasting. The forty-day 
period suggests Exod 24.18 and/or Exod 34.28–35 and Moses’ glowing visage upon his descent (2.70) would point to the 
second of these. 
236. Piety’s “twin” is φιλανθρωpiι'α (Virtues 54). The former is directed towards God, the latter towards humanity.
237. For examples of Moses as intercessor, e.g., Moses 1.128; Dreams 1.143; Planting 46. 
238. See Lierman, New Testament Moses, 43–44 for further titles and references. For a more extensive discussion of 
Philo’s understanding of knowledge, see Wolfson, Philo, 2.3–72 who discusses prophecy within the broader context of 
Philo’s epistemology.
239. These categories can overlap. At Decalogue 175, for example, Moses is said to have interpreted the sacred 
utterances (category 1) when filled with the divine spirit (category 3).
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presumably would include under this type those instances in the Pentateuch when the Lord speaks 
directly to Moses.240 Philo then discusses the second (2.192–245) and third (2.246– 287) types of 
prophecy by providing examples from Israel’s history as found in the Pentateuch. Although Philo notes 
that, strictly speaking, only the third type is prophecy, in each of the phenomena being discussed, God 
is the source of knowledge; it is this sense of divine revelation that ties them together. From this it 
follows that it is important for the king to exercise prophecy because through divine revelation the 
prophet-king discovers what reason alone is unable to grasp (2.6, 187).
While prophecy included knowledge of the future—a prophet was provided for God’s people lest 
they indulge in divination (Spec. Laws 1.64–65)—prophecy also dealt with the present. Philo provides 
a number of examples in which God provided an answer to Moses’ question about dealing with a 
particular incident, such as the punishment suited to a particular instance of blasphemy (2.192–208; cf. 
Lev 24.10–16). Divine knowledge was needed lest the punishment was too heavy or too light, and once 
received, the divine answer was then included in the law of Moses. This incident exemplifies the 
connection between prophecy and law.
John Lierman points out that Moses’ function as lawgiver and prophet are closely related,241 so 
much so that Moses can be called “the prophet of the laws” (Virtues 51) and “the one who prophesied 
our laws” (Spec. Laws 2.104). Like prophecy, parts of the law are revealed to Moses, and both “the art 
of legislation and prophecy” come through “wisdom given by divine inspiration” (Prelim. Studies 132). 
Furthermore, prophecy seems to be linked to priesthood since the revelation to Moses of the model 
upon which the tabernacle was based is also considered a form of prophecy (Moses 2.76) and Philo 
observes that Moses was “taught the patterns of the holy tabernacle” (2.141), presumably through 
divine revelation. As Philo notes when considering the priest who acts as judge in difficult cases (Deut 
17.8–9), “the true priest is necessarily a prophet” (Spec. Laws 4.192). The three offices discussed in 
Book 2 of the Life of Moses are thus related to one another. Like the virtues, each of these offices is 
essential and to fall short in any one of them leads to an imperfect form of rule (Rewards 56).
With a poetic flourish, Philo asserts the following with regard to Moses’ roles as king, legislator, 
priest, and prophet:
Beautiful and all-harmonious is the union of these four faculties; for, intertwined and clinging 
to each other, they move in rhythmic concord, mutually receiving and repaying benefits, and 
thus imitate the virgin Graces whom an immutable law of nature forbids to be separated. 
(Moses 2.7)
 In order to lead God’s people as their king, Moses was a prophet who was given divine knowledge of 
the future and who was also able to inquire directly of God with regard to the correct course of action 
to be taken in difficult circumstances. As priest he could intercede for his subjects in God’s presence. 
As lawgiver he was able to provide his subjects with a set of laws modelled on the law of nature which 
he was able to behold through his reason. The common and central element in these various offices is 
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240. E.g., Exod 33.11; Num 12.8; see Wolfson, Philo, 2.36–43.
241. New Testament Moses, 132–34; cf. Wolfson, Philo, 2.17.
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the divine. Through occupying these four offices Moses stands between God and the nation, thus 
playing a mediating role that is similar to the played by the Logos in the heavenly realm.  
Philo: Concluding Comments
In his treatise On the Special Laws, Philo discusses the kingship laws of Deuteronomy 17.14–20 
(4.157–169). The provisions made in Deuteronomy for the copying and reading of the law ensure that 
the king remains “a badge of blameless rule, sculpted according to the archetype of the kingship of 
God” (Spec. Laws 4.164; my translation). These laws, as we have seen in this section, are the written 
laws Moses produced on the basis of the law of nature, which is also the divine law. It is not surprising, 
then, to find the written laws extolling a form of kingship which mirrors divine kingship. But Moses 
did more than produce the written copy of the law, he embodied it. Future kings could thus either study 
the law or, even better, study Moses himself, the ideal king (Virtues 70).   
Philo’s portrait of Moses as ideal king takes as its basis the biblical account of Moses’ life and 
adds to this account in order to explain or expand the biblical tradition. In the Pentateuch, Philo finds 
Moses acting as lawgiver, priest, and prophet (Moses 2). These offices form part of a larger complex of 
ideals which include that of king. While there are clear indications of Moses’ kingship in the earlier 
part of his life (1.1–70) as recounted in Philo’s biblical sources, nowhere is Moses explicitly identified 
as king. Philo explains that in an ascent to the divine, which follows Moses’ rescue of God’s people 
(1.71–146), Moses’ royal office is recognized and legitimized (Moses 1.147–162). Moses’ kingship in 
this passage is seen to be a combination of the Platonic philosopher-king and the Stoic king-like sage. 
We have also seen ideas similar to those present in the Pythagorean kingship treatises emerge from 
time to time in Philo’s writing about Moses. With regard to the various traditions intertwined in Philo’s 
presentation of Moses, Ray Barraclough observes:
This is not simply mechanical eclecticism on his part, but springs from his belief that what is to 
be admired in the Greek ideals for rulers is present in Moses, and that what the Jewish 
scriptures wrote of him complemented this Hellenic estimate of the ideal ruler.242
Philo thus provides us with a prime example of ideal kingship constructed in one part of the world of 
Hellenistic Judaism.
Hellenistic Jewish Kingship: Concluding Comments
All three texts studied in this section originate in Alexandrian Judaism from roughly the middle of 
the second century BCE to the middle of the first century CE. They illustrate the way in which Jewish 
authors were influenced by the Hellenistic intellectual milieu in which they worked. With regard to 
Barclay’s axes of acculturation (see above, p. 211), it has been observed that all three authors show an 
awareness and understanding of Greek culture and, more specifically, of the Greek philosophical 
tradition. They should be placed fairly high on the acculturation axis.243
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242. “Philo’s Politics,” 488.
243. We might place Philo in Barclay’s category of “scholarly expertise” (see, further, Erkki Koskenniemi, “Philo and 
Classical Education,” in Reading Philo: A Handbook to Philo of Alexandria, ed. Torrey Seland [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
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Nevertheless, all three authors belong somewhere in the middle of the accommodation axis, 
indicative of “those who propounded some Hellenistic interpretation of Judaism but preserved its 
difference or uniqueness in certain respects.”244 Our three authors critique Graeco-Roman culture, 
especially in religious matters—theriolatry (Aristeas), ruler cult (Pseudo-Solomon), ignorance of 
Jewish law (Philo)—but this opposition to Graeco-Roman culture is countered by attempts at 
integration in other areas.245 The focus in this section has been on the way in which these writers have 
integrated the Greek philosophical tradition of ideal kingship in their thought and writing to produce a 
synthesis of the Greek and Jewish intellectual traditions. In the following chapter, Saul of Tarsus is 
examined to see whether he exhibits a similar synthesizing inclination.   
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2014], 102–28), while Aristeas and Pseudo-Solomon probably belong a bit lower down in the category of “familiarity with 
Greek literature, rhetoric, philosophy and theology” (Jews in the Diaspora, 95).
244. Barclay, Jews in the Diaspora, 98.
245. Torrey Seland (“Philo as Citizen,” 73) writes: “[Philo] might to some extent be considered an acculturated Jew, but 
far from being assimilated.” For the opposing position, see Borgen, “Survey of Research”. The Wisdom of Solomon is an 
example of “cultural antagonism” or “cultural aggression,” in Barclay’s estimation (Jews in the Diaspora, 181–91), but he 
admits it remains “an elusive document, hard to categorize and difficult to place in a historical context” (p. 181). For a view 
of Wisdom of Solomon closer to the one I am expressing, see Collins, Between Athens and Jerusalem, 195–202 who speaks 
of a “convergence with Greek culture” (p. 202).    
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CHAPTER 6. PAUL’S CONSTRUCTION OF JESUS’ KINGSHIP
Having examined in earlier chapters the way in which ideal kingship is constructed in classical 
and Hellenistic Greek thought, I proceeded to sketch out kingship ideals as they appear in the books of 
the Jewish scriptures from which Paul draws most frequently. In the preceding chapter I have looked at 
three examples of how Jewish writers in the Diaspora have blended Hellenistic and Jewish language 
about kingship. It remains to ask whether and, if so, how Paul1 uses kingship language from these two 
traditions and whether he does so in a way similar to these other Hellenistic Jewish authors. 
Paul’s language about Jesus2 will first be examined in terms of three royal titles: “Christ,” “Son of 
God,” and “Lord.” This will be followed by a functional and relational analysis of the figure of Jesus in 
Paul’s writings in which kingly elements will be sought in Christ’s various acts on behalf of God and 
God’s people, and in his relationship with God and those who might be considered Christ’s subjects.     
In order to deal with the various elements of Paul’s royal Christology, this chapter will necessarily 
be selective. I will discuss key texts that illustrate the point under discussion, rather than attempt to list 
and investigate every passage that might have a bearing on a certain word or concept. My argument is 
not that every passage about δικαιοσυ' νη, for example, can be illuminated by reading it in the light of 
“justice” in the Hellenistic kingship topos, but that such a reading is enlightening in the case of some 
passages. My overarching concern, however, is to investigate the Pauline writings within the context of 
ancient constructions of ideal kingship described in the earlier chapters of this dissertation. This present 
chapter will not only demonstrate the presence or absence of certain elements of the kingship topos in 
Paul’s writings, but, in keeping with the methodology described in Chapter 1, will also draw attention 
to similarities and differences in the elements that Paul shares with other writers. 
In the introduction to this study, I noted that Paul nowhere calls Jesus “βασιλευ' ς.” Except for 2 
Corinthians 11.32 which speaks of King Aretas, the lexeme does not occur in the Pauline texts being 
studied.3 Paul’s most common way of referring to Jesus, even more common than the name “Jesus,” is 
————————————
1. As mentioned in Chapter 1, I focus on the undisputed Pauline writings. For a discussion of the status quaestionis, 
see Mark Harding, “Disputed and Undisputed Letters of Paul,” in The Pauline Canon, ed. Stanley E. Porter, PAST 1 
(Leiden: Brill, 2004), 129–68. 
2. While “Jesus” is frequently used to speak of the earthly person and “Christ” reserved for the post-resurrection figure, 
this is a modern distinction, not one made by Paul and not one that I will follow closely (see, e.g., Udo Schnelle, Apostle 
Paul: His Life and Theology, trans. M. Eugene Boring [Grand Rapids: Baker, 2005], 105–8; Stanley E. Porter, “‘Jesus 
Christ’ in Paul’s Letters,” in Sacred Tradition in the New Testament: Tracing Old Testament Themes in the Gospels and 
Epistles [Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2016], 227–45). Although I will show in the next section that “Christ” does at 
times still bear the weight of “Messiah” in Paul’s writings, this has been all but lost in modern discourse. I will tend to use 
“Jesus,” “Christ,” or “Jesus Christ” interchangeably. 
3. Elsewhere in the Pauline corpus, βασιλευ' ς is found only in 1 Timothy 1.17; 2.2; 6.15. The first and third examples 
speak of God as “king” and “king of kings,” respectively. The verb βασιλευ'ω occurs more frequently (Rom 5.14, 17, 21; 
6.12; 1 Cor 4.8), but only once has Christ as its subject (1 Cor 15.25). While κυριευ'ω is used of Christ once (Rom 14.9), 
other words related to the idea of monarchical reign are absent (δεσpiο' ζω, διοικε'ω, τυραννευ'ω).
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as Χριστο' ς, “Christ.”4 I will start this chapter by discussing Paul’s use of “Christ” and two other “titles 
of majesty”—“Lord,” and “Son of God.”5 The goal in this section is not to trace the origins of these 
titles (although I will be drawn into this discussion at points), but rather to demonstrate that in Paul’s 
writings they bear royal weight. 
Royal Titles
The titles given to Jesus have played an important role in modern Christology. Wilhelm Bousset’s 
study set the agenda for much of the twentieth century in which attempts were made to trace the origins 
and development of the various titles.6 The problems inherent in “titular Christology” have been 
noted.7  The subsequent lack of progress in this field led Nils Dahl to call for more attention to be given 
to the “syntax of christological language,” that is, the roles that various designations of Jesus occupy in 
the New Testament, as opposed to the “vocabulary,” that is, the titles themselves.8 Alongside this 
attention given to syntax, Dalh suggests studying the sources of christological language. These sources 
are “linguistic resources—words, phrases, forms, and patterns of composition—that existed prior to 
their use in speaking about Jesus.”9 Jens Schröter notes correctly that the “titles of majesty” used by 
Paul should not be thought of as circumscribing a particular set of concepts inherited from Judaism and 
transferred to Jesus—as if the water drawn from one pool is simply poured into another. “Rather,” 
Schröter argues, “their application to Jesus represents a special case of reception, in which certain 
semantic features were actualized and connected with his activity and fate.”10 While Schröter’s 
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4. Martin Hengel, “‘Christos’ in Paul,” in Between Jesus and Paul: Studies in the Earliest History of Christianity, 
trans. John Bowden (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983), 65.
5. These are the same titles studied by Ferdinand Hahn, The Titles of Jesus in Christology: Their History in Early 
Christianity, trans. Harold Knight and George Ogg (Cambridge: James Clarke, 2002) who calls these “titles of majesty” (p. 
11). Hahn’s study of the development of these titles focuses on the canonical Gospels and thus also includes “Son of Man” 
and “Son of David,” which do not occur in the Pauline texts. Although the latter is implied in Rom 1.3, the absence of the 
former is intriguing, especially given its prominence in the Gospel tradition and the possibility that Paul draw on the 1 Enoch 
37–71, as argued by James A. Waddell, The Messiah: A Comparative Study in the Enochic Son of Man and the Pauline 
Kyrios, Jewish and Christian Texts in Contexts and Related Studies 10 (London: T&T Clark, 2011), where the title is used 
frequently. Waddell suggests that potential misunderstanding caused by a competing Adam-soteriology led Paul to avoid 
using “Son of Man,” lest Jesus be subordinated to Adam (pp. 186–201).
6. Wilhelm Bousset, Kyrios Christos: A History of the Belief in Christ from the Beginnings of Christianity to Irenaeus, 
trans. John E. Steely (Nashville: Abingdon, 1970); in 2013, Baylor University Press reprinted this edition with an additional 
introduction by Larry W. Hurtado. For critique and appreciation of Bousset’s work, see Larry W. Hurtado, “New Testament 
Christology: A Critique of Bousset’s Influence,” TS 40 (1979): 306–17; Larry W. Hurtado, “Wilhelm Bousset’s Kyrios 
Christos: An Appreciative and Critical Assessment,” EC 6.1 (2015): 17–29; Cilliers Breytenbach, “Bousset’s Kyrios 
Christos: Imperfections of a Benchmark,” EC 6.1 (2015): 5–16. Werner R. Kramer, Christ, Lord, Son of God, trans. Brian 
Hardy, SBT 50 (London: SCM, 1966) reconstructs the pre-Pauline tradition and describes the Pauline use of the 
Christological titles.
7. See, e.g., Larry W. Hurtado, “New Testament Christology: Retrospect and Prospect,” Semeia 30 (1984): 23; Leander 
E. Keck, “Christology of the New Testament: What, Then, is New Testament Christology?” in Who Do You Say That I Am? 
Essays on Christology, ed. Mark Allan Powell and David R. Bauer (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1999), 196–97.
8. Nils Alstrup Dahl, “Sources of Christological Language,” in Jesus the Christ: The Historical Origins of 
Christological Doctrine, ed. Donald H. Juel (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991), 113–36, here 116. For an excellent application of 
Dahl’s call for careful attention to the syntax of christological language, see Matthew V. Novenson, Christ Among the 
Messiahs: Christ Language in Paul and Messiah Language in Ancient Judaism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
9. Dahl, “Sources of Christological Language,” 116.
10. Jens Schröter, “Metaphorical Christology in Paul: Reflections on the Contribution of a Theory-of-Metaphor 
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assumption is that these features were drawn primarily from Judaism, I am interested in the possibility 
that concepts taken from Greek kingship texts might have been used in addition to those drawn from 
Jewish texts. One final comment must be made with regard to these Jewish texts before we examine 
Paul’s titles for Jesus.
Elements found in Jewish kingship texts are taken up into messianic texts,11 but the study of 
messianism and Messiah language is a much bigger enterprise that cannot be entered into at this point. 
Such a study would be complicated by the fact that many consider the term “Messiah” not to have had 
a univocal meaning, but that it was filled by different individuals and groups with a variety of 
concepts.12 Some, such as William Green, would deny any real significance to messianism and 
messianic thought in Israelite religion, Judaism, and early Christianity.13 For Green, the presence of 
Messiah language is not necessarily significant since “‘messiah’ is all signifier with no signified.”14 In 
contrast, William Horbury represents those more confident of finding a messianism which, although 
exhibiting diversity, is marked by “an underlying unity arising from its roots in biblical tradition on the 
king.”15 If Horbury’s assessment of Jewish messianism is correct, we might expect to uncover 
something of this royal tradition in Paul’s writings. In what follows, my concern is thus not with 
messianism, messianic expectations, messianic speculations or the figure of the Messiah per se, but, 
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Approach to Christology with Reference to a Number of Christological Metaphors in the Letters of Paul,” in From Jesus to 
the New Testament: Early Christian Theology and the Origin of the New Testament Canon, trans. Wayne Coppins, Baylor-
Mohr Siebeck Studies in Early Christianity (Waco: Baylor University Press, 2013), 187.
11. In addition to the essays in Philip E. Satterthwaite, Richard S. Hess, and Gordon J. Wenham, eds., The Lord’s 
Anointed: Interpretation of Old Testament Messianic Texts (Carlisle: Paternoster, 1995), see, e.g., J. J. M. Roberts, “The Old 
Testament’s Contribution to Messianic Expectations,” in The Messiah: Developments in Earliest Judaism and Christianity: 
The First Princeton Symposium on Judaism and Christian Origins, ed. James H. Charlesworth (Minneapolis: Fortress, 
1992), 39–51; Tremper Longman III, “The Messiah: Explorations in the Law and Writings,” in The Messiah in the Old and 
New Testaments, ed. Stanley Porter (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), 13–34; Mark J. Boda, “Figuring the Future: The 
Prophets and Messiah,” in The Messiah in the Old and New Testaments, ed. Stanley E. Porter (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
2007), 35–74. It is also the case that once royal messianism had been established, Jewish kingship texts were read in the light 
of messianism. Novenson observes that, “there may not be any messiahs in the Hebrew Bible, but some Jewish authors of the 
Hellenistic and Roman periods evidently thought there were” (Christ Among the Messiahs, 52–53).
12. James Charlesworth comments, following the 1987 Princeton Symposium on the Messiah, that no member of that 
symposium “holds that a critical historian can refer to a common Jewish messianic hope during the time of Jesus” (“From 
Messianology to Christology: Problems and Prospects,” in The Messiah: Developments in Earliest Judaism and Christianity: 
The First Princeton Symposium on Judaism and Christian Origins, ed. James H. Charlesworth [Minneapolis: Fortress, 
1992], 5). But the absence of “a common Jewish messianic hope” does not preclude the possibility that there are sufficient 
similarities in the various “messianic hopes” so as to be able to speak of a broad messianism (or to arrange a symposium 
around the idea) which various groups would recognize as such.
13. “Introduction: Messiah in Judaism: Rethinking the Question,” in Judaisms and Their Messiahs at the Turn of the 
Christian Era, ed. Jacob Neusner, William Scott Green, and Ernest S. Frerichs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1987), 1–13.
14. Green, “Messiah in Judaism,” 4.
15. “Messianism in the Old Testament Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha,” in Messianism Among Jews and Christians: 
Biblical and Historical Studies (London: T&T Clark, 2003), 63; see also Jewish Messianism and the Cult of Christ (London: 
SCM, 1998), 36–63. But not all Messiahs are royal. The Dead Sea Scrolls, for example, bear witness to a royal and priestly 
messianic tradition; see John Joseph Collins, The Scepter and the Star: The Messiahs of the Dead Sea Scrolls and Other 
Ancient Literature, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010), 79–109. 
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rather, with the royal aspects of these elements in so far as they can be found in Paul’s writing about 
Jesus (the) Christ. 
Christ
There seems to be a prima facie case to be made for Jesus’ kingship in Paul’s writing on the basis 
of Paul’s use of χριστο' ς to speak of Jesus. The etymology of this word is linked to the idea of 
anointing,16 and it was used to translate the Hebrew חיׁשמ, “anointed one/messiah.”17 To the extent that 
the “anointed one” in the Jewish Scriptures is frequently a royal figure (see Chapter 4), and assuming 
that Paul’s use of χριστο' ς is influenced by these texts, the royal connotations of this title when used of 
Jesus would seem self-evident.18 
Yet the majority of scholars writing on New Testament Christology argue that, despite its 
etymology, χριστο' ς is not used by Paul to denote “Messiah” but, rather, is used as a proper name 
appended to that of Jesus.19 It is sometimes acknowledged that Paul understands χριστο' ς to mean 
“Messiah”/ “anointed one” but that the significance of this title has disappeared.20 Andrew Chester 
identifies this as “the paradox of Paul’s usage [of χριστο' ς]”: “he knew that Jesus was the messiah ... 
yet, in his writings at least, he lays no emphasis on Jesus as messiah, and makes very little of messianic 
tradition more generally.”21 The term χριστο' ς is then explained as a name or, in the phrase Χριστο' ς 
Ι  ησουñς, as a “titular name” and cognomen, assuming that Ι  ησουñς functions as the nomen.22
There is a smaller group of scholars who contend that χριστο' ς continues to bear the weight of 
“Messiah” in Paul’s general usage. N. T. Wright, for example, has argued in a number of places that 
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16. LSJ s.v. χρι'ω, χριστο' ς.
17. See, e.g., 1 Sam 2.10; Ps 2.2; Isa 45.1. Twice in John’s Gospel, the Aramaic is transliterated as µεσσι'ας and glossed 
as χριστο' ς (John 1.41; 4.25).
18. C. F. D. Moule, The Origin of Christology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 32: “But ‘an anointed 
one’, or ‘the anointed one’, without further designation, would almost certainly mean nothing except the divinely appointed 
King.”
19. For a survey of modern scholarship starting with F. C. Baur, see Novenson, Christ Among the Messiahs, 12–33.
20. Hengel, “‘Christos’ in Paul”; Nils Alstrup Dahl, “The Messiahship of Jesus in Paul,” in Jesus the Christ: The 
Historical Origins of Christological Doctrine, ed. Donald H. Juel (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991), 15–25; Magnus Zetterholm, 
“Paul and the Missing Messiah,” in The Messiah in Early Judaism and Christianity, ed. Magnus Zetterholm (Minneapolis: 
Fortress, 2007), 33–55. Zetterholm argues, “In Paul’s letters ... any tendency to stress the messiaship of Jesus has vanished 
into thin air” (p. 37). According to Zetterholm, Paul believed Jesus to be the Messiah but chose not to emphasize this aspect 
of his person when writing to Gentiles (pp. 39–40).
21. “The Christ of Paul,” in Redemption and Resistance: The Messianic Hopes of Jews and Christianity in Antiquity, 
ed. Markus Bockmuehl and James Carleton Paget (London: T&T Clark, 2007), 120.
22. Chester, “Christ of Paul,” 111. Similarly, Hengel, “‘Christos’ in Paul,” 68 argues that when Paul refers to Jesus as ο   
κυ' ριος Ι  ησουñς Χριστο' ς, the nomen is Ι  ησουñς , Χριστο' ς is to be read as the cognomen, and κυ' ριος as an honorific title. A full 
discussion of this use of χριστο' ς is now found in Novenson, Christ Among the Messiahs, 64–97, who concludes that χριστο' ς 
should be understood as an honorific accompanying a name, such as Α  ντι'οχος Ε  πιφανη' ς or Πτολεµαιñος Σωτη' ρ, and not a 
title or name. Novenson argues that χριστο' ς retains messianic overtones.
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χριστο' ς carries the weight of “Messiah” whenever Paul uses it.23 In an innovative study that attempts to 
avoid the stalemate reached in tradition-historical studies, Matthew Novenson employs linguistic 
arguments to show that Paul does indeed use “Messiah language” when speaking about Jesus and that 
Paul’s language should be understood not in contrast to, but as an example of, Jewish messianic 
language.24
My concern here is to show that at least some of the passages in which Paul uses χριστο' ς to refer 
to Jesus envisage Jesus as a royal figure. The argument in this section consists of the demonstration of 
three correlated hypotheses: (1) Paul uses messianic language to speak of Jesus; (2) Paul understands 
Jesus’ person and ministry in terms of messianic passages; and (3) Jesus fulfills certain messianic 
functions. 
Nils Dahl cites a number of Pauline passages where the reader might detect “messianic 
connotations.”25 Chester disagrees: “In the majority of these [passages cited by Dahl], it seems to me 
difficult to find any real messianic sense.”26 Chester defines Messiah as “the agent of final divine 
deliverance,”27 but it is unclear which of the elements in this description he finds lacking in Paul’s 
writing about Jesus. Certainly, it is not immediately evident that a relationship exists between the 
singular seed/descendant of Abraham and the Messiah (Gal 3.16)28 nor why the rock that followed 
Israel in the wilderness (Exod 17; Num 20–21) is identified as the Messiah (1 Cor 10.4).29 Other texts, 
however, do link Paul’s use of χριστο' ς more closely with Israel’s Messiah. According to Dahl, it is in 
the opening verses of Romans that “Paul speaks most clearly of the messiahship of Jesus”30 and so it is 
with this passage that I begin.31 
In the opening verses of Romans, Paul introduces himself in relation to “the gospel of God” (Rom 
1.1). This gospel is promised through the prophets in the holy Scriptures (v. 2) and is concerned with 
God’s Son (v. 3). In addition to being called “God’s Son,” this person is identified as “Christ Jesus” (v. 
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23. N. T. Wright, “ΧΡΙΣΤΟΣ As ‘Messiah’ in Paul: Philemon 6,” in The Climax of the Covenant: Christ and the Law 
in Pauline Theology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991), 41–55; N. T. Wright, “Messiahship in Galatians? (2012),” in Pauline 
Perspectives: Essays on Paul 1978–2013 (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2013), 510–46; N. T. Wright, Paul and the Faithfulness of 
God, vol. 4 of Christian Origins and the Question of God (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2013), 815–36. Others, such as Stanley 
Porter, would argue that not every use of χριστο' ς “implies a full-blooded concept of messianism” but that “messianic 
associations often accompany its usage” (“‘Jesus Christ’ in Paul’s Letters,” 234).
24. Novenson, Christ Among the Messiahs.
25. Rom 15.6; 1 Cor 1.23; 10.4; 15.22; 2 Cor 5.10; 11.2-3; Gal 3.16; Eph 1.10, 12, 20; 5.14; Phil 1.15, 17; 3.7. 
(“Messiahship of Jesus in Paul,” 17, 24 nn. 11 and 12). There is some overlap between these passages and the texts studied 
by Novenson to illustrate Paul’s use of Messiah language (Christ Among the Messiahs, 137–73): Rom 1.3–4; 9.1–5; 15.3, 7–
12; 1 Cor 1.23; 15.20–28; 2 Cor 1.21–22; 5.16–17; Gal 3.16.
26. Chester, “Christ of Paul,” 110 n. 7.
27. Chester, “Christ of Paul,” 109.
28. But see Novenson, Christ Among the Messiahs, 138–42; Wright, “Messiahship in Galatians”.
29. But see Wright, Faithfulness of God, 668 n. 157, 1333–35 and the brief comments by Martin Hengel, The Son of 
God: The Origin of Christology and the History of Jewish-Hellenistic Religion, trans. John Bowden (London: SCM, 
1976), 72–73.
30. Dahl, “Messiahship of Jesus in Paul,” 17.
31. Romans provides us with a mature and considered—although not comprehensive—statement of key aspects of 
Paul’s theology (James D. G. Dunn, The Theology of Paul the Apostle [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998], 25–26). 
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1),32 “Jesus Christ our Lord” (v. 4), “Jesus Christ” (v. 6), and “Lord Jesus Christ” (v. 7). A number of 
combinations of “Jesus,” “Christ,” and “Lord” are thus present and no specific meaning seems to 
adhere to any particular combination. Of interest, though, is Paul’s expansion and explanation of “his 
[God’s] Son” (v. 3)33 through the use of two balanced participial clauses: τουñ γενοµε'νου ε κ σpiε'ρµατος 
∆αυι`δ κατα` σα' ρκα, “descended from David according to the flesh” (1.3) and τουñ ο  ρισθε'ντος υι ουñ θεουñ 
ε ν δυνα' µει κατα` piνευñµα α  γιωσυ' νης ε ξ α  ναστα' σεως νεκρωñν, “declared to be Son of God with power 
according to the spirit of holiness by resurrection from the dead” (1.4).34
Paul’s own claim is that the gospel he is announcing was promised by God in the Jewish 
scriptures (Rom 1.2). Although there are no quotations from the Greek Scriptures in the passage under 
consideration, there is evidence that points to those texts as the source of Paul’s language about Jesus. 
The first participial clause provides the only explicit reference in the undisputed Pauline corpus to 
Jesus’ Davidic descent,35 suggesting to most commentators that Paul is using an inherited confessional 
formula.36 Novenson notes that 2 Samuel 22.51 LXX (= Ps 17.51 LXX) provides the linguistic 
combination of χριστο' ς, ∆αυει'δ, and σπε'ρµα.37 The link between “David” and “seed” is also found in 2 
Samuel 7.12. Although the term χριστο' ς is not present in 2 Samuel 7.12, Donald Juel has shown how 
the passage was understood in messianic terms by those producing the Qumran texts and by early 
Christians.38 Even if the way in which this LXX terminology is used to speak about Jesus is not 
original to Paul but is, instead, mediated through some pre-Pauline Christian tradition, its presence 
shows that Paul feels confident in what this language expresses about Jesus. In using this language, 
Paul anticipates the same tradition on display in the later New Testament writings which linked Jesus 
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32. Some early manuscripts, notably d26 א A, read “Jesus Christ.” The phrase in v. 1 was most likely attracted to this 
form found at vv. 4, 6, and 7.
33. The phrase “Son of God” will be dealt with below. It is worth noting, however, that both participial phrases are 
controlled by the identification of Jesus as “his [God’s] son” (v. 3), suggesting that there is an element of divine sonship that 
existed before the event described in v. 4 (C. E. B. Cranfield, The Epistle to the Romans, 2 volumes, ICC [Edinburgh: T&T 
Clark, 1975], 58).
34. See Joshua W. Jipp, “Ancient, Modern, and Future Interpretations of Romans 1:3–4: Reception History and 
Biblical Interpretation,” JTI 3.2 (2009): 241–59 for a survey of how these verses have been handled by ancient and modern 
interpreters.
35. Compare 2 Tim 2.8: “Remember Jesus Christ, raised from the dead, a descendant of David (ε κ σπε'ρµατος ∆αυι'δ)—
that is my gospel.”
36. Kramer, Christ, Lord, Son of God, 108–11; Cranfield, Romans, 57; Hengel, The Son of God, 59–60. For a history 
of the scholarly endeavour to identify and isolate the pre-Pauline tradition, see Robert Jewett, “The Redaction and Use of an 
Early Christian Confession in Romans 1:3–4,” in The Living Text: Essays in Honor of Ernest W. Saunders, ed. Dennis E. 
Groh and Robert Jewett (Lanham: University Press of America, 1985), 99–122. For one of the few challenges to this 
position, see Vern Sheridan Poythress, “Is Romans 13–4 a Pauline Confession After All?” ExpTim 87.6 (1976): 180–83.
37. Christ Among the Messiahs, 168. Paul’s familiarity with this psalm is evident from the fact that he cites Ps 17.50 
LXX at Rom 15.9. For the argument that Paul understands Jesus to be the Messiah who prays the psalms in Rom 15, see 
Richard B. Hays, “Christ Prays the Psalms: Israel’s Psalter as Matrix of Early Christology,” in The Conversion of the 
Imagination: Paul as Interpreter of Israel’s Scripture (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 101–18. Hays’s conclusions support 
the main point I am arguing with regard to Rom 1: that “the Davidic messiahship of Jesus is a significant aspect of Pauline 
Christology” and that “the conventional wisdom that Christos in Paul is a name, not a title, is seriously misleading” (p. 117).
38. Messianic Exegesis: Christological Interpretation of the Old Testament in Early Christianity (Philadelphia: 
Fortress, 1988), 59–88.
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to the Davidic dynasty.39 Thus, echoing language from the Jewish Scriptures, Paul identifies Jesus as 
the Messiah who stands in Israel’s royal line as David’s descendant.40  
Paul’s claim that these things were “promised beforehand through his prophets in the holy 
scriptures” (Rom 1.2) seems to be stretched to breaking point when it comes to the question of the 
resurrection.41 However, Martin Hengel argues that 2 Samuel 7.12 strengthens the link between 
Messiah and resurrection.42 God’s promise in this verse to establish the Davidic dynasty was translated 
into Greek as και` α  ναστη' σω το` σπε'ρµα σου µετα` σε' . Once it is accepted that Jesus stands in the line of 
David, it is easy to see how this text could have been connected to Jesus’ resurrection. Furthermore, 
Psalm 89 (which is thematically related to 2 Samuel 7) provided the early Christians with a text in 
which the Davidic Messiah experiences suffering, humiliation, and ultimately, vindication.43 Key royal 
passages in the Jewish Scriptures thus provide Paul with the language he uses to speak of Jesus as 
Messiah.
But Paul’s exegesis of certain biblical passages also shows that he considers Jesus to be the 
Davidic Messiah and that the importance of these texts for Paul extends beyond their provision of 
messianic language. In order to illustrate this we have to look to the conclusion of the body of 
Romans.44 The focus of Romans 15.7–13 is the work of Χριστο' ς that stands as an example to be 
followed (15.7). The collection of quotations from the three sections of the Jewish scriptures (Law: 
Deut 32.43; Prophets: Isa 11.10; Writings: Ps 18.49 [=2 Sam 22.50]; 117.1) are apparently drawn 
together by the catchword ε»θνη. But Paul’s choice of these passages is governed by another 
consideration. If it is accepted that Paul’s quotations, allusions, and echoes of the Jewish Scriptures 
evoke the larger context from which they are drawn, at least two of these quotations are messianic.45 
Psalm 17 LXX speaks of the suffering and vindication of God’s king (βασιλευ' ς) and anointed 
one/Messiah (χριστο' ς), that is, David and his descendant (σπε'ρµα) (Ps 17.51 LXX). We have already 
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39. See, e.g., Matt 1.1–17; Luke 1.32, 69; 3.23–38; John 7.42; Acts 2.30; Rev 3.7; 5.5; 22.16. The question as to the 
extent to which Paul was influenced by the same tradition that gave rise to these writings cannot be entered into at this point. 
40. Ps 17.51 LXX = 2 Sam 22.51 LXX heightens the link between king and messiah by identifying “his [God’s] king” 
(βασιλε'ως αυ  τουñ) with “his [God’s] Messiah” (τωñ,  χριστωñ,  αυ  τουñ). If Paul’s text is indeed influenced by this verse, he could 
not have missed the fact the Jesus is God’s Messiah and thus God’s king. 
41. Paul asserts in an earlier letter that the death and resurrection of Χριστο' ς  happened κατα` τα`ς γραφα' ς (1 Cor 15.3–
4). In his own mind, in any case, the link seems well established; see also Luke 24.25–27, 44–46; Acts 2.29–33 where the 
same link is made.
42. Hengel, The Son of God, 64; see also Wright, Faithfulness of God, 818–19.
43. Juel, Messianic Exegesis, 104–10.
44. Hays identifies this as “the letter’s rhetorical climax” (“Christ Prays the Psalms,” 114). The passage is usually seen 
as the conclusion to 14.1–15.6 (so Cranfield, Romans, 739; Joseph A. Fitzmyer, Romans: A New Translation with 
Introduction and Commentary, AB 33 [New York: Doubleday, 1993], 705–6).
45. See, e.g., Richard B. Hays, Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989). In 
contrast, Christopher Stanley (Arguing with Scripture: The Rhetoric of Quotations in the Letters of Paul [London: 
Continuum T & T Clark, 2004]) argues that Paul’s readers would not have made the sometimes complex connections 
suggested by Hays. Some of the methodological questions surrounding this matter are debated further by Steve Moyise, 
“Does Paul Respect the Context of His Quotations?” in Paul and Scripture: Extending the Conversation, ed. Christopher D. 
Stanley, ECL 9 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2012), 97–114 and Mitchell Kim, “Respect for Context and 
Authorial Intention: Setting the Epistemological Bar,” in Paul and Scripture: Extending the Conversation, ed. Christopher 
D. Stanley, ECL 9 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2012), 115–29.
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noted the possibility that these texts provides Paul with some of the Messiah language used in Romans 
1.1–7. The use of this passage at the end the body of the letter suggests a christological inclusio.46 This 
hypothesis is strengthened when the centrality of the resurrection, and thus, by implication, Christ’s 
suffering and death, is noted in the opening verses of the letter.47 Isaiah 11.10, the quotation found at 
Romans 15.12, speaks of the root of Jesse that “stands up to rule nations.” The passage that precedes 
this, Isaiah 11.1–9, was discussed in detail in Chapter 4 in terms of its contribution to royal ideology. 
Paul’s use of Isaiah 11 brings that complex of ideas, including the future Davidic Messiah, into view.48 
This quotation from Isaiah also raises the theme of the Messiah’s eschatological rule over the nations, 
the same theme that occurs in Psalm 17 LXX. The reason (δια` τουñτο; Ps 17.49 LXX) for the Messiah’s 
praise of the Lord is his vindication (vv. 47–50), which includes the subjugation of the nations.49 
From this brief consideration of Paul’s quotations in Romans 15, I would argue that Paul reads 
these messianic texts from the Jewish scriptures as speaking about Jesus. Not only does he understand 
Jesus’ ministry and messiahship in the light of the Jewish scriptures (Rom 1.2), but his understanding 
of own ministry is also shaped by the messianic shape of those scriptures.
The focus of Paul’s ministry is, according to Romans 1.5, “to bring about the obedience of faith 
among all the Gentiles (ει ς υ  piακοη`ν πι'στεως ε  ν piαñσιν τοιñς ε»θνεσιν) for the sake of his name [i.e., 
“Jesus Christ our Lord” (see v. 4)].” The same phrase is found in the letter’s concluding paragraph 
(Rom 16.26; cf. 16.19).50 . At the start of the letter’s concluding section, Paul once again speaks of his 
ministry in terms of the obedience of the Gentiles (Rom 15.18). These references point to the 
importance of obedience in the letter.51 More will be said below about obedience and its attendant 
virtue, faith. Here it is important to notice that the theme of obedience also points to its corollary, 
Christ’s ruling function, the same theme we saw introduced through the quotation of Isaiah 11.10. 
Although Kenneth Pomykala’s study concludes that “there existed in early Judaism no continuous, 
widespread, or dominant expectation for a Davidic messiah,” what his study also demonstrates is the 
existence of Jewish texts in which a stubborn thread ties the Davidic dynasty to messianic 
expectations.52 Paul’s letter to the Romans would seem to provide another example of just such a 
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46. Hays, “Christ Prays the Psalms,” 116; Jipp, “Romans 1:3–4,” 258.
47. For the claim that the resurrection provides the interpretive key to the entire letter, see J. R. Daniel Kirk, Unlocking 
Romans: Resurrection and the Justification of God (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008).
48. For a more detailed study of the way in which the quotations in Rom 15 inform our understanding of Paul’s 
implicit Christology, see Hays, “Christ Prays the Psalms”. The results of Hays’ work are applied to Romans 1 by Christopher 
G. Whitsett, “Son of God, Seed of David: Paul’s Messianic Exegesis in Romans 2[sic]:3–4,” JBL 119.4 (2000): 661–81. 
49. The use of λαοι' at Ps 17.47 LXX instead of ε»θνη (cf. v. 49) reflects the Hebrew which has םימע and םיוג in vv. 47 
and 49 (Ps 18.48, 50 MT), respectively. The consistent use of the plural indicates that the nations are in view throughout. 
50. For the argument that chapter 16 is indeed part of Paul’s original letter, see Harry Gamble Jr., The Textual History 
of the Letter to the Romans: A Study in Textual and Literary Criticism, SD 42 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977).
51. Fitzmyer (Romans, 237) thinks “obedience” has “a pejorative connotation” at Rom 1.5 and prefers to translate the 
phrase as “a commitment of faith” (cf. 1.8; 15.18; 16.19, 26). But in Romans it is not obedience per se that is problematic (so 
Rom 5.19), rather, the object of obedience determines whether obedience is seen positively or negatively (Rom 6.16).
52. The Davidic Dynasty Tradition in Early Judaism: Its History and Significance for Messianism, Early Judaism and 
Its Literature 7 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1995), 270; see also Joseph A. Fitzmyer, The One Who is to Come (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2007), 33–133 for a discussion of the development of the idea of the Davidic dynasty in the Jewish scriptures, the 
Septuagint, and extrabiblical Jewish writings. In addition to the texts mentioned in the preceding discussion, the link between 
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text.53 It is true, as Martin Hengel, observes, that Paul never advances proof from the scriptures that 
Jesus is the Messiah, but that he assumes it.54 On the basis of the observations made regarding Jesus’ 
Davidic lineage and messianic rule in Romans, we are warranted in taking Paul’s use of Χριστο' ς at 
face value. The gospel that Paul announces, which he finds adumbrated in the Jewish scriptures, does 
indeed have as its focus the Davidic king, the Messiah, Jesus.55
The second participial clause in Romans 1.3–4 provides us with a suitable starting point for 
establishing the royal significance of the second “title of majesty,” namely, “Son of God.”56 
Son of God
 I start this section with a discussion of some Pauline passages in which the royal Son of God 
makes an appearance. This is followed by a brief discussion of the possible antecedents for Paul’s 
sonship language. In addressing the question in this order I am following the example of Martin 
Hengel’s short but influential study.57  
In Romans 1.4, Paul states that through his resurrection from the dead,58 God’s Son (Rom 1.3) is 
now shown to be “Son of God with power.”59 Jesus’ resurrection proves to be an inflection point:60 
following this event it is no longer adequate to think of Jesus’ messiahship purely in terms of his 
human descent within the David line since it now continues in a different sphere.61 Summarizing his 
gospel in 1 Thessalonians 1.9–10,62 Paul commends the church for the reports that they “wait 
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the Davidic dynasty/seed and the messianic king is drawn in Jer 23.5–6; 30.9; 33.14–18; Ezek 34.23–24; 37.24–25; Pss Sol 
17.21.
53. Because Paul’s writings are often the object of study, it is easy to miss the fact that they also provide additional 
examples of Jewish messianic texts, as Novenson points out (Christ Among the Messiahs, 8–10, 176–78).
54. “‘Christos’ in Paul,” 67. Similarly, Donald Juel writes, “The confession of Jesus as Messiah is the presupposition 
of NT theology, not necessarily its content” (Messianic Exegesis, 81).
55. Additional arguments for this conclusion as they pertain to Paul’s other writings can be found in Wright, 
“ΧΡΙΣΤΟΣ As ‘Messiah’”; Wright, “Messiahship in Galatians”. Novenson (Christ Among the Messiahs) argues that “Christ” 
is an honorific that is capable of bearing the royal weight for which I have argued in this section. 
56. The capitalization of “Son of God” and “Son” here and elsewhere indicates my understanding that it is primarily 
used in a titular sense. However, I consider the significance of the title to lie in the filial relationship it expresses (so Larry W. 
Hurtado, “Jesus’ Divine Sonship in Paul’s Epistle to the Romans,” in Romans and the People of God: Essays in Honor of 
Gordon D. Fee on the Occasion of His 65th Birthday, ed. Sven K. Soderlund and N. T. Wright [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1999], 221–22).   
57. Hengel, The Son of God; cf. Hurtado, “Jesus’ Divine Sonship” who takes the same approach for his study of 
sonship in Romans.
58. The preposition in the phrase ε ξ α  ναστα'σεως νεκρωñν might be understood causally or temporally (Hahn, Titles of 
Jesus, 250). It seems that both are in view in Rom 1.4: the resurrection is both the way in which God exalts Jesus and the 
point in time from which his exaltation becomes evident (James D. G. Dunn, “Jesus—Flesh and Spirit: An Exposition of 
Romans I. 3–4,” JTS NS 24.1 [1973]: 57 n. 1).
59. Most recent commentators understand ε  ν δυνα' µει to be modifying υι ουñ  θεουñ  rather than ο  ρισθε' ντος (e.g., 
Cranfield, Romans, 62; Fitzmyer, Romans, 235; Richard N. Longenecker, The Epistle to the Romans: A Commentary on the 
Greek Text, NIGTC [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2016], 68–69); see Robert Jewett, Romans: A Commentary, Hermeneia 
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 2007), 107 for a dissenting voice. 
60. For the determinative nature of the resurrection on Paul’s understanding of Jesus, see N. T. Wright, The 
Resurrection of the Son of God, vol. 3 of Christian Origins and the Question of God (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2003), 241–67; 
for Rom 1.3–4, see pp. 242-45.
61. It is this to which κατα` πνευñµα α  γιωσυ' νης refers. The contrast between the Son’s messianic work κατα` σα' ρκα and 
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(α  ναµε' νω) for [God’s] Son from heaven, whom he raised from the dead—Jesus, who rescues us 
( Ι  ησουñν το`ν ρ  υο' µενον η  µαñς) from the coming wrath” (1.10). Just as in Romans 1, following his 
resurrection, Jesus is understood to have ascended to heaven as the Son of God. The question remains 
whether this, too, reflects an element of kingly rule. First Corinthians 15 indicates that this is indeed the 
case. 
The general discussion in 1 Corinthians is about the resurrection. In 15.20–28, Paul sketches out 
an eschatological timeline in which the return of the Messiah (v. 23)—the one who has already been 
raised—occurs immediately before or at the same time as “the end” (v. 24), at which time
he hands over the kingdom to God the Father (ο«ταν παραδιδωñ,  τη`ν βασιλει'αν τωñ,  θεωñ,  και` 
piατρι'), after he has destroyed every ruler and every authority and power. For he must reign (δειñ 
γα`ρ αυ  το`ν βασιλευ' ειν) until he has put all his enemies under his feet. The last enemy to be 
destroyed is death. (1 Cor 15.24–26)
Finally, “When all things are subjected to him, then the Son himself will also be subjected to the one 
who put all things in subjection under him, so that God may be all in all” (1 Cor 15.28). The details of 
the eschatological timeline and the unfolding of God’s reign described here have occasioned some 
disagreement.63 But regardless of where one places the rule of Christ temporally, the importance of this 
passage for my study is its use of both “Messiah” and “Son of God” to speak of Jesus in terms of one 
who reigns as God’s vice-regent or plenipotentiary. The quotation of Psalm 8.7 and the allusion to 
Psalm 109.1 LXX in vv. 27 and 25, respectively, further this impression.64 
Psalm 8.5 LXX identifies the subject of the psalm as a “son of man” (υι ο`ς α  νθρω' που), a human 
being who is crowned with glory and honour, set up over the works of God’s hands, and under whose 
feet all things have been subjected (vv. 6–7). At Hebrews 2.6–8 (and probably Ephesians 1.22) this 
figure in Psalm 8 is identified as the resurrected Jesus. Similarly, Psalm 109 LXX was regularly read by 
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κατα` πνευñµα is not to be understood antithetically (Dahl, “Messiahship of Jesus in Paul,” 19–20) or in terms of quality 
(contra Dunn, “Jesus—Flesh and Spirit”; James D. G. Dunn, Romans, 2 volumes, WBC 38 [Dallas: Word, 1988], 19–20). 
62. So Seyoon Kim, “Jesus the Son of God as the Gospel (1 Thess 1:9–10 and Rom 1:3–4),” in Earliest Christian 
History: History, Literature, and Theology: Essays from the Tyndale Fellowship in Honor of Martin Hengel, ed. Michael F. 
Bird and Jason Maston, WUNT 2/320 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012), 117–41. Abraham Malherbe points out that, strictly 
speaking, this is not a summary of Paul’s preaching but of their belief (The Letters to the Thessalonians: A New Translation 
with Introduction and Commentary, AB 32B [New York: Doubleday, 2000], 132). It is not unreasonable, however, to expect 
a resemblance between the two.
63. L. Joseph Kreitzer, Jesus and God in Paul’s Eschatology, JSNTSup 19 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 
1987), 131–64 argues that, similar to some apocalyptic texts (4 Ezra and 2 Baruch), 1 Cor 15 envisages a temporal, earthly 
messianic kingdom inaugurated by Jesus’ parousia, and which is eventually replaced by God’s eternal, heavenly rule. 
Against this position, Charles Hill argues that Paul sees Jesus’ reign inaugurated at his ascension (“Paul’s Understanding of 
Christ’s Kingdom in 1 Corinthians 15:20–28,” NovT 30.4 [1988]: 297–320; see also Gordon D. Fee, The First Epistle to the 
Corinthians, NICNT [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987], 755–56). 
64. For Paul’s use of the LXX at this point, see John Paul Heil, The Rhetorical Role of Scripture in 1 Corinthians, 
SBLStBL 15 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2005), 205–11; on 1 Cor 15.27, see also Christopher D. Stanley, Paul 
and the Language of Scripture: Citation Technique in the Pauline Epistles and Contemporary Literature, SNTSMS 69 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 206–7. Stanley recognizes the allusion to Ps 109.1 LXX, but ignores the 
passage for methodological reasons.
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early Jewish and Christian interpreters as messianic.65 Both of these verses have undergone a 
“christological transposition” in Paul’s hands.66 In both cases, the Psalms originally speak of God 
subjecting all things under the feet of a human being (Ps 8)67 or his king (Ps 109 LXX). Paul has Christ 
subjecting all things under his own feet.68 The start of this process is Jesus’ resurrection. From that 
time onward he reigns in order to destroy “every ruler and every authority and power” (παñσαν α  ρχη`ν 
και` παñσαν ε  ξουσι'αν και` δυ' ναµιν; v. 24), following which, he returns sovereignty back to God, his 
Father (v. 24), “so that God may be all in all” (v. 28). Paul thus finds in the Jewish Scriptures the idea 
of one who rules universally under God’s rule, and the language of sonship in relation to this rule is 
found in Psalm 8 and Psalm 109 LXX.69 But this does not explain Paul’s use of “Son of God.” What 
might the title have suggested to Paul and his readers?  
We begin by noting the corporate use of this language. Groups of people were referred to as “sons 
of God” in the Septuagint,70 a usage with which Paul is familiar.71 But Paul’s articular references to 
Jesus as “the Son of God” or “his (i.e., God’s) Son”72 are of a different nature. N. T. Wright argues that 
within the Jewish world, “son of God” would be heard as referring to Israel as a corporate entity or to 
Israel’s king.73 This royal association would be strengthened if Martin Hengel’s suggestion that υι ο`ς 
θεουñ was derived from παιñς θεουñ is correct.74 That the latter phrase is understood as a royal appellation 
amongst early Christians can be seen in Acts 4 where, in close proximity, both David and Jesus are 
identified as the Lord’s “servant” (Acts 4.25, 27). The royal association with the phrase “son of God” 
is further strengthened by two scrolls found at Qumran. The first, 4Q174, a florilegium of messianic 
texts, interprets 2 Samuel 7 along messianic lines, identifying the son (2 Sam 7.13–14) as a “branch of 
David” (דיוד חמצ) who will arise to restore the Davidic line. The second, 4Q246, speaks of a future ruler 
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65. For further discussion, see David M. Hay, Glory at the Right Hand: Psalm 110 in Early Christianity, SBLMS 18 
(Nashville: Abingdon, 1973); Martin Hengel, “‘Sit at My Right Hand!’ The Enthronement of Christ at the Right Hand of 
God and Psalm 110:1,” in Studies in Early Christology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), 119–225. 
66. Jan Lambrecht, “Paul’s Christological Use of Scripture in 1 Cor. 15:20–28,” NTS 28 (1982): 507. It is also possible 
that Paul draws on an earlier Christian tradition at this point (see pp. 508, 512). 
67. For a discussion of the Adamic overtones in this passage, see below.
68. Fee, 1 Corinthians, 755–56, contra Hengel, “‘Sit at My Right Hand!’,” 165 who nevertheless allows for “the 
interchangeability or the unity of action of God and Christ.”
69. Hay identifies “a significant but not major tradition” in which titles of divine sonship were interpreted together with 
Psalm 110 (Glory, 110). 
70. The term might refer to heavenly beings (Gen 6.2, 4; Job 1.6; Ps 88.7 LXX) or Israel (Deut 32.43 LXX; Hos 2.1 
LXX) or, more broadly, God’s people (Wis 5.5; Ps Sol 17.27).
71. E.g., Rom 8.14, 19; Gal 3.26; 4.6.
72. “The Son of God” (Rom 1.4; 2 Cor 1.19; Gal 2.20); “his Son” (e.g., Rom 1.3; 5.10; 1 Cor 1.9; 15.28; Gal 1.16; 4.4; 
1 Thess 1.10). This usage stands in contrast to the anarthrous use of the singular at Gal 4.7 to speak of the Christian. As 
Hurtado argues, “Paul’s consistent use of the definite article seems intended to make a strong distinction between the use of 
divine-sonship rhetoric for others and what he intends to assert as true of Jesus” (“Jesus’ Divine Sonship,” 222).
73. Resurrection, 724 (cf. Bousset, Kyrios Christos, 91–94). Israel: Exod 4.22 (πρωτο' τοκος); Jer 31.9 (πρωτο' τοκος); 
Hos 11.1 (νη' πιος); Mal 1.6 (υι ο' ς; implied). These references are singular and thus dennote Israel as a body, in contrast to 
those in n. 70 which use plural nouns to refer to the people of God. King: 2 Sam 7.14; 1 Chr 17.13; Pss 2.7; 89.26–27.
74. Hengel, The Son of God, 65. For the LXX use of this term in a royal context, see, e.g., 1 Chr 17 passim; 2 Chr 6 
passim; Ps 17.1 LXX. 
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as “Son of God” and “Son of the Most High.”75 These texts indicate that “Son of God” was understood 
in a messianic, and thus kingly, sense in Jewish texts of the Second Temple period, opening the 
possibility that Paul used this title in the same way.76
If we turn from the Jewish scriptures to the Greek and Graeco-Roman world, the texts examined 
in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 of this dissertation contain allusions to the language of divine sonship, but 
this phenomenon does not play a major role in their construction of kingship.77 We noted that Cyrus 
was provided with a divine genealogy, but that Xenophon chose to play down the tradition, preferring 
to attribute the king’s success to his superior leadership. There is nothing about Nicocles’ heritage in 
To Nicocles, but when Isocrates writes in the king’s voice, he mentions the king’s divine genealogy 
(Nic. 42) in order to make an argument against illegitimate offspring. The king’s superiority—and thus 
implicit authority—comes from the virtues he has cultivated, rather than from his origin. 
The most obvious parallel to Paul’s language of divine sonship is found in Roman imperial 
ideology. More than a century ago, Adolf Deissmann pointed to the designation of the Roman emperor 
as divi filius and θεουñ υι ο' ς in inscriptions scattered across the Mediterranean world.78 The post-mortem 
deification of an emperor meant that his son became the “son of a god,” and this formed part of the new 
emperor’s legitimation. As Edward Pillar concludes: 
The desire to claim the relationship of son to the new [imperial] divinity may demonstrate 
awareness that the deification of the emperor after death was in fact a vitally important aspect 
of the legitimization of the rule of the successor.79
Imperial apotheosis and divine sonship did not necessarily coincide with the imperial cult, but these 
phenomena were related, as indicated by the inscription from Gytheum of festival regulations for 
celebrating the imperial cult (ca. 15 CE): “[The agoranomos] shall celebrate the first day for the god 
Caesar Augustus, son of the god <Caesar>, our Saviour and Deliverer.”80 
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75. See, further, Craig A. Evans, “Jesus and the Dead Sea Scrolls from Cave 4,” in Eschatology, Messianism, and the 
Dead Sea Scrolls, ed. Craig A. Evans and Peter W. Flint, SDSSRL 1 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), 92–94; Florentino 
García Martínez, “Divine Sonship at Qumran: Between the Old and the New Testament,” in Biblical Traditions in 
Transmission: Essays in Honour of Michael A. Knibb, ed. Charlotte Hempel and Judith M. Lieu (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 109–
32; Adela Yarbro Collins and John Joseph Collins, King and Messiah as Son of God: Divine, Human, and Angelic Messianic 
Figures in Biblical and Related Literature (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), 65–73.
76. James Charlesworth provides thirteen additional examples of the “son of God” in early Jewish literature (Jesus 
Within Judaism: New Light from Exciting Archaeological Discoveries, ABRL [New York: Doubleday, 1988], 149–52).
77. More recent studies of imperial cult avoid philosophical sources (see, e.g., Ittai Gradel, Emperor Worship and 
Roman Religion [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002], 3–4), preferring to approach these questions through archaeology, 
sociology, and ritual. 
78. Adolf Deissmann, Bible Studies: Contributions Chiefly from Papyri and Inscriptions to the History of the 
Language, the Literature, and the Religion of Hellenistic Judaism and Primitive Christianity, trans. Alexander Grieve 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1901), 166–67; Adolf Deissmann, Light from the Ancient East: The New Testament Illustrated by 
Recently Discovered Texts of the Graeco-Roman World, 2nd ed., trans. Lionel R. M. Strachan (1910; repr., London: Hodder 
& Stoughton, 1927), 350. For a recent discussion and further examples, see Edward Pillar, Resurrection as Anti-Imperial 
Gospel: 1 Thessalonians 1:9b-10 in Context, Emerging Scholars (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2013), 195–98; Stanley E. Porter, 
“The Son of God and the Messiah and Jesus,” in Sacred Tradition in the New Testament: Tracing Old Testament Themes in 
the Gospels and Epistles (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2016), 108–9.
79. Resurrection, 198.
80. Mary Beard, John A. North, and Simon R. F. Price, A Sourcebook, vol. 2 of Religions of Rome (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 254 [10.5a] = SEG XI.923.7–40. For a discussion of the imperial cults, see the first 
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The possibility that language from the imperial cult provided the background to Paul’s usage had 
been noted but dismissed by Bousset because, he claimed, the cult of the emperor was not dominant in 
the time that Paul wrote.81 More recent research on Roman religion and the imperial cult has 
challenged Bousset’s claim, arguing that emperor worship was more pervasive than previously thought, 
and also that it functioned more subtly than an earlier generation had assumed.82 N. T. Wright can thus 
claim that the imperial cult had, in Paul’s time, become “the dominant cult in a large part of the 
empire.”83
In both Jewish and Graeco-Roman traditions, “Son of God” thus carries royal overtone. Whether 
or not the parallel between Paul’s language and imperial ideology explain the origin of Paul’s use of 
“Son of God,”84  the language of divine sonship would have been understood by many of Paul’s 
readers against that background, especially if the Jewish messianic overtones were lost on Paul’s non-
Jewish readers.85 Nevertheless, the Pauline passages investigated above demonstrate that the Son of 
God was still, for Paul, linked to messianic and Jewish royal ideas.  
Lord
The final title of majesty to consider is κυ' ριος which speaks broadly of one having power and 
authority, and is thus commonly used as a term of deference.86 As was the case with the titular use of 
“Son of God,” the term resonates within a number of Jewish and Graeco-Roman contexts. With regards 
to the Graeco-Roman background to this title, Bousset argued that it is central to understanding the 
development of Christology in the Hellenistic church and that κυ' ριος had its roots in Greek cults of 
various deities and rulers.87 Other scholars have demonstrated the possibility that the Jewish scriptures 
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volume: A History, vol. 1 of Religions of Rome (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 348–63.
81. Bousset, Kyrios Christos, 207 n. 142.
82. See, e.g., the seminal work of Simon R. F. Price, Rituals and Power: The Roman Imperial Cult in Asia Minor 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) and now that of his student Gradel, Emperor Worship. Michael Peppard, 
The Son of God in the Roman World: Divine Sonship in Its Social and Political Context (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011), 31–85 offers a careful discussion of the divinity of the Roman emperor and the nature of sonship in the Roman 
Empire seen in the light of this new paradigm. The relationship between the earliest Christians and the imperial cult is 
examined thoroughly by Bruce W. Winter, Divine Honours for the Caesars: The First Christians’ Responses (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2015).
83. “Paul’s Gospel and Caesar’s Empire (2000),” in Pauline Perspectives: Essays on Paul 1978–2013 (Minneapolis: 
Fortress, 2013), 170.
84. For a fuller discussion of the problems behind the various Graeco-Roman antecedents, see Hengel, The Son of 
God, 23–41. The emperor cult is discussed briefly on p. 30.
85. So Deissmann, Bible Studies, 166–67; Bousset, Kyrios Christos, 207; Rudolf Bultmann, Theology of the New 
Testament, 2 volumes, trans. Kendrick Grobel (New York: Scribner, 1951–55), 1.128; Porter, “Son of God, Messiah, 
Jesus,” 111. Similarly, Peppard (Son of God) chooses to investigate the way in which divine sonship and adoption would 
have “resonated” with Mark’s audience, rather than questions around the origin of Mark’s language.
86. On the meaning of κυ' ριος in first-century Koine, see Joseph D. Fantin, The Lord of the Entire World: Lord Jesus, a 
Challenge to Lord Caesar? NTMon 31 (Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2011), 149–90.
87. Kyrios Christos, 121–52. The Aramaic Maranatha transliterated by Paul at 1 Cor 16.22 remains problematic for 
Bousset’s thesis since it suggests that Jesus was first called “Lord” in a setting in which Aramaic was spoken; see Arthur 
Darby Nock, Early Gentile Christianity and Its Hellenistic Background (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 32–35; Moule, 
Origin of Christology, 36–38 and the articles by Fitzmyer referenced in the following footnote.
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provide Paul with this language.88 Approaching the question from a slightly different angle, William 
Horbury argues that the cult of Christ developed from Jewish messianic cults which had, in turn, been 
influenced by Greek and Graeco-Roman ruler cults.89
Paul shows that he is aware of the use of κυ' ριος to speak of Graeco-Roman deities (1 Cor 8.5) but 
he also affirms the exclusivity of Jesus Christ as Lord (ειðς κυ' ριος Ι  ησουñς Χριστο`ς; 1 Cor 8.6). Paul’s 
use of the term in its absolute sense, ο   κυ' ριος, indicates Jesus’ “special status and dignity.”90 In 
particular, Jesus’ lordship is associated at a number of places with his death and resurrection,91 which 
seems paradoxical, but is explained in the Philippian “hymn” (Phil 2.6–11). Jesus’ humble obedience 
to death on the cross is predicated as the reason for his exaltation: διο` και` ο   θεο`ς αυ  το`ν υ  περυ' ψωσεν (v. 
9a). As part of this exaltation God gives Jesus “the name that is above every name” (v. 9b–c), that is, 
“Lord.” There is some debate as to whether or not “Lord” is indeed the name that Jesus receives,92 but 
if verse 11 provides the climax of this section, the confession that “Jesus Christ is Lord” would seem to 
be conclusive. Jesus’ lordship is thus the climax of his vindication by God. This passage thus mirrors 
the pattern found in Romans 1.3–4: Jesus ignominious death is followed by divine exaltation which, in 
both cases, means that he is called Κυ' ριος.
Paul’s appropriation of the language of Isaiah in Philippians 2.10–11 confirms in a striking way 
that κυ' ριος is understood in terms of Jesus’ universal rule. In Isaiah 45.23 it is God who says, ‘to me 
every knee shall bow, every tongue shall acknowledge God’ (NETS). The passage emphasizes the 
exclusive nature of YHWH as god and saviour (Isa 45.21) and this is certainly the way Paul 
understands it in Romans 14.11. Yet in Philippians, Paul asserts that it is Jesus who receives the 
universal worship that elsewhere belongs properly to YHWH. If it is true, as some have argued, that 
this passage is meant as a polemic aimed at the emperor,93 this serves further to confirm the aspects of 
rulership and authority inherent in the confession that “Jesus Christ is κυ' ριος.”
In this section I have not attempted to argue either that a distinct Christology adheres to each of 
the “titles of majesty,”94 or that the titles bear their full semantic weight every time they are used. 
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88. Hengel, The Son of God, 77–83; Moule, Origin of Christology, 35–46; Joseph A. Fitzmyer, “The Semitic 
Background of the New Testament Kyrios-Title,” in A Wandering Aramean: Collected Aramaic Essays; Joseph A. Fitzmyer, 
SBLMS 25 (Chico: Scholars Press, 1979), 115–42; Joseph A. Fitzmyer, “New Testament Kyrios and Maranatha and Their 
Aramaic Background,” in To Advance the Gospel: New Testament Studies, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids; Cambridge: Eerdmans, 
1998), 218–35.
89. Jewish Messianism, 109–52.
90. Dunn, Theology of Paul, 245.
91. See, e.g., Rom 4.24; 10.9; 1 Cor 2.8; 6.14 and Dunn, Theology of Paul, 244–52.
92. While some suggest the name is “Jesus” (e.g., C. F. D. Moule, “Further Reflexions on Philippians 2:5–11,” in 
Apostolic History and the Gospel: Biblical and Historical Essays Presented to F. F. Bruce, ed. W. Ward Gasque and Ralph 
P. Martin (Exeter: Paternoster Press, 1970), 265–76), most agree that the name is “the Lord” (e.g., Stephen E. Fowl, 
Philippians, THNTC [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005], 102–5; G. Walter Hansen, The Letter to the Philippians, PNTC 
[Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009], 162–63; Markus Bockmuehl, The Epistle to the Philippians, BNTC [Peabody: 
Hendrickson, 1998], 143 and Ralph P. Martin, A Hymn of Christ: Philippians 2:5–11 in Recent Interpretation and in the 
Setting of Early Christian Worship [Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1997], 239–47, with the bibliography at p. 245 n. 1). 
93. So Bockmuehl, Philippians, 143–44, 147; Fantin, Lord of the World, 252–59. See, further, Samuel Vollenweider’s 
essay in which he argues that Jesus is portrayed in Philippians 2.6–11 as an antitype of hubristic rulers (“Der ‘Raub’ der 
Gottgleichheit: Ein religionsgeschichtlicher Vorschlag zu Phil 2.6[-11],” NTS 45 [1999]: 413–33). 
94. Heeding the warning given by Hurtado, “Retrospect and Prospect,” 23. 
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Rather, I have shown that “Christ,” “Son of God,” and “Lord” are each able to carry connotations of 
royal rule in Paul’s writings. I have not attempted to argue conclusively for a particular origin for each 
of these titles. They are found with royal connotations in Jewish and Graeco-Roman sources. If pushed 
to make a decision, I would most likely follow William Horbury in his conclusion that while these titles 
recall the Graeco-Roman ruler cults, they come to Paul from the Jewish Scriptures and Jewish 
messianism.95   
From this perspective, then, it is a truism to say that Jesus was, in Paul’s eyes, “king” and would 
have been identified as such on the basis of these titles by Jewish and Graeco-Roman auditors of Paul’s 
letters. If Jesus’ kingship was an important element in Paul’s thought, we should expect this role to be 
reinforced by Paul’s description of Jesus’ relationships and deeds. In the remainder of this chapter I 
examine these relationships and deeds against the backdrop of the different elements that make up the 
Hellenistic περι` βασιλει'ας topos outlined in the earlier chapters of this study. 
Jesus as God’s Vice-Regent
The relationship between God and king is not as important in the earliest Greek texts studied in 
chapters 2 and 3 as it is in the Pythagorean and Jewish texts. In the first group of texts, there is a sense 
in which the king should imitate God in ruling over the earthly realm as God rules the heavenly realm, 
but the language remains largely impersonal and almost mechanical. In the second group, however, we 
find texts that speak of the divine creation and sending of the king (Ecphantus) or of the divine 
appointment of the king (Deuteronomy; Psalms; Isaiah) to rule on earth as God’s vice-regent.96 Philo’s 
Moses is perhaps the best example of this: not only is God’s guiding hand present from his birth 
(Moses 1.12, 17, 19) but he is given his office by God (1.148), and this office is described in terms of 
shared rule (1.155) which extends to Moses sharing the title of “god and king” with God (1.158).
The preceding discussion of Jesus’ royal titles establishes kingship as a foundational element of 
Paul’s understanding of Jesus’ person. Jesus is understood to exercise his royal rule not independently, 
but as God’s vice-regent or plenipotentiary. This dependency is illustrated in a number of ways.
In Philippians 2.6–11, it is God who exalts Christ (v. 9). Following, as it does, the statement about 
Jesus’ death on the cross, this verse must refer, at the very least, to the resurrection (cf., e.g., Rom 10.9; 
1 Cor 6.14; Gal 1.1). Also in view, however, is Christ’s exaltation to a position of honour and power at 
God’s right hand (cf. Rom 8.34), as implied by the universal worship that Christ receives in Philippians 
2.10–11. Christ’s position at God’s right hand is an allusion to Psalm 110.1 where the throne next to 
God’s throne “symbolizes highest honour and closeness to Yahweh.”97 Christ’s relationship to God is 
thus defined by the fact that it is God who exalts Christ following Christ’s obedience (Phil 2.9–11), 
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Ephesians, WUNT 2/313 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), 175 provides a list of passages from the Imperial period that 
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LHBOTS 527 (New York: T&T Clark, 2010), 248–91.
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rather than Christ exalting himself. And even this exaltation and the worship received by Christ is “to 
the glory of God the Father” (Phil 2.11). Furthermore, Christ’s reign is understood to culminate with 
his handing over of the kingdom to God the Father, following which Christ will be made subject to 
God’s reign (1 Corinthians 15.20–28). Christ is thus seen to play a central role in God’s dealing with 
the world, but there will come a point in time at which this role will cease and God will himself be seen 
as the great king under whom everything is subjected. 
Jesus’ dependence on God is further illustrated by the role that God’s Spirit plays in Jesus’ work. 
Jesus’ baptism is understood as a sign of his messianic identity in both the Synoptic tradition and 
John’s Gospel (Matt 3.13–17; Mark 1.9–13; Luke 3.21–22; cf. 4.16–21; John 1.32–34), but although 
the Spirit is central in Paul’s theology,98 he does not refer to the Spirit’s role in Jesus’ baptism. 
However, it was observed in the earlier discussion of Romans 1.3–4 that the “spirit of holiness” 
(πνευñµα α  γιωσυ' νης) plays a role in Jesus’ resurrection and exaltation. Scholars continue to debate the 
precise meaning of this phrase (which is found only here in Paul’s writings)—whether it is a reference 
to God’s Spirit or to the spiritual realm.99 Elsewhere, Paul writes that Jesus was raised by the Father’s 
glory (δο' ξα) (Rom 6.4) and by God’s power (δυ' ναµις) (1 Cor 6.14) and that Jesus lives by God’s 
power (δυ' ναµις) following his crucifixion (2 Cor 13.4). If God’s Spirit is the means by which God acts 
powerfully in the world,100 then we are justified in understanding Romans 1.4 as a reference to the 
Spirit of God and to see the Spirit’s involvement in Jesus’ resurrection.101 And if the Spirit’s role in 
Jesus’ resurrection is recognized and placed alongside the centrality of the resurrection in Jesus’ 
exaltation as Lord (Rom 1.3–4), then we might recognize something of the pneumatological element of 
Old Testament kingship ideology (see above, ch. 4) in this relationship.
In this section we have noted that Christ’s kingship is not exercised independently of God’s, but 
that Christ is portrayed as God’s vice-regent. His obedience in Philippians 2 is rewarded as God exalts 
him, but, as 1 Corinthians 15 shows, God’s kingly reign is ultimate and supreme.102 In the sections that 
follow, we will note how, as God’s vice-regent, Jesus fulfills a number of royal roles.  
Jesus as Judge
The role of judge and the dispensing of justice was central in ancient conceptions of kingship, 
from Cyrus’ education (Cyr. 1.2–3) to Diotogenes’ “most just man” (ο   δικαιο' τατος) who fulfills the 
roles of general, judge, and priest (72.6–23). While the king’s judicial functions are curtailed in 
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Letters of Paul [Peabody: Hendrickson, 1994], 478–84) argues that the reference is to the Holy Spirit but that “the Spirit in 
the passage probably has to do with the heavenly, eschatological sphere of life, into which Christ by resurrection has now 
entered” (p. 484).
100. James D. G. Dunn, Christology in the Making: A New Testament Inquiry Into the Origins of the Doctrine of the 
Incarnation, 2nd ed. (London: SCM, 1989), 133; Fitzmyer, Romans, 124.
101. So Schnelle, Apostle Paul, 487; others deny that the Spirit was the “means” by which God raised Jesus (see, e.g., 
Fee, God’s Presence, 484), arguing that it is always God who is active in the resurrection.
102. On this theme, see further Larry W. Hurtado, God in New Testament Theology, Library of Biblical Theology 
(Nashville: Abingdon, 2010), 53–55.
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Deuteronomy 17, other Septuagint texts emphasize this aspect of ancient kingship. The royal figure in 
Isaiah 11, for example, is said to judge with righteousness and Psalm 72 prays that God will give the 
king right judgement so that he might judge with justice (vv.1–2). This theme takes an eschatological 
turn in Psalm 109.5–6 LXX where the lord enthroned at God’s right hand will “judge among the 
nations” on “the day of his wrath.” Given the confusion of pronouns in this psalm, it is possible that 
this “day of wrath” was interpreted with reference to the king. It is more likely, however, in keeping 
with other passages in the Jewish scriptures, that it was understood to refer to the eschatological day of 
God’s wrath and judgment, often referred to as “the day of the Lord.”103
In Paul’s writings, the eschatological day of judgment is interpreted christologically. Paul knows 
of the day of God’s wrath and judgment (Rom 2.1–11; cf. 1.18; 3.6), but God’s judgment happens 
“through Jesus Christ” (Rom 2.16).104 Romans 14.10 envisages all people standing before God’s 
“judgment seat” (βηñµα), but in 2 Corinthians 5.10 it is before Christ’s βηñµα that all must appear. Thus, 
“the day” on which humankind is judged (1 Cor 3.13) is the “day of the Lord” (1 Cor 5.5; 1 Thess 5.2) 
and “the day of our Lord Jesus Christ” (1 Cor 1.8).105 The Old Testament “Day of the Lord YHWH” 
thus becomes, in certain cases, the “Day of the Lord Jesus Christ.”106 
The idea of another agent acting in judgment on God’s behalf is not unprecedented in Jewish 
writings. Figures like Enoch (in the Similitudes of Enoch, i.e., 1 En 37–71) and Moses (Philo, On the 
Life of Moses; Ezekiel the Tragedian) are exalted to positions in which they exercise judgment.107 
He [God] placed the Elect One on the throne of glory; and he shall judge all the works of the 
holy ones in heaven above, weighing in the balance their deeds. (1 En 61.8; trans. Isaacs in 
OTP; cf. 51.3; 55.4; 62.5; 69.29)
This development most likely occurred under the influence of passages in which the Israelite king is 
shown to be responsible for dispensing justice on God’s behalf (see Chapter 4). Just as in Psalm 110,108 
this exalted figure is portrayed as exercising judgment from a heavenly throne, thus emphasizing the 
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103. In Zeph 1, for example the “day of the Lord” (vv. 7, 14) is “a day of wrath” (v. 15) and “the day of the Lord’s 
wrath” (v. 18); see also Isa 13.6, 9; Ezek 7.5–12; Joel 2.1–11; Amos 5.18–20; Mal 4.1–3. The “day of the Lord” is associated 
with the Divine Warrior theme (see below). In this section, however, I focus on the aspect of judgment associated with this 
“day.” 
104. The imagery is somewhat different in Romans 8.33–34 where, in a passage filled with forensic allusions, Jesus is 
portrayed as an advocate or defence counsel, interceding for his people at the right hand of God, who justifies his people. 
Elsewhere Jesus is also spoken of as the one who saves his people from (God’s) future wrath (Rom 5.9; 1 Thess 1.10).
105. For other variations, see 1 Cor 3.13; 2 Cor 1.14; Phil 1.6, 10; 2.16.
106. Waddell, Messiah, 163–66; Kreitzer, Jesus and God, 129. The lack of consistency regarding the identity of the 
figure who stands as the final eschatological judge—God or Jesus—is part of what Kreitzer calls “a bifurcated eschatological 
scheme” which reflects the tension between God and Messiah in their respective eschatological roles, while at the same time 
demonstrating attempts to resolve this tension (pp. 24, 163). 
107. For a general discussion of the Pauline precedents, see James D. G. Dunn, “Jesus the Judge: Further Thoughts of 
Paul’s Christology and Soteriology,” in The New Perspective on Paul: Collected Essays, rev. ed. (Grand Rapids; Cambridge: 
Eerdmans, 2008), 395–411. Enoch: Larry W. Hurtado, One God, One Lord: Early Christian Devotion and Ancient Jewish 
Monotheism, 2nd ed. (London: T&T Clark, 1998), 51–56; Waddell, Messiah, 48–103. Moses: Wayne A. Meeks, “Moses as 
God and King,” in Religions in Antiquity: Essays in Memory of Erwin Ramsdell Goodenough, ed. Jacob Neusner, SHR 14 
(Leiden: Brill, 1970), 354–71; Hurtado, One God, 56–63.
108. For the relationship between this Psalm and the Enochic literature, see Hay, Glory, 26–27.
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link between judge and king, as well as the belief that this figure occupies these roles under the 
authority of God.
As God’s vice-regent, Jesus occupies the heavenly throne from which he exercises judgment. 
Jesus’ judgment may have a present aspect to it (1 Cor 11.27–32), but the focus is more often than not 
on the eschatological “Day of the Lord.” Closely related to the figure of the judge are two inextricable 
concepts: justice and law. 
Justice
It is tempting to seek Paul’s teaching about justice purely in his use of δικαιοσυ' νη and its 
cognates. This approach, however, yields miserly dividends because of the diverse ways in which this 
word group is used. It is generally accepted that words in this family are important elements of Paul’s 
soteriology,109 but the precise meaning and implications of his use of this language, especially the 
important phrase δικαιοσυ' νη θεουñ ,110 is contested. What exactly is it that God is doing when 
“justifying” believers? Is he declaring them “righteous” or making them “righteous”? Does the 
“righteousness of God” refer to divine activity or divine attribute? Is the sense of this groups of words 
to be sought primarily in forensic, ethical, or relational terms? We are not able to wade too deeply into 
the debate,111 but simply note a few salient points as they pertain to the possibility that Paul describes 
Jesus in royal terms as a just judge. Without attempting to reach a conclusion about righteousness 
language in Paul’s writings, I will show that the sense of forensic justice and, with it, the figure of the 
judge, are present in some instances of Paul’s use of “righteousness” and “justification.”   
As seen in the first two chapters of this study, δικαιοσυ' νη plays an important role as one of the 
cardinal virtues in classical and later Greek thought. When applied to the ideal king, the virtue serves to 
link kingship to justice in both a narrow, forensic sense as well as a broader, ethical sense. The same is 
true of the Septuagint’s use of the word. God’s anointed king will execute justice and righteousness 
(ποιειñν κρι'µα και` δικαιοσυ' νην) in the land (1 Kgdms 2.10; cf 2 Kgdms 8.15; 3 Kgdms 3.9 LXX). The 
importance of judicial and ethical language in Isaiah’s portrait of ideal kingship is on view at Isaiah 11 
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109. The “righteousness of God” provides Paul’s message with “a nucleus and name,” while at the same time 
constituting “the central problem of Pauline theology” (Ernst Käsemann, “‘The Righteousness of God’ in Paul,” in New 
Testament Questions of Today, trans. W. J. Montague and Wilfred F. Bunge [London: SCM, 1969], 168). This approach to 
Paul was countered by Albert Schweitzer for whom righteousness by faith was merely a “subsidiary crater” in Paul’s 
theology (The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle, trans. W. Montgomery [1929; repr., New York: Holt, 1931], 205–26, here, 
225). Approaching the problem from a completely different angle, Douglas Campbell also argues against justification as the 
controlling element in Paul’s soteriology (The Deliverance of God: An Apocalyptic Rereading of Justification in Paul 
[Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009]).
110. Rom 1.17; 3.5; 3.21, 22, 26 (implicit); 10.3 (bis); 2 Cor 5.21; Phil 3.9. The δικ– word-group occurs throughout 
the Pauline corpus, although there are particularly significant clusters in Rom 1–4; 9–10; Gal 2–3. 
111. For a study of the development of the doctrine of justification in the western theological tradition, see Alister E. 
McGrath, Iustitia Dei: A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005). Douglas Campbell notes wryly that the profusion of secondary literature on the δικαιοσυ' νη θεουñ debate forces modern 
discussions to start with a “survey of surveys” (Deliverance of God, 677), before providing a bibliographic survey of his own 
on pp. 1111–13 nn. 1–2. Stephen Westerholm, Justification Reconsidered: Rethinking a Pauline Theme (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2013) provides a brief but critical discussion of six of the most influential scholars in the recent debate: Krister 
Stendahl, E. P. Sanders, Heikki Räisänen, N. T. Wright, James D. G. Dunn, and Douglas A. Campbell.
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(see above, ch. 4), where the royal figure who is “girded with righteousness (δικαιοσυ' νη) around [his] 
waist” (v. 5) is the same one in verses 3–4 who will rightly administer justice (κρι'νω and ε λε'γχω).112 
To observe that δικαιο'ω and δικαιοσυ' νη characterizes the good king’s character and deeds along 
forensic lines is not to argue that other semantic fields are not present.113 As some have pointed out, the 
LXX use of righteousness language frequently occurs in relation to the covenant established between 
God and God’s people.114 Understood against this background, then, Paul’s righteousness language 
potentially occurs in both a forensic and a relational sense.115 The important point for this study is the 
possibility that righteousness language bears forensic weight in Paul’s thought, even if this use does not 
exhaust its meaning.
It is against this forensic configuration of Paul’s use of righteousness-language against that 
Douglas Campbell mounts his extensive argument in The Deliverance of God.116 Of particular interest 
to my study is Campbell’s argument that, in Romans, the ancient discourse on kingship is focused on, 
and realized by, Jesus Christ.117 Drawing on an observation made by Richard Hays and others—that 
Paul’s programmatic statement of God’s righteousness in Romans 1.16–17 contains an allusion to 
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112. In classical usage, the verb δικαιο' ω followed by a personal object almost always bears a negative sense: to 
“punish” or “condemn” (James B. Prothro, “The Strange Case of δικαιο' ω in the Septuagint and Paul: The Oddity and Origins 
of Paul’s Talk of ‘Justification’,” ZNW 107.1 [2016]: 51–56; cf. J. A. Ziesler, The Meaning of Righteousness in Paul: A 
Linguistic and Theological Enquiry, SNTSMS 20 [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972], 47). In the Septuagint 
the opposite is true. There the verb is most often used positively with respect to a personal object to mean “vindicate” or 
“clear from a charge” (Ziesler, Meaning of Righteousness, 52–69). The context in which this language occurs often lends 
judicial overtones to the word group. In Exodus 23.7, the Israelites are told, “you shall not acquit the impious person (ου   
δικαιω' σεις το`ν α  σεβηñ) for the sake of a bribe.” In the MT YHWH makes his own unwillingness to acquit the guilty the basis 
for Israelite justice (John William Wevers, Notes on the Greek Text of Exodus, SCS 30 [Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990], 361). 
This makes Paul’s description of God in Rom 4.5 as “the one who acquits the ungodly” (το`ν δικαιουñντα το`ν α  σεβηñ) 
especially shocking. The LXX changes the first-person verb  קידצא־אל into the second person: ου   δικαιω' σεις and adds the 
motivating factor of the bribe. The verb thus describes the way in which a judge must act only in regard to the innocent and 
not the guilty. In Psalm 81 LXX, God presides in the divine council as a judge (δικρι'νω; v. 1) and commands those who have 
been judging unjustly and showing partiality (v. 2) to “give justice (κρι'νω) to the orphan and the poor / and to vindicate 
(δικαιο'ω) the lowly and the penurious” (v. 3; my translation). These examples demonstrate that δικαιο'ω can carry a forensic 
sense in certain passages of the LXX (Prothro, “∆ικαιο'ω In Paul and LXX,” 59–60).
113. For other LXX uses of this word-group, see the discussion in Ziesler, Meaning of Righteousness, 47–67 or Chris 
VanLandingham, Judgment and Justification in Early Judaism and the Apostle Paul (Peabody: Hendrickson, 2006), 246–72. 
VanLandingham’s conclusion that “none of the δικαι– group of terms is intrinsically forensic” is puzzling since meaning is 
never “intrinsic” to any lexeme but must be established on the basis of usage in context. The use of this word-group 
discussed in this section demonstrate that a forensic sense is primary in certain instances and that it is not impossible for Paul 
to have used these words in a similar way. 
114. In addition to Ziesler (Meaning of Righteousness, 36–43, 52–67), see Wright, Faithfulness of God, 795–804.
115. Ernst Käsemann (“‘Righteousness of God’,” 172) notes that Paul’s use of δικαιοσυ' νη θεουñ has Jewish precedents 
which should contribute to our understanding of Paul’s language. The two aspects of justification/righteousness in Paul’s 
thought should not be collapsed into one another, neither is it right to give priority to one or the other; so Ziesler (Meaning of 
Righteousness, 147–211), who also includes the very important element of incorporation, or being “in Christ,” as part of this 
discussion.
116. For fuller engagement with Campbell’s work, see Douglas J. Moo, “Review of The Deliverance of God: An 
Apocalyptic Rereading of Justification in Paul by Douglas A. Campbell,” JETS 53.1 (2010): 143–50; Alan Torrance, 
“Article Review: Douglas Campbell, The Deliverance of God,” SJT 65.1 (2012): 82–89; Bruce Clark, “Review Article: The 
Deliverance of God: An Apocalyptic Rereading of Justification in Paul by Douglas A. Campbell,” TynBul 64.1 (2013): 55–
88; Chris Tilling, ed., Beyond Old and New Perpectives on Paul: Reflections on the Work of Douglas Campbell (Eugene: 
Cascade, 2014). 
117. Deliverance of God, 695. Jipp argues for a similar position, albeit along slightly different lines; see below.
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Psalm 89.2—Campbell argues that an “ancient discourse of kingship” informs Paul’s understanding of 
the righteousness of God.118 Based on the Psalms’ depiction of both the divine and human king, 
Campbell argues that δικαιοσυ' νη bears salvific rather than retributive connotations. The δικαιοσυ' νη 
θεουñ in Romans 1.16–17, then, speaks of God’s saving, liberating action in Christ. Paul uses kingship 
discourse to portray God as the sovereign who delivers his people through his appointed agent.
Campbell’s argument is convincing with regard to Romans 1.16–17 and the other passages in 
Romans in which he perceives Paul drawing on this particular aspect of kingship discourse.119 
However, his desire to argue against what he calls “justification theory” means that he understates the 
forensic elements that are present in Paul’s righteousness language elsewhere. In Romans 8.33–34, for 
example, the figure of God as the one who justifies (ο   δικαιωñ ν) occurs in the context of judicial 
language of charging (ε γκαλε'ω) and judging (κατακρι'νω). Again, in Romans 5.18 and 2 Corinthians 
3.9, the language of righteousness and justification occurs in opposition to that of judgment and 
condemnation.120 Compared to classical examples, the δικ- word-group is surprisingly positive in 
Paul’s usage; in this Campbell is correct. He is incorrect, however, to minimize the judicial aspects of 
this language
As the divine king—and, therefore, judge—God will act with justice in order to reward the 
righteous and punish the wicked (Rom 2.1–16; 1 Cor 5.13).121 Each person is treated according to their 
deeds (Rom 2.6) and without favouritism (v. 11).122 God cannot be accused of injustice since this 
would immediately disqualify God from judging the world (Rom 3.5–6). With regard to the relative 
paucity of this note of judgment, it should be remembered that Paul’s letters are addressed to fellow 
believers; judgment upon the wicked is thus not as prominent a theme as is the vindication of the 
righteous. This latter theme is consistently linked to Christ. Believers are justified “in Christ” (Gal 
2.17) or “in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ” (1 Cor 6.11), and God’s justification of these believers 
results from Christ’s death and resurrection for them (Rom 3.21–24; 4.25; Gal 1.4; 2.21). In both cases, 
whether in judgment or vindication, Paul asserts that God acts justly through Christ.
Given the role that Christ plays as God’s agent, and in light of the role that Christ plays as 
eschatological judge (see above), it is surprising that he is rarely identified as the one who exercises 
  
 276 
————————————
118. Deliverance of God, 688–704. The references to those who also perceive an allusion to Ps 98.2–3 at Rom 1.16–17 
can be found at p. 1114 n. 22. Campbell’s “rereading” of δικαιοσυ' νη θεουñ in Rom 1.16–17 provides him with the title of his 
book: “the deliverance of God” (p. 699). See, further, Joshua W. Jipp, Christ is King: Paul’s Royal Ideology (Minneapolis: 
Fortress, 2015), 233–71 who argues that Paul’s discourse on justice draws heavily from the Psalms and Isaiah.
119. Deliverance of God, 694–98.
120. So, e.g., Fitzmyer, Romans, 420–21; Margaret E. Thrall, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Second 
Epistle to the Corinthians, ICC (London: T&T Clark, 1994), 249.
121. It is this portrayal against which Campbell revolts. In his rereading of Paul, God is exclusively benevolent (p. 71); 
but see Clark, “Review of Campbell, Deliverance,” 78. As Udo Schnelle astutely notes, “The concept of the last judgment 
gives theological expression to the conviction that God is not finally indifferent to the way people live their lives nor to 
history as a whole” (Apostle Paul, 585).
122. The role of these statements in Rom 2 within Pauline theology is a notorious problem in New Testament 
scholarship; see, recently, N. T. Wright, “Justification by (Covenantal) Faith to the (Covenantal) Doers: Romans 2 Within the 
Argument of the Letter,” Covenant Quarterly 72.3 (2014): 95–108. For an older but still useful survey of some of the 
significant problems in Romans 2, see Klyne R. Snodgrass, “Justification by Grace - to the Doers: An Analysis of the Place 
of Romans 2 in the Theology of Paul,” NTS 32.1 (1986): 72–93. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
justice. Christ’s judgment is twice mentioned explicitly: Paul states that all must appear before Christ’s 
judgment seat to receive their due (2 Cor 5.10) and identifies Jesus Christ as the one through whom 
God will judge humanity’s secret thoughts at the final assize (Rom 2.16).123 This judgment forms part 
of a series of events inaugurated by Christ’s return (παρουσι'α; 1 Cor 15.23; 1 Thess 2.19; 3.13; 4.15; 
5.23).124 Yet Paul does not speak of Christ’s impartiality or his ability to judge justly in the same way 
as he does of God’s. Is Christ indeed a just judge, according to Paul? 
A number of scholars have argued recently that Jesus is “the righteous one” (ο   δι'καιος) of 
Habakkuk 2.4 as quoted in Romans 1.17 and Galatians 3.11.125 It is because Jesus is the righteous king, 
that he is resurrected and enthroned in heaven. He is then envisaged to adopt the kingly role of making 
his subjects righteous. This happens through his death and resurrection (Rom 4.25–26).126 While these 
arguments are convincing, and while Paul’s construction of Jesus as an ideal king is corroborated at 
other points in this present study, these passages do not seem to attribute forensic justice to Jesus.
 Taken at face value, Jesus as ο   δι'καιος in Romans 1.17 could be understood to refer to “Jesus the 
just one,” but similar constructions elsewhere suggest that a broader sense of righteousness is 
frequently in view when Jesus is described in this way. Jipp correctly notes that righteousness language 
occurs together with ideas of kingship and reign in Romans 5.12–21.127 In verse 16, however, it is 
God’s gift that leads to δικαι'ωµα—an act of justification or acquittal. This divine gift comes through 
one man, Jesus Christ (v. 17), whose one act of righteousness (ε  νο`ς δικαιω' µατος; v. 18) is 
characterized in verse 19 as “obedience.” Throughout this passage there is a contrast between the two 
singular figures of Adam and Christ. The point is repeatedly made that Christ’s positive actions not 
only nullify but exceed Adam’s negative actions. Nevertheless, there must be elements of congruity 
between the two figures for the contrast to be effective. Adam’s sin (α  µαρτι'α) and transgression 
(παρα' πτωµα) are thus made ineffective and are surpassed by Christ’s righteousness and obedience. 
Moral and volitional, rather than forensic, concepts seem to provide the basis for comparison, and so 
Christ is best described in this passage in terms of being ethically righteous. Other passages 
demonstrate that the righteous (δι'καιος) person is defined in terms of obedience to God’s law, that is, in 
moral and ethical terms (Rom 2.13; 3.9–18).128 It is thus Christ’s ethical righteousness, rather than the 
virtue of justice, which is in view when Paul describes him as “righteous” or speaks of his 
“righteousness.” It is this quality which forms the basis for God’s acquittal of human beings.129 
  
 277 
————————————
123. That Jesus is understood as judge in early Christian writings is evident from Acts 10.42; 17.31; 2 Tim 4.1.
124. Waddell, Messiah, 163–66. See also the foregoing discussion about the Day of the Lord.
125. Campbell, Deliverance of God, 699–704; Stephen L. Young, “Romans 1.1–5 and Paul’s Christological Use of 
Hab. 2.4 in Rom. 1.17: An Underutilized Consideration in the Debate,” JSNT 34.3 (2012): 277–85; Jipp, Christ is 
King, 253–57. For use of this title to refer to Jesus elsewhere in the NT, see Acts 3.14–15; 7.52; 1 Pet 3.18; 1 John 2.1–2; 
see, further, Richard B. Hays, “Apocalyptic Hermeneutics: Habakkuk Proclaims ‘the Righteous One’,” in The Conversion of 
the Imagination: Paul as Interpreter of Israel’s Scripture (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 124–36. Only the final example 
bears a forensic sense, but even here Jesus is portrayed as advocate (παρα' κλητος) rather than judge.
126. See Jipp, Christ is King, 257–59 who argues the suffering servant of Isaiah 53 stands behind this Pauline passage.
127. Christ is King, 259–65.
128. Paul’s argument in the opening chapters of Romans is that human beings lack this moral righteousness, but this 
does not change the nature of this righteousness. 
129. This argument is strengthened if πι'στις Χριστουñ is understood in terms of Christ’s obedience; see below.
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For Paul, both God and Christ adopt the eschatological role of judgment. However, he usually 
depicts God, rather than Christ, as the just judge who acquits in the present those who become 
righteous through Jesus Christ (Rom 3.22; Phil 3.9). From this perspective, Christ might be considered 
the means whereby God acquits his people, rather than the one who acquits. Although Paul most likely 
understands Christ, like God, to be a just and fair judge, this element of ideal kingship is never made 
explicit. 
Clemency
The requirement for the king to show justice was often expressed alongside the desire that he act 
with clemency and mercy. In certain configurations of ideal kingship, clemency (ε πιει'κεια) is portrayed 
as necessary to balance absolute justice. Paul’s contemporary, Seneca, spoke of clemency as 
“moderation that diminishes a due and deserved punishment to some degree” (Clem. 2.3; trans. 
Kaster). If we survey the Pauline corpus for occurrences of clemency, mercy, and the like, we find a 
cluster of these concepts in Romans 9–11.130 In this passage, Paul argues for mercy as a fundamental 
characteristic of God who acts with favour towards his people instead of exercising judgment,131 or 
rather, exercises mercy in his judgment.132 Earlier in the letter, Paul states that it is this aspect of God’s 
character that is meant to lead people to repentance (2.4) and it is the same trait which draws praise 
from the Gentiles (15.9)—that is, from those who have become “vessels of mercy” instead of “vessels 
of wrath” (9.22–23). In Romans 3.25 Paul states that God left earlier sins unpunished in order that he 
might display his righteousness (v. 26). The justice God exercises in this verse is therefore not strict 
retributive justice, but rather his clemency shown towards those who are associated with Christ through 
faith. 
Cilliers Breytenbach shows that in this portrayal of God, “[Paul] stood firmly in the Jewish 
tradition that the abundance of God’s mercy and compassion towards the disobedient outweighs their 
sins.”133 The influence of Exodus 34.6–7 can be seen not only in the rest of the Jewish Scriptures, but 
also in Paul’s writings.134 In this passage, God is described as “compassionate” (οι κτι'ρµων), “merciful” 
(ε λεη' µων), “patient” (µακρο' θυµος), “very merciful” (πολυε'λεος), and as “doing mercy” (ποιωñν ε»λεος) 
because he “takes away acts of lawlessness and of injustice and sins.” Breytenbach argues, furthermore, 
that even though the language of χα' ρις comes from the realm of benefaction, perhaps even imperial 
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130. ε λεε'ω, ε»λεος: Rom 9.15 (bis), 16, 18, 23; 11.30, 11.31 (bis); οι κτι'ρω/οι τιρµο' ς: Rom 9.15 (bis); cf. 12.1.
131. Fitzmyer, Romans, 566–67. Ephesians describes God as one who is “rich in mercy” (2.4). There are examples 
where this language does not bear strong judicial undertones and refers more generally to God’s goodness and kindness: 1 
Cor 7.25; 2 Cor 4.1; Phil 2.27.
132. See J. Louis Martyn, Galatians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, AB 33A (New York: 
Doubleday, 1997), 266–67 for references to “a long and impressive line of tradition” in Jewish texts that equate God’s 
justification with his mercy. Similarly, Campbell’s reading of Romans leads him to argue that God’s righteousness expresses 
God’s benevolence towards humanity with no sense of retribution (Deliverance of God, esp. 677–711).
133. “‘Charis’ and ‘Eleos’ in Paul’s Letter to the Romans,” in The Letter to the Romans, ed. Udo Schnelle, BETL 226 
(Leuven: Peeters, 2009), 277.
134. Breytenbach, “‘Charis’ and ‘Eleos’,” 253–58.
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benefaction, as James Harrison argues,135 this metaphor is frequently mapped on to the domain of 
God’s mercy and compassion as expressed in the Jewish Scriptures.
When the pattern of God’s mercy as found in the Jewish Scriptures is joined to the observation 
made above—that Paul usually talks about God, and not Christ, as dispensing justice—it is not 
surprising to find that it is usually God, and not Christ, who acts with mercy and compassion, even 
while Christ is instrumental in averting God’s judgment (1 Thess 1.10; 5.9). There is possibly an 
exception to this observation in 2 Corinthians 10.1 where Paul speaks of Christ’s ε piιει'κεια.  
The lexeme ε piιει'κεια and its cognates occur in Paul’s writings only at 2 Corinthians 10.1 and 
Philippians 4.5. In the latter case ε piιεικη' ς is something Christians are to exhibit (cf. 1 Tim 3.3; Titus 
3.2; Jas 3.17). In 2 Corinthians 10.1, however, Paul appeals to the Corinthians to respond positively to 
his request on the basis of the πραο' της and ε piιει'κεια of Christ.136 Scholars debate the origins of Paul’s 
language at this point. This characterization of Christ as meek, gentle, gracious is sometimes traced 
back to Jesus’ words recorded in Matthew 11.29: “I am gentle (πραυ΅ς) and humble in heart (ταπεινο`ς 
τηñ,  καρδι'α, ).”137 And while some have sought the origin of this Matthean language in a Wisdom 
Christology, others have suggested that the language found in Matthew evokes the Old Testament 
figures of the Servant, Moses, the Messiah, the Son of God, or the king.138 
It is also possible that behind Paul’s description of Christ in 2 Corinthians 10.1 stands the 
christological tradition on view at Philippians 2.6–8.139 Here Christ’s humble nature is demonstrated in 
his willingness to obey God to the point of death. As we noted earlier in this chapter, in Philippians 2, 
the end of Christ’s humility is his exaltation and kingly rule (vv. 9–11). 
Whether Matthew’s figures from Israel’s history or a kenotic Christology stands behind 2 
Corinthians 10.1, the traits of πραυ΅ς and ταπεινο' ς are linked to kingship. But it is not necessary to 
choose between the Gospel tradition and the Christology represented in Philippians. Rather, Paul is 
speaking at the same time of both the “earthly Jesus” as represented in the Gospels and the risen Lord 
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135. James R. Harrison, Paul’s Language of Grace in Its Graeco-Roman Context, WUNT 2/172 (Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 2003).
136. Cf. Rom 12.1 where Paul’s appeal comes “by the mercies of God” and Rom 15.30 where he appeals “by our Lord 
Jesus Christ.” In 2 Corinthians 10, however, Paul will proceed to offer not Christ, but rather, himself “as a model drawing on 
the traits of Christ through participation in him” (Dustin W. Ellington, “Not Applicable to Believers? The Aims and Basis of 
Paul’s ‘I’ in 2 Corinthians 10–13,” JBL 131.2 [2012]: 328). Jan Lambrecht argues that Paul was sidetracked from his 
original desire to begin an exhortative section (2 Cor 10.1a) and that 10.1b–13.10 is a rather lengthy excursus (“Paul’s 
Appeal and the Obedience to Christ: The Line of Thought in 2 Corinthians 10,1–6,” Bib 77.3 [1996]: 398–416). Questions 
around the integrity of the text of 2 Corinthians need not delay our discussion at this point. The major issues are summarized 
by Mark A. Seifrid, The Second Letter to the Corinthians, PNTC (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2014), xxix-xxxi.
137. See, e.g., Seifrid, 2 Corinthians, 375; Victor Paul Furnish, II Corinthians, AB 32A (New York: Doubleday, 
1984), 455, 460. This is not to assume that Matthew is earlier than 2 Corinthians, but rather that Matthew contains a saying 
of Jesus which can be traced back to Jesus’ ministry and which might have been known in the earliest churches. We also note 
that the coming king of Matt 21.5 is described as “gentle” (πραυ΅ς), following Zech 9.9.
138. For a summary and critique of the Wisdom Christology thesis as it pertains to Matt 11, see Daniel J. Ebert IV, 
Wisdom Christology: How Jesus Becomes God’s Wisdom for Us, Explorations in Biblical Theology (Phillipsburg: P&R 
Publishing, 2011), 19–38. The various positions taken with respect to the figures behind this verse are summarized by 
Warren Carter, “Take My Yoke not Rome’s: Matthew 11:28–30,” in Matthew and Empire: Initial Explorations (Harrisburg: 
Trinity Press, 2001), 108–12.
139. So Furnish, II Corinthians, 460; Thrall, Second Corinthians, 600.
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revealed to him by God (Gal 1.15–16).140 It is implausible that the early church’s Christology which is 
glimpsed in Paul’s writings was not linked in some way to the memory of the teachings of Jesus of 
Nazareth which were eventually codified in the earliest Gospels.141  
Drawing on some of the same evidence presented is earlier chapters of my study, Donald Walker 
argues that Paul’s appeal to Christ’s πραο' της and ε  piιει'κεια in 2 Corinthians 10.1 needs to be 
understood primarily against the background of ideal kingship in Graeco-Roman texts, rather than the 
dominical saying in Matthew 11.142 Walker’s study of these individual words and their collocation143 
leads him to translate the phrase as “the leniency and clemency of Christ” that Christ exercises as the 
risen and exalted king.144
At one point in his study Walker states that “grace, acquittal, and reconciliation feature 
prominently in Christ’s rule.”145 While Paul would, no doubt, respond positively to this statement as it 
characterizes Christ, the same pattern seen in Paul’s portrayal of divine justice is present in his 
portrayal of divine clemency: it is usually God who displays these traits while Christ is instrumental in 
bringing about justice and clemency for God’s people. It is more often God, rather than Christ, who is 
characterized in terms of royal justice and clemency. Ultimately, though, the Hellenistic discussion of 
clemency in the discourse on ideal kingship was a discussion about the relationship between the king 
and law.   
Christ and God’s Law
In earlier chapters, we observed how discussions of the relationship between king and law often 
masked more fundamental questions about kingship, human/positive law, and how these two 
phenomena related to divine/natural law.146 In these chapters we also noted a number of possible 
configurations of the relationship between king, law, and divine will: (1) the king might embody the 
divine will in his own person and, as such, be considered “animate law” (νο' µος ε»µψυχος) (Diotogenes); 
(2) the king might submit to established, written law which, when rightly ordered, expresses the divine 
will (Aristeas);147 (3) the king might implement and himself follow the divine law as it is expressed in 
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140. Seifrid, 2 Corinthians, 375. 
141. See Schnelle, Apostle Paul, 472–77. Porter, “‘Jesus Christ’ in Paul’s Letters” demonstrates that the modern 
distinction between “the Jesus of history” and “the Christ of faith” was not made by Paul.
142. Donald Dale Walker, Paul’s Offer of Leniency (2 Cor 10:1): Populist Ideology and Rhetoric in a Pauline Letter 
Fragment, WUNT 2/152 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002).
143. Paul’s Offer of Leniency, 38–90. The combination of πραυ΅της/πραο' της and ε piιει'κεια occurs at Philo, Creation 
103; Plutarch, Pericles 39.1; Sertorius 25.4; Caesar 15.4; 57.3; Moralia 80b; 729e; Pericles and Fabius 3.1; Lucian, Somn. 
10; Alexander the False Prophet 61; Appian, Basilica 1.5; Dio Cassius, Historiae Romanae 53.6.1; Athenaeus, Deipn. 
12.72/549d; Julian, Panegyric in Honour of Empress Eusebia 106a.
144. Walker’s discussion of the relationship between 2 Corinthians 10.1 and Matthew 11.29 occurs at Paul’s Offer of 
Leniency, 183–88. His conclusion is that such a relationship does not exist and that this identification of Christ is wholly 
Paul’s.
145. Paul’s Offer of Leniency, 183.
146. Christine Elizabeth Hayes, What’s Divine About Divine Law? Early Perspectives (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2015) examines the different ways in which the relationship between human and divine law were understood and 
expressed. Her taxonomy and summary of ten Graeco-Roman “discourses” about law are especially helpful (pp. 54–89).
147. This is similar to the position espoused by Xenophon’s Cyrus, but the supreme leader is also able to adapt the law 
as he sees fit. There is an underlying assumption that the good king will do so for the sake of his subjects. Similarly, 
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the written law (Jewish Scriptures);148 (4) the king might provide his people with a written law based 
on his own person (νο' µος ε»µψυχος) and on the unwritten laws of nature, both of which are understood 
as an expression of divine law (Philo).149
A full-blown discussion of Paul’s understanding of the place and role of the law would require its 
own monograph.150 My concern in this section is to examine the relationship between Christ and the 
divine law in the light of the discussion in earlier chapters about the relationship between the ideal king 
and the law. The following section investigates the question of Jesus’ obedience to the law, but first the 
question of Jesus’ replacement of the law is examined.
Paul’s Jewish heritage ensures that his starting point for thinking about law is the Torah: God’s 
holy, just, and good commandment (Rom 7.12) which was given at Sinai to Moses (Rom 5.14; 1 Cor 
9.9; Gal 3.16–19). In Jewish thought, the written law revealed at Sinai through Moses is an expression 
of the divine will for God’s people.151 Yet, in statements that would have been shocking to some of his 
Jewish readers,152 Paul argues that the law is not able to bring about humanity’s righteousness before 
God (Rom 3.20; 9.30–10.4; Gal 2.16; Phil 3.9),153 but instead, vivifies sin and produces death (Rom 
3.20; 5.20; 7.7–11). At best, the law is a παιδαγωγο' ς, a temporary guardian, until the arrival of Christ 
(Gal 3.24–25), who is described as the τε' λος of the law (Rom 10.4). Regardless of whether one 
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Isocrates’ ruler judges according to his own rationality, but must do so for the benefit of his subjects. In neither writer is there 
an emphasis on the king’s enactment of law as an expression of divine will, although this aspect of law is not explicitly 
denied.
148. The major difference between (2) and (3) is that (3) assumes that the written law is produced by the “legislator” 
(Moses) through divine revelation while in (2), the laws of the city reflect the divine will because they are enacted by sage-
like legislators.
149. See Hayes, Divine Law, 94–139 for further discussion of how Jewish Hellenistic writers attempted to “bridge the 
gap” between divine and human law.
150. See Hans Hübner, Law in Paul’s Thought, trans. James C.G. Greig; ed. John Riches, SNTW (Edinburgh: T & T 
Clark, 1984); Heikki Räisänen, Paul and the Law, 2nd ed., WUNT 29 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1986); E. P. Sanders, Paul, 
the Law, and the Jewish People (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985). This research is summarized by Douglas J. Moo, “Paul and 
the Law in the Last Ten Years,” SJT 40 (1987): 287–307 and, more recently, Veronica Koperski, What Are They Saying 
About Paul and the Law? WATSA (New York: Paulist Press, 2001). For an attempt to address the problem from a slightly 
different angle, see Brian S. Rosner, Paul and the Law: Keeping the Commandments of God, NSBT 31 (Nottingham: 
InterVarsity Press, 2013).
151. Hayes, Divine Law, 14–53.
152. Barclay notes, for example, “In the rich tapestry of Second Temple Judaism, it is hard to find any strands that do 
not identify the Torah as the definition of virtue or righteousness. ... What was entirely unnatural for anyone reared in the 
Jewish tradition was to decenter the Torah” (Paul and the Gift [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2015], 400, 401).
153. For this traditional approach to reading of these passages, see Stephen Westerholm, Israel’s Law and the 
Church’s Faith: Paul and His Recent Interpreters (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1988); Stephen Westerholm, Perspectives Old 
and New on Paul: The “Lutheran” Paul and His Critics (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004). I trust that those advocating for a 
“New Perspective” will nonetheless grant my main point: that in the light of the Christ-event, the role played by the law in 
the life of the people of God has changed in dramatic fashion; see, e.g., Wright, Faithfulness of God, 860–79 on Gal 3.1–
4.11.
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understands τε'λος as “goal” or “termination” or both,154 Paul’s language suggests a radical change in 
humanity’s relationship to divine law. 
Paul identifies the Christ-event as the fulcrum in the history of God’s dealing with humanity, and 
it is this event that reconfigures the way in which the law functions. In Brian Rosner’s language: the 
law has been “repudiated” as law-covenant, “replaced” by Christ, and “re-appropriated” as prophecy 
and wisdom.155 The use of these different functions attempts to recognize the variegated way in which 
Paul describes the law. Without using exactly the same language, Joshua Jipp argues that 
understanding Jesus in terms of the discourse around ideal kingship enables the relationship between 
Christ and the law to emerge more clearly.156 I turn, first, to a puzzling phrase in Galatians.
The reference in Galatians 6.2 to the “law of Christ” is quite unexpected. In the early chapters of 
the letter, Paul sets up “law” against the categories of “faith” and “promise.” In the christological 
narrative in Galatians, the latter have surpassed and replaced the former.157 It is therefore surprising 
that in the concluding section of the letter Paul urges his readers to “bear one another’s burdens, and in 
this way you will fulfil the law of Christ (α  ναπληρω' σετε το`ν νο' µον τουñ  Χριστουñ)” (Gal 6.2). In 
Galatians, the only other reference to believers fulfilling the law comes in 5.14: “For the whole law is 
summed up [has been fulfilled; πεpiλη' ρωται] in a single commandment, ‘You shall love your neighbour 
as yourself.’”158 The verbal and conceptual similarities between these two verses suggest that they be 
interpreted in terms of one another. 
Joshua Jipp understands the perfect passive in Galatians 5.14 to refer to Christ’s fulfilling the law 
by providing “the perfect pattern and embodiment of love for neighbour as demanded by Lev. 
19:18.”159 This pattern of love is found in Jesus’ life and, above all, in his self-giving death. These 
themes, although not central to Paul’s argument in Galatians, are raised throughout and can be seen, for 
example, in Christ’s giving of himself to deliver his people (1.3–4); his giving of himself for Paul 
(2.20); his obedience to God displayed in being born of a woman, under the law, in order to redeem 
those under the law (4.4–7) by becoming a curse in their place (3.10–14).160 If Christ is thus the 
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154. The matter is surveyed by Fitzmyer (Romans, 584–85), who opts for “goal,” while Longenecker (Romans, 848–
52) opts for “termination.” Moo (The Epistle to the Romans, NICNT [Grand Rapids; Cambridge: Eerdmans, 1996], 636–42) 
suggests that τε'λος bears temporal and teleological weight, thus both ideas are in view. This final approach seems best suited 
to address the way in which Paul speaks of the law as a unity which, nonetheless, meets the believer in different capacities 
(see Rosner, Paul and the Law, 43).
155. Paul and the Law, passim.
156. Christ is King, 60–76.
157. Richard B. Hays, The Faith of Jesus Christ: The Narrative Substructure of Galatians 3:1–4:11, 2nd ed. (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 198–204; Barclay, Paul and the Gift, 400–422.
158. Cf. Rom 13.8–10. The quotation is from Lev 19.18; see Douglas J. Moo, Galatians, Baker Exegetical 
Commentary on the New Testament (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2013), 349–50 for a brief discussion of this verse’s reception 
history. In addition to Paul’s use of this verse, it is important in the rest of the Christian tradition: see Mark 12.31 (par); Matt 
5.43; 19.19; Jas 5.8.  
159. Jipp, Christ is King, 64; see also Richard B. Hays, “Christology and Ethics in Galatians: The Law of Christ,” 
CBQ 49 (1987): 268–90; Moo, Galatians, 345–48. For the more conventional reading that sees the believer fulfilling the law 
through love, see James D. G. Dunn, The Epistle to the Galatians, BNTC (London: A&C Black, 1993), 289–92. For a survey 
of Pauline texts that speak of believers fulfilling the law, see Rosner, Paul and the Law, 121–24.
160. Hays, “Christology and Ethics,” 276–80. The debate around the meaning of πι'στις Χριστουñ is related to this 
discussion and will be mentioned in the following section. 
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paradigm of self-giving love, and if the command to love one’s neighbour (Lev 19.18) is understood as 
summing up or being in some way central to the law, then it follows that Christ fulfills the law through 
his embodiment of love.161
The identification of Christ as the one who fulfills the law through love suggests a way forward in 
understanding Paul’s use of “the law of Christ” in Galatians 6.2. This phrase has been interpreted as 
referring to (1) the law of Moses, now re-interpreted by Christ; (2) the command to love; (3) Christ’s 
ethical teaching; (4) Christ’s example; (5) a combination of (2)–(4).162 Against (1), it should be 
observed that Paul’s polemic against those who would place the Galatian believers under the law (cf. 
3.25; 4.21) would lose much of its power if he replaced one form of Mosaic law with another. Instead, 
the “law of Christ” in Galatians seems primarily to refer to (4): Christ’s example of self-giving love. 
Christ’s ethical injunctions (3) are not absent in Paul’s writings, but they are few and far between.163 
Assuming Christ’s example mirrored his teaching, (3) might also be implied in (4). Similarly, in so far 
as these ethical injunctions and Christ’s example focus on love, (2) is also present in (4). Without 
denying the presence of these themes—and thus recognizing (5) as a suitable solution to this 
question—the driving theme behind fulfilling the “law of Christ,” however, must be Christ’s 
paradigmatic self-giving love, that is, option (4). In the words of Richard Hays, Paul presents to his 
readers “not a body of rules, but a regulative principle or structure of existence, in this case the 
structure of existence embodied paradigmatically in Jesus Christ.”164 
Joshua Jipp’s contribution to this discussion is to show how Christ’s embodiment of the law might 
better be understood against the background of the king as νο' µος ε»µψυχος. In common with 
Diotogenes’ portrayal of the king and Philo’s Moses, Christ embodies the divine law in his own 
person.165 If, in Classical and Hellenistic thought, the king as living law was meant to address the 
shortcomings of the written law,166 this reading of Paul suggests that the law of Christ as defined 
above—Christ as the paradigmatic embodiment of law, the living law— is seen to replace the written 
law of Moses.167 To read Paul in this way does not solve all the problems that orbit the question of 
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161. Outside of the early Christian tradition (see above), there is no indication that Lev 19.18 was understood in this 
way before Paul. This understanding of the verse is most likely derived from Jesus himself (Dunn, Galatians, 291–92). For 
Jesus’ use of Lev 19, see Dale C. Allison Jr, Constructing Jesus: Memory, Imagination, and History (Grand Rapids: Baker, 
2010), 351–74.
162. For this taxonomy and references to those holding these positions, see Moo, Galatians, 376–77. For a 
demonstration of the growing acceptance of (1) in current scholarship, see Todd A. Wilson, “The Law of Christ and the Law 
of Moses: Reflections on a Recent Trend in Interpretation,” CurBR 5 (2006): 123–44.
163. Dunn, Theology of Paul, 650–51 notes eight or nine echoes of Jesus’ teaching that are found in Paul’s paraenesis.
164. “Christology and Ethics,” 276; cf. Rosner, Paul and the Law, 116–17.
165. Jipp finds a similar emphasis in two other Pauline passages. In 1 Cor 8–10 Paul identifies himself as being “under 
Christ’s law” (ω  ν ... ε»ννοµος Χριστουñ; 1 Cor 9.21), reminiscent of Gal 6.2 (Christ is King, 67–70). And as he did in Gal 
5.14, Paul refers to Lev 19.18 in Rom 13.8–10; this command to love finds practical expression in the context of Jew–Gentile 
relationships in the Roman church (Rom 13.8–15.13) (pp. 70–75). The theme of Christ’s self-giving love is found throughout 
these passages and, as in Galatians, serves to provide Paul’s readers with a pattern to imitate. 
166. This is Hayes’s “Discourse 4” which focuses on the contrast between the superior, unwritten, living law, and the 
inferior, inflexible, written law (Divine Law, 66–70). In the case of Philo’s Moses, of course, the written law was not yet 
available and it was Moses himself who provided the people of God with the law, first in embodied form and then in written 
form.
167. Paul employs the written, inferior/unwritten, superior contrast elsewhere in his letters: Rom 7.1–6; 2 Cor 3.6. In 
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“Paul and the law,” but it does indicate how reading Paul’s Christology with reference to ancient 
constructions of ideal kingship might move the discussion forward. To identify Christ and his 
behaviour as “paradigmatic” assumes that they stand as examples to be imitated; the believer’s 
imitation of Christ will be examined below.
The Obedience of Christ
One further matter related to the king and law deserves some consideration. The Deuteronomistic 
History and Psalms emphasized the necessity of Israel’s king obeying the divine law. The king was not 
free to create new legislation, nor even, in Deuteronomy 17 (see above, ch. 4), to pronounce judgments 
on the basis of the law. Rather, the king was to obey the divine law and in doing so, provide a model 
that his subjects might follow.168 It is perhaps under the influence of this line of thought, but certainly 
also in keeping with the Hellenistic debate around the nature of the king-law relationship, that Aristeas 
argues that the king should submit to the laws laid down by legislators. With the exception of Romans 
13.1–7, Paul has very little to say about human legislation, but is there any evidence that Paul portrays 
Jesus as adopting this stance of obedience towards the divine law?
Christ’s obedience is a theme that has occupied Christian theologians since at least the fourth 
century.169 John Murray considers the obedience of Christ to be “the unifying or integrating principle” 
for the various descriptions of the work of Christ and Richard Longenecker identifies this complex of 
ideas as “the foundational conviction of New Testament Christology.”170 While Jesus’ obedience to the 
Father is an explicit theme in the Gospels and Hebrews,171 its significance in the Pauline literature 
remains disputed.
In a comparison of Adam and Christ (Rom 5.12–21), Paul contrasts the disobedience of the 
former with the obedience of the latter without defining the nature of either disobedience or obedience. 
In the concluding passage, Paul first contrast Adam’s one trespass (παρα' πτωµα) with Christ’s one 
righteous act (δικαι'ωµα); while the former leads to condemnation, the latter leads to “justification of 
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contrast to some of the Graeco-Roman constructions of this dichotomy, in Paul’s thinking the problem is not with the written 
law per se, but with the response elicited by the written law (see, e.g., Rom 7.7–25).
168. The question of imitation will be dealt with below.
169. Richard N. Longenecker, “The Obedience of Christ in the Theology of the Early Church,” in Reconciliation and 
Hope: New Testament Essays on Atonement and Eschatology Presented to L. L. Morris on His 60th Birthday, ed. Robert 
Banks (Milton Keyes: Paternoster, 1974), 150–52; Mark W. Elliott, “Πι'στις Χριστουñ In the Church Fathers and Beyond,” in 
The Faith of Jesus Christ: Exegetical, Biblical, and Theological Studies, ed. Michael F. Bird and Preston M. Sprinkle 
(Peabody: Hendrickson, 2009), 277–89. 
170. John Murray, Redemption: Accomplished and Applied (London: Banner of Truth, 1961), 19; Richard N. 
Longenecker, “The Foundational Conviction of New Testament Christology: The Obedience / Faithfulness / Sonship of 
Christ,” in Jesus of Nazareth: Lord and Christ: Essays on the Historical Jesus and New Testament Christology, ed. Joel B. 
Green and Max Turner (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), 473–88.
171. Synoptic Gospels: Peter G. Bolt, “The Faith of Jesus Christ in the Synoptic Gospels and Acts,” in The Faith of 
Jesus Christ: Exegetical, Biblical, and Theological Studies, ed. Michael F. Bird and Preston M. Sprinkle (Peabody: 
Hendrickson, 2009), 209–22; John: Willis H. Salier, “The Obedient Son: The ‘Faithfulness’ of Christ in the Fourth Gospel,” 
in The Faith of Jesus Christ: Exegetical, Biblical, and Theological Studies, ed. Michael F. Bird and Preston M. Sprinkle 
(Peabody: Hendrickson, 2009), 223–37; Hebrews: Matthew C. Easter, Faith and the Faithfulness of Jesus in Hebrews, 
SNTSMS 160 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), especially chapter 7.
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life” (v. 18).172 In verse 19, the trespass is described as disobedience while the righteous act is spoken 
of as the obedience of the one (δια` τηñς υ  πακοηñς τουñ  ε νο`ς). Adam’s trespass refers to the events of 
Genesis 3.1–7 and, given the central place that Christ’s death occupies in Romans (3.25; 4.25; 6.1–4), 
the one righteous act must refer to this climactic event.173 The question, however, is whether Christ’s 
obedience mentioned in verse 19 encompasses only this one righteous act or whether it is his whole life 
that is in view. Theologians have used the categories of Christ’s “active obedience” to indicate his life 
lived in faith and obedience to the Father and “passive obedience” to speak of his death on the cross.174 
The narrative in Genesis does not record Adam as leading an especially dissolute life following 
the sin in Genesis 3 and it is most likely, then, that in verse 19 Paul still has in mind Adam’s one sin 
and act of disobedience.175 If Paul’s argument is running along parallel lines, then it is Christ’s one act 
of righteousness/obedience—his death on the cross—that is in view (“passive obedience”) in verse 19, 
rather than his whole life (“active obedience”).176 This conclusion is bolstered by Paul’s language in 
Philippians where Christ’s death is held up as the pinnacle of humble servanthood: “[Christ Jesus] 
humbled himself and became obedient to the point of death—even death on a cross” (Phil 2.8).177 The 
conclusion that Romans 5.18–19 and Philippians 2.8 focus on Jesus’ death as the clearest display of his 
obedience to God’s will (“passive obedience”) does not preclude the possibility that other Pauline 
passages speak of his “active obedience.”
Over the past century, a growing number of scholars have seen in Paul’s phrase πι'στις Χριστουñ178 
a reference not to believers’ “faith in Christ” but rather, the “faithfulness of Christ.” While Gerald 
O’Collins might be correct when observing that “the tide seems to have turned in favour [of the 
latter],”179 the debate continues and there is no clear consensus or even majority view on the matter.180 
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172. The nature of the genitive in the phrase ει ς δικαι'ωσιν ζωηñς is unclear. Regardless of whether it constitutes a 
genitive of apposition, purpose (Fitzmyer, Romans, 421) or result (Cranfield, Romans, 289), what is clear is the link 
throughout Romans between justification/righteousness and life (e.g., 1.17; 5.21; 6.20–23; 8.1–11).
173.  Dunn, Romans, 284–85. In contrast, Cranfield, Romans, 289 argues that this phrase in v. 18 refers to Christ’s 
whole life, just as v. 19 does.
174. See, e.g., Murray, Redemption, 19–24 (with the cautions noted there); Robert Letham, The Work of Christ, 
Contours of Christian Theology (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1993), 130–32. 
175. The Genesis narrative is clear, however, regarding the ongoing deleterious effect that this initial trespass has on 
Adam’s progeny.
176. Dunn, Romans, 283. Cranfield argues that Christ’s δικαι'ωµα refers not to a single “righteous act” but rather 
Christ’s “righteous conduct,” and that the verse thus refers to, “the obedience of His life as a whole” (Romans, 289).
177. This idea is found elsewhere in the early Christian tradition. Hebrew 5.8 reads “he learned obedience through 
what he suffered.” The larger context of Heb 5.1–10 makes it clear that Jesus’ crucifixion is in view (William L. Lane, 
Hebrews, 2 volumes, WBC 47 [Dallas: Word, 1991], 121).
178. With some minor variations, the phrase occurs in the undisputed Pauline texts at Rom 3.22, 26; Gal 2.16 (bis); 
3.22; Phil 3.9. Once it is accepted that these texts speak of Christ’s faithfulness, it is also possible to extend the argument to 
texts like Rom 3.25 (δια` πι'στεως ε ν τωñ,  αυ  τουñ αι«µατι) and Rom 5.1 (∆ικαιωθε'ντες ουòν ε κ piι'στεως); see Stephen L. Young, 
“Paul’s Ethnic Discourse on ‘Faith’: Christ’s Faithfulness and Gentile Access to the Judean God in Romans 3:21–5:1,” 
HTR 108.1 (2015): 30–51.
179. Gerald O’Collins S. J., Christology: A Biblical, Historical, and Systematic Study of Jesus, 2nd ed. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), 271.
180. For a survey of the discussion, see Debbie Hunn, “Debating the Faithfulness of Jesus Christ in Twentieth-Century 
Scholarship,” in The Faith of Jesus Christ: Exegetical, Biblical, and Theological Studies, ed. Michael F. Bird and Preston M. 
Sprinkle (Peabody: Hendrickson, 2009), 15–31; Matthew C. Easter, “The Pistis Christou Debate: Main Arguments and 
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At its most basic level, the debate is whether the genitive noun, Χριστουñ, should be understood in an 
objective or subjective sense. Although this is primarily a grammatical question, scholars on either side 
of the debate agree that linguistic arguments are insufficient for determining the meaning of the phrase; 
the debate is essentially a theological one.181 The voluminous literature generated by this intractable 
debate cautions against seeking an easy solution. For our purposes, however, it is sufficient to note the 
possibility that certain texts speak of Christ’s faithfulness.
We have already established that Paul speaks of Christ’s obedience, and since obedience and 
faithfulness can be considered as cognate themes,182 it is certainly possible that πι'στις Χριστουñ  
occupies the same semantic domain. But does drawing πι'στις Χριστουñ into the discussion enable one to 
say anything more about Christ’s obedience than what was said in regard to Romans 5? The answer 
seems to be “no.” It is unlikely that Paul has a broader obedience in view (“active obedience”) when 
speaking of Christ’s faithfulness since his discussions of the theme in Romans 3, Galatians 2–3, and 
Philippians 3 all occur in the context of Christ’s death. Paul does not deny Christ’s active obedience, it 
is simply not an important element within his arguments in these letters. When Paul writes of Christ’s 
faithfulness and obedience, then, his focus is on Christ’s “passive obedience” displayed in his death on 
the cross.183
The theme of kingship achieved through suffering is reminiscent of the Cynic ideal of toil seen, 
above all, in the figure of Heracles. However, the parallels between Heracles and Christ extend beyond 
this one theme,184 suggesting that the greater complex of ideas surrounding the hero, rather than 
kingship itself, played a significant role at this point.
If Paul’s language of obedience and faithfulness has as its focus the cross, is there any evidence 
that Jesus’ obedience to the law finds a place in Paul’s theology in a way similar to that in the 
Gospels?185 In Galatians 4.4–5 Paul says that “when the fullness of time had come, God sent his Son, 
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Responses in Summary,” CurBR 9.1 (2010): 33–47. In addition to these surveys, the debate is most readily accessed through 
two seminal essays produced in the 1990s: James Dunn’s “Once More, ΠΙΣΤΙΣ ΧΡΙΣΤΟΥ,” and Richard Hays’ “ΠΙΣΤΙΣ and 
Pauline Theology” What is at Stake?” Both of these appeared in David M. Hay and E. Elizabeth Johnson, eds., Looking 
Back, Pressing On, vol. 4 of Pauline Theology, SBLSS 4 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1997) and can now also be found as 
appendices in Hays, Faith of Jesus Christ, 249–71 and 272–97, respectively. The essays in Michael F. Bird and Preston M. 
Sprinkle, eds., The Faith of Jesus Christ: Exegetical, Biblical, and Theological Studies (Peabody: Hendrickson, 2009) 
provide more recent perspectives that also move beyond the evidence in the Pauline letters.  
181. Hunn, “Debating the Faithfulness of Christ,” 26.
182. Longenecker, Romans, 598.
183. This is also true if τη`ν υ  πακοη`ν τουñ Χριστουñ in 2 Cor 10.5 is understood as a subjective genitive: the focus 
remains on Christ’s weakness and humility exhibited in his death (Michael Kibbe, “‘The Obedience of Christ’: A 
Reassessment of τη`ν υ  πακοη`ν τουñ Χριστουñ in 2 Corinthians 10:5,” JSPL 2.1 [2012]: 41–56).
184. See David Edward Aune, “Heracles and Christ: Heracles Imagery in the Christology of Early Christianity,” in 
Greeks, Romans, and Christians: Essays in Honor of Abraham J. Malherbe, ed. David L. Balch, Everett Ferguson, and 
Wayne A. Meeks (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990), 3–19; Abraham J. Malherbe, “Heracles,” in Light from the Gentiles: 
Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays, 1959–2012, ed. Carl R. Holladay, et al., NovTSup 150 
(Leiden: Brill, 2014), 651–74. 
185. “Do not think that I have come to abolish the law or the prophets; I have come not to abolish but to fulfill. For 
truly I tell you, until heaven and earth pass away, not one letter, not one stroke of a letter, will pass from the law until all is 
accomplished” (Matt 5.17–18). See also the references in n. 171.
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born of a woman, born under the law (γενο' µενον υ  πο` νο' µον), in order to redeem those who were under 
the law.”186 The phrase γενο' µενον υ  πο` νο' µον indicates that Jesus was born a Jew (cf. 1 Cor 9.20), 
which brought with it the obligation to follow Torah.187 The following clause (Gal 4.5a)—ι«να του`ς υ  πο` 
νο' µον ε  ξαγορα' ση, —indicates both the divine purpose and the result of God’s sending his son: the 
redemption of those under the law.188 While the process of this redemption and its link to Jesus’ 
Jewishness are not obvious on the basis of these verses alone, Paul’s argument in 3.10–14 explains that 
through his death Christ bore the curse that properly belonged to those who were under the law and 
unable to keep the law.189
Christ’s redemption in Galatians 3 is described in terms of a “an exchange curse:”190 he redeems 
God’s people from the curse of the law by becoming a curse for them (v. 13). But in order for this 
formulation to function correctly, Christ must not be under the same curse as those for whose sake he 
will become accursed. One way in which Christ can avoid the curse is if he keeps the law since, 
according to verse 10, those who do not remain in the law and do what is written are cursed, they 
experience the “curse of the law” (v. 13).191 Christ’s conformity to the law lies behind another passage 
in which exchange is highlighted: “For our sake [God] made him to be sin who knew no sin, so that in 
him we might become the righteousness of God” (2 Cor 5.21).192 That Jesus “knew no sin” implies his 
obedience to the law, and Paul’s logic in Galatians 3.10–14 also requires this obedience. Christ’s 
obedience to the law remains an unspoken assumption, rather than an explicit element, in Paul’s 
argument in Galatians.
One final element to note in Galatians 3.10–14 is Paul’s assertion that the curse was transferred to 
Christ through his crucifixion. Paul finds the connection between “curse” and “crucifixion” in 
Deuteronomy 21.23: “cursed is everyone who hangs on a tree” (Gal 3.13).193 The precise way in which 
this exchange occurs remains elusive. What Paul seems to have in mind, as in Romans 5 (see above), is 
a representative Christology in which Christ identifies with God’s people.194
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186. If this is a pre-Pauline confession (so Richard N. Longenecker, Galatians, WBC 41 [Dallas: Word Books, 
1990], 166–67), it nevertheless receives Paul’s approval, as evidenced by the argument that follows.
187. Longenecker, Galatians, 171–72.
188. Longenecker, Galatians, 172.
189. The central argument of Hays’s thesis is that these two passages are related through “a single foundational story” 
(Faith of Jesus Christ, 73–117, here 80); see also Moo, Galatians, 212–13.
190. Longenecker, Galatians, 121.
191. We are once again in heavily disputed territory. In the “traditional” reading of Paul, the curse falls upon those 
who attempt to live by law instead of by faith because they are unable to fulfil the law perfectly (see, e.g., Moo, 
Galatians, 201–5 and the list of modern commentators on p. 202). Representing one form of the “New Perspective,” James 
Dunn, argues that the curse falls on those who fail to do the law in that they “[put] too much weight on the distinctiveness of 
Jews from Gentiles ... those who invested their identity too far in the presumption that Israel was set apart from ‘the nations’” 
(Galatians, 170–74, here 172).
192. The idea of Christ’s sinlessness is found throughout the early Christian tradition: Heb 4.15; 1 Pet 2.22; 1 John 3.5; 
see O’Collins, Christology, 280–84 for further discussion. O’Collins’s discussion of the faith of Jesus (pp. 262–80) focuses 
on the question of belief rather than fidelity. 
193. For textual matters pertaining to Paul’s quotation of Deuteronomy, as well as references to other Jewish writings 
from Paul’s day that link this text to crucifixion, see Moo, Galatians, 222–23.
194. Hays, Faith of Jesus Christ, 150–53; Moo, Galatians, 213; see below, p. 316.
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The passages examined in the preceding paragraphs indicate the centrality of the cross in Paul’s 
conception of Christ’s faithfulness and obedience. It is Christ’s “passive obedience” which dominates 
Paul’s thinking. While some passages seem to allude to Christ’s “active obedience” and faithful 
keeping of God’s law, this theme is only arrived at by filling in some exegetical gaps. Deuteronomy’s 
image of the king as an exemplary, law-abiding Israelite is thus not central to Paul’s writings. At best, 
one might infer this aspect of Christ’s person, but it is not an integral element in Paul’s conception of 
Jesus’ kingship. 
The Model King
In the Hellenistic kingship ideal, the king’s virtue resulted from his imitation of God. In turn, the 
king provided a model for his subjects to imitate. In this section three related elements within Paul’s 
Christology are examined to establish the extent of their conformity to this vision of kingship. 
The Imitation of Christ
Imitation plays an important role in the king’s rule according to a number of authors surveyed 
earlier in this study. Philo’s Moses, for example, improves his subjects by providing for them a model 
(παρα' δειγµα ) to copy (Moses 1.158–161). Both in Philo and in the Pythagorean texts, as subjects gaze 
upon the king, they are transformed. Joshua Jipp notes the importance of the presence of the king in 
this encounter between king and subject and links this to the Pauline concept of union with Christ.195 It 
is, however, possible to examine the imitation and union motifs separately, and it is the former that will 
occupy us in this section.
It is striking that most of the examples of explicit calls to imitation in the Pauline letters set Paul 
up as the example to be copied rather than Christ (1 Thess 1.6; 1 Cor 4.16; 11.1; Phil 3.17; Gal 
4.12).196 While some scholars have focused on the Pauline call to imitation as an imposition of power 
and a form of coercing obedience from his readers,197 others, noting the “accent of humility, self-
denial, self-giving, self-sacrifice for the sake of Christ and the salvation of others,” see in Paul a desire 
that his believers model their behaviour on the example of Christ.198 Paul serves as a paradigm only in 
so far as he himself looks to Christ as a paradigm to be imitated.199 This pattern is on view most clearly 
at 1 Corinthians 11.1: “Be imitators of me, as I am of Christ.” 
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195. Christ is King, 65–66. Jipp explores this theme more fully in “Sharing the Heavenly Rule of Christ the King: 
Paul’s Royal Participatory Language in Ephesians,” in “In Christ” in Paul: Explorations in Paul’s Theology of Union and 
Participation, ed. Michael J. Thate, Kevin J. Vanhoozer, and Constantine R. Campbell, WUNT 2/384 (Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 2014), 251–79. The role that relationship/union with Christ plays in imitation is also raised by Willis Peter de Boer, 
The Imitation of Paul: An Exegetical Study (Kampen: Kok, 1962), 57–58, 70–71, 214–16. 
196. See, e.g., de Boer, Imitation, 92–205, who provides an exegetical study of these passages with a focus on the call 
to imitate Paul. De Boer also includes exegesis of Acts 20.35; 2 Thess 3.7–9, 1 Tim 1.16; 2 Tim 1.13; 3.10.
197. See the summary in Brian Dodd, Paul’s Paradigmatic “I”: Personal Example as Literary Strategy, JSNTSup 177 
(Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999), 18–29. These approaches are critiqued by Andrew D. Clarke, “‘Be Imitators of 
Me’: Paul’s Model of Leadership,” TynBul 49.2 (1998): 329–60.
198. Clarke, “‘Be Imitators of Me’,” 359; de Boer, Imitation, 207.
199. The imitation of Christ is mediated through Paul (Schnelle, Apostle Paul, 568–69). De Boer argues that Paul saw 
the need for this mediation to fall away as believers matured (Imitation, 215).
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In what is possibly his earliest letter, Paul writes to the Thessalonians that he is thankful they 
“became imitators of us (µιµηται` η  µωñν ε γενη' θητε) and of the Lord” (1 Thess 1.6). This statement is 
descriptive rather than prescriptive, describing the effect that acceptance of the gospel had in the lives 
of these believers. In particular, Paul points to the manner (“with the joy of the Holy Spirit”) in which 
they accepted the θλιñψις200 which followed their turning to God. It is this joyful acceptance of suffering 
that Paul considers to be Christ-like.201 Similarly, in his letter to the believers in Philippi, Paul’s call to 
imitate him (Phil 3.17) occurs in the context of a warning about “enemies of the cross of Christ” (v. 18) 
and Paul’s own desire to imitate Christ’s suffering (v. 10). Paul’s exhortation that the Corinthians 
imitate him (1 Cor 4.16) is followed by the promise that he would send Timothy who would remind the 
Corinthians of Paul’s “ways in Christ Jesus” (v. 17) which, in 1 Corinthians 1–4, is the way of the 
cross.202 These examples suffice to indicate that when Paul calls his readers to imitate him, Christ is 
always the ultimate object of imitation.203 When Paul writes about imitation, both with regard to 
himself and thus the imitation of Christ, the focus is on Christ’s self-giving and humility, seen 
supremely in his vicarious suffering and death. In Graeco-Roman moral discourse, virtuous figures 
were regularly held up for imitation.204 If the king is understood as the supremely virtuous person, it 
follows that he, above all others, who should be the object of imitation. 
The Image of God
There are instances in Paul’s letters where imitation of Christ as an ethical ideal is replaced by the 
idea of conforming to, or being transformed into, the image or likeness of Christ. Paul writes that those 
God foreknew were “predestined to be conformed to the image (συµµο' ρφους τηñς ει κο' νος) of his Son” 
(Rom 8.29). Similarly, those who see the glory of the Lord “are being transformed into the same image 
(τη`ν αυ  τη`ν ει κο' να µεταµορφου' µεθα)” (2 Cor 3.18; cf. 4.4).205 In both cases, as in the case of imitation 
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200. Cf. 1 Thess 2.14. This tribulation might refer either to persecution or to the social distress that accompanied their 
acceptance of Paul’s message (Malherbe, The Letters to the Thessalonians: A New Translation with Introduction and 
Commentary, 128).
201. See de Boer, Imitation, 114–15. In 1 Thess 1.7, Paul notes that following their imitation of him and the Lord, the 
Thessalonians became a model (τυ' πος) for believers in Macedonia and Achaia.
202. In 1 Cor 1.17–2.16, in particular, Paul establishes the cross as central to his preaching of the gospel and also as 
foundational to his exhortation to the Corinthians that follows in chaps. 3–4. With reference to these passages, Schnelle 
observes, “For Paul, the cross of Christ is the decisive theological criterion; he gives no argument for the cross but speaks 
from the cross as the axiomatic foundation of what he has to say” (Apostle Paul, 199); see also Dodd, Paul’s Paradigmatic 
“I”, 33–63.
203. Clarke, “‘Be Imitators of Me’,” 342–47.
204. David B. Capes, “Imitatio Christi and the Early Worship of Jesus,” in The Jewish Roots of Christological 
Monotheism: Papers from the St. Andrews Conference on the Historical Origins of the Worship of Jesus, ed. Carey C. 
Newman, James R. Davila, and Gladys S. Lewis, JSJSup 63 (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 294–95. James R. Harrison, “The Imitation 
of the ‘Great Man’ in Antiquity: Paul’s Inversion of a Cultural Icon,” in Christian Origins and Greco-Roman Culture: Social 
and Literary Contexts for the New Testament, ed. Stanley E. Porter and Andrew W. Pitts, TENTS 9 (Leiden: Brill, 
2013), 213–54 argues that Pauline mimesis should be understood within the context of civic benefaction, rather than that of 
philosophical instruction.
205. The identity of the κυ' ριος into whose image believers are transformed is unclear. Whether it is the image of Christ 
or of God at this point, the end result is the same: since Christ is the image of God, believers will be transformed into the 
image of God (2 Cor 4.4). 
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(above), the ethical transformation of the believer is in view, although some sort of final, eschatological 
transformation is also indicated in certain passages.206 
The significance of the believer’s transformation into the image of Christ is further heightened by 
the fact that Christ is, for Paul, the image of God (2 Cor 4.4; cf. Col 1.15). As believers take on the 
image of Christ, they thus take on the image of God and provide the world with a glimpse of the divine:
Bearing the image of God, through the agency of the Messiah, thus emerges as one of the 
foundation themes of Paul’s vision for what we may call “new humanity”. ... Paul is not 
leaving the cosmos without images to mediate the presence of the one true God. On the 
contrary. The world, the cosmos, is already presented with the one true Image, the Messiah 
himself.207
The question is whether this notion of the divine image bears royal connotations in Paul’s writings. In 
other words, is it an aspect of Christ’s kingship for him to be in the image of God? And if this is indeed 
the case, does it follow that for the believer to be conformed to the image of God’s Son connotes the 
believer’s share in Christ’s royal rule?
Despite the ongoing discussion amongst theologians regarding the image of God,208 Richard 
Middleton identifies “a virtual consensus among Old Testament scholars” in which the image of God 
in Genesis 1 is interpreted as the delegated rule and royal function that human beings exercise on 
earth.209 That this understanding of the meaning of “image” was current in certain strands of Second 
Temple Judaism is confirmed by Sirach 17.1–4, where humanity’s creation in the image of God is 
associated with authority, power, and dominion over the world.210
In contrast to the royal language that adheres to the idea of the image of God in the tradition 
represented by Sirach, when Paul speaks of Christ as the image of God in 2 Corinthians 4.4, there is 
nothing explicit about Christ’s kingship.211 Rather, the thrust of the passage is on the revelatory aspect 
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206. Wright, Faithfulness of God, 438–42, demonstrates the ethical nature of Paul’s use of image language. The 
transformation in Phil 3.20–22, like that in 1 Cor 15.42–49, is related but speaks of the eschatological transformation of the 
believer’s body. With regard to 2 Cor 3.18, Furnish (II Corinthians, 240–42) draws attention to the dynamic nature of the 
transformation inaugurated in the present, but extends into the eschaton, at which time the bodily transformation mentioned 
in Phil 3 and 1 Cor 15 occurs. Fitzmyer (Romans, 525) and Longenecker (Romans, 739) read Rom 8.29 in this way; Dunn 
(Romans, 483) concedes that Paul has a process in mind, but argues that Rom 8.29 refers to the end of that process.
207. Wright, Faithfulness of God, 441–42.
208. For brief surveys of this discussion, see Anthony A. Hoekema, Created in God’s Image (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1986), 33–65; J. Richard Middleton, The Liberating Image: The Imago Dei in Genesis 1 (Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2005), 15–
24.
209. J. Richard Middleton, “The Liberating Image? Interpreting the Imago Dei in Context,” Christian Scholars 
Review 24.1 (1994): 11. The arguments outlined in this article are given substance in Middleton, Liberating Image.
210. I am not arguing that this is the only, or even the dominant, understanding of “image” in Jewish texts, only that 
this understanding is present in some texts. Contrast Wisdom 2.23 where the image is associated with incorruption and 
immortality or Philo’s Creation where the image is interpreted along Platonic lines (Gregory E. Sterling, “‘The Image of 
God’: Becoming Like God in Philo, Paul, and Early Christianity,” in Portraits of Jesus: Studies in Christology, ed. Susan E. 
Myers, WUNT 2/321 [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012], 157–73; Gregory E. Sterling, “Different Traditions or Emphases? 
The Image of God in Philo’s De Opificio Mundi,” in New Approaches to the Study of Biblical Interpretation in Judaism of 
the Second Temple Period and in Early Christianity: Proceedings of the Eleventh International Symposium of the Orion 
Center for the Study of the Dead Sea Scrolls and Associated Literature, Jointly Sponsored by the Hebrew University Center 
for the Study of Christianity, 9–11 January, 2007, ed. Gary A. Anderson, Ruth A. Clements, and David Satran [Leiden: Brill, 
2013], 41–56). 
211. This, in turn, is in stark contrast to Col 1.15–20 which is filled with royal language apparently predicated on 
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of Christ’s mediatorial role.212 Paul has just stated that those who contemplate the Lord’s glory are 
transformed into “the same image” (2 Cor 3.18)—most likely the image of Christ the Lord, since 
elsewhere Paul speaks of this same transformation into the image of Christ, rather than into the image 
of God. 
In Romans 8.29, the believer is said to conform to the image of God’s Son. There is no explicit 
royal language in the immediate context, but we have already seen (above, pp. 265–269) that “son of 
God” language can be associated with kingship. The emphasis in the earlier part of Romans 8 is on the 
present and eschatological transformation of the believer, especially with regard to ethical matters. The 
allusion to Psalm 109.1 LXX in Romans 8.34 certainly carries messianic, and thus royal, overtones 
(assuming the allusion was heard by Paul’s readers). However, Christ’s intercession in this verse (ο ς 
και` ε  ντυγχα' νει υ  piε`ρ η  µωñ ν) suggests that he bears a priestly role or that of an advocate.213 It is 
ultimately the love of God in Christ (v. 39; cf. v. 35), demonstrated in Christ’s intercessory role, which 
assures the believer of his or her final transformation into the image of God’s Son. 
This eschatological transformation is most explicit in 1 Corinthians 15.49 which concludes a 
section in which the first Adam—the first person, the earthly person—is contrasted with the last Adam, 
the heavenly person (1 Cor 15.44b–49). Paul’s main concern seems to be with timing: the physical (το` 
ψυχικο' ν) must precede the spiritual (το` πνευµατικο' ν).214 The climax of this section is the statement that 
believers will “bear the image of the heavenly man” (v. 49). There is nothing in the passage to suggest 
that “image” bears some of the royal elements it does in other Jewish texts. However, it should be 
noted that the climactic conclusion of the believers’ transformation (1 Cor 15.49) is part of a larger 
section concerned with the resurrection and the eschaton (1 Cor 15.1–58). Although Christ’s present 
kingship is assumed, the focus in vv. 20–28 is on the eschatological events through which this kingship 
is brought to completion. The resurrection and future transformation of believers into the image of the 
heavenly person constitute a part of these eschatological events and are thus related to Christ’s 
kingship, even though there is nothing to indicate that the believer’s transformation into the image of 
Christ necessarily includes royal elements as part of this change.215 
Before turning to Paul’s use of the figure of Adam, we note that in both Romans 8.29 and 2 
Corinthians 3.18, the believer’s transformation into the image of Christ occurs in relation to δο' ξα, 
“glory” (cf. Rom 8.30). The same is true of 1 Corinthians 15 where the spiritual body that will be 
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Christ as the image of God (v. 15); see Jipp, Christ is King, 100–127.
212. See, e.g., Furnish, II Corinthians, 222, 248, who notes the parallels between Paul on the one hand, and Philo and 
the Wisdom of Solomon, on the other and traces the similarities back to Wisdom speculation in Hellenistic Judaism.
213. Priestly: Hengel, “‘Sit at My Right Hand!’,” 159–63. Judicial: Longenecker, Romans, 755–56; cf. ε γκαλε'ω, “to 
bring a charge against, to accuse,” at Rom 8.33.
214. The contrast indicated here has already been adumbrated (1 Cor 2–3), suggesting that Paul is returning to a 
question plaguing the Corinthian church, possible one raised by them because of a religious-philosophical exegetical 
tradition inherited from Alexandrian Judaism (Gregory E. Sterling, “‘Wisdom Among the Perfect’: Creation Traditions in 
Alexandrian Judaism and Corinthian Christianity,” NovT 37.4 [1995]: 355–84). 
215. Has Paul played down this aspect of eschatological transformation because of the Corinthians’ overzealous 
proclamation of their kingship in 1 Cor 4.8?
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raised in power and glory (vv. 43–44), is the same body that will be transformed into the likeness of the 
heavenly person (v. 49). The link between the fall of Adam and loss of glory is well-established in a 
number of Jewish texts and provides Paul with this key element of his soteriology.216 Paul is thus 
drawing on a nexus of ideas in which the image of God and the glory associated with that image was 
given to Adam, was subsequently lost, but is being renewed in humanity through the work of Christ.217 
It is this which encourages Paul to speak of Christ as “the last Adam” (1 Cor 15.45). 
The New Adam
The link between the image of God and the figure of Adam was noted in the previous section. 
That Adam is associated with dominion in certain Jewish traditions is established by 4 Ezra 6.53–54 
which describes the creation on the sixth day of “cattle, beasts, and creeping things” before observing 
that “over these [God] placed Adam as ruler over all the work which [he] had made.” The author has 
conflated ideas found in Genesis 1.26–28 with those from Genesis 2.4–7, 19–20 in order to turn Adam 
into a king-like figure.218 While Adam is rarely mentioned by name in the Pauline literature being 
examined in this chapter,219 Dunn argues that Adam and the Genesis account lie just beneath the 
surface of key Pauline passages like Romans 1.18–32; 3; 5.12–21; 7.7–13; 8.19–22 and Philippians 
2.6–11, and that Adam is thus a significant figure for Paul’s Christology and soteriology.220 Whether or 
not Dunn’s assessment of Adam in Paul’s theology is correct,221 the question that needs to be addressed 
is whether the link between Adam and Christ contributes to Paul’s understanding of Christ’s kingship. 
Romans 5.12–21 contrasts Adam and Christ as two representative figures, each of whom defines 
the future of their respective “descendants.”222 Throughout this passage, the two figures are 
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216. These references are collected at Dunn, Christology in the Making, 102 n. 15. For the link with Paul’s soteriology, 
see pp. 106–107. Again, the claim that there are certain strands of Judaism which exhibit this tradition is not the same as the 
claim that this position is representative of Second Temple Judaism. John R. Levison, Portraits of Adam in Early Judaism, 
JSPSup 1 (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1988), studies seven Jewish texts to demonstrate that there is no single Adam tradition, but 
that the respective authors adapt and use Adam differently within their larger projects.
217. 1 Cor 11.3–16 contains the same complex of ideas, but it does not have direct bearing on the point being argued 
here. I note, however, that even if kingship language is absent, the idea of dominion of one sort or another, is not (see v. 3). 
218. In addition to the explicit mention of dominion in Gen 1.28 (κατακυριευ' σατε ... και` α»ρχετε), the account in 
Genesis 2 also contains royal imagery when understood within the broader socio-cultural context in which it was written 
(Gerhard von Rad, Genesis: A Commenatry, rev. ed., trans. John H. Marks, OTL [London: SCM, 1972], 77, 83).
219. Rom 5.14 (bis); 1 Cor 15.22, 45; cf. 1 Tim 2.13–14.
220. Dunn, Christology in the Making, 98–128; Dunn, Theology of Paul, 79–101; see also N. T. Wright: “it is clear 
that the contrast of Adam and Christ is somewhere near the heart of Paul’s thought” (“Adam in Pauline Christology,” in 
Society of Biblical Literature 1983 Seminar Papers, ed. Kent Harold Richards, SBLSP 22 [Chico: Scholars Press, 
1983], 387). For an example of an older approach to Adam Christology in which questions of origin were central, see Oscar 
Cullmann, The Christology of the New Testament, 2nd ed., trans. Shirley G. Guthrie and Charles A. M. Hall, NTL (London: 
SCM, 1963), 166–81. 
221. Dunn’s reading of Phil 2 has proved especially controversial; see Wright, “Adam,” 373–84.
222. John Levison observes with regard to other Jewish texts that, “[Adam] is both an individual figure and humankind 
itself” (“Adam as a Mediatorial Figure in Second Temple Jewish Literature,” in New Perspectives on 2 Enoch: No Longer 
Slavonic Only, ed. Andrei Orlov and Gabriele Boccaccini, associate editor Jason M. Zurawski, Studia Judaeoslavica 4 
[Leiden: Brill, 2012], 248). The exact nature of Adam and Christ’s “representation” in Rom 5 and 1 Cor 15 is disputed. 
Appeal is still made to the idea of “corporate personality,” but with caution (A. J. M. Wedderburn, “Some Observations on 
Paul’s Use of the Phrases ‘in Christ’ and ‘with Christ’,” JSNT 25 [1985]: 97 n. 52; Grant Macaskill, Union with Christ in the 
New Testament [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013], 101–2). Constantine R. Campbell, Paul and Union with Christ: An 
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antithetical. The only trait they share—the reason Adam can be described as a “type” of Christ, the one 
who is to come (τυ' πος τουñ µε'λλοντος; 5.14)—is the way in which they are representative of all their 
respective descendants. Although this passage uses language of dominion and reign, it is not Adam and 
Christ who reign in their respective spheres, but death (vv. 14, 17),223 on the one hand, and grace 
through righteousness (vv. 21), on the other.224 These elements are said to enter the world and reign 
through their respective human representatives. Paul’s personification of these elements has occasioned 
a number of different explanations.225 For our purposes it should be noted that while dominion is thus 
an important theme in this passage, neither Adam nor Christ are explicitly depicted as reigning but, 
instead, occupy representative roles. Paul does write that those who receive grace and righteousness 
through Christ, will reign (v. 17). 
Christ’s reign is mentioned explicitly in 1 Corinthians 15. In verse 25, this reign is explained 
through a quotation from Psalm 8.7. This psalm is quoted here and elsewhere in early Christian 
writings in combination with Psalm 109.1 LXX,226 most likely because of the shared idea of the 
subjection of God’s enemies.227 
But there is another reason why Psalm 8 attracted the attention of Christian readers. The psalm 
echoes the narrative of Genesis 1–2 in speaking of all creation being placed under the rule of α»νθρωπος 
and υι ο`ς α  νθρω' που (Ps 8.5 LXX). It is quite likely this latter phrase (a translation of םדא־ןב) which 
drew the attention of the early Christian readers of these Greek psalms and contributed to their 
understanding of its messianic implications. Although the figure of Adam is not mentioned explicitly in 
the psalm, it is humanity understood corporately and in some relation to creation which is primarily in 
view. And since both Adam and Christ are representative figures in whom humanity is summed up 
(Rom 5.12–21), this psalm could be read both as speaking of humanity’s experience in Adam before 
the fall, and of humanity’s experience in Christ after his resurrection, ascension, and session at God’s 
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Exegetical and Theological Study (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2012), 343–49 argues that each figure represents a domain of 
sin and death, on the one hand, and life and righteousness, on the other. For Dunn (Theology of Paul, 94–97, here, 94), “Paul 
encapsulates all human history under [these] two archetypal figures.” This does not mean that elsewhere Paul’s participatory 
language, “in Christ,” does not bear more theological weight than this.
223. In certain Jewish exegetical traditions mortality results from the human condition—the Hebrew adam read in 
terms of humanity—rather than from the figure of Adam (Levison, “Adam as Mediatorial Figure”). Paul, it seems, would not 
disagree, but he roots this human condition in the disobedience of Adam.
224. Unlike 1 Cor 15, the contrast here is not primarily temporal, but speaks to those who are either “in Adam” or “in 
Christ” and thus find themselves under the reign of death or life, respectively. Thus, Martin de Boer observes, “we do not 
have successive temporal epochs but two conflicting, warring orbs of power that are cosmically conceived” (The Defeat of 
Death: Apocalyptic Eschatology in 1 Corinthians 15 and Romans 5, JSNTSup 22 [Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1988], 173). 
225. According to de Boer, Rom 5–8 represents Paul’s “mythologization” programme in which he deploys 
“cosmological-anthropological” categories in contrast to the forensic-eschatological categories of Rom 1–4 (“Paul’s 
Mythologizing Program in Romans 5–8,” in Apocalyptic Paul: Cosmos and Anthropos in Romans 5–8, ed. Beverly Roberts 
Gaventa [Waco: Baylor University Press, 2013], 1–20). According to Longenecker, Paul uses this language to address 
Gentiles who would not be familiar with Jewish categories like “redemption” and “justification” (Romans, 581–84).
226. Eph 1.20–22; 1 Pet 3.22; Pol. Phil. 1.1; see Hengel, “‘Sit at My Right Hand!’,” 166–68.
227. E.g., Lambrecht, “Christological Use of Scripture,” 505–7; Fee, 1 Corinthians, 754–55. Hengel suggests that the 
two psalms were sung together by the earliest Jerusalem congregations and that “they mutually interpreted one another” 
(“‘Sit at My Right Hand!’,” 166–67).
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right hand. Read together, as they often were by early Christians, Psalm 8 and Psalm 109 LXX join 
Adamic and Davidic elements in the person of Jesus the Christ. The combination of these texts in 1 
Corinthians 15 supports the idea that the figure of Adam represents, for Paul, dominion and authority, 
as it does in Genesis 1–2. Adam/humanity’s role as God’s vice-regent over creation is lost through the 
events narrated in Genesis 3, and it is this situation which Christ remedies.
Having established the connection between Adam and rule, we might return to Romans 5 and read 
that passage in a slightly different light. Although neither Adam nor Christ are spoken of explicitly as 
ruling, the theme of dominion permeates the passage and in the light of our reading of 1 Corinthians 
15, we might assert more confidently that the representative roles played by Adam and Christ in this 
passage are linked to their ruling roles in the realms of death and life, respectively.
Turning to the hymn in Philippians 2.6–11, we see Christ described as the being “in the form of 
God” (ε ν µορφηñ,  θεουñ υ  πα' ρχων), yet “taking the form of a slave, being born in human likeness” (2.6, 
7). Scholars disagree as to whether the text alludes to the Adam narrative and whether the “form of 
God” should be understood in relation to the “image of God.”228 However, if, as suggested above, the 
Adam/Christ contrast is, partly, about dominion, and if the portrait of Christ in Philippians 2.5–11 is 
painted in colours meant to contrast Hellenistic or Graeco-Roman rulers,229 then it is quite possible that 
the figure of Adam is also lurking in the background of this passage. Regardless of how the details are 
interpreted, the general shape of the narrative is one of descent (vv. 6–8) followed by ascent (vv. 9–
11),230 and being “in the form of God” mirrors the exaltation of Christ, with all it implies about royal 
rule (see above, p. 270).
George van Kooten, citing Plutarch, demonstrates that the ruler’s reflection of the image of the 
divine was an important element of Graeco-Roman kingship ideology:231 
The ruler is the image of God (ει κω`ν θεουñ) who orders all things ... by his virtue he forms 
himself in the likeness of God (ο  µοιο' τητα θεωñ, ) and thus creates a statue most delightful of all 
to behold and most worthy of divinity. (Princ. iner. 3 [780e–f])
Even though the language of divine image was not used in any of the texts studied in earlier chapters of 
this dissertation, the importance of the king’s imitation of God as part of this kingship discourse (from 
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228. Those who argue that Paul is alluding to Gen 1–3 in some way include Dunn, Christology in the Making, 114–21; 
N. T. Wright, “Jesus Christ is Lord: Philippians 2.5–11,” in The Climax of the Covenant: Christ and the Law in Pauline 
Theology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991), 90–97; Hansen, Philippians, 138–42. Those who deny a link with Genesis, often 
wary of Dunn’s argument at this point against Jesus’ pre-existence, include Larry W. Hurtado, Lord Jesus Christ: Devotion 
to Jesus in Earliest Christianity (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), 121–23; Gordon D. Fee, Paul’s Letter to the Philippians, 
NICNT (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995), 209–10; Bockmuehl, Philippians, 131–33. Bockmuehl recognizes that an 
analogous narrative is at work, even if concrete allusions are not present: “The problem is, however, that the undeniable 
counter-analogy between Philippians 2 and Genesis 3 in general is not easily pinned down in particulars” (p. 133; original 
emphasis).
229. So Peter Oakes, Philippians: From People to Letter, SNTSMS 110 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001), 129–74; Vollenweider, “Der ‘Raub’ der Gottgleichheit”; Wright, “Jesus Christ is Lord”.
230. John Reumann, Philippians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, AB 33B (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2008), 334–35.
231. George H. Van Kooten, Paul’s Anthropology in Context: The Image of God, Assimilation to God, and Tripartite 
Man in Ancient Judaism, Ancient Philosophy and Early Christianity, WUNT 232 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 204–5.
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which Plutarch is drawing and furthering) was demonstrated. These two elements—“image of God” 
and “imitation of the divine”—are thus closely situated within the ancient discourse of ideal kingship. 
From this flows the idea that the king’s subjects should imitate him if they are to pursue the goal of 
assimilation to the divine.232 
Christ, too, is seen by Paul as one to be imitated. In addition to the exemplary role that Christ 
plays in relation to the law, there are also passages which speak explicitly of imitation. The believer’s 
imitation of Christ is focused especially on Christ’s self-giving and sacrificial death which serves as a 
model of love between believers. Closely related to the idea of imitation is that of the believer’s 
transformation into the image of Christ. We have seen that this concept has ethical implications both 
for the present and for the eschatological future. We noted, further, that the scriptural connection 
between image and rule (Gen 1.26–28) is present in passages like Romans 5 and 1 Corinthians 15, and 
Philippians 2, once the link with the figure of Adam (Gen 2.4b-25) is established. We might summarize 
the underlying structure of Paul’s thought as follows: Christ is the last Adam (1 Cor 15.45) through 
whom the effects of the disobedience of the first Adam are undone that humanity might be transformed 
into the image of God. This transformation has a present and future ethical component, but also 
includes Christ’s people sharing in his rule, thus enjoying in the eschaton the dominion over the world 
for which they were created. 
The King’s Kindness
The relationship between king and subject is central in conceptualizing ideal kingship. We 
observed in a number of texts that the king was required to act in such a way as to establish good will 
and affection between him and his subjects. The subjects were also expected to respond to ideal 
kingship with loyalty and obedience. The subject’s response will be examined in the following section. 
In this current section I analyze the way in which Paul portrays Christ’s action on behalf of his subjects.
In the concluding chapter of his important study of the benefactor, Frederick Danker observes that 
“no subject dominates Graeco-Roman literary and non-literary texts as does the remembered 
benefactor.”233 The title ευ  εργε'της, “benefactor,” was given to or adopted by a number of Hellenistic 
kings (for example, Ptolemy III, Antigonus III, and Mithridates V).234 Although the titular use on 
display in the epigraphic record235 is absent in the texts examined in earlier chapters of this present 
study, in these texts the ideal king is constantly urged to exhibit ευ  εργεσι'α towards his subjects.236 
However, the theme of benefaction extends beyond the use of this word-group.
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232. George van Kooten argues that Graeco-Roman philosophical categories, specifically that of Platonic assimilation, 
contribute to Paul’s understanding of image and assimilation (Paul’s Anthropology, 199–219). As van Kooten himself notes, 
however, the link between Adam and image in 1 Corinthians 15, together with the significance of Adam elsewhere in Paul’s 
letters, points to importance of Genesis 1.26–27 in Paul’s understanding of the image of God (pp. 205–206).
233. Frederick William Danker, Benefactor: Epigraphic Study of a Graeco-Roman and New Testament Semantic Field 
(St. Louis: Clayton, 1982), 488.
234. See Walker, Paul’s Offer of Leniency, 127–28.
235. For a thorough discussion of fifty-three epigraphic benefaction texts, see Danker, Benefactor, 57–316.
236. E.g., Diotogenes, 72.14–15; Let. Aris. 249. Xenophon’s Cyrus is typically mercenary in his attitude towards 
euergetism. In Wisdom of Solomon, God’s kingship is illustrated by his display of beneficence (3.5; 11.5, 13; 16.2, 11, 24).
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Danker’s reconstruction of a “profile of benefactors” from the epigraphic evidence yields a 
portrait of the benefactor containing language related to ideal kingship: α  ρετη' , φιλανθρωπι'α, 
δικαιοσυ' νη, ε piιει'κεια.237 Similarly, Jerome Neyrey argues that it is insufficient to study the subject by 
looking only at texts that contain the title ευ  εργε' της. He list six titles that commonly express divine 
benefaction: βασιλευ' ς, piατη' ρ, σωτη' ρ, ευ  εργε'της, δηµιουργο' ς, δεσpiο' της.238 Seen from this perspective, 
the portrait of the ideal king and ideal benefactor all but coincide.239 This is not surprising if, as has 
been observed, one of the goals of producing images of ideal kingship was to encourage rulers to 
exercise virtues that expressed themselves in care for their subjects. The most important role the king 
could play, from the perspective of his subjects, was to enable them to thrive. Whether this was 
expressed in terms of the king’s ευ»νοια, φιλανθρωπι'α, or ευ  εργεσι'α is, in some ways, irrelevant.240 The 
king’s positive attitude towards his subjects from which flows his active work for their well-being is of 
primary importance. In this section, I consider divine action in Paul’s writing against the backdrop of 
these concepts. 
Gift-Giver
The ευ  εργ– group of words occurs infrequently in the New Testament,241 but the goodness, 
kindness, and benevolence of God towards humanity is frequently on view, especially when Paul 
employs the language of grace/gift (χα' ρις).242 John Barclay provides a “lexicon of gift” to illustrate a 
number of terms related to grace that contribute to Paul’s expression of divine benefaction: χρηστο' της 
(Rom 2.4), ε»λεος (Rom 15.9), ευ' λογι'α (Rom 15.29), δι'δωµι (1 Cor 3.10; 2 Cor 5.5).243 By tracing this 
semantic domain through Paul’s writings, we note that they show him praying or giving thanks for 
benefactions similar to those found in other Graeco-Roman text:244 healing from ill-health (2 Cor 12.7–
8);245 assistance and comfort in times of distress (2 Cor 1.3–7); rescue from opponents (Rom 15.30–
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237. Benefactor, 317–66.
238. Jerome H. Neyrey S. J., “God, Benefactor and Patron: The Major Cultural Model for Interpreting the Deity in 
Greco-Roman Antiquity,” JSNT 27.4 (2005): 471–75.
239. Even a superficial comparison of Danker’s “profile of benefactors” (Benefactor, 317–66) with Schubart’s 
Königsideal (“Das hellenistische Königsideal nach Inschriften und Papyri,” APF 12 [1937]: 1–26) supports this statement. 
Klaus Bringmann, “The King as Benefactor: Some Remarks on Ideal Kingship in the Age of Hellenism,” in Images and 
Ideologies: Self-Definition in the Hellenistic World, ed. Anthony Bulloch, et al., HCS 12 (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1993), 7–24 discusses royal donations in cash and in kind on view in the literary and epigraphic record. 
240. For ευ»νοια,see Schubart, “Hellenistische Königsideal,” 8–15. In chapter 2 we saw that φιλανθρωπι'α served this 
purpose in Xenophon’s Cyrus. Danker understands the ruler’s actions in terms of ευ  εργεσι'α (Benefactor). 
241. Lk 22.25; Acts 4.9; 10.38; 1 Tim 6.2.
242. See Barclay, Paul and the Gift, 24–51 for a survey of “gift” in the Graeco-Roman world. The most important 
contribution of Barclay’s magnum opus is his “taxonomy of gift/grace” which recognizes six “perfections” of gift: 
superabundance, singularity, priority, incongruity, efficacy, and non-circularity (pp. 66–78). In Barclay’s re-reading of 
Galatians (pp. 331–446) and Romans (pp. 449–561), Barclay argues that Paul has different perfections and combinations of 
perfections in view at different points in these two letters. A model like that of Neyrey’s (“Benefactor and Patron”) which 
insists on reciprocity as a key element, thus runs the risk of misinterpreting those Pauline passages where non-circularity, for 
example, is present. 
243. Barclay, Paul and the Gift, 575–82.
244. See, e.g., Neyrey, “Benefactor and Patron,” 477–80.
245. The exact nature of Paul’s “thorn in the flesh” is debated, but some sort of physical ailment is most likely 
(Furnish, II Corinthians, 528–29, 550; Graham H. Twelftree, Paul and the Miraculous: A Historical Reconstruction [Grand 
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31). Paul uses gift-language to describe the believer’s reception of God’s Spirit (Rom 5.5; 1 Cor 2.12–
14; 2 Cor 1.22;1 Thess 4.8) and spiritual gifts (Rom 12.3–8; 1 Cor 12.1–31).246 Paul’s ministry is 
considered a divine gift (Rom 1.5; 15.15; 1 Cor 3.10; 15.10).247 
There are passages in Paul’s writings in which grace is associated with Christ. In addition to 
passages in letter openings in which “the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ” is placed alongside, or 
identified with, the grace of God,248 Paul can speak in letter endings of the grace of Christ without 
mentioning God.249 Outside of the Pauline letter endings, this way of speaking about grace without 
reference to God is unusual, occurring only at 2 Corinthians 8.9 and possibly at Galatians 1.6.250 For 
Paul, therefore, it is primarily God, and not Christ, who is the gift-giver. If the genitive in the phrase η   
χα' ρις τουñ κυρι'ου Ι  ησουñ Χριστουñ and its variants is understood as epexegetical, then Paul’s focus is on 
Christ and his work as the gift given by God.251 The prime example of this way of thinking of the 
Christ-event is perhaps Romans 8.32, where, in an argument from the greater to the lesser, God’s 
giving his own Son guarantees that he will give believers “all things.”252 Furthermore, the Christ-event 
effects justification for God’s people which is also described in gift-language (δικαιου' µενοι δωρεα`ν τηñ,  
αυ  τουñ  χα' ριτι; Rom 3.24) with God as its source. Elsewhere Paul writes that the justification which 
comes through Christ (δι  ουð) provides access to God’s χα' ρις (Rom 5.1–2). In Romans 6.23, God’s 
“free gift” (χα' ρισµα) is eternal life “in Christ.” These examples could be multiplied,253 but in each case 
we are dealing with God’s action towards believers, mediated through Christ.254 Thus Barclay: “in all 
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Rapids: Baker Academic, 2013], 158–62), especially if this ailment is also the “weakness of the flesh” Paul speaks of in Gal 
4.13–14 (so Dunn, Galatians, 233; Twelftree, Paul and the Miraculous, 155–58). 
246. In short, “the gift of the Spirit provided the motivating and enabling power by which [believers] were to live” 
(Dunn, Theology of Paul, 413–41, here 414). 
247. See, further, Orrey McFarland’s demonstration that Paul does not separate this gift of apostleship from the divine 
gift given in the person of Christ (God and Grace in Philo and Paul, NovTSup 164 [Leiden: Brill, 2016], 156–76). The 
reading of Rom 1.5 I have adopted here and below accepts that χα' ριν και` α  ποστολη' ν constitutes a hendiadys: “the grace of 
apostleship” (so Fitzmyer, Romans, 237; Longenecker, Romans, 78–79). See McFarland, God and Grace, 157 for a summary 
of the counter-argument.
248. Rom 1.7; 1 Cor 1.3; 2 Cor 1.2; Gal 1.3; Phil 1.2; 1 Thess 1.1; Phlm 3.
249. Rom 16.20; 1 Cor 16.23; 2 Cor 13.13; Gal 6.18; Phil 4.23; 1 Thess 5.28; Phlm 25. Jeffrey A. D. Weima, 
Neglected Endings: The Significance of the Pauline Letter Closings, JSNTSup 101 (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1994), 78–87 
calls this the “grace benediction,” noting that it occurs in all the Pauline letters and consistently contains three elements: 
Paul’s wish, its divine source, and mention of the recipient. All of these occurrences are found in the endings of Paul’s 
letters. In contrast to ancient letters which often concluded with health wishes, Paul sought to show his concern for his 
readers’ spiritual well-being, providing an inclusio with the divine grace spoken of in the letters’ openings (Weima, 
Neglected Endings, 85).
250. And even one of these two cases is “suspect”: important manuscripts (including ý46) omit Χριστουñ at Gal 1.6 (so 
Dunn, Galatians, 38 n. 1, 40; the argument for the inclusion of Χριστουñ is summarized by Moo, Galatians, 86. See also 
Bruce M. Metzger, A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament, 2nd ed. [Stuttgart: German Bible Society, 
1994], 520–21).
251. Weima sees a genitive of source in the concluding formulae, i.e., “the grace that Jesus Christ has and gives” 
(Neglected Endings, 81). In contrast, John Reumann writes, with reference to Phil 4.23, “The gen[itive] is not subjective ... 
but epexegetical or explanatory, grace is God’s bestowal that consists of actions through the risen Lord, Jesus Christ” 
(Philippians, 742); cf. BDF §167. On Christ as the divine gift, see McFarland, God and Grace, 103–53.
252. Danker, Benefactor, 332–36.
253. In Galatians, Barclay argues for a “Christological configuration of the gift of God” in which Paul “interprets the 
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these cases, there is the closest possible identification between God and the Christ-event, but the source 
of the action is consistently God.”255
Since God is the figure who provides the gift, we may think of God as benefactor or patron.256 
Believers respond with gratitude (Rom 1.8; 1 Cor 1.4; Phil 1.3; Phlm 4) or by honouring God through 
making his benefaction known (Rom 1.8; 1 Thess 1.8). It is, above all, the believer’s response of 
loyalty (πι'στις—see below) which defines their relationship to God. The gratitude, loyalty, and honour 
with which God’s “clients” reciprocate confirm the presence of the metaphor of benefaction/patronage 
in Paul’s writings.257
God’s benefaction is in view in Paul’s life. Not only his conversion, but also his apostleship is 
viewed as a divine gift (Rom 1.5; 12.3; 1 Cor 3.10; 15.10). As Zeba Crook puts it: “Through the 
mission to the gentiles, and by establishing communities of gentile believers, Paul is working hard to 
spread and promote the good name of his patron.”258 In so far as this role mediates between benefactor 
and client, Paul can also be considered as a “broker” of God’s χα' ρις—the one who facilitates the 
relationship between the benefactor and the client. Since it is God who is predominantly portrayed as 
benefactor, it is worth noting that Paul can on occasion portray himself as Christ’s client or 
ambassador. This configuration is possibly in view when Paul calls himself a “servant” (δουñλος) of 
Christ Jesus (Rom 1.1) who receives apostleship through him (Rom 1.5).259
But Christ might also be understood as a “broker” who mediates between God and God’s people. 
Prayers are offered “through” Christ to God (Rom 1.8; 7.25) and God gives his subjects victory 
through Jesus Christ (1 Cor 15.57). At the final assize, God’s people will be gathered together and 
receive salvation through Christ (1 Thess 4.14; 5.9).260  In these and other ways, “Jesus, then, mediates 
the heavenly patronage of God to us, even as he functions to mediate earthly petition and praise to the 
heavenly patron.”261 
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divine beneficence celebrated in Judaism through the prism of the Christ-event” (Paul and the Gift, 333).
254. See the discussion in Campbell, Union with Christ, 73–94, 239–48.
255. Barclay, Paul and the Gift, 451–52. In addition to warning against using this observation to separate God and 
Christ in ways that Paul does not, Barclay also notes the presence of exceptions: in Gal 1.4 and 2.20 it is Christ who gives 
himself (cf. Rom 5.8; 2 Cor 8.9).
256. For the current debate around the distinction between benefaction (Greek) and patronage (Roman), see Bruce A. 
Lowe, “Paul, Patronage and Benefaction: A ‘Semiotic’ Reconsideration,” in Paul and His Social Relations, ed. Stanley E. 
Porter and Christopher D. Land, PAST 7 (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 57–84. Both systems function within monarchical rule.
257. Zeba A. Crook, “The Divine Benefactions of Paul the Client,” JGRChJ 2 (2001–5): 9–26; Zeba A. Crook, “BTB 
Readers Guide: Loyalty,” BTB 34 (2004): 167–77.
258. Crook, “Divine Benefactions,” 22. For Paul’s conversion as benefaction, see pp. 15–19; for his apostleship, see 
pp. 19–25.
259. Lowe, “Paul, Patronage and Benefaction,” 81; cf. 1 Cor 4.1; Phil 1.1. This is not to argue that the “broker” image 
exhausts Paul’s use of slave/servant language. 
260. For this reading of 1 Thess 4.14, see Malherbe, The Letters to the Thessalonians: A New Translation with 
Introduction and Commentary, 265–67. 
261. Neyrey, “Benefactor and Patron,” 475–76, here, 476.
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Saviour
A number of Greek texts combine ευ  εργε'της and σωτη' ρ, suggesting that rescue be considered one 
of the ways in which beneficence is shown.262 Not surprisingly, some Hellenistic kings received the 
honorary title “saviour,” most famously Ptolemy I and Antiochus I.263 The title σωτη' ρ did not occur in 
any of the kingship texts examined in earlier chapters of this study, but the concept was seen to be 
present in demands for the king’s provision of deliverance and safety from enemies.264 As such, the 
salvation provided by the king formed part of his φιλανθρωπι'α—his love for his subjects—displayed in 
these instances by providing them with help in times of need.265 This sense of the king’s ability to 
provide salvation is also tied to the ruler cult and explains why this title is so important within the cult: 
when the king does what the gods generally do—in this case, provide rescue—the king deserves 
honours similar to those received by the gods.266
In the Jewish Scriptures, the title σωτη' ρ is used almost exclusively for God.267 When a human 
agent such as Othniel (Judg 3.9) or Ehud (Judg 3.15) is identified as “saviour,” it is because God has 
raised them up and empowered them for the task. Roland de Vaux’s observation, quoted in Chapter 4, 
that “the king is ipso facto a saviour”268 must be understood against the foundational assertion that God 
is Israel’s saviour. The human king’s role as saviour is derived from that of God, as illustrated in 1 
Samuel 11. Following Saul’s routing of the Ammonites (vv. 1–11), the new king exclaims, “today the 
Lord has wrought deliverance in Israel” (v. 13).269 Messianic figures are generally not identified as 
saviours in the Greek Bible, but there are two suggestive passages that link the future king and 
salvation. In Isaiah 49.6, God says to his servant that he, the servant, will be “a light of nations ... for 
salvation to the end of the earth.”270 And in Zechariah 9.9, the foal-riding king is described as “just and 
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262. So Oakes, Philippians, 140. Numerous examples of this collocation are collected in Arthur Darby Nock, “Soter 
and Euergetes,” in The Joy of Study: Papers on New Testament and Related Subjects Presented to Honor Frederick Clifton 
Grant, ed. Sherman E. Johnson (New York: Macmillan, 1951), 127–48.
263. For more references, see Paul Wendland, “ΣΩΤΗΡ: Eine religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchung,” ZNW 5 
(1904): 335–53; Dominique Cuss, Imperial Cult and Honorary Terms in the New Testament, Paradosis: Contributions to the 
History of Early Christian Literature and Theology 23 (Fribourg: Fribourg University Press, 1974), 63–71; Walker, Paul’s 
Offer of Leniency, 127 n. 138.
264. The title was also frequently used of the gods, in which case salvation was often from illness or other dangers 
outside of human control (Nock, Early Gentile Christianity, 36–37). 
265. Jipp, “Sharing the Heavenly Rule,” 263 n. 48.
266. See, e.g., Hans-Josef Klauck, The Religious Context of Early Christianity: A Guide to Graeco-Roman Religions, 
trans. Brian McNeil (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000), 254–55.
267. See, e.g., Deut 32.15; 1 Sam 10.19; Pss 23.5; 24.5; 61.3, 7; 78.9; 94.1 LXX; Isa 12.2; 17.10; 45.15; 62.11. For 
discussion of these texts, see Werner Foerster and Georg Fohrer, “Σω', ζω, Σωτηρι'α, Σωτη' ρ, Σωτη' ριος,” TDNT 7: 965–1024. I 
have been unable to consult Franz Jung, ΣΩΤΗΡ: Studien zur Rezeption eines hellenisticschen Ehrentitels im Neuen 
Testament, NTAbh 2/39 (Münster: Aschdendorff, 2002) and rely on the reviews of Pieter Van Der Horst (Mnemosyne 56.6 
[2003]: 745–47) and Angela Standhartinger (Review of Biblical Literature 6 [2004]: 390–93) for its contents and argument.
268. Roland de Vaux O.P., Ancient Israel: Its Life and Institutions, 2nd ed., trans. John McHugh (London: Darton, 
Longman & Todd, 1973), 110.
269. My study of 1 Samuel 8–12 (in Chapter 4) argued that it is not kingship per se that is problematic in these 
chapters, but Israel’s rejection of God as their deliverer.
270. In the Hebrew text, the servant is made a light so that God’s salvation (“my salvation,” יתעוׁשי) will reach the end 
of the earth.
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salvific” (δι'καιος και` σω', ζων αυ  το' ς). In both cases, though, these agents of salvation are dependant on 
God for their ability to bring deliverance. 
In keeping with the pattern found in the Greek Bible,271 God is identified as σωτη' ρ in the New 
Testament (e.g., Luke 1.47; 1 Tim 2.3; Titus 1.3; Jude 25), but the title is also extended to Jesus (e.g., 
Luke 2.11; John 4.42; Acts 5.31; Titus 1.4; 2 Pet 1.1). 272 Matthew is certainly aware of the etymology 
of Jesus’ name and its link to salvation (Matt 1.21),273 but Luke, although he identifies Jesus as 
saviour, is either unaware of this etymology or chooses not draw his reader’s attention to it (Luke 1.31), 
despite the importance of this theme in Luke’s birth narrative and elsewhere in his Gospel (see 1.69, 
71, 77; 2.11, 30; cf. 3.6; 19.9). The title plays an important role in the soteriology of the Pastoral 
Epistles.274 The presence of the title in other early Christian texts highlights its absence in the 
undisputed Pauline letters. 
Only once in the texts being studied in this chapter does Paul use the word σωτη' ρ. In Philippians 
3.20, Paul reminds the believers, “our citizenship is in heaven, and it is from there that we are 
expecting a Saviour, the Lord Jesus Christ.” Verse 19 establishes a contrast between earthly things (τα` 
ε piι'γεια ), which lead to destruction, and the heavenly citizenship of Paul’s readers (v. 20), which 
guarantees their salvation.275 There are other passages, however, which associate Christ with future 
salvation, thus implying his role as saviour. In Romans 11, Paul draws on language from Isaiah to 
argue that “all Israel” will be saved when “the deliverer” (ο   ρ  υο' µενος)276 comes from Zion (Rom 
11.25–27).277 First Thessalonians 1.10 also speaks of Jesus as the one “who rescues us ( Ι  ησουñν το`ν 
ρ  υο' µενον η  µαñς) from the wrath that is coming.” Despite the absence of the title, Christ takes on the 
role of saviour in Paul’s writings. Following this observation is the question about the nature of that 
from which Christ saves his people.
A handful of passages speak of salvation from God’s wrath. The aforementioned 1 Thessalonians 
1.10, for example, is possibly a summary of Paul’s gospel preached to the Thessalonians,278 which 
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271. For the argument that Paul’s σωτη' ρ Christology is indebted to Jewish rather than Greek thought, see Cullmann, 
Christology, 238–45; Nock, Early Gentile Christianity, 40. Malherbe (“‘Christ Jesus Came Into the World to Save Sinners:’ 
Soteriology in the Pastoral Epistles,” in Collected Essays, 1959–2012, in Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and 
Early Christianity: Collected Essays, 1959–2012, ed. Carl R. Holladay, et al., NovTSup 150 [Leiden: Brill, 2014], 436–37) 
argues that since there is no evidence that the Messiah was ever called “saviour,” the New Testament identification of Jesus 
as σωτη' ρ must derive from the Greek world. 
272. In keeping with general Greek usage, Jewish authors like Philo and Josephus felt free to identify human figures as 
σωτη' ρ; it is thus striking that the New Testament limits this language to God and Christ (Martin Karrer, “Jesus, der Retter 
[Sōtēr],” ZNW 93 [2002]: 170). 
273. Matt 1.21: καλε'σεις το` ο»νοµα αυ  τουñ Ι  ησουñν· αυ  το`ς γα`ρ σω' σει το`ν λαο`ν αυ  τουñ α  πο` τωñν α  µαρτιωñν αυ  τωñν. Ι  ησουñς  
is a translation of עוׁשי, which is understood in the Hebrew Bible and elsewhere (e.g., Philo, Names 121: Ι  ησουñς δε` 
[ε ρµηνευ' εται] σωτηρι'α κυρι'ου) to relate to the Lord’s salvation (Karrer, “Retter,” 153–56).
274. Malherbe, “Soteriology”.
275. Bousset (Kyrios Christos, 310) asserts that Paul’s language at this point is most likely influenced by “the 
eschatological language of the Old Testament.” 
276. Against the argument that the deliverer in v. 26 is God and not Christ, see Fitzmyer, Romans, 620, 624–25; 
Longenecker, Romans, 898–900. The lexeme ρ  υ' οµαι is used infrequently by Paul, but when used substantively it can refer to 
Jesus (1 Thess 1.10). In 2 Cor 1.10 the verb clearly refers to God’s past, present, and future deliverance. The agent of 
deliverance is ambiguous in Rom 15.31. 
277. It is not universally accepted that the salvation in view happens at Christ’s return; see the discussion in Cranfield, 
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would confirm the centrality of Jesus’ return as saviour of his people from God’s wrath (cf. 1 Thess 
5.9). This wrath may have a present expression (1 Thess 2.16; Rom 1.18), but it is above all on the 
final day of judgment that God’s wrath will be experienced.279 In both Philippians 3.20 and 1 
Thessalonians 1.10, this is the day on which Jesus Christ will show himself to be σωτη' ρ.
The passages mentioned in the previous paragraph point to sin as the cause of God’s present and 
future wrath. The refusal to recognize God and to acknowledge God appropriately is identified as the 
foundational sin in Romans 1.19–23.280 As God gives people over to their sins, God’s wrath is 
displayed through the inevitable results of those sins (vv. 24–32). In the words of Wisdom of Solomon: 
“a person is punished by the very things by which the person sins” (11.15–16). 
The connection between these ideas and Christ’s deliverance can be observed as we return to 
Philippians. Paul’s prayer for the Philippians is that “in the day of Christ [they] may be pure and 
blameless (ει λικρινειñς και` α  piρο' σκοποι), having produced the harvest of righteousness (καρπο`ν 
δικαιοσυ' νης) that comes through Jesus Christ” (1.10–11). If “pure and blameless” describes the 
absence of sin, “the harvest of righteousness” describes the presence of good works.281 The same 
concepts, good works joined to the idea of being “blameless and innocent” (α»µεµpiτοι και` α  κε'ραιοι; v. 
15), are once again connected to the “day of Christ” at Philippians 2.12–16 (cf. 1 Cor 1.7–8; 1 Thess 
3.13; 5.23).
If we arrange this complex of ideas temporally, we see that human beings move from being in a 
state of sin,282 and thus under the threat of God’s wrath, into a state of innocence. Believers are 
sustained in this blameless state until the future “day of Christ,” when he returns as their saviour. The 
missing element at the centre of this process of deliverance is, of course, the Christ-event.283 More 
specifically, salvation is effected by the confession of Jesus’ lordship in the context of his death and 
resurrection (Rom 10.9–10) which, in turn, is linked to the forgiveness of sin (Rom 3.21–26; 4.25) and 
ongoing avoidance of sin (Rom 6.1–11).284 For the sake of coherence, the nature of salvation must 
correlate with the condition it addresses—the cure must address the disease.285 From the foregoing 
discussion it has become evident that Christ’s work as σωτη' ρ addresses the wrath of God by dealing 
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Romans, 576–77. For the position I am assuming, see Longenecker, Romans, 897–98.
278. Seyoon Kim, “Son of God as Gospel”.
279. Longenecker, Romans, 202.
280. Longenecker, Romans, 205–15. The sin on view in 1 Thess 2.14–16 is the persecution of believers which arises 
from the failure to recognize the way in which God is now working through Christ. 
281. See, e.g., Phil 1.22; 4.17. In understanding καρπο`ν δικαιοσυ' νης this way, I am following Hansen, Philippians, 63; 
cf. Reumann, Philippians, 158–59.
282. See, further, Dunn, Theology of Paul, 79–101, 317–18; Schnelle, Apostle Paul, 499–505.
283. Dunn, Theology of Paul, 317–33; Schnelle, Apostle Paul, 434–35, 484–85.
284. The connection between forgiveness of sin, Jesus’ death and resurrection, and the salvation theme seems to be 
part of the common Christian tradition; see Matt 1.21; Acts 5.30–31.
285. Malherbe, “Soteriology,” 434, citing Keck, “Christology of the New Testament,” 193.
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with humanity’s sin.286
Paul employs a number of different image and metaphors to speak about the way in which God 
deals with humanity’s sin through Christ. In Romans 3.214–26 Paul uses language that speaks of 
release and deliverance from slavery and imprisonment (α  πολυ' τρωσις) to emphasize the freedom that 
believers experience, cultic language (ι λαστη' ριος) brings to mind atonement and ritual purity, and 
forensic language (δικαιο' ω/δικαιοσυ' νη) speaks of the removal of guilt.287 The first of these images 
brings to mind the idea of liberation—a theme closely associated with deliverance and the σωτη' ρ.288
Paul’s use of liberation imagery is the complement to his assertion that those who find themselves 
apart from Christ are enslaved.289 In Galatians 4.1–11, believers are described as having been enslaved 
by τα` στοιχειñα τουñ κο' σµου before they turned to Christ and they are in danger of being enslaved once 
more should they accept the false teaching about which Paul is warning.290 The exact nature of these 
forces is less significant for our purposes than Paul’s declaration that believers have been redeemed 
(ε ξαγορα' ζω) through God sending his son (v. 5). The slavery image reoccurs in 4.21–31 in the allegory 
of Hagar and Sarah. Paul’s major concern in Galatians is to encourage the Galatian believers to remain 
in the freedom (ε λευθερι'α) they enjoy because of Christ’s liberation (5.1; cf. 5.13). This theme is 
announced in the introduction of the letter as Paul declares that the Lord Jesus Christ “gave himself for 
our sins to set us free from the present evil age (ε ξε'ληται η  µαñς ε κ τουñ αι ωñνος τουñ ε νεστωñτος πονηρουñ)” 
(1.4).291 The link between sin, enslavement, and Christ’s liberation is further worked out in Romans.
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286. For a fuller discussion of Paul’s future soteriology as it is unfolded in Romans, see Cilliers Breytenbach, “‘For in 
Hope We Were Saved’: Discerning the Time in Paul’s Letter to the Romans,” in Grace, Reconciliation, Concord: The Death 
of Christ in Graeco-Roman Metaphors, NovTSup 135 (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 239–56.
287. D. A. Carson, “Atonement in Romans 3:21–26,” in The Glory of the Atonement: Biblical, Historical, and 
Practical Perspectives: Essays in Honor of Roger Nicole, ed. Charles E. Hill and Frank A. James III (Downers Grove: 
InterVarsity Press, 2004), 127–35; Beverly Roberts Gaventa, “The Rhetoric of Violence and the God of Peace in Paul’s 
Letter to the Romans,” in Paul, John, and Apocalyptic Eschatology: Studies in Honour of Martinus C. de Boer, ed. Jan 
Krans, et al., NovTSup 149 (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 65; Longenecker, Romans, 419–25, 432–41.
288. Schnelle, Apostle Paul, 434–37.
289. Paul’s liberation imagery is central to those who argue for an “apocalyptic Paul.” Martyn, for example, notes that 
Paul regularly speaks of “Sin” rather than “sins,” “identifying it is a power that holds human beings in a state of slavery. And 
he sees liberation rather than forgiveness as the fundamental remedy enacted by God” (Galatians, 90). For an historical 
survey as well as critique of this approach to reading Paul, see N. T. Wright, Paul and His Recent Interpreters: Some 
Contemporary Debates (London: SPCK, 2015), 135–218. Wright expresses doubt as to whether apocalyptic and 
covenantal/salvation historical approaches to Paul are as antithetical as is sometimes portrayed; see also David A. Shaw, 
“Apocalyptic and Covenant: Perspectives on Paul or Antinomies at War?” JSNT 36.2 (2013): 155–71. Of course, it is not 
necessary to postulate an “apocalyptic Paul” in order to think of Christ’s work in these terms; see, for example, Gustaf 
Aulén’s classic treatment, Christus Victor: An Historical Study of the Three Main Types of the Idea of the Atonement, trans. 
A. G. Hebert (London: SPCK, 1961). For attempts to think about the atonement in non-violent categories, see the essays in 
Brad Jersak and Michael Hardin, eds., Stricken by God? Nonviolent Identification and the Victory of Christ (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2007).  
290. The identity (and translation) of τα` στοιχειñα is tied to the question of how they can enslave both groups. 
Following Martinus de Boer’s argument (“The Meaning of the Phrase τα` στοιχειñα τουñ κο' σµου in Galatians,” NTS 53.2 
[2007]: 204–24), Barclay translates the term as “physical elements of the world (Paul and the Gift, 409) which stand in 
contrast to its invisible Creator (p. 410). Martyn agrees that this might have been the original meaning for the Galatians, but 
he argues that through the letter, Paul changes the phrase to indicate the various pairs of opposites—Jew/Gentile, slave/free, 
male/female (Gal 3.28)—which are determinative for life outside of Christ (Galatians, 393–406). For the argument that Paul 
here refers to abstract “basic principles,” see Longenecker, Galatians, 165–66. 
291. It should be noted that the rescue in this verse, in keeping with the warnings Paul gives the Galatians later, is 
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Romans 5.12 describes sin’s entrance into the world through one person, with death following in 
sin’s wake.292 Both sin (5.21) and death (5.14) reign. Sin is also described as ruling or controlling 
(κυριευ' ω) those who are under law (6.14; cf. v. 12). People in this situation are obedient—and thus 
enslaved—to sin and, as in 5.12, this slavery leads to death (6.16). The nexus between these three 
enslaving and oppressive elements is summarized at Romans 7.11: sin, seizing an opportunity provided 
by the law, brings death.293
Not surprisingly, given the pattern discerned in Galatians, slavery language in Romans is also 
countered by language of freedom. Those who were previously under the dominion of death will 
receive grace and righteousness in order that they might “exercise dominion in life through the one 
man, Jesus Christ” (Rom 5.17). Those who were once slaves to sin are freed from sin but become 
slaves to God (6.20–22). The climactic statement in Romans 8.2 announces freedom, but also replaces 
one law with another: “For the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus has set you free (η  λευθε'ρωσε'ν 
σε294) from the law of sin and of death.”295 Nevertheless, oppression by sin, the law, and death is 
replaced by freedom expressed in terms of the gift of life and righteousness.296
Absent from these passages in Romans is talk of Christ as liberator (but cf. Gal 1.4; 5.1). Those 
who receive God’s gift and righteousness reign in life through Jesus Christ (Rom 5.21), believers live 
together with him because they died with him (6.8), and believers die to the law through his body (7.4). 
While Christ thus certainly plays a role in bringing freedom and establishing believers in this new life, 
the gift—eternal life (see 6.23)—comes from God (6.15, 16; cf. 8.11), and believers are to offer 
themselves to God (6.13) and become slaves to God (6.22). The one exception to this pattern comes in 
Romans 7.4 where believers are said to be freed from the law that they might belong “to him who has 
been raised from the dead,” that is, Christ. But even this belonging to Christ is in order to “bear fruit 
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present rather than future (Longenecker, Galatians, 8–9). Although their future well-being is also at stake, by (re)turning to 
τα` στοιχειñα τουñ κο' σµου, Paul’s readers risk being enslaved in the present, with all the negative consequences that entails. As 
Martyn observes, “The human plight consists fundamentally of enslavement to supra-human powers; and God’s redemptive 
act is his deed of liberation” (Galatians, 97).
292. Death at this point most likely refers to “moral death or spiritual death” rather than “bodily demise” (de Boer, 
“Paul’s Mythologizing Program,” 11).
293. For a fuller discussion of slavery within the broader theme of violence, see Gaventa, “Rhetoric of Violence”.
294. Despite the awkward singular, I read σε here and not µε (Jewett, Romans, 474). The poorly attested η  µαñς is an 
attempt to harmonize the text with Rom 8.4 (Metzger, Textual Commentary, 456).
295. It should be noted at this point that one form of slavery or law is replaced by another. To these passages could be 
added those in which Paul, his co-workers, and other believers are described as “slaves” to God or Christ (e.g. Rom 1.1; 1 
Cor 7.22; 2 Cor 4.5; Gal 1.10; Phil 1.1). Gaventa mentions this note of “compulsion” that accompanies freedom in Christ and 
seems to want to categorize it as part of the violence of Romans (“Rhetoric of Violence,” 66), but this sense of slavery to God 
seems unavoidable since absolute human autonomy would seem to place one back in the realm of sin. Paul knows only two 
ways to live: in Adam or in Christ (Rom 5.12–21); as a slave to sin or a slave to righteousness/God (Rom 6.15–23).
296. It is possible to read Paul’s talk of “slavery” against the background of Cynic and Stoic moral philosophy; see 
§§567, 578 in M. Eugene Boring, Klaus Berger, and Carsten Colpe, eds., Hellenistic Commentary to the New Testament 
(Nashville: Abingdon, 1995). We observed in Chapter 3 how slavery and kingship could be reconfigured around moral lines. 
True kingship, and thus freedom from slavery, was defined in terms of self-control and right reason. With the exception of 
Rom 5.17, it is not the individual who is described as reigning, but grace and righteousness (Rom 5.21; 6.14, 18) or 
obedience (Rom 6.16). It is, above all, God to whom believers must submit (Rom 6.22) and who is thus the royal figure in 
this passage. 
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for God.” Although the work of Christ in obedience to God is the same in Romans and Galatians, the 
language used in Romans makes Christ’s role instrumental. It is God who is at work through Christ in 
order to liberate human beings that they might serve God. A glimpse at 1 Corinthians 15, a passage 
which is similar to Romans 5–8 in many ways,297 pulls this statement into focus.
Although the language of slavery and freedom is missing from 1 Corinthians 15, Christ is still 
described as the one who liberates God’s people by destroying every ruler, authority, and power (παñσαν 
α  ρχη`ν και` παñσαν ε ξουσι'αν και` δυ' ναµιν; 1 Cor 15.24)298 before destroying the final enemy, death (v. 
26). The destruction of death refers to the final resurrection (vv. 35–58)299 at which point “death has 
been swallowed up in victory” (v. 54) and the sin-death-law nexus is finally destroyed (vv. 55–56). 
Following this final victory, Christ, the Son, is himself subjected to God so that God may become “all 
in all” (vv. 27–28). Christ’s historical role as “an agent exercising God’s sovereignty” thus comes to an 
end,300 his kingship is shown to be temporary and ultimately subordinate to the kingship of God the 
Father.301 Christ’s work as saviour/liberator must therefore be seen within the larger context of God’s 
action on behalf of God’s people. The Jewish Scriptures provide the conceptual background for God’s 
action in this regard. 
In addition to using the title “saviour” to speak of God (as noted above), the Jewish Scriptures 
frequently portray God as saviour/redeemer/liberator of the people of Israel.302 God’s greatest salvific 
act in Israel’s history is the exodus:
I am the Lord, and I will bring you out from the domination of the Egyptians (ε ξα' ξω υ  µαñς α  piο` 
τηñς δυναστει'ας τωñν Αι γυπτι'ων), and I will deliver you from slavery (ρ  υ' σοµαι υ  µαñς ε κ τηñς 
δουλει'ας), and I will redeem you (λυτρω' σοµαι υ  µαñς) by a raised arm and great judgment. 
(Exod 6.6; cf Deut 7.8)
The influence of this narrative is clear when the exodus is evoked in Isaiah to speak of the oppression 
experienced by God’s people in exile and of their liberation by God: 
Do not be afraid of the Assyrians when they beat you with a rod and lift up their staff against 
you as the Egyptians did. ... The Lord of hosts will wield a whip against them, as when he 
struck Midian at the rock of Oreb; his staff will be over the sea, and he will lift it as he did in 
Egypt. (Isa 10.24–26; cf. 11.15–16; 52.4–12)
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297. See, e.g., de Boer, Defeat of Death.
298. These three “are abstract terms for some sort of governing entities, probably supraterrestrial or even mythological” 
(Joseph A. Fitzmyer, First Corinthians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, AB 32 [New York: 
Doubleday, 2008], 572); cf. 1 Cor 3.22: κο' σµος, ζωη' , θα' νατος, ε νεστωñτα, µε'λλοντα and Rom 8.38: θα' νατος, ζωη' , α»γγελοι, 
α  ρχαι', ε νεστωñτα, µε'λλοντα, δυνα' µεις, υ«ψωµα, βα' θος, and τις κτι'σις ε τε'ρα.
299. Fee, 1 Corinthians, 747; Jan Lambrecht, “Structure and Line of Thought in 1 Cor. 15,23–28,” NovT 32 
(1990): 149.
300. Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 574.
301. See also 1 Cor 3.21b–23: “... all belong to you, and you belong to Christ, and Christ belongs to God.”
302. So, e.g., ο   λυτρου' µενος: Isa 41.14; 43.14; 44.24; Jer 27.34; 1 Macc 4.11; ο   σω', ζων: Isa 43.3; 60.16; Ps 16.7; 1 
Macc 4.11;  ο   ε ξαιρου' µενο' ς: 2 Sam 22.2; Isa 60.16; ο   ρ υο' µενος : Isa 59.20.
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The New Testament writers, and Paul in particular, pick up exodus language and themes when 
speaking of God’s salvific work now revealed in and accomplished through Christ.303 The theme of 
salvation would also resonate with those familiar with this role as ascribed to the ideal Hellenistic king. 
God’s defeat of Israel’s enemies in order to effect the liberation and salvation of God’s people is tied to 
the theme of the Divine Warrior.304 Is there evidence that Paul understood Jesus in similar terms?
In identifying Divine Warrior themes in the New Testament, Tremper Longman points to the fact 
that in Paul’s writings, “the day of Christ” has, in some cases, replaced “the day of the Lord” (1 Cor 
1.8; 5.5; 2 Cor 1.14; Phil 1.6, 10; 2.16).305 Since the latter is related to the Divine Warrior theme in the 
Jewish Scriptures,306 it follows that Paul’s transformation assumes that Christ plays a similar role. 
Against this it should be noted, as discussed in the section on Christ as judge, that judicial rather than 
martial language dominates the passages which speak of “the day of Christ.” Martial language is 
present elsewhere in Paul’s writings, however.
We have already noted the way in which language of liberation and salvation, closely linked to 
language of military victory, is used to speak of Christ in passages like 1 Corinthians 15. His 
destruction (καταργε'ω) of “every ruler and every authority and power” (1 Cor 15.24), for example, 
implies that he functions as a warrior in ridding the cosmos of God’s enemies. The ultimate victory 
over death is given by God “through our Lord Jesus Christ” (1 Cor 15.57). As Robert Jewett notes, 
Paul’s triumphant cry that “in all these things we are more than conquerors through him who loved us 
(υ  περνικωñµεν δια` τουñ α  γαπη' σαντος η  µαñς)” (Rom 8.37) “brings Paul’s discourse within the scope of 
divinely inspired warriors and kings who win total victories over their foes.”307
 In the Pauline writings being examined, the foes defeated by Jesus are usually described as 
personified cosmic powers:308 the rulers, authorities, and powers of 1 Corinthians 15.24 or the στοιχειñα 
which enslaved God’s people before Christ’s coming (Gal 4.3, 9; cf. Col 2.8, 20). The precise nature of 
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303. This material is surveyed in Daniel Lynwood Smith, “The Use of ‘New Exodus’ in New Testament Scholarship: 
Preparing a Way Through the Wilderness,” CurBR 14.2 (2016): 207–43. For Paul’s use of the exodus in Romans and 
Galatians, see N. T. Wright, “New Exodus, New Inheritance: The Narrative Substructure of Romans 3–8 (1999),” in Pauline 
Perspectives: Essays on Paul 1978–2013 (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2013), 160–68; for a study of Romans 8 along these lines, 
see Sylvia C. Keesmaat, Paul and His Story: (Re)Interpreting the Exodus Tradition, JSNTSup 181 (Sheffield: Sheffield 
Academic Press, 1999).
304. See the classic studies of Frank Moore Cross, “The Divine Warrior,” in Canaanite Myth and Hebrew Epic: Essays 
in the History of the Religion of Israel (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), 91–111 and his student, Patrick D. 
Miller, The Divine Warrior in Early Israel (1973; repr., Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2006).
305. Tremper Longman III, “The Divine Warrior: The New Testament Use of an Old Testament Motif,” WTJ 44 
(1982): 292–94. These passages were noted above (p. 273) with reference to Christ’s role as judge.
306. See, e.g., Cross, “Divine Warrior,” passim; Patrick D. Miller, Divine Warrior, 135–41.
307. Jewett, Romans, 548–49. Yet the source of the believers’ victory in Romans 8.37, “the one who loved us,” is 
ambiguous: Christ’s love is spoken of in v. 35, while “the love of God in Christ Jesus our Lord” (v. 39) sees God as the 
source with Christ mediating this love.
308. See above, n. 298. This stands in contrast to the Gospels, for example, in which Jesus is often depicted as 
defeating demons; see Ragnar Leivestad, Christ the Conqueror: Ideas of Conflict and Victory in the New Testament (New 
York: Macmillan, 1954), 27–80; Keith Ferdinando, The Triumph of Christ in African Perspective: A Study of Demonology 
and Redemption in the African Context, PBTM (Carlisle: Paternoster, 1999), 183–240. When Satan is mentioned in the 
Pauline writings, it is usually as humanity’s foe (1 Cor 5.5; 7.5; 2 Cor 2.11; 11.14; 12.7; 1 Thess 2.18) whom, believers are 
assured, God will crush (Rom 16.20).
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these elements are not of primary concern. What is of interest at this point is that Christ is depicted as 
defeating them or leaving them enervated (Rom 8.37–39), with the guarantee of their final defeat at his 
return (1 Cor 15.24–28), when he brings everything under his control (Phil 3.20).309 Sin is also 
described as a power that is defeated by Christ (Rom 8.3–4) as is death (1 Cor 15.57).310 The former 
happens through Christ’s death, the effects of which, including the defeat of death itself, are only 
consummated at his parousia.
While Paul never describes Christ explicitly as a general or warrior, the language of Christ’s 
victory of the powers and his liberation of his people could certainly arouse these images in the minds 
of his readers. We noted in Chapter 3 that the Hellenistic period was, in the words of Angelos 
Chaniotis, “the period of the ubiquitous war.”311 It was observed in earlier chapters that while authors 
felt the need to mention the king’s role as warrior or general, they often did so in muted tones, choosing 
to emphasize the peaceful outcome of war, rather than war itself. It has been demonstrated by others 
that Paul is familiar with the language of war and warfare,312 and yet his description of Christ links him 
with these themes only by implication.313 This raises the possibility that Paul, like some of the authors 
discussed earlier in this dissertation, was aware of the horrifying realities of war and, therefore, chose 
not to describe Christ with explicitly martial titles. If we accept that Paul does see Christ as a warrior, 
we must also note that Jewett’s point about Romans 8.37 is true throughout Paul’s writings: “The 
particular victory Paul has in mind is won through love rather than competition.”314
Before turning to other aspects of the king’s benefaction and euergetism, there is one further 
Graeco-Roman image that Paul uses to describe God which needs to be noted. The Roman triumph, 
“the most important and well-known political-religious institution of the [New Testament] period,”315 
is used by Paul as part of a discussion of his ministry. In 2 Corinthians 2.14, God is portrayed as the 
triumphator who celebrates his victory over Paul (Τωñ,  δε` θεωñ,  χα' ρις τωñ,  πα' ντοτε θριαµβευ' οντι η  µαñς ε ν 
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309. See Leivestad, Christ the Conqueror, 92–115 for a more detailed discussion of the relevant passages. Oakes, 
Philippians, 139 suggests that Paul’s imagery in Philippians 3.20 “must be an analogy with a military leader of a state.”
310. Leivestad, Christ the Conqueror, sin: 115–22, death: 122–38.
311. Angelos Chaniotis, War in the Hellenistic World: A Social and Cultural History, Ancient World at War (Malden: 
Blackwell, 2005), 1–17, here, 2.
312. Abraham J. Malherbe, “Antisthenes and Odysseus, and Paul at War,” in Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic 
Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays, 1959–2012, ed. Carl R. Holladay, et al., NovTSup 150 (Leiden: Brill, 
2014), 135–66 reads 2 Cor 10.1–6 against Hellenistic philosophical appropriations of war imagery that can be traced back to 
Antisthenes. Lisa M. Bowens, “Investigating the Apocalyptic Texture of Paul’s Martial Imagery in 2 Corinthians 4–6,” 
JSNT 39.1 (2016): 3–15 demonstrates linguistic parallels between Paul and other Greek writers on military matters. These 
studies shows Paul’s familiarity with martial imagery, but also highlight the fact that in 2 Cor this imagery is used to speak of 
Paul himself, and not Christ.
313. This can be compared to the most explicit image of Christ as a warrior king in Revelation 19.11–16; see 
Longman, “Divine Warrior,” 297–302.
314. Jewett, Romans, 549.
315. Scott J. Hafemann, “Roman Triumph,” DPL: 1004–8, here 1004. Two recent works, Mary Beard, The Roman 
Triumph (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007) and Ida Östenberg, Staging the World: Spoils, Captives, and 
Representations in the Roman Triumphal Procession, Oxford Studies in Ancient Culture and Representation (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), approach the triumph in terms of mimesis and performance, respectively. Beard, in 
particular, is pessimistic about being able to reconstruct the historical triumph accurately and focuses instead on the literary 
presentation of the triumph.
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τωñ,  Χριστωñ, ).316 It is not necessary for our purposes to spend too much space interpreting Paul’s use of 
this image. We simply note that God, rather than Christ, is once again portrayed in a position of 
authority and power. In this case, paradoxically, it is Paul himself, rather than the enemies mentioned 
above, over whom God has triumphed.
Given the variety of contexts in which the title and concept σωτη' ρ occurs, two essential questions 
that need to be answered when attempting to understand each particular instance: “Saviour from 
what?” and “How is this deliverance achieved?”317 Kings are often granted honours for saving their 
subjects from the oppression of their enemies through military force. The saviour gods are frequently 
petitioned or thanked for deliverance from illness. Paul is aware of God’s deliverance in times of 
personal danger and illness (2 Cor 1.8–11; Phil 1.19; cf. 4.11–13; but see 2 Cor 12.7b–10), but these 
instances are rare and their significance pales in comparison to Christ’s great victory over the cosmic 
powers and his rescue of God’s people from God’s wrath by dealing with their sin through his death on 
the cross. The nature of Jesus’ salvation makes him an unusual saviour.318 Paul’s language might have 
produces echoes of imperial ideology that reminded his readers of the emperor’s claim to be σωτη' ρ,319 
but the nature and means of his salvation would have struck them as out of the ordinary. 
Creator
 None of the texts studied in earlier chapters of this dissertation have sought to emphasize the 
king’s role as founder (κτι'στης) of cities. Nonetheless, Alexander was remembered as a great founder 
of cities320 and his successors would likewise be honoured for their role as founders of cities.321 The 
king would frequently be celebrated as κτι'στης in conjunction with his role as σωτη' ρ and ευ  εργε'της.322
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316. There is some debate around precisely how this verse is to be understood (see Furnish, II Corinthians, 174–75; 
Hafemann, “Roman Triumph,” 1005–7; the passage has recently received extensive treatment in Christoph Heilig, Paul’s 
Triumph: Reassessing 2 Corinthians 2:14 in Its Literaru and Historical Context, BTS 27 [Leuven: Peeters, 2017], but I have 
not been able to obtain a copy of this volume). In context, Paul’s apostolic ministry is the focus of the metaphor. According 
to Hafemann, Paul is speaking of the suffering that accompanies this ministry (Suffering and Ministry in the Spirit: Paul’s 
Defense of His Ministry in 2 Corinthians 2:14–3:3 [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990]), while Cilliers Breytenbach argues that 
the focus is on the way in which the knowledge of Christ is spread through Paul’s ministry (“Paul’s Proclamation and God’s 
‘Thriambos’: Notes on 2 Corinthians 2:14–16a,” Neot 24.2 [1990]: 257–71). The prepositional phrase, ε ν τωñ,  Χριστωñ, , is best 
understood as causal: “on account of Christ”: Paul engages in his ministry because of and for Christ (Campbell, Union with 
Christ, 142–43). Colossians 2.15 uses the same language, but in this instance the rulers and authorities who have been 
despoiled by God are being led in the triumph as captives.
317. Nock, “Soter and Euergetes,” 127. On the same page, Nock writes, “Soter was a word which took much of its 
color from its context.”
318. This is not to say “unique” (see the warnings of Jonathan Z. Smith, Drudgery Divine: On the Comparison of 
Early Christianities and the Religions of Late Antiquity [1990; repr., Jordan Lectures in Comparative Religion 1988Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1994] and the methodological problems discussed by Everett Ferguson, Backgrounds of Early 
Christianity, 3rd ed. [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003], 279–82). A proper defence of this assertion would require a thorough 
assessment of the uses of σωτη' ρ in Graeco-Roman literary and epigraphic texts. But the evidence in Wendland, “ΣΩΤΗΡ”; 
Nock, “Soter and Euergetes”; Foerster and Fohrer, “Σω', ζω, Κτλ.” should suffice to support the assertion that Jesus’ 
deliverance is “unusual.” The closest parallels are offered by the mystery cults, with their emphasis on individual purification 
and the afterlife (see Martin P. Nilsson, A History of Greek Religion, 2nd ed., trans. F. J. Fielden [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1949], 180–223; Jan N. Bremmer, Initiation Into the Mysteries of the Ancient World, Münchner Vorlesungen zu Antiken 
Welten 1 [Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014]).
319. So, for example, Oakes, Philippians, 129–74.
320. Although this reputation is most likely overblown, see Richard A. Billows, “Cities,” in A Companion to the 
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Paul is familiar with the Septuagint use of κτι'ζω to speak of God as the creator (Rom 1.25; 1 Cor 
11.9; cf. Gen 14.19; Deut 4.32; Isa 45.8; Ps 89.13), but he does not refer to Christ explicitly as κτι'στης. 
There is, however, one passage in the Pauline texts under consideration which seems to speak of Christ 
as the agent of creation.323 In order to address the problems the Corinthians faced with food offered to 
idols (1 Cor 8.1–11.1), Paul asserts in 1 Corinthians 8.6 that the one and only God, the Father, is the 
source of all things (ε ξ ουð τα` πα' ντα) and that the one and only Lord, Jesus Christ, is his agent (δι ουð τα` 
πα' ντα). The origin of this passage is not significant for our argument.324 It should be noted, however, 
that the possibility that popular philosophy lies behind Paul’s language at this point325 lends further 
support to the proposition laid out in the first chapter of this thesis that Paul knew and could employ to 
his own ends the language and ideas of Graeco-Roman popular philosophy.326 In this case, Paul uses 
philosophical language to assert Christ’s role as the agent of creation.
Not only is Christ the agent of creation, he also inaugurates the process leading to the new 
creation—the eschatological world which is free from the present ills that beset humanity and, indeed, 
the cosmos (Rom 8.18–25).327 There are two passages in which the phrase καινη` κτι'σις occurs (2 Cor 
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Hellenistic World, ed. Andrew Erskine, BCAW (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 198. The tradition of honouring kings as 
founders goes back even earlier: at least as far as Philip II, Alexander’s father (Angelos Chaniotis, “The Divinity of 
Hellenistic Rulers,” in A Companion to the Hellenistic World, ed. Andrew Erskine, BCAW [Oxford: Blackwell, 2003], 434; 
Theodora Suk Fong Jim, “Private Participation in Ruler Cults: Dedications to Philip Soter and Other Hellenistic Kings,” 
CQ Forthcoming [2017]).
321. Cultic honours: Frank W. Walbank, “Monarchies and Monarchic Ideas,” in The Hellenistic World, 2nd ed., ed. 
Frank W. Walbank, et al., CAH 7.1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 87–96. Papyri: Schubart, 
“Hellenistische Königsideal,” 13–14. Mithridates I received the royal epithet Κτι'στης, probably for his founding the kingdom 
of Pontus. For literary examples, see Plutarch, Luc. 29.5 (ευ  εργε'της ... και` κτι'στης); Cic. 22.5 (σωτη' ρ και` κτι'στης).
322. See, e.g., the examples noted in Jim, “Private Participation”. The title οι κιστη' ς could also express a similar idea.
323. In this section I am not concerned with the implications of Christ’s agency in creation for understanding Christ 
within the identity of God. For this, see Richard Bauckham, “God Crucified,” in Jesus and the God of Israel: God Crucified 
and Other Studies on the New Testament’s Christology of Divine Identity (Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2008), 26–30; 
Richard Bauckham, “Paul’s Christology of Divine Identity,” in Jesus and the God of Israel: God Crucified and Other 
Studies on the New Testament’s Christology of Divine Identity (Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2008), 194–95, 210–18.
324. For recent discussion of this passage, see Ronald Cox, By the Same Word: Creation and Salvation in Hellenistic 
Judaism and Early Christianity, BZNW 145 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2007), 141–61; Sean McDonough, Christ as Creator: 
Origins of a New Testament Doctrine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 150–71. The idea that Christ is the agent of 
creation is not unique to Paul (see John 1.3–4, 10; Col 1.15–20; Heb 1.2–3). The fact that similar language is used in these 
texts (see the table produced by Calvin D. Redmond, “Jesus: God’s Agent of Creation,” AUSS 42.2 [2004]: 301–2) suggests 
a common source.
325. Johan C. Thom, “Paul and Popular Philosophy,” in Paul’s Graeco-Roman Context, ed. Cilliers Breytenbach, 
BETL 277 (Leuven: Peeters, 2015), 65–70. Paul engages in similar “prepositional theology” at Rom 11.36. 
326. The proposition that Paul was familiar with popular philosophy is not negated if Cox is correct that Paul’s 
language in 1 Cor 8.6 comes from a Greek-speaking Jewish liturgy which had been deeply influenced by Middle Platonism 
(By the Same Word, 354; see also Bauckham, “Paul’s Christology of Divine Identity,” 214–15). Rather, it shows that Paul 
understood the religio-philosophical implications of this tradition and felt comfortable employing it for his own purposes.
327. Ryan Jackson (New Creation in Paul’s Letters: A Study of the Historical and Social Setting of a Pauline Concept, 
WUNT 2/272 [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010]) contends that the cosmological elements of Paul’s concept of new creation 
cannot be ignored and needs to be combined with the anthropological emphases. For the former, see Ulrich Mell, Neue 
Schöpfung: eine traditionsgeschichtliche und exegetische Studie zu einem soteriologischen Grundsatz paulinischer 
Theologie, BZNW 56 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1989). Moyer Hubbard (New Creation in Paul’s Letters and Thought, SNTSMS 
119 [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002]) argues that the concept of new creation was primarily anthropological. 
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5.17; Gal 6.15) and which lend support to this understanding of Christ’s work. Paul’s main point in 2 
Corinthians 5.11–19 is that his ministry is a ministry of reconciliation, but that he, Paul, is not the 
primary reconciler; it is God who is reconciling the world to himself through Christ. At the personal 
level, the “new creation” of v. 17 is wrought through the believer’s reconciliation to God achieved 
through Christ’s death (2 Cor 5.15; cf Rom 5.1–11).328 The same phrase, καινη` κτι'σις, is used in 
Galatians 6.15 to press home Paul’s point regarding the insignificance of the circumcized-
uncircumcized distinction amongst believers in the era following Christ’s death (cf. Gal 5.6). That is, in 
light of the new creation inaugurated by the Christ event, the sorts of things that separated human 
beings are no longer definitive for those who are united in Christ and who thus participate in the new 
creation (cf. Gal 3.28; 5.6).329
Paul employs philosophical categories to speak of God as the source of creation and Christ as the 
agent of creation. Christ’s death, resurrection, and ascension serve to inaugurate the new creation 
which believers enter through participation in Christ. Christ can be considered the founder of this new 
people, although, as demonstrated above, Paul’s language often portrays God as the primary actor in 
the drama of salvation with Christ as an agent effecting God’s purposes.330 
Reconciliation
The king is traditionally thought of as a figure able to establish peace. Historically, this peace was 
frequently attained through the spear, although the kingship treatises tend to discuss this aspect of 
Hellenistic kingship in muted tones. In this section we note briefly another implicit indicator that Paul 
thought in terms of a divine kingship which was effected through Christ, the divine agent. Cilliers 
Breytenbach demonstrates that Paul’s use of reconciliation language (καταλλαγη' , καταλλα' σσω, 
δε'οµαι, πρεσβευ' ω in 2 Cor 5.18-20; cf. Rom 5.10–11) is drawn from that of Hellenistic and Roman 
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328. Furnish, II Corinthians, 321–37. Cilliers Breytenbach sees in 2 Cor 5.17 “an implicit reference to Paul being 
called by God” (“Salvation of the Reconciled [with a Note on the Background of Paul’s Metaphor of Reconciliation],” in 
Grace, Reconciliation, Concord: The Death of Christ in Graeco-Roman Metaphors, NovTSup 135 [Leiden: Brill, 
2010], 181), but would presumably not deny that Paul would extend this description to all who are “in Christ.” 
329. For the argument that what is in view in Gal 3.28 is not equality but inclusion, see John H. Elliott, “The Jesus 
Movement Was not Egalitarian but Family-Oriented,” BibInt 11.2 (2003): 173–210. In his apocalyptic reading of Galatians, 
Martyn understands 3.28 “to announce nothing less than the end of the cosmos,” noting further that the allusion to Gen 1.27 
implies that “the structure of the original creation [has] been set aside ... an implied reference to new creation” 
(Galatians, 376–77). Karin Neutel’s study of this verse (A Cosmopolitan Ideal: Paul’s Declaration ‘Neither Jew Nor Greek, 
Neither Slave Nor Free, Nor Male and Female’ in the Context of First Century Thought, LNTS 513 [London: Bloomsbury 
T&T Clark, 2015]) suggests that Paul’s new creation language should be read in conversation with ancient utopian 
discourses, such as those discussed in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
330. Paul’s comparison of his role with those of Apollos and God in 1 Cor 3.5–9 bring to the fore two aspects of his 
understanding of the founding of congregations of believers. First, it highlights the priority of God, noting that Apollos and 
Paul are mere servants (δια' κονοι). Second, Paul can indeed think of himself, under God, as a founder of churches (cf. Rom 
15.20–21; 2 Cor 10.15–16), a picture that agrees with the portrait of Paul presented in Acts.
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diplomacy,331 which Paul has adapted in a number of significant ways. The most striking change Paul 
makes to the reconciliation paradigm is found in his insistence that it is God who is reconciling sinful 
and estranged humanity to himself, whereas it is usually the responsibility of those who have caused 
the rift in relationship to initiate the reconciliation process.332 Paul has also merged the categories of 
reconciliation and atonement, both of which he understands to come through Christ’s death.333
Within this particular configuration of reconciliation, Paul casts himself in the role of Christ’s 
ambassador (υ  πε`ρ Χριστουñ ουòν πρεσβευ' οµεν334) who entreats others on Christ’s behalf, yet it is God’s 
appeal335 and it is to God that people must ultimately be reconciled (2 Cor 5.20). This reconciliation is 
necessary because human beings are described as being in a state of enmity towards God (ε χθροι` ο»ντες; 
Rom 5.10) because of their sin (Rom 5.8; cf 1.18–3.20).
It is possible to consider Paul’s ambassadorship in general terms in which divine kingship does 
not play a part336 since, of course, it is not necessary for Paul to be transferring all characteristics of the 
metaphor from the source to the target.337 But the inherent polysemy of metaphorical language means 
that it is not always clear which characteristics are intended. The presence of ancient diplomatic 
language allows for the possibility that when Paul describes his ministry as fulfilling an ambassadorial 
role, he is doing so because of his understanding of divine kingship.338 As we have seen in previous 
sections of this chapter, God is portrayed as the king since it is God to whom human beings must be 
reconciled. This reconciliation happens through Christ, who is once again the agent of this action 
towards God.
This section began with the observation that ideal kingship is often tied closely to the king’s 
actions on behalf of his people. In contrast to the abuses which often characterize those with 
unrestrained power, the ideal kings constructed in the discourses studied in Chapters 2–5 acted for the 
good of their subjects. In return, subjects displayed good will and obedience. The subject-ruler 
relationship established along these lines ensured concord, order, and mutual flourishing.
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331. Breytenbach, “Salvation of the Reconciled”; see also Thrall, Second Corinthians, 436. For the argument that in 2 
Cor 5 Paul is drawing on the image of Moses as mediator and the one who reconciles God’s people to God, see Anthony 
Bash, Ambassadors for Christ: An Exploration of Ambassadorial Language in the New Testament, WUNT 2/92 (Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 1997), 87–116, 122–23. Breytenbach argues that Paul’s use of reconciliation is quite different from that 
found in other Jewish writings (pp. 176–179), while Margaret Thrall suggests Paul might have developed his understanding 
“in conscious contrast” to that of other Jewish writers (p. 430).
332. John T. Fitzgerald, “Paul and Paradigm Shifts: Reconciliation and Its Linkage Group,” in Paul Beyond the 
Judaism/Hellenism Divide, ed. Troels Engberg-Pedersen (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2001), 248–49.
333. Fitzgerald, “Paul and Paradigm Shifts,” 254–55.
334. Thrall identifies this as an “apostolic” plural (Second Corinthians, 432).
335. The phrase ω  ς τουñ θεουñ παρακαλουñντος δι η  µωñν should not be understood in terms of potential or unreality (as 
the NIV translation does: “ as though God were making his appeal through us”), but expresses, rather, Paul’s conviction that 
God makes an appeal through Paul (Thrall, Second Corinthians, 437; Seifrid, 2 Corinthians, 259).
336. See, e.g., the discussion in Seifrid, 2 Corinthians, 255–68 which recognizes the metaphor (pp. 257, 259) but 
focuses on the state of enmity that exists between the parties, rather than on the royal nature of the one sending the 
ambassador. 
337. Breytenbach, “Salvation of the Reconciled,” 173.
338. So Campbell, Deliverance of God, 696, writing about Rom 1.1–5 and Rom 5.1–11.
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Paul draws on the language of benefaction, salvation, liberation, and creation to describe the 
relationship between God and his people. In some cases, this language is applied to Christ, but more 
often than not, it is applied to God, with Christ functioning primarily as the agent through whom God 
accomplishes good for God’s people. The response required of subjects forms the focus of the 
following section.
Christ’s Subjects
 While discussion about those over whom Christ rules has not been absent up to this point, in this 
section I turn to the question of the relationship between Christ and his subjects. Two major topics are 
discussed. The first has to do with the question of obedience and the second deals with the question of 
participation. 
Obedience of Christ’s Subjects
Despite the somewhat negative connotations of “obedience” in certain theological traditions,339 
the concept is not absent in Paul’s writings. We note, firstly, that on a handful of occasions, the 
language of obedience (υ  πακου' ω, πει'θω, υ  piοτα' σσω and cognates) is used to speak of the stance 
required of believers towards Paul, his emissaries, and those appointed to positions of authority by 
Paul. The Corinthian believers are expected to respond positively to what Paul wrote in an earlier letter 
(2 Cor 2.9; cf. Phlm 21) and in their reception of Titus (2 Cor 7.15; cf. 1 Cor 16.15–16). In contrast, 
Paul and those with him refused to submit to the “false brothers” who had infiltrated their ranks (Gal 
2.4–5). Behind Paul’s bold claim to authority which allows him to make these demands and to resist 
the demands of others stands God and God’s Messiah (Gal 1.1; 2 Cor 1.1; cf. 10.8, 13.10).340 The 
believers’ obedience to Paul is founded upon their obedience to God and Christ.341
Believers are first and foremost obedient to God. Romans 6.15–23 uses slave imagery to speak of 
the believers’ change of allegiance: they are no longer slaves to sin, but slaves to God (Rom 6.22) and, 
as such, must obey their new lord. It is for this reason that Paul can call on the Roman believers to offer 
themselves wholly to God (Rom 12.1–2; cf 15.18).342 Although the language in Romans 12 has cultic 
overtones, the sense of obedience is not absent. In Philippians, Paul urges the believers to adopt the 
same attitude as Christ Jesus (2.5–11), an attitude of humble obedience to God the Father (v. 8). Paul 
can therefore urge them to continue to live lives marked by this Christ-like obedience towards God 
(Phil 2.12).
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339. For a discussion and critique of this tendency, see Mark Jones, Antinomianism: Reformed Theology’s Unwelcome 
Guest? (Philpsburg: Presbyterian & Reformed, 2013).
340. For 2 Corinthians, see Thrall, Second Corinthians, 179. More broadly, on the authority of Paul and co-workers, 
see Bengt Holmberg, Paul and Power: The Structure of Authority in the Primitive Church as Reflected in the Pauline 
Epistles (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1978), 57–93. 
341. The believer’s life of obedience can also be spoken of in terms of obedience to God’s Spirit (Rom 8.1–12; Gal 
5:16), but this theme will not be pursued.
342. So James C. Miller, The Obedience of Faith, the Eschatological People of God, and the Purpose of Romans, 
SBLDS 177 (Atlanta: Society of biblical literature, 2000), 54–55.
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The believers’ obedience to God is often expressed as obedience to God’s law. The Roman church 
is called upon to fulfil God’s law through loving one another (Rom 13.8–10). Similarly, in 1 
Corinthians 7.19, Paul asserts, somewhat surprisingly, that circumcision and uncircumcision are 
nothing, but that obeying God’s commandments is everything. Despite the tension that is established 
when these positive statements are placed alongside Paul’s negative statements about the law,343 what 
is clear is that Paul understands the life of the believer to be characterized by obedience to God and his 
law in some form or another.344
I have already argued above that obedience to God’s law is now reconfigured around the person of 
God’s king, Jesus the Messiah. This is clear when Paul speaks about the need for the believer to fulfil 
the law of Christ (Gal 6.2) or when he claims that despite not being under the law, he is, nonetheless, 
not free from God’s law and is under Christ’s law (1 Cor 9.21). But being obedient to Christ’s law is 
only part of a bigger picture in which the believer is called to be obedient to Christ himself.
Despite the problems raised by Paul’s polemical and metaphorical language in 2 Corinthians 
10.1–6,345 what is striking is his description of the purpose of his ministry as “[taking] every thought 
captive to obey Christ (ει ς τη`ν υ  piακοη`ν τουñ  Χριστουñ)” (2 Cor 10.5). The prostration of the entire 
cosmos in Philippians 2.10, likewise, implies obedience to Christ. This universal subjection is also on 
view in 1 Corinthians 15.24–28 where, in the eschaton, everything must submit to Christ (cf. Phil 3.21) 
before Christ himself is made subject to God. 
The argument that Paul understands obedience to stand at the centre of the life of the believer is 
further strengthened when the nature of πι'στις is considered. The well-established tradition of 
understanding πι'στις as “faith”—assent to, or belief in, certain propositions—has been challenged in 
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343. The path towards resolving this tension is suggested by Gal 6.15 where Paul draws on the same contrast as 1 Cor 
7.19, but couches his conclusion in terms of the believer’s new existence in Christ: “For neither circumcision nor 
uncircumcision is anything; but a new creation (καινη` κτι'σις) is everything” (cf. 2 Cor 5.17). Whatever “obeying God’s 
commandments” means in 1 Cor 7.19, it moves beyond what it meant before the coming of Christ. James Miller describes 
Paul’s understanding of “eschatological obedience” in Romans (James C. Miller, Obedience of Faith, 55–57). 
344. This proposition can also be demonstrated negatively by observing that unbelievers are described in terms of 
disobedience (e.g., Rom 2.8, 23; 11.30–31; 15.31).
345. See Thrall, Second Corinthians, 598–618; Malherbe, “Antisthenes, Odysseus, Paul”.
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recent scholarship.346 The shift has already been observed above with regard to the phrase πι'στις 
Χριστουñ which, it has been argued above, is best understood in both the objective and subjective sense: 
“faith in Christ” and “Christ’s faithfulness/obedience.” The question is whether the meaning of πι'στις 
on display in the subjective reading—“faithfulness” or “obedience”—can be found in passages which 
speak of those who follow Christ. An examination of a key element in Romans suggests that it can.
In the opening of the letter, Paul explains his ministry by means of a subordinate clause which 
identifies “Jesus Christ our Lord” as the one “through whom we have received grace and apostleship to 
bring about the obedience of faith (ει ς υ  piακοη`ν πι'στεως) among all the Gentiles for the sake of his 
name” (Rom 1.5). The significance of the “obedience of faith” is seen in the fact that the same 
prepositional phrase, ει ς υ  piακοη`ν πι'στεως, occurs in the letter’s final doxology at 16.26.347 A further 
passage describing the nature and result of Paul’s ministry uses related language: “For I will not 
venture to speak of anything except what Christ has accomplished through me to win obedience from 
the Gentiles (ει ς υ  piακοη`ν ε θνωñν)” (15.18).348
The last-mentioned passage, Romans 15.18, establishes that Paul saw the obedience of the 
Gentiles as something achieved by his ministry in “word and deed” (v. 18). In a proto-Trinitarian 
formulation, Paul relates the signs and wonders to the powerful working of God’s Spirit (v. 19), but 
asserts that the obedience of the Gentiles is what Christ has accomplished through him (v. 18), and that 
this constitutes his priestly service before God (v. 16; cf. v. 17). Paul understood his mission to the 
Gentiles both “as a personal vocational imperative and as an inevitable theological corollary to his 
understanding of God’s promises and purpose.”349 The cultic language of v. 16 and the use of “signs 
and wonders” in v. 19 echo themes from Israel’s Scriptures and serve to establish continuity between 
the people of God in those Scriptures and the Gentile believers who have been brought into the people 
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346. As part of his re-framing of Paul’s soteriology, Douglas A. Campbell, The Quest for Paul’s Gospel: A Suggested 
Strategy, JSNTSup 274 (London: T&T Clark, 2005), 178–207 re-frames the meaning of πι'στις both in terms of its semantic 
domain—arguing that personal trust and fidelity be added to the usual understanding of true belief—and it’s function in 
Paul’s soteriology; see also Campbell, Deliverance of God, 377–92. Matthew Bates argues that “allegiance,” defined in terms 
of “mental affirmation,” “professed fealty,” and “enacted loyalty,” is a better English translation for πι'στις (Salvation by 
Allegiance Alone: Rethinking Faith, Works, and the Gospel of Jesus the King [Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2017]). 
Teresa Morgan’s study of πι'στις/fides (Roman Faith and Christian Faith: Pistis and Fides in the Early Roman Empire and 
Early Churches [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015] is undertaken within a much broader context which includes the 
Greek and Roman social, political, and religious world, the Septuagint, and the New Testament texts. She argues that the 
New Testament use of this concept is rooted in the Graeco-Roman world within which the early believing communities were 
formed, but that it then proceeded to evolve. Nevertheless, within the various texts she studies, πι'στις/fides is shown to be 
primarily a relational concept focused on trust, trustworthiness, and faithfulness (see the concluding summary on pp. 501–
509). These studies all share the conviction that Paul’s use of πι'στις extends beyond “the faith,” “belief” and even “trust in 
something or someone,” to include the sense of “faithfulness” and “obedience.” I have been unable to consult the essays 
recently published in Jörg Frey, et al., Glaube: Das Verständnis des Glaubens im frühen Christentum und in seiner jüdischen 
und hellenistisch-römischen Umwelt, WUNT 373 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2017).    
347. This doxology contributes to the notorious text-critical crux in the Pauline literature: the concluding chapters of 
Romans (see Gamble, Textual History of Romans). Jewett provides an extensive bibliography of those who argue for and 
against the authenticity of 16.25–27 (Romans, 998 nn. 5 and 6), while himself arguing that the verses are an interpolation 
(pp. 998–1002). For a recent argument that the doxology is authentic, but composed apart from Romans, see Longenecker, 
Romans, 1083–86.
348. See also Rom 5.19; 6.15–18; 16.19.
349. Dunn, Romans, 856.
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of God through Paul’s ministry.350 The inclusion of the Gentiles within the people of God means that 
they, like the people of God constituted in Israel’s Scriptures, must be characterized by obedience.351 
This conclusion confirms the centrality of obedience as the believer’s response to the gospel 
message,352 but it remains to ask how the phrase ει ς υ  piακοη`ν πι'στεως should be understood.353
The main exegetical question has to do with the nature of the genitive, πι'στεως.354 Broadly 
speaking, this is an adnominal/adjectival genitive which modifies or limits υ  πακοη' .355 Paul thus 
understands his apostolic task amongst the Gentiles in terms of bringing about obedience which has 
been configured or defined in terms of faith.356 If we follow Morgan recognizing that πι'στις is primarily 
a relational term, Paul’s phrase speaks of the obedience that is characterized by this relation between 
God and the believer, a relationship which is established through Christ,357 and a relationship of which 
obedience forms an important part without constituting it.358 
The mention of this faith relationship in the next section establishes the thesis put forward in the 
previous paragraph. When Paul writes to the Roman believers that he longs to visit them “that we may 
be mutually encouraged by each other’s faith” (Rom 1.12), he is speaking to those who are “are full of 
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350. Cultic language: see, e.g., Exod 19.4; Lev 11.44; Deut 33.3; signs and wonders: Exod 7.3; Deut 4.34; 6.22; for 
further references, see Dunn, Romans, 860–63. For a discussion of this passage in the context of the miraculous in Paul’s 
ministry, see Twelftree, Paul and the Miraculous, 218–23.
351. See, e.g., Exod 19.5; 24.7; Deut 4.1; 5.1; 6.1–3; 27.1–28.68. Glenn Davies argues from Rom 1–4 that God’s 
people, both before and after the coming of Christ, are to be marked by faith and obedience (Faith and Obedience in 
Romans: A Study in Romans 1–4, JSNTSup 39 [Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1990]).
352. In Rom 6.17, Paul can speak of being obedient to “the form of teaching” (τυ' πον διδαχηñς). In Gal 5.7 he speaks of 
“not obeying the truth” (τηñ,  α  ληθει'α,  µη` piει'θεσθαι). And in 2 Cor 9.13 he commends the Corinthians for their “obedience to 
the confession of the gospel of Christ” (τηñ,  υ  ποταγηñ,  τηñς ο  µολογι'ας υ  µωñν ει ς το` ευ  αγγε'λιον τουñ Χριστουñ). In each case, the 
obedience either required or displayed is toward the content of Paul’s preaching, rather than toward Christ or God per se. If 
this preaching is understood to include Jesus’ kingship (so Bates, Salvation by Allegiance), then obedience to the message 
would be a shorthand way of speaking of obedience to Jesus. 
353. Given the uncertainty of the authenticity of doxology at Rom 16.25–27 (see n. 347), I will focus on the phrase in 
Rom 1.5. If the doxology is authentic, the phrase is part of an inclusio; if inauthentic, it nonetheless bears witness to the 
significance of the phrase to an early reader of Paul’s letter (Davies, Faith and Obedience, 25–26). 
354. Longenecker (Romans, 79–80) identifies five ways in which it has been understood: (1) an objective genitive: 
“obedience to the faith” or “obedience to the message of faith”; (2) a subjective genitive: “obedience that faith brings about 
faith” [sic] or “obedience required by faith”; (3) a genitive of source: “obedience that comes from faith”; (4) an adjectival 
genitive: “believing obedience” or “faithful obedience”; or (5) a genitive of apposition or definition (epexegetical): “faith that 
consists of obedience” or “faith that manifests itself in obedience.” References to scholars holding each of these positions can 
be found at pp. 79–80 nn. 173–177. Longenecker argues that Rom 1.5 should be understood in terms of (3) or perhaps (5): 
“obedience that comes from faith” or “faith that manifests itself in obedience” (p. 80). Cranfield (Romans, 66–67) lists seven 
options before arguing that the construction represents a genitive of apposition: “a faith which consists in obedience.” 
355. BDF §§162–168; see also Jewett, Romans, 110.
356. Jewett  (Romans, 110–11) suggests that Paul is not polemically contrasting Jewish obedience with a new type of 
obedience, (contra Donald B Garlington, “The Obedience of Faith”: A Pauline Phrase in Historical Context, WUNT 2/38 
[Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1991], 1–4); he is removing the stigma of obedience—related as it is to the idea of slavery—by 
associating obedience with the gospel.
357. See, e.g., Morgan, Roman Faith and Christian Faith, 291–92.
358. This description falls somewhere between the genitive of source and the genitive of apposition; Garlington argues 
that it is an ambiguous phrase that is meant to express both of these ideas (Faith, Obedience, and Perseverance: Aspects of 
Paul’s Letter to the Romans, WUNT 79 [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1994], 30). The former makes faith prior to obedience, 
while the latter equates faith and obedience. Thus, the two “belong inalienably together,” (Andrie B. Du Toit, “Faith and 
Obedience in Paul,” Neot 25.1 [1991]: 72) both in the initiatory stages of the believer’s faith-relationship with God and 
beyond as “the outgrowth of their initial commitment to Paul’s gospel” (Garlington, Faith, Obedience, Perseverance, 22).
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goodness, filled with all knowledge, and able to instruct one another” (15.14), yet he still desires to 
proclaim the gospel to them (1.15), presumably in order to encourage their faith. As demonstrated in 
Romans 14.1–15.13, the letter is Paul’s attempt to suture the division between the “weak” and “strong” 
in Rome in order that Jew and Gentile together might engage in an act of eschatological worship, 
which is nothing less than a commitment of oneself to God (Rom 12.1–2).359 Faith and obedience are 
thus bound together.
With Dunn, I would argue that the obedience of faith constitutes “a crucial and central theme” in 
the letter to the Romans.360 Romans 1.5 can thus also be considered “a programmatic statement of the 
main purpose of Romans,” as Garlington puts it.361 This being the case—and if we accept that Romans, 
while it addresses particular concerns among the believers in Rome, is also the most comprehensive 
and mature statement of Paul’s theology362—we are justified in seeing the human response of 
obedience to Jesus’ kingship as an important part of Paul’s thought. The “gospel of God” (Rom 1.1) 
which Paul announces entails not only assent to certain propositions regarding Jesus, but 
“unconditional submission to his lordship.”363
Before concluding this section, we should note one final element relating to the obedience of faith. 
According to Romans 1.5, Paul’s mission is to be exercised among “all the Gentiles” (ε ν piαñσιν τοιñς 
ε»θνεσιν). While Romans 15.19, 23–24 demonstrate a geographical strategy behind Paul’s mission,364 
the theological foundation for this strategy is provided by texts from Israel’s Scriptures that speak of 
the eschatological gathering of the Gentiles.365 Jesus’ universal dominion is thus complemented by the 
call for universal obedience.
 If Paul conceptualizes Jesus in terms of Hellenistic ideal kingship, then one would expect to find 
Jesus’ people responding to his kingship with obedience. In the foregoing section we have seen that 
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359. This is the main thesis of Miller, Obedience of Faith.
360. Dunn, Romans, 17–18; see also Miller, Obedience of Faith, 175–80.
361. Garlington, Faith, Obedience, Perseverance, 10; contrast Du Toit, “Faith and Obedience,” 67. who, with others, 
thinks that Rom 1.16–17 is more likely to fulfil this role.
362. This is not to attempt to resurrect Melanchthon’s view of Romans as a “compendium of Christian doctrine”; I 
recognize that many important Pauline themes are not raised in Romans (so Longenecker, Romans, 2–3).
363. Donald B. Garlington, “Faith’s Obedience and Israel’s Triumphant King: Romans 1:5 Against Its Old Testament 
Backdrop,” in Studies in the New Perspective on Paul: Essays and Reviews (Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 2008), 57. While 
arguing that obedience plays a central role in the believer’s response to Christ’s kingship, I have not attempted to enter the 
debate regarding the role this obedience plays in the final judgement (see Garlington, Faith, Obedience, Perseverance, 44–
71; VanLandingham, Judgment and Justification; Alan P. Stanley, ed., Four Views on the Role of Works at the Final 
Judgment, Counterpoints: Bible and Theology [Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2013]).
364. So W. Paul Bowers, “Paul and Religious Propaganda in the First Century,” NovT 22 (1980): 316–23, who 
contrasts this geographical element of Paul’s understanding of his mission with other forms of first-century religious 
propaganda. As Arland Hultgren observes, if Paul was interested in Gentiles as individual Gentiles, “there were plenty of 
Gentiles in Roman Palestine and Syria to occupy him for a lifetime. But he proclaimed the gospel to various ethnicities, the 
nations of the world in which he lived” (“Paul’s Christology and His Mission to the Gentiles,” in Paul as Missionary: 
Identity, Activity, Theology, and Practice, ed. Trevor J. Burke and Brian S. Rosner, LNTS 420 [London: T&T Clark, 
2011], 117).
365. For a recent survey of research on Paul’s missionary purpose, see Richard Last, “What Purpose Did Paul 
Understand His Mission to Serve?” Harvard Theological Review 104.3 (2011): 301–10. Hultgren surveys the Jewish texts 
that might have been foundational for Paul’s understanding of his Gentile mission (“Paul’s Christology and Mission,” 124–
26).
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this is indeed the case. Not only is obedience explicitly mentioned, but recent research on πι'στις 
demonstrates that at the core of Paul’s message about Jesus as the Christ is the requirement of a 
faithful, loyal, obedient response by those who recognize Jesus’ kingship. 
Union With Christ
Paul frequently uses language like ε ν Χριστωñ, , ει ς Χριστο' ν, συ`ν Χριστωñ, , δια` Χριστουñ, as well as a 
number of striking metaphors (including “body of Christ”), to describe the relationship of believers to 
Christ. This is recognized as a central aspect of his soteriology, usually summarized by the phrases 
“union with Christ” or “participation in Christ.”366 
While the precise meaning of the foundational phrase “in Christ” is debated,367 one particular 
thread in this discussion has a possible bearing on Paul’s understanding of Jesus’ kingship. In response 
to E. P. Sanders’ argument that participation rather than justification is the central soteriological 
element in Paul’s theology, Richard Hays proposes that this participation be understood in four 
different ways:368 participation as (1) belonging to a family; (2) political or military solidarity with 
Christ; (3) belonging to the church; and (4) living within the Christ story. These models of 
participation, Hays argues, are complementary, not exclusive, with each one providing a different view 
on “the complex reality to which Paul’s participation language points.”369 As an example of the second 
of these models, Hays cites Romans 6.1–11, noting that in this passage, “Christ is the king who through 
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366. For an extensive survey of New Testament scholarship on this subject, see Campbell, Union with Christ, 31–64; 
Macaskill, Union with Christ, 17–41. Macaskill also discusses how this theme developed in Patristic and Eastern Orthodox 
theology (pp. 42–76) and Lutheran and Reformed theology (pp. 77–99). The rest of his book is devoted to studying the 
nature of the union between God and humanity as expressed in the New Testament. Campbell’s Union with Christ is a 
thorough exegetical analysis of all the relevant Pauline phrases and metaphors, followed by a discussion of how these work 
in Paul’s theology. Both authors have contributed essays to Michael J. Thate, Kevin J. Vanhoozer, and Constantine R. 
Campbell, eds., “In Christ” in Paul: Explorations in Paul’s Theology of Union and Participation, WUNT 2/384 (Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 2014). The recognition in recent scholarship of the importance of union/participation for Paul can probably 
be traced back to E. P. Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism: A Comparison of Patterns of Religion (London: SCM, 1977). 
While most scholars understand participation to function in concert with justification as soteriological models, Campbell 
(Deliverance of God) pits the two against each other, arguing that the justification model of understanding Paul must be 
replaced by an apocalyptic model which has participation at its core. His reading of Romans, upon which this thesis is largely 
based, has proved provocative, but has not garnered much support; see the contributions in Tilling, Beyond Old and New.
367. Campbell concludes that the idiom is not formulaic and its meaning at each point in Paul’s writings needs to be 
understood in context: “These idioms can express instrumentality, close association, agency, recognition, cause, kind and 
manner, locality, specification or substance, circumstance or condition, the object of faith, incorporation, union, reference or 
respect, and participation.” (Union with Christ, 67–199, here, 199). Contrast this to Novenson’s conclusion (Christ Among 
the Messiahs, 119–26) that most instances of the phrase should be understood in terms of the conventional locative use, 
including the figurative uses of “time at which” and “means by which” or “agent through whom.” Schnelle, Apostle 
Paul, 481–82, also argues that the primary meaning is locative, referring to a sphere of being, but that other complex 
statements can grow from this basic understanding.
368. Richard B. Hays, “What is ‘Real Participation in Christ’? A Dialogue with E.P. Sanders on Pauline Soteriology,” 
in Redefining First-Century Jewish and Christian Identities: Essays in Honor of Ed Parish Sanders, ed. Fabian E. Udoh; 
with Susannah Heschel, Mark Chancey, and Gregory Tatum (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2008), 336–51; 
see Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 502–8 for the argument that while justification and participation language 
belong together and often overlap, participation is the dominant category. For a contrasting reading of participation, see 
Stowers, “What is ‘Pauline Participation in Christ’?”, 351–71, in the same volume.
369. Hays, “‘Real Participation’,” 348.
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his death and resurrection has triumphed over the powers of Sin and Death ... To be joined with him in 
baptism is to belong to him, to come under his sovereignty.”370
N. T. Wright argues that Paul’s writings are best understood if it is accepted that Χριστο' ς means 
“Messiah” and that Paul’s use of εν   Χριστωñ,  is understood in terms of incorporation, that is, as denoting 
“the whole people of whom the Messiah is the representative.”371 Asserting that this “incorporative 
sense” is “endemic in the understanding of kingship, in many societies and certainly in ancient Israel,” 
Wright cites a handful of texts from the Jewish Scriptures to illustrate this view (2 Sam 19.40–43; 20.1; 
1 Kgs 12.16), but admits the insufficiency of this data.372 In his later work, Wright argues that the 
events of Jesus’ death and resurrection forced Paul to read the Jewish Scriptures in this incorporative 
way.373
Joshua Jipp also argues that Jesus’ messianic role, through which he both shares in God’s 
kingship as well as represents the people of God, serves to explain much of Paul’s participatory 
language.374 Jipp shows how in Paul’s writings, Christ’s rule enables his people to share in his divine 
sonship and inheritance, the Spirit of God, the Messiah’s resurrection and glorification and triumph 
over his enemies. It is because his people are “in the Messiah,” that what is true of him is also true of 
them. And these things are true of the Messiah because of the relationship he enjoys as God’s vice-
regent who shares in God’s kingly rule. The concept of “Messiah” thus provides the link between 
Jesus’ sharing in divine kingship and the royal rule which his people are said to enjoy through him.
The texts studied in Chapters 2 and 3 did not draw attention to anything approaching this idea of 
the subjects’ participation in, or union with, the king. There is a sense in which the king’s subjects 
naturally share in his victories or losses—it does not make sense to speak of a king losing a war but of 
his subjects winning, for example. If a king is successful, and assuming he is a good king who seeks to 
benefit his people, they will share in this success.375 It is thus something of a truism that “as the king 
goes so goes the nation,” but there is nothing equivalent in these texts to Paul’s incorporative 
language.376 The same is true of the Jewish texts examined in Chapters 4 and 5.
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370. Hays, “‘Real Participation’,” 341–43, here, 342 Without drawing exactly the same conclusion, Sanders (Paul and 
Palestinian Judaism) writes that participation in Christ means a “transfer of lordship” (p. 549), from that of sin (conceived of 
not only as transgression, but also as a power), to the lordship of Christ (pp. 546–47). 
371. Wright, “ΧΡΙΣΤΟΣ As ‘Messiah’,” 46; cf. Wright, Faithfulness of God, 825–35: “the ‘incorporative’ thought and 
language which so pervades Paul is best explained in terms of his belief that Jesus was Israel’s Messiah” (p. 825).
372. “ΧΡΙΣΤΟΣ As ‘Messiah’,” 46–47. These passages are cited and discussed more fully in Wright, Faithfulness of 
God, 828–30 where Wright admits they do not explain Paul’s usage (p. 830).
373. Wright, Faithfulness of God, 827.
374. Jipp, Christ is King, 139–210. He adduces evidence from the Jewish Scriptures for the king’s participation in 
divine kingship and the king’s representative role (pp. 149–65) and demonstrates a similar pattern in Paul. See also his essay 
on the same theme in Ephesians: Jipp, “Sharing the Heavenly Rule”.
375. See, e.g., the discussion of the Epicurean use of Homer (Od. 19.109–114) to illustrate this point (above, ch. 3). 
This theme is also found in the Psalms (see above, ch. 4).
376. As a potential parallel to these ideas, Jipp cites Seneca’s De clementia in which the emperor is described as the 
“head” and Rome as the “body” (e.g., 1.3.5; 1.5.1; 2.2.1). On Seneca’s metaphor, see further Michelle V. Lee, Paul, the 
Stoics and the Body of Christ, SNTSMS 137 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 35–39. While this provides us 
with a parallel to Paul’s “body of Christ” language which, in turn, is related to his ideas of participation and union, some 
distance remains between this metaphor and Paul’s “in Christ”t language. 
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The king of Deuteronomy 17 was meant to be an example for his people to imitate, and we saw 
that in certain psalms the king mediates God’s blessing so that what is true of the king is true of his 
subjects, but this does not bring us closer to Paul’s “in Christ” language.377 Without demonstrating 
direct dependency on a specific group of passages, Grant Macaskill’s study places the New 
Testament’s theology of participation and union very clearly in the context of the Jewish Scriptures.378 
More specifically, the intertwining themes of Israel, torah/law, covenant, and temple provide the New 
Testament writers with the conceptual resources from which “in Christ” language is developed.379
I have argued above that Paul’s use of Χριστο' ς should be understood to connote, and at times to 
denote, Jesus’ kingship. It is also evident, as Jipp demonstrates, that a number of the blessings that 
accrue to believers—those who are “in Christ”—resonate with ideas of royal rule. It is not the case, 
however, that this participatory language has any antecedents in either the Graeco-Roman or Jewish 
kingship literature studied in earlier chapters of this dissertation.380 Paul did not derive his ε ν Χριστωñ,  
language from the discourse of ideal kingship and it is unlikely that Paul’s first readers would have 
understood it as such. 
Jesus’ Beauty and Wisdom
Before concluding this chapter, I raise briefly a number of topics pertaining to my comparison of 
Paul and the ideal kingship topos of the Graeco-Roman world.  
The Beauty of the Lord
It was demonstrated that in certain texts, the king’s physical attributes play an important role in 
defining his kingship. In the Pythagorean treatises, for example, as the king’s subjects gaze upon his 
majesty, the state is brought into harmony.381 As is fitting for a wedding song, Psalm 44 LXX describes 
Israel’s king in terms of his youthful beauty, but, generally speaking, no comment is made on the 
physical appearance of the king in the Jewish Scriptures.382 A similar lack of concern regarding 
Christ’s physical attributes is present in Paul’s writings.383 Despite having experienced a revelation of 
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377. We have already noted Wright’s struggle to identify any biblical antecedents for this language. Jipp shows how 
there is precedent for the idea of Israel’s king sharing in divine rule and for being the people’s representative and mediator 
(Christ is King, 149–65), but fails to demonstrate any additional antecedents (other than those mentioned by Wright) for the 
language of incorporation or union. 
378. Macaskill, Union with Christ. Chapters 4–5 establish the background, while chapters 6–11 provide a reading of 
the New Testament texts (not only Paul) against this background.
379. N. T. Wright, presumably, would agree, while at the same time arguing that these elements are first drawn into the 
single figure of the Messiah before expanding again to include Christian believers (see, e.g., for torah: Faithfulness of 
God, 1032–37). Against the idea that the church conceptually replaces Israel in Paul’s thought, see Sanders, Paul and 
Palestinian Judaism, 511–15.
380. However, with Macaskill, Union with Christ, I would see other Jewish elements as providing some of the 
conceptual framework for Paul’s language.
381. See above, ch. 3. For Xenophon’s use of this topos, see ch. 2.
382. For Ps 44 LXX, see ch. 4. For a discussion of the description of kings in DH, see ch. 4.
383. The New Testament is not without references to the physical. According to Mikeal Parsons, Luke deconstructs 
ancient physiognomic assumptions regarding the lame, blind, and so forth, by focusing on Jesus’ interaction with these 
groups (Body and Character in Luke and Acts: The Subversion of Physiognomy in Early Christianity [Grand Rapids: Baker 
Academic, 2006]), and Paul’s opponents in 2 Corinthians seem to have attacked Paul’s physical appearance on the basis of 
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God’s son (Gal 1.15–16) which, at 1 Corinthians 1.9, is described as having seen the Lord ( Ι  ησουñν το`ν 
κυ' ριον η  µωñν ε ο' ρακα; cf 1 Cor 15.8; 2 Cor 4.6 [?]), Paul never describes the content of this vision.384 
Paul’s discussion of his experience of Christ is related to his apostolic authority that arises therefrom 
and its soteriological importance.385 
Christ’s body is of concern in so far as it stands metonymically for his death (Rom 7.4; 1 Cor 
11.23–26) or has become a metaphor through which Paul speaks of, and to, the community of believers 
(1 Cor 10.16; 12.27).386 Because Christ was raised by God, his body has been transformed into an 
exalted form which anticipates that which all believers will experience (1 Cor 15.42–56; cf. Rom 8.11–
23). In Philippians 3.21, the believer’s present “body of humiliation” stands in contrast to Christ’s 
“body of glory” (το` σωñµα τηñς δο' ξης αυ  τουñ).387 Although the context is that of Christ’s royal power, 
this power is not linked to the glory of his body in the way that the Hellenistic king’s success is linked 
to his visage. There is one passage in Paul’s writings which could be read to suggest that Christ’s 
subjects are transformed through their vision of him.
In 2 Corinthians 3.18, Paul writes that believers, “seeing the glory of the Lord as though reflected 
in a mirror (τη`ν δο' ξαν κυρι'ου κατοπτριζο'µενοι), are being transformed into the same image (τη`ν αυ  τη`ν 
ει κο' να µεταµορφου' µεθα) from one degree of glory to another.” In general, Paul associates the Spirit 
with the transformation of believers (Rom 8.9–17; 1 Cor 12; Gal 5.16–6.10), but here, if the “Lord” is 
indeed Christ,388 then it would seem that we are dealing with the transformation of believers through a 
vision of Christ. Paul’s language at this point reflects his ongoing use of the biblical tradition upon 
which he has been drawing since verse 7, namely, Exodus 34.29–35, which here is extended to speak 
of the new covenant.389 Under the new covenant, and in contrast to the old, the believer is able to see 
God’s glory. However, the believer does not see God’s glory per se, but God’s glory displayed in 
Christ (2 Cor 4.6). This comes through Paul’s ministry, at the centre of which was the preaching of the 
gospel (2 Cor 4.1–3; cf. 2.12–3.6). What is in view at 2 Corinthians 3.18, then, is not a mystical vision 
of Christ’s majestic glory, but an understanding and acceptance of “[Paul’s] ministry of glory that 
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similar cultural assumptions (see, e.g., Van Kooten, Paul’s Anthropology, 254–55). But the New Testament documents 
concentrate on Christ’s deeds rather than his physical appearance. The symbolic imagery in Revelation proves to be the 
exception to this rule.
384. The passages in Acts which speak of this event (9.1–9; 22.6–11; 26.12–18) do not give an indication that Paul 
saw the resurrected Christ. In his account (2 Cor 12.1–4) of his paradisiacal “visions and revelations of the Lord” (ο  πτασι'ας 
και` α  ποκαλυ'ψεις κυρι'ου), Paul says that he “heard” (η»κουσεν; v. 4) things that should not be expressed. 
385. Schnelle, Apostle Paul, 88–94.
386. See Dale B. Martin, The Corinthian Body (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 38–55; Lee, Paul, the 
Stoics, and the Body.
387. See Hansen, Philippians, 272–77. Reumann (Philippians, 599) argues that Paul has in view the sphere of Christ’s 
influence–a locative rather than an ontological distinction.
388. It is not at all clear that this is the case. However, given that in the following passage (2 Cor 4.1–6) Paul speaks of 
“the glory of Christ” (v. 4) and Christ’s mediation of God’s glory (v. 6), I am inclined to side with those, like Lambrecht 
(“Transformation in 2 Cor 3,18,” Bib 64.2 [1983]: 245), who argue that Christ is in view as “the Lord.”
389. Thrall, Second Corinthians, 290–95.
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beings justification” (2 Cor 3.9).390 We are quite a distance away from the Hellenistic concept of the 
transformative power affected through a vision of the king.
Although the image of Christ seated—presumably upon a throne—at the right hand of God, the 
heavenly king, is found throughout early Christian writings (Acts 2.33; 5.31; 7.55; Eph 1.20; Col 3.1; 
Heb 1.3, 13; 8.1; 10.12; 1 Pet 3.22), with two exceptions, this image is never made explicit in the 
Pauline writings we are examining. Romans 8.34 notes that Christ is interceding for believers “at the 
right hand of God” and 2 Corinthians 5.10 sees Christ seated on a “judgment seat” (βηñµα), which 
might be considered a throne of judgment.391 Other visual representations of kingship—the sceptre, 
royal robes, crown—are entirely absent in Paul’s writings about Christ.392
While later Christian texts and art would make much of the beauty of the risen Christ,393 Paul, in 
keeping with Jewish kingship traditions, is not concerned with the physical features of Christ. Neither 
does he describe Christ’s kingship using the visual imagery of ancient kingship.394 Christ’s kingship is 
defined primarily in terms of his relationship to his subjects, his royal deeds on their behalf, and his 
role as God’s royal agent. 
Christ, the Wisdom of God
Wisdom was an important characteristic in both the Hellenistic and Jewish constructions of ideal 
kingship.395 It was, in particular, the defining feature of Solomon’s kingship in Jewish literature,396 yet 
the figure of Solomon plays a very limited role in the New Testament and is not even mentioned by 
Paul.397 The Pauline references to wisdom are also limited; so much so that Gordon Fee can write, in 
the context of the opening chapters of 1 Corinthians, “It is especially doubtful whether ‘wisdom’ is a 
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390. So Lambrecht, “Transformation”; see also Paul B. Duff, Moses in Corinth: The Apologetic Context of 2 
Corinthians 3, NovTSup 159 (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 201: “Paul almost certainly means that the glory of the deity can be 
perceived in Christ’s salvific death and subsequent resurrection.”
391. Waddell, Messiah, 165–66.
392. When Paul does reference the “crown,” στε'φανος, in 1 Cor 9.25; Phil 4.1; 1 Thess 2.19, he is drawing from a 
different semantic domain; see James R. Harrison, “Paul and the Athletic Ideal in Antiquity: A Case Study Inwrestling with 
Word and Image,” in Paul’s World, ed. Stanley E. Porter, PAST 4 (Leiden: Brill, 2008); Bradley Arnold, “Re-Envisioning 
the Olympic Games: Paul’s Use of Athletic Imagery in Philippians,” Theology 115.4 (2012): 243–52. 
393. See William Horbury, “Messianism Among Jews and Christians in the Second Century,” in Messianism Among 
Jews and Christians: Biblical and Historical Studies (London: T&T Clark, 2003), 278–79 and the references cited in n. 16.
394. This aspect of Paul’s writing might derive, in part, from his chosen genre; compare, for example, the royal 
imagery in apocalypses like Rev, 1 En., 2 Bar., 4 Ezra.
395. Note, in particular, the spirit of God in Isaiah 11.2 that rests upon the king is described as a “spirit of wisdom 
(σοφι'ας) and understanding (συνε'σεως) ... the spirit of knowledge (γνω' σεως)”; see ch. 4.
396. See the essays in Joseph Verheyden, ed., The Figure of Solomon in Jewish, Christian, and Islamic Tradition: 
King, Sage, and Architect, TBN 16 (Leiden: Brill, 2013), as well as Walter A. Brueggemann, “The Social Significance of 
Solomon as a Patron of Wisdom,” in The Sage in Israel and the Ancient Near East, ed. John G. Gammie and Leo G. Perdue 
(Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 1990), 117–32; Moyna McGlynn, “Solomon, Wisdom and the Philosopher-Kings,” in Studies 
in the Book of Wisdom, ed. Géza G. Xeravits and József Zsengellér, JSJSup 142 (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 61–81. For a lengthy 
survey of the development of the Jewish wisdom tradition, see Ben Witherington III, Jesus the Sage: The Pilgrimage of 
Wisdom (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1994), 3–116. A more detailed discussion of the tradition and its texts can be found in John 
Joseph Collins, Jewish Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age, OTL (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1997).
397. Albert L. A. Hogeterp, “King Solomon in the New Testament and Jewish Tradition,” in The Figure of Solomon in 
Jewish, Christian, and Islamic Tradition: King, Sage, and Architect, ed. Joseph Verheyden, TBN 16 (Leiden: Brill, 
2013), 143–63.
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truly Pauline word at all.”398 Nevertheless, God is wise or characterized by wisdom (Rom 11.33; 16.27; 
1 Cor 2.7) and Paul’s desire is for his readers to be wise (Rom 16.19), although Paul knows that human 
wisdom is not always true wisdom (Rom 1.22; 1 Cor 3.18–20). Christ is never identified as wise, but 
he is called “the power of God and the wisdom of God” (1 Cor 1.24). This phrase needs to be 
examined more carefully.
The concentration of wisdom language and the identification of Christ with the wisdom of God is 
generally recognized as a response by Paul to terms and concepts used by the Corinthians.399 Their 
desire for, and claim to, wisdom lead Paul to redefine and reconfigure wisdom in the opening chapters 
of 1 Corinthians. Although Jews demand signs and Greeks desire wisdom (1 Cor 1.22), Paul proclaims 
Christ crucified (Χριστο`ν ε σταυρωµε'νον)—a crucified king/Messiah (v. 23). This message, Paul 
recognizes, is unacceptable to both groups since a crucified Messiah is “a stumbling-block to Jews and 
foolishness to Gentiles” (v. 23). However, to those who have been called (τοιñς κλητοιñς), that is, those 
who believe (v. 21) and who are saved (v. 18), the same message of a crucified Messiah is understood 
to be the power and wisdom of God (Χριστο`ν θεουñ δυ' ναµιν και` θεουñ σοφι'αν; v. 24). These two divine 
attributes stand in parallel to the desire for signs and wisdom from Jews and Greeks, respectively.400 
God’s power and wisdom, are displayed and effected, paradoxically, in a crucified Messiah.
There is a strong interpretive tradition that understands this passage in terms of a Wisdom 
Christology in which Paul employs the figure of personified or even hypostasized Wisdom found in 
Jewish Hellenistic wisdom literature.401 In 1 Corinthians 1.24, however, Paul’s focus is not on Christ’s 
wisdom or Christ as God’s wisdom, but on God’s wisdom displayed in Christ’s death.402 Paul goes on 
to link wisdom and soteriology in verse 30 when Christ, “who became for us wisdom from God,” is 
associated with “righteousness, holiness and redemption.” That God’s wisdom is being contrasted with 
human wisdom becomes clearer as Paul’s argument progresses. He contrasts the “wisdom of this age or 
of the rulers of this age” (1 Cor 2.6) with God’s wisdom, which is “secret and hidden” (v. 7). Paul is 
aware of the link between rulers and wisdom, and contrasts this sort of wisdom with that of God. The 
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398. Gordon D. Fee, Pauline Christology: An Exegetical-Theological Study (Peabody: Hendrikson, 2007), 103.
399. Dunn, Christology in the Making, 177; Andrew Chester, “Messianism, Mediators and Pauline Christology,” in 
Messiah and Exaltation: Jewish Messianic and Visionary Traditions and New Testament Christology, WUNT 207 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), 388–89. While scholars often narrow down the background of the Corinthian problem(s) 
to one element, Schnelle suggests that “a variety of partly overlapping religions, cultural and social influences” explain the 
Corinthians situation, including Hellenistic Jewish wisdom and Graeco-Roman intellectual traditions (Apostle Paul, 197–
207, here, 204). 
400. Fee, Pauline Christology, 103–4.
401. Dunn, Christology in the Making, 176–96; Dunn, Theology of Paul, 266–93; Witherington, Jesus the Sage, 249–
333; Martin Hengel, “Jesus as Messianic Teacher of Wisdom and the Beginnings of Christology,” in Studies in Early 
Christology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), 72–117. For a vigorous denial of Wisdom Christology in Paul, see A. Van 
Roon, “The Relation Between Christ and the Wisdom of God According to Paul,” NovT 16.3 (1974): 207–39; Fee, Pauline 
Christology, 595–630.
402. See Waddell, Messiah, 129–35, who argues that Paul’s language should be understood in terms of the “visible 
manifestation” of God’s wisdom in the Christ-event “rather than identification” of Christ with wisdom (p. 135); similarly, 
Van Roon, “Christ and Wisdom,” 217–23.
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latter is only available by God’s revelation through the Spirit (vv. 9–12).403
The focus in the opening chapters of 1 Corinthians is thus not on Christ as the figure of Wisdom, 
nor even on Christ as wise, but rather on God’s wisdom manifested in Christ’s death. 
What Paul is setting out to do is to recapture “wisdom” from his Corinthians critics by showing 
that God’s foolishness found in the cross can in fact be recognized as wisdom, but not in terms 
of God’s attribute of wisdom—and this only by those who have received the Spirit of God.404
While Christ is associated with God’s wisdom in this way, he is not explicitly said to be wise. Neither, 
for that matter, is he characterized in terms of a number of the other virtues associated with Hellenistic 
kingship. It is not Christ’s unique virtue that makes him fit for kingship, but the fact that he is the one 
sent by God to fulfil certain tasks as God’s royal agent and vice-regent. 
Missing Royal Elements
Before concluding, it is necessary to mention three royal elements commonly found in the other 
literature which might have been expected in the Pauline writings but which don’t play a role in his 
conceptualization of Jesus’ kingship.
First, a common theme in the kingship texts is concerned with the king’s possessions. Wealth is 
frequently portrayed as a necessary evil. The writers are clearly aware of the temptations that enormous 
wealth brought to monarchy and attempted to remove, or at least, diminish these temptations by urging 
kings to use their wealth for the benefit of their subjects.
The question of the extent of Paul’s knowledge of Jesus’ life apart from his death and resurrection 
continues to be debated.405 One of the passages that forms part of this debate has to do with Christ’s 
poverty. Paul’s appeal to the Corinthians’ generosity in 2 Corinthians 8.9 is based on “the gift of our 
Lord Jesus Christ” (τη`ν χα' ριν τουñ κυρι'ου η  µωñν Ι  ησουñ Χριστουñ):406 “though he was rich, yet for your 
sakes he became poor, so that by his poverty you might become rich.” But is Paul reflecting on the 
tradition that Jesus’ ministry was marked by poverty?407 The parallels between this passage and 
Philippians 2.6–11 suggest that it is not primarily Jesus’ material deprivation that is in view, but rather, 
his incarnation and death: “His self-impoverishment in the whole event of incarnation was for the 
spiritual enrichment of believers.”408 Paul calls upon the Corinthian believers to imitate the churches of 
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403. On the inaccessibility of divine wisdom and the necessity for revelation in Jewish literature, see Van Roon, 
“Christ and Wisdom,” 213–15; Witherington, Jesus the Sage, 313–14.
404. Fee, Pauline Christology, 107.
405. See, recently, G. Francois Wessels, “The Historical Jesus and the Letters of Paul: Revisiting Bernard C. Lategan’s 
Thesis,” in The New Testament Interpreted: Essays in Honour of Bernhard C. Lategan, ed. Cilliers Breytenbach, Jeremy 
Punt, and Johan C. Thom (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 27–51; Porter, “‘Jesus Christ’ in Paul’s Letters”. The essays in A. J. M. 
Wedderburn, Paul and Jesus: Collected Essays (London: Continuum, 2004) remain invaluable.
406. Most commentators understand τουñ κυρι'ου at 2 Cor 8.9 as a genitive of source: the gift that comes from Christ 
(so, e.g., Seifrid, 2 Corinthians, 331–32). Barclay (Paul and the Gift, 451–52, 577) considers Christ to be the gift given by 
God, i.e., reading this as an epexegetical genitive.
407. See, e.g., Matt 8.20; Luke 8.3.
408. Thrall, Second Corinthians, 532–34, here, 534; see also Furnish, II Corinthians, 416–18. Seifrid (2 
Corinthians, 330–32) is largely in agreement, although, given the priority he ascribes to Christ in the gift-giving (see n. 406), 
he argues that Christ is simultaneously rich and poor: “the riches of Christ, hidden in his poverty, are the riches that make the 
Corinthians rich” (p. 330).
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Macedonia (2 Cor 8.1–7), not Christ. Rather, the gift of salvation—their wealth—that comes from 
Christ describes the reality from within which they are expected to act. It is possible that Paul knew of 
the paradoxical poverty of Jesus the Messiah, but his exhortation to the Corinthians is based on 
soteriology, not ethical imitation.409
Second, it is because of the soteriological role that he plays in God’s economy that Jesus Christ 
cannot be described as “father,” another term that was employed of the ideal king.410 While Paul can 
sometimes portray his own God-given authority (2 Cor 10.12–18) by describing himself as the father of 
those who come to believe through his preaching (1 Cor 4.14–15; 2 Cor 6.11–13; 11.2; 12.13–17; 1 
Thess 2.7, 11), the title “father” is otherwise reserved for God (Rom 1.6; 6.4; 1 Cor 8.6; 15.24; Gal 1.1, 
4; Phil 1.2; 2.11; 4.20; 1 Thess 1.1, 3; 3.13; Phlm 3). This divine title has antecedents in both Jewish 
and Graeco-Roman texts. Furthermore, believers are able to call God “Abba, Father” because of their 
adoption as children of God through the Spirit of God (Rom 8.14–16; Gal 4.4–6).411 Finally, because 
Christ is the Son of God, God is described as “the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ” (Rom 
15.6; 1 Cor 1.3; 2 Cor 1.2, 3; 11.31; Gal 1.3). Given this relationship, it would certainly not be possible 
for Paul to call Christ “father,” but neither is it possible for Paul to use related language to speak of 
Christ. Rather, Christ is the Son whose work allows others to become children (υι οι': Gal 3.26; 4.6, 7; 
τε'κνα: Rom 8.16, 17) of God.412 
Finally, the metaphor of “king as shepherd,” so prominent in many of our other texts, is also 
missing. This is all the more striking given the presence of this metaphor throughout the rest of the 
early Christian tradition.413 But the absence of the word should not lead us to declare the absence of the 
concept. If “shepherd” carries connotations of care, provision, leadership, then the Christ of Paul’s 
writings fulfills these ideals (see above). It remains somewhat puzzling, however, that Paul does not 
identify Jesus as “shepherd” of his people. 
Concluding Comments
In this chapter, I have examined the language and concepts used to refer to Jesus Christ in the 
undisputed Pauline epistles. I have moved beyond a study of the titles ascribed to Christ to include a 
functional and relational analysis. In the former I described the various roles Christ played in obedience 
to God and on behalf of God’s people. In the latter, the relationships between Christ and God, and 
Christ and his subjects were investigated. It is not always possible to keep these categories separate. 
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409. See, further, Bruce W. Longenecker, Remembering the Poor: Paul, Poverty, and the Greco-Roman World (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010); David J. Downs, Alms: Charity, Reward, and Atonement in Early Christianity (Waco: Baylor 
University Press, 2016), 143–74.
410. This was also an imperial title; see James R. Harrison, “Paul, Theologian of Electing Grace,” in Paul and His 
Theology, ed. Stanley E. Porter, PAST 3 (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 106 and references at p. 106, n. 123.
411. See Dunn, Theology of Paul, 435–37. For book length treatments, see James M. Scott, Adoption as Sons of God: 
An Exegetical Investigation Into the Background of ΥΙΟΘΕΣΙΑ in the Pauline Corpus, WUNT 2/48 (Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 1992); Trevor J. Burke, Adopted Into God’s Family: Exploring a Pauline Metaphor, NSBT 22 (Downers Grove: 
InterVarsity Press, 2006); Brian Robert Lewis, Paul’s “Spirit of Adoption” in Its Roman Imperial Context, LNTS 545 
(London: T&T Clark, 2016).
412. At this point Paul seems to anticipate what is made explicit in Heb 2.10–18.
413. See, e.g., Matt 2.6; Mark 6.34; John 10.1–16; Heb 13.20; 1 Pet 5.4; Rev 7.17.
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“Saviour,” for example, is simultaneously a title and a function, and it establishes a particular type 
relationship between the saviour and those who are saved.
Ancient constructions of ideal kingship that were discussed in earlier chapters have served to 
guide the approach to Pauline Christology followed in this chapter. An attempt was made to discuss 
Paul’s writings in the context of the various conceptual matrices of ideal kingship observed in these 
earlier chapters. The results of this comparative project will be synthesized in the next chapter. 
A number of parallels between the various constructions of kingship and Paul’s christological 
language were observed. However, the most striking aspect of Jesus’ kingship is his consistent 
portrayal as God’s vice-regent and plenipotentiary.     
  
 324 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION
In this dissertation I have sought to read Paul’s Christology as part of the “ecology” of first-
century political thought. The cultural repertoire provided by popular philosophy contains, among other 
elements, the topos of ideal kingship, often signalled in philosophical writings with the phrase piερι` 
βασιλει'ας. Through establishing the various configurations this topos might take and comparing these 
with Paul’s writing about Jesus, I have shown that Paul’s Jesus does indeed meet the expectations of 
ideal kingship expressed in the Hellenistic topos, but that he does so in ways influenced by the Jewish 
Scriptures.
The Hellenistic Kingship Topos
Isocrates’ To Nicocles and Xenophon’s Cyropaedia stand at the head of the piερι` βασιλει'ας 
tradition (Chapter 2).The importance of virtue in defining the king was highlighted by Isocrates’ use of 
the cardinal virtues—wisdom, justice, moderation, courage—to structure his text. Xenophon’s lengthy 
narrative of Cyrus’ rise to power draws attention to this Persian king’s virtues. Both writers justify 
monarchical rule on the basis of the king’s superiority which is defined in terms of the virtues.
Almost none of the numerous piερι` βασιλει'ας treatises composed in the Hellenistic period have 
survived. Nonetheless, these texts provide the focus for Chapter 3. Cynic, Stoic, and Epicurean 
writings about kings and kingship suggest certain themes that might have found a place in the kingship 
treatises written by members of these schools. A group of three piερι` βασιλει'ας texts preserved by 
Stobaeus and attributed to Pythagorean writers provide further insight into the development of 
Hellenistic thought about kingship. The motif of the king’s virtue-based superiority provides an 
element of continuity between these texts and those from the classical period. In the Hellenistic period, 
this provided a way for intellectuals to address the harsher aspects of monarchical rule. Also of interest 
in this period is the way in which kingship is used as a metaphor for discussing the life of the sage.
Jewish writings were studied in the fourth and fifth chapters. In the former, the Jewish Scriptures 
which focused on Israel’s king were discussed. These were limited to Deuteronomy (including other 
texts from the Deuteronomistic History), Psalms, and Isaiah, since these are the books Paul quotes from 
most frequently. The king’s relationship to God expressed in obedience to God’s law emerges as an 
important theme. In Chapter 5, the Letter of Aristeas, Wisdom of Solomon, and Philo’s On the Life of 
Moses were examined. These Jewish Hellenistic texts provide examples of the use of kingship themes 
from both the Jewish Scriptures and Hellenistic intellectual traditions. 
The penultimate chapter of this dissertation examined Paul’s undisputed letters against the various 
models of ideal kingship established in the preceding chapters. 
Jesus as Paul’s Ideal King
In the study of Paul’s writings, similarities and differences between Paul’s writings and the 
various constructions of kingship were observed in his portrayal of Jesus and the portraits of ideal 
kingship observed in Chapters 2–5. The similarities point to Paul’s familiarity with the Hellenistic 
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topos of ideal kingship, while the differences can be ascribed to the influence of the Jewish Scriptures 
and the particular traditions about Jesus familiar to Paul.
A central trait in Jesus’ kingship is his relationship to God. More specifically, his role as God’s 
vice-regent is on view throughout Paul’s writings. In the classical texts, the king’s piety was only one 
of many virtues. There is a heightened sense of the divine in the Pythagorean kingship treatises, but 
even there, the king’s responsibility towards God extends only to imitation. In contrast, Jesus is 
described as one who rules at God’s right hand on God’s behalf until that point in the future when he 
returns sovereignty to God. Jesus’ exaltation to God’s right hand results from his resurrection. Both 
Jesus’ rule and his resurrection are linked to his identification as “Son of God” which, in turn, 
highlights his relationship to God. Although this language is found in both Jewish and 
Hellenistic/Graeco-Roman traditions, the relationship between Jesus and God described by Paul echoes 
most closely that of the Davidic king in the Psalms.1
Similar to the king of the Deuteronomistic History and Psalms, and in contrast to the Hellenistic 
kingship ideal, Jesus’ kingship is not spoken of primarily in terms of his virtues which make him the 
best of men. Rather, his rule derives primarily from his obedience to God. This obedience is seen, 
above all, in his sacrificial giving of himself for his people. Paradoxically, the virtues of obedience and 
humility—hardly royal traits (although there are hints here of the Cynic theme of kingship achieved 
through toil and/or suffering)—establish Jesus as king and lead to his exaltation. Christ’s suffering in 
obedience to God, rather than suffering per se, remains central in Paul’s thought. 
In his role as God’s vice-regent, Jesus fulfills a number of royal functions and exhibits a number 
of royal traits. However, important elements of kingship such as judgment, clemency, and benefaction 
are more regularly associated with God, with Jesus frequently described as the one through whom God 
fulfills these functions. This pattern serves to establish kingship as an important metaphor upon which 
Paul draws when speaking of God. It is likely that Paul understands Jesus’ kingship as an imitation of 
God’s divine kingship. 
Just as in the Hellenistic ideal, Jesus’ subjects imitate him as he imitates God. The most striking 
example of this imitation is found in Galatians, where Paul calls upon believers to fulfil the law of 
Christ by following Christ’s example. Although Deuteronomy 17 suggests that the Israelite king should 
serve as a model Israelite in following God’s law, Paul’s portrayal of the person of Christ as a paradigm 
around which the divine law is reconfigured goes beyond what is envisaged in the Jewish Scriptures. 
The authority of the Hellenistic king, conceptualized as the “living law” (νο' µος ε»µψυχος) in the 
writings of Diotogenes and Archytas, provides a closer parallel.
Jesus acts for the good of his subjects. The king’s φιλανθρωpiι'α, expressed in terms of his saving 
power exercised on his people’s behalf, his benefaction provided for them, and the goodwill he shows 
towards them, is of central concern in Hellenistic and Graeco-Roman kingship writings. By placing this 
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1. Beth Stovell identifies the following as two of the four major themes that define the relation between human and 
divine kingship in the Jewish Scriptures: (1) the human king is an instrument of God; (2) he “reflects the character of the 
Divine King” (Mapping Metaphorical Discourse in the Fourth Gospel: John’s Eternal King, Linguistic Biblical Studies 5 
[Leiden: Brill, 2012], 73–133, here, 73).
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idea at the centre of the piερι` βασιλει'ας topos, the writers of these treatises hoped to influence the king’s 
behaviour along these lines. While many Greeks were made royal subjects through conquest, divine 
φιλανθρωpiι'α, effected by Jesus and often portrayed in terms of “love,” is expressed towards those who 
are at enmity with God and God’s king. Paul’s ambassadorial mission is to announce that God’s 
enemies are being reconciled to God through Christ. While the language Paul uses derives from the 
world of Hellenistic and Graeco-Roman diplomacy, it has undergone a surprising reconfiguration in 
light of Jesus’ unusual kingship.
Like all kings, Jesus demands obedience from his people. Both Xenophon and Ecphantus theorize 
about the king’s influence over his people. They contrast those who rule through violence, fear, and 
forced obedience, with others who set themselves up as examples to be imitated and who show 
goodwill towards their subjects that they might obey willingly. The first set of approaches characterizes 
tyranny, while kingship embraces the second. In Romans, Paul’s phrase “the obedience of faith,” 
combined with the emphasis on Jesus’ φιλανθρωpiι'α, places Jesus in the latter camp, once the relational 
aspect of piι'στις is recognized.
The “shape” of kingship in Paul’s thought, more often than not, is that God is king while Jesus is 
his vice-regent or plenipotentiary. This shape is essentially Jewish, derived from the teachings of the 
Jewish Scriptures about God’s kingship and the derived kingship enjoyed by God’s king. It is this 
relationship which was subsequently transferred to God’s Messiah, in certain cases. Within this 
fundamental Jewish structure, Paul incorporates the Hellenistic topos of ideal kingship. 
Paul’s Paradigm Shift
Both the Jewish and the Hellenistic/Graeco-Roman ideal of kingship have undergone a “paradigm 
shift” in Paul’s portrayal of Jesus as king. In an essay on Paul’s understanding of reconciliation, John 
Fitzgerald observes: 
One of the most remarkable characteristics of Paul as a theologian is his ability to take over an 
existing conceptual paradigm and transform it. The result is a paradigm shift in which the 
elements of the old paradigm remain, but they appear in a revolutionary new configuration.2
Paul is not simply borrowing ideas about kingship from a variety of sources, but he has taken the topos 
of ideal kingship and put it to new use to speak of the kingship of God and Jesus.
We might speculate as to the reason for this paradigm shift. Paul might deliberately employ 
language and categories which he knows would be understood by his auditors. Max Pholenz, for 
example, argues that Paul used Stoic concepts and rhetoric for missionary purposes. “Paul’s goal, 
[Pohlenz] maintains, was to find a Hellenistic language with which to draw a Hellenistic audience to a 
basically non-Hellenistic set of theological beliefs.”3
It is also possible, in the case of Paul’s kingship discourse, that this was the language with which 
Paul thought about kingship even before his call to apostleship. If, as was postulated in the first 
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Judaism/Hellenism Divide, ed. Troels Engberg-Pedersen (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2001), 244–45.
3. Marcia L. Colish, “Stoicism in the New Testament: An Essay in Historiography,” ANRW 26.1: 373–74, here, 374.
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chapter, Paul was influenced by popular philosophical topoi, he would not necessarily have thought he 
was speaking of either Jewish or Hellenistic/Graeco-Roman kingship, but simply of kingship. Popular 
philosophy and the Jewish Scriptures provided him with the piερι` βασιλει'ας topos which described the 
ideal king, and since Jesus was the ideal king (and more)4, Paul naturally applied this topos to him, 
with the changes necessary to speak of Jesus accurately.
In some instances, such as the reconciliation language mentioned in Chapter 6, Paul himself 
adapted the topos to speak of Jesus’ unusual kingship. In other cases, over time, a number of the 
elements of this topos became part of the Christian lexicon (δικαιοσυ' νη, χα' ρις) and in doing so, took 
on slightly different meanings from those they originally had in the kingship topos. As Teresa Morgan 
observes in her study of piι'στις: 
New communities forming themselves within an existing culture do not typically take language 
in common use in the world around them and immediately assign to it radical new meanings. 
New meanings may, and often do, evolve, but evolution takes time. This is all the more likely 
to be the case where the new community is a missionary one. One does not communicate 
effectively with potential  converts by using language in a way which they will not 
understand.5 
By paying attention to the original topos, we are able to filter out some of the meanings that have 
accrued to these words and are thus in a position to hear Paul more clearly.
We should be careful not to claim too much with regard to the philosophical significance of this 
topos in Paul’s writings. Abraham Malherbe has stated that “Paul is at his most philosophical when 
responding to claims made in philosophical terms by some of his churches.”6 Paul’s language about 
Jesus’ kingship, while drawing on the philosophical topos, is not used to answer philosophical 
questions about the nature of ideal kingship or the best polity. It is not used for philosophical ends. 
Rather, as God’s king, Jesus is portrayed in the common language of ideal kingship.7 
Between Jerusalem and Athens, or In Alexandria?
The question of the origin of individual elements within Paul’s thought is, for the most part, 
under-determined. Those who argue that Paul’s thought should be situated primarily within first-
century Judaism point to his use of the Jewish Scriptures and his autobiographical comments (Gal 1; 
Phil 3) to support this position. Others point to allusions to Greek literature as proof that Paul was 
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4. This study is not arguing that the kingship ideal accounts for the totality of Pauline Christology. While there is much 
in the New Testament that resonates with royal ideology, and Jewish royal messianism in particular, as Crispin Fletcher-
Louis notes, “the real focus is on Jesus’ inclusion within the divine identity in a way that goes far beyond the Israelite [and, I 
would add, Hellenistic] view of the king” (Christological Origins: The Emerging Consensus and Beyond, vol. 1 of Jesus 
Monotheism [Eugene: Cascade, 2015], 216). 
5. Roman Faith and Christian Faith: Pistis and Fides in the Early Roman Empire and Early Churches (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015), 4.
6. “Introduction,” in Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays, 1959–
2012, ed. Carl R. Holladay, et al., NovTSup 150 (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 5.
7. In Romans, Douglas Campbell observes, “[this] ancient discourse of kingship is not so much elaborated as 
presupposed” (The Deliverance of God: An Apocalyptic Rereading of Justification in Paul [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
2009], 699).
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familiar with at least part of this tradition.8 If scholarship from an earlier generation felt the need to 
argue that Paul’s thought must be either predominantly Jewish or predominantly Graeco-Roman, the 
literature surveyed in Chapter 1 demonstrates that this is no longer the case.
In the mid-twentieth century, W. D. Davies could state confidently that, “It has also been shown 
that Paul was acquainted only in the slightest degree with both Greek literature and philosophy,”9 but 
more recent studies suggest this position is untenable. Thus Abraham Malherbe can write,
There is no longer any doubt that Paul was thoroughly familiar with the teaching, methods of 
operation, and style of argumentation of the philosophers of the period, all of which he adopted 
and adapted to his own purposes. This is not to argue that he was a technical philosopher; 
neither were his philosophical contemporaries. The philosophers with whom Paul should be 
compared were not metaphysicians who specialized in systematizing abstractions, but, like 
Paul, were preachers and teachers who saw their main goal to be the reformation of the lives of 
people they encountered in a variety of contexts, ranging from the imperial court and the salons 
of the rich to the street corners.10 
This is not to deny the Jewish elements within Paul’s thought, but it recognizes that he cannot be 
understood apart from the Hellenistic/Graeco-Roman world. We might think of this Paul as belonging 
to neither Jerusalem nor Athens, but finding a home, rather, in the Jewish Diaspora as exemplified by 
the Alexandrian Jewish community, for example.
Like Paul, these texts from Jewish Alexandria all display a knowledge of the Hellenistic topos of 
ideal kingship. In the case of Philo, there is a clear Platonic and Stoic influence; the philosophical 
antecedents to the Letter of Aristeas and Wisdom of Solomon are more difficult to identify, but their 
presence is unmistakable. Like Paul, these texts also draw deeply from the Jewish Scriptures. There is 
no indication that any of these authors felt the need to pit the two traditions against one another. Like 
Paul, the kingship ideals in both Jewish and Hellenistic/Graeco-Roman traditions were brought 
together in a creative synthesis characteristic of much Hellenistic literature. The conclusion that Paul 
retained certain Jewish kingship categories and structures of thought does not undermine the 
fundamental thesis that he was also familiar with the Hellenistic/Graeco-Roman tradition of ideal 
kingship found in the popular philosophy of the first century. 
Extending the Discussion
This comparison of the Hellenistic/Graeco-Roman kingship ideal with Paul’s Christology raises 
further questions and potential discussions. 
This study has demonstrated the utility of topos—“an ordered cognitive space”11—as a heuristic 
  
 329 
————————————
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1970), 12.
10. Abraham J. Malherbe, “Paul: Hellenistic Philosopher or Christian Pastor?” in Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic 
Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays, 1959–2012, ed. Carl R. Holladay, et al., NovTSup 150 (Leiden: Brill, 
2014), 198.
11. Johan C. Thom, “‘The Mind in Its Own Place’: Defining the Topos,” in Early Christianity and Classical Culture: 
Comparative Studies in Honor of Abraham J. Malherbe, ed. John T. Fitzgerald, Thomas Olbricht H., and L. Michael White, 
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device for studying ancient texts through comparison. This approach is different from comparing the 
manner in which a single theme is developed by different authors, or the comparison of a collection of 
discrete concepts across various texts. By establishing the topos as the element of comparison, a 
category from the ancient world is employed. Furthermore, this approach also allows one to compare 
not only individual elements, but also the relationships that exists between these elements. When one 
element in the topos is modified, the potential exists for related elements to be modified along with it. 
Adaptations of this nature are more easily identified when considering the topos as opposed to 
considering isolated elements. Some topoi common to the Graeco-Roman world and the New 
Testament, such as friendship and the passions, have already received scholarly attention,12 while 
others remain to be investigated using this approach. 
The relationship between kingship and priesthood needs to be examined further. The Hasmoneans 
subsumed kingship within the priesthood (to the consternation of some) and Crispin Fletcher-Louis 
argues, “there is now plenty of evidence that their predilection for a royal high priesthood was 
essentially faithful to an older, traditional, Jewish political theology, and one firmly grounded in 
Scripture.”13 Does Paul draw on this same “traditional, Jewish political theology ... firmly grounded in 
Scripture”? We saw that Diotogenes and Philo both included the priesthood as one of the royal duties, 
and from Augustus onwards, the Roman emperor assumed multiple priesthoods.14 This suggests that 
the study of royal high priesthood (or priestly kingship) should not be limited to Jewish sources since it 
is possible for priesthood to form part of the ideal kingship topos in various traditions.
When Christians needed to theorize kingship in the fourth century in order to speak to and of a 
Christian emperor, they drew on Hellenistic and Graeco-Roman concepts of ideal kingship.15 Does this 
conclusion need to be revisited in the light of this dissertation’s demonstration of Paul’s knowledge of 
this topos? It is also possible that studying these later texts using a similar methodology as that applied 
in this dissertation might yield slightly different results to those attained in earlier studies?
Finally, commenting on Cilliers Breytenbach’s conclusions regarding the origin of Paul’s 
language of “reconciliation,” John Fitzgerald points out that, 
[Breytenbach’s] analysis offers yet another proof that one can readily acknowledge Paul’s 
genuine indebtedness to Hellenistic terms and traditions without undermining the apostle’s 
theological integrity. It is, after all, what Paul does with derived concepts that is theologically 
significant, not the sources themselves.16
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 This dissertation has only hinted at the theological implications of Paul’s portrayal of God and Jesus in 
terms of ideal kingship. There are, no doubt, implications not only for Pauline and New Testament 
Christology, but also for the Christological debates of the fourth century and beyond. 
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